COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (DECEMBER 16 – DECEMBER 20, 2019)

By John Polyzogopoulos on December 22, 2019

Jump To: Table of Contents | Civil Decisions | Short Civil Decisions | Criminal Decisions| Ontario Review Board

Good afternoon,

Following are this week’s summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

In Sosnowski v. MacEwen Petroleum Inc., the Court appears to have unconvincingly dialed back how far the “appropriate means” test can go to extend the limitation period. In this case, the employee waited until he was acquitted of theft (which took six years, including appeals) before suing for wrongful dismissal (he had been fired for cause because of the alleged theft). I would have thought that on the basis of Winmill v. Woodstock (Police Services Board), 2017 ONCA 962, the limitation period would have been delayed until the acquittal. However, the Court did not see it that way, and distinguishedWinmillon the basis that the criminal charge of assault by the plaintiff against the police in that case was the other side of the same coin as the plaintiff’s civil claim against the police for battery. In addition, the Court felt that it was important that the police’s conduct was at issue in Winmill, while it was not in this case. With all due respect to the Court, I fail to see how the theft conviction was not the other side of the same coin to whether the plaintiff had been terminated for cause. If there is no theft, there is no cause. There also appears to be no principled basis to restrict the application of Winmillto situations where police conduct is in question. It is arguable that this decision and Winmillare in conflict, and that the Supreme Court ought to settle the debate of how far the “appropriate means” test should go.

In Hilson v. 1336365 Alberta Ltd., the Court confirmed that the limitation period to sue on guarantees of mortgage debts is ten years, not two years, even where the guarantees are “stand-alone” and not contained in the mortgage covenant actually registered on title.

Other topics covered this week included more wrongful dismissal.

Wishing everyone Happy Holidays!

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Civil Decisions

O’Reilly v. IMAX Corporation, 2019 ONCA 994

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Employment, Wrongful Dismissal, Stock Option Plans, Ledcor Construction Ltd. v Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co., 2016 SCC 37, Sylvester v. British Columbia, [1997] 2 SCR 315, Kieran v Ingram Micro Inc.(2004), 189 O.A.C. 58

Rossman v. Canadian Solar Inc., 2019 ONCA 992

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Employment, Wrongful Dismissal, Termination Clauses, Enforceability, Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 41, ss. 1(1), 5(1) and 57, Machtinger v. Hoj Industries Ltd., [1992] 1 SCR 986, Andros v. Colliers Macaulay Nicholls Inc., 2019 ONCA 679, Amberber v. IBM Canada Ltd., 2018 ONCA 571, Garreton v. Complete Innovations Inc., 2016 ONSC 1178, Dumbrell v. Regional Group of Companies Inc., 2007 ONCA 59

Hilson v. 1336365 Alberta Ltd., 2019 ONCA 1000

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Guarantees, Limitation Periods, Statutory Interpretation, Damages, Principle against Double Recovery, Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, s. 43(1), Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.11, s. 4, Registry Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.20, s. 1, Land Registration Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.4, s. 1

Sosnowski v. MacEwen Petroleum Inc., 2019 ONCA 1005

Keywords: Employment Law, Wrongful Dismissal, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Discoverability, Appropriate Means, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, s. 5(1)(a)(iv), Winmill v. Woodstock (Police Services Board), 2017 ONCA 962, Nasr Hospitality Services Inc. v. Intact Insurance, 2018 ONCA 725, Markel Insurance Company of Canada v. ING Insurance Company of Canada, 2012 ONCA 218

Short Civil Decisions

Firstonsite Restoration Limited v. 4049 River Road GP Inc., 2019 ONCA 1007

Keywords: Insurance Law, Summary Judgment

Criminal and Regulatory Decisions

R. v. C., 2019 ONCA 986

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing, Immigration, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 126, Criminal Code, s. 718, R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, R. v. A.G., 2015 ONCA 159, R. v. L.M., 2008 SCC 31, R. v. Downes (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 321, R. v. Pomanti, 2017 ONCA 48

R. v. A., 2019 ONCA 988

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing, Amicus, Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b)

R. v. R., 2019 ONCA 996

Keywords: Criminal Law, Robbery, Firearms Offences, Assault, Fresh Evidence, Wrongful Conviction

R. v. S.L., 2019 ONCA 990

Keywords: Criminal Law, Weapons Offences, Fresh Evidence

R. v. B., 2019 ONCA 998

Keywords: Criminal Law, Firearms Offences, Sentencing, Mandatory Minimum, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Fresh Evidence, Criminal Code, s. 683(1), Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, R. v. Wong, 2018 SCC 25, R. v. T.(R.) (1992), 10 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.), R. v. R.P., 2013 ONCA 53, R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, R. v. Cherrington, 2018 ONCA 653, R. v. Girn, 2019 ONCA 202, R. v. Rulli, 2011 ONCA 18

R. v. B., 2019 ONCA 989

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing, Criminal Code, s. 719, R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, R. v. U.A., 2019 ONCA 946

R. v. C-C., 2019 ONCA 1002

Keywords: Criminal Law, Dangerous Driving Causing Death, Dangerous Driving Causing Bodily Harm, Right to Speedy Trial, Waiver, Fresh Evidence, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 11(b) R. v. Hazout, (2005), 199 C.C.C. (3d) 474 (Ont. C.A.), R v McNeil, 2009 SCC 3

R. v. D., 2019 ONCA 993

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing

R. v. L., 2019 ONCA 1001

Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking, Agreed Statement of Facts, Evidence, Admissibility, Out of Court Statements, Sentencing, Criminal Code, s. 655, R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, R. v. Bosley (1992), 59 O.A.C. 161 (C.A.)

R. v. P-M., 2019 ONCA 997

Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking, Sentencing, R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64

Ontario (Labour) v. N., 2019 ONCA 999

Keywords: Criminal Law, Provincial Offences, Labour and Employment, Occupational Health and Safety, Criminal Negligence Causing Death, Right to Speedy Trial, Jordan Application, 11(b) Application, Unreasonable Delay, Presumptive Ceiling, Criminal Code, Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.1, Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 131(1), R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, R. v. J.M., 344 C.C.C. (3d) 217, R. v. K.G.K., 2019 MBCA 9, R. v. Jurkus, 2018 ONCA 489, R. v. Majeed, 2019 ONCA 422, R. v. Regan, 2018 ABCA 55, R. v. Saikaley, 2017 ONCA 374

R. v. C., 2019 ONCA 1004

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing

R. v. S., 2019 ONCA 1008

Keywords: Criminal Law, Firearms Offences, Possession of a Controlled Substance, Unreasonable Search and Seizure, Search Warrants, Criminal Code, ss. 86(1), 95(1), Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 8, 10(b), 24(2), R. v. Paterson, 2017 SCC 15

R. v. A., 2019 ONCA 1006

Keywords: Criminal Law, Terrorism, Statutory Interpretation, Not Criminally Responsible, Criminal Code, s. 83.2, Anti-terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41, (Re), 2004 SCC 42, Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, R. v. Khawaja, 2010 ONCA 862, United States of America v. Nadarajah, 2010 ONCA 859, R. v. Ansari, 2015 ONCA 575, R. v. Venneri, 2012 SCC 33, Winters v. Legal Services Society, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 160, R. v. Katigbak, 2011 SCC 48, R. v. Zeokowski, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1378, Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, R. v. Daoust, 2004 SCC 6, Opitz v. Wrzesnewskvj, 2012 SCC 55

R. v. T., 2019 ONCA 1011

Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking, Garofoli Hearing, Search Warrants, Sentencing, R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65

Ontario Review Board Decisions

M (Re), 2019 ONCA 1003

Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Not Criminally Responsible, Criminal Code, s. 672.54, R. v. Lamanna, 2009 ONCA 612, Mazzei v. British Columbia (Director of Adult Forensic Psychiatric Services), 2006 SCC 7, Re Collins, 2018 ONCA 563, R. v. Ferguson, 2010 ONCA 810, Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, Re Foote, 2019 ONCA 731, Re Woods, 2019 ONCA 87, Re Krivicic, 2018 ONCA 535, Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625

G (Re), 2019 ONCA 1009

Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Not Criminally Responsible, Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 20, R. v. Winko, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625

M (Re), 2019 ONCA 1010

Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Not Criminally Responsible

CIVIL DECISIONS

O’Reilly v. IMAX Corporation, 2019 ONCA 994

[Strathy C.J.O., Doherty and Sharpe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Catherine Osborne and Justin Tetreault, for the respondent/appellant by way of cross-appeal
Trevor Lawson and Brandon Kain, for the appellant/respondent by way of cross-appeal

facts:

This appeal concerns an issue that is being litigated with increasing frequency: the entitlement of a wrongfully dismissed employee to exercise stock options, receive bonuses, or take advantage of other aspects of his or her compensation package during the reasonable notice period.

In this case, the employer, IMAX, contended that the terms of the employee’s stock options and restricted share units (“RSUs”) prevented them from vesting after the date he was dismissed without cause. The motion judge rejected this submission, finding that the options and share units continued to vest during the reasonable notice period and that the employee was entitled to damages for the loss of the opportunity to exercise them.

The motion judge found that the language of the relevant awards was not sufficient to cancel the respondent’s entitlement to exercise the awards or to remove his entitlement to damages for their loss. He was therefore entitled to damages for the loss of the right to exercise the RSUs and stock options that would have vested during the reasonable notice period

issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err in deciding that the respondent was entitled to damages for the loss of the right to exercise the RSUs and stock options that would have vested during the reasonable notice period?

(2) Did the motion judge err in determining when the respondent would have exercised his right?

holding:

Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No. While the language in all the plans at issue in this case extinguish the respondent’s right to exercise any unvested awards as of the date of “termination” or when employment “terminates”, they do not establish, in unambiguous terms, when the date of termination is or when employment terminates. In other words, they leave open the possibility that termination could have occurred at the end of the reasonable notice period. And, as expressed above, where such ambiguity exists, the language will be interpreted as mandating a lawful termination. There was no language to remove any entitlement to damages.

(2) No. The motion judge looked at the evidence concerning the cross-appellant’s actual sales during the reasonable notice period. The thrust of the respondent’s cross-appeal was that, having accepted the plaintiff’s evidence that “he would have exercised the RSU and stock option grants at the earliest possible opportunity”, the motion judge erred by concluding that he would have sold the shares five months after their vesting dates. The court did not agree with this argument, as the method of valuation the motion judge chose was found to be reasonable.

Rossman v. Canadian Solar Inc., 2019 ONCA 992

[MacPherson, Pepall and Lauwers JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Sean G. Foran and Aisling Flarity, for the appellants
Eytan Rip, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Employment, Wrongful Dismissal, Termination Clauses, Enforceability, Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 41, ss. 1(1), 5(1) and 57, Machtinger v. Hoj Industries Ltd., [1992] 1 SCR 986, Andros v. Colliers Macaulay Nicholls Inc., 2019 ONCA 679, Amberber v. IBM Canada Ltd., 2018 ONCA 571, Garreton v. Complete Innovations Inc., 2016 ONSC 1178, Dumbrell v. Regional Group of Companies Inc., 2007 ONCA 59

facts:

The respondent was an employee (the “Employee”) of the appellant. The Employee had signed an employment contract for his first position, and later signed a new employment contract when he was promoted. The termination clauses of both contracts were the same.

The appellant terminated the Employee without cause. The Employee commenced an action seeking damages for wrongful dismissal and the payment of commissions. While the payment of commissions was not addressed on the motion for summary judgement, the motion judge granted partial summary judgement to the Employee finding the Termination Clause unenforceable.

issue:

Did the motion judge err by holding that the Termination Clause was void and unenforceable?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No. There is a longstanding presumption at common law that an employer cannot terminate an employee without reasonable notice. While employees and employers are free to contractually agree to any notice period in and agreement between them, the agreement must respect the minimum standards stipulated in the Employment Standards Act (“ESA”). If a clause attempts to contract out of the employment standards minimum, the entire clause is void. The court agreed with the motion judge that the Termination Clause was void. The impugned provision stated “benefits shall cease 4 weeks from the written notice”. On its face, this language flew in the face of the ESA.

The appellant submitted that the four-week benefits clause provided the Employee with more generous benefits than those statutorily prescribed if he were terminated in the first three years of his employment. Since the appellant terminated the Employee just under two years after he signed the agreement, it argued that there was no violation of the notice period under the ESA. The court stated that the Termination Clause must be read as a whole and in the context of the circumstances as they existed when the agreement was made. Accordingly, it is irrelevant whether the impugned provision accords with the minimum standards in certain circumstances. The employment was for an indefinite period. Accordingly, the benefit needed to run for a minimum of eight weeks to comply with the ESA.

The court also held that the provision was ambiguous, and should therefore be interpreted in favour of the Employee. The appellants attempted to rely on the case of Amberber, but the court found the impugned provision before it distinguishable based on the addition of the words “benefits shall cease 4 weeks from the written notice.” The combination of the initial ‘ESA trumps’ language with the concluding ‘but nothing over 4 weeks’ language created a genuine ambiguity.

The court ended with a policy rationale for its reasons, noting that employees must know the conditions, including entitlements, of their employment with certainty. A finding that saving provisions in termination clauses could save employers who attempt to contract out of the ESA minimum standards creates the risk that employers will exploit vulnerable employees.

Hilson v. 1336365 Alberta Ltd., 2019 ONCA 1000

[Doherty, Sharpe and Roberts JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Jonathan L. Rosenstein, for the appellants
Howard W. Reininger, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Guarantees, Limitation Periods, Statutory Interpretation, Damages, Principle against Double Recovery, Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, s. 43(1), Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.11, s. 4, Registry Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.20, s. 1, Land Registration Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.4, s. 1

facts:

The respondent’s claim against the appellants was based upon certain guarantees relating to 25 mortgage loans given by the respondent to the named corporate entities formed by the appellants to invest in 25 separate interests in a residential real estate development known as “Godstone”. The mortgages went into default and the respondent sued the appellants on their guarantees. There were two types of guarantee. The mortgages themselves contained guarantees (the “covenant guarantees”) and the appellants executed five separate instruments by which they personally guaranteed the amounts owing on the 25 mortgages (the “stand-alone guarantees”).

The trial judge found the appellants liable on the five stand-alone guarantees, rejecting their argument that the claim was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002. In another action, the respondent sued the lawyer who had acted for her on these and other transactions in negligence for allegedly failing to obtain proper security for her mortgage investments. That action was settled for a global sum. The trial judge reduced the amount owing on the guarantees by 50% to account for the proceeds of the settlement and to avoid double recovery. On appeal, the appellants argued that the proper reduction was 100%. By way of cross-appeal, the respondent argued that there should have been no reduction on account of the settlement, or if there is a reduction, it should only be 28.8%.

issues:

(1) Did the trial judge err in finding that the applicable statutory limitation period for the claim on the stand-alone guarantees was ten years pursuant to the Real Property Limitations Act, and not the two-year period in the Limitations Act, 2002?

(2) Did the trial judge err by reducing the amount owing by 50% to account for the proceeds of the settlement?

holding:

Appeal dismissed. Cross-appeal allowed.

reasoning:

(1) No. The crucial question was whether the stand-alone guarantees fell within the emphasized words of section 43(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act: “any other instrument … to repay the whole or part of any money secured by a mortgage”. The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that “instrument” should be given a narrower meaning that does not embrace the stand-alone mortgage guarantees.

First, the Court was unable to accept the appellants’ historical argument that the language of s. 43(1) must be read in the light of the circumstances that existed at the time of its predecessor’s enactment in 1939. The Court held that if the legislature had intended to limit the meaning of s. 43(1) to covenants by subsequent purchasers, it could easily have said so. Instead the legislature used general language that can readily be interpreted to embrace stand-alone guarantees. The Court also agreed with the trial judge, that there was “no justification for having different limitation periods depending on whether the guarantee covenant is in the mortgage or in a separate document,” and found that this would introduce an anomalous distinction between identical guarantees. Furthermore, the Court found the appellants’ argument, that when interpreting the word “instrument” it should rigidly adhere to the specific problem that motivated its enactment, to be contrary to the Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.11, s. 4.

Second, the Court rejected the appellants’ submission that the meaning of “instrument” in the Real Property Limitations Act should be governed by the definition of “instrument” in the Registry Act. The purpose of s. 43(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act is to establish an appropriate limitation period for claims arising under and in relation to mortgages. That purpose does not engage the same concerns as those arising under the Registry Act and has no relationship to the registrability of documents. The Court noted that the legislature did not incorporate the Registry Act definition in relation to s. 43(1), as it did in s. 1 of the Land Registration Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.4 where incorporation made sense to do so.

(2) Yes. The Court agreed with the respondent’s submission that her claim for the guaranteed debt owed to her by the appellants was neither barred nor diminished by reason of her claim in negligence against her solicitor and that the guaranteed debt should not be reduced on account of the settlement of the respondent’s claim against her solicitor. The Court found that the trial judge’s determination that a 50% reduction was appropriate to be entirely speculative because the facts of the case did not, at that point, engage the double recovery or double satisfaction principle.

The rule against double recovery does not preclude a plaintiff from pursuing different defendants for the same loss and only precludes a plaintiff from recovering more than he or she lost. The Court found that there was no basis in the evidence to conclude that the respondent recovered anything on the debt guaranteed by the appellants. Recovery against the appellants depended not only upon the outcome of this appeal but also upon the solvency and means of the appellants to pay the debt they owe. Until the respondent actually achieved full or substantial satisfaction of the debt she was owed, there could be no question of double recovery.

Sosnowski v. MacEwen Petroleum Inc., 2019 ONCA 1005

[Watt, Hourigan and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Gustavo Camelino, for the appellants
Porter Heffernan and Joël Rocque, for the respondent

facts:

The appellant S worked for the respondent until he was dismissed with cause for theft on November 9, 2009. A few months later, S’s counsel wrote to the respondent asserting that the appellant had been wrongfully dismissed. A month later, the appellant was criminally charged with theft and fraud for which he was convicted on August 15, 2011. He successfully appealed his convictions and he was acquitted on November 26, 2014. The appellant brought an action for wrongful dismissal against the respondent on July 24, 2015. The respondent brought a successful summary judgement motion on the basis that the Limitations Act, 2002 barred the appellant’s action.

issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err in finding that the appellant knew that it was appropriate to commence a civil proceeding pursuant to s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No. Relying on Winmill v. Woodstock (Police Services Board), the appellant argued that because the criminal proceeding was ongoing, it would not have been appropriate to sue for wrongful dismissal because, were he to be convicted of theft, he would have little chance of success in the civil matter. The Court distinguished Winmillon the basis that, in that case, a claim for battery against the police, the criminal proceeding as to whether the plaintiff had assaulted the police was the other side of the same coin as the civil claim, and in both the civil and criminal proceedings, the conduct of the police was in question. Therefore, the limitation period in Winmillwas delayed until the outcome of criminal proceeding. The Court felt that these factual differences were sufficient to distinguish Winmillfrom the case at bar. Permitting plaintiffs to evaluate the strength of their claim before being required to commence a proceeding would introduce a measure of uncertainty that is contrary to the legislature’s intention in enacting the current Limitations Act, 2002.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Firstonsite Restoration Limited v. 4049 River Road GP Inc., 2019 ONCA 1007

[Trotter, Zarnett and Jamal JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Robert J. Kennaley, for the appellants, 4049 River Road GP Inc., 4049 River Road LP
Raymond M. Slattery and Sepideh K. Nassabi, for the respondent

Keywords: Insurance Law, Summary Judgment

CRIMINAL DECISIONS

R. v. C., 2019 ONCA 986

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Lauwers and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Alan D. Gold and Laura J. Metcalfe, for the appellant
Kevin R. Wilson and Vanita Goela, for the respondent

R. v. A., 2019 ONCA 988

[MacPherson, Sharpe and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J.A., self-represented
Erin Dann, duty counsel
Andrew Hotke, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing, Amicus, Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b)

R. v. R., 2019 ONCA 996

[Brown, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Jeffrey Carolin and Nicolas Rouleau, for the appellant
Linda Shin, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Robbery, Firearms Offences, Assault, Fresh Evidence, Wrongful Conviction

R. v. S.L., 2019 ONCA 990

[MacPherson, Sharpe and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S.L., acting in person
Erin Dann, duty counsel
Michael Fawcett, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Weapons Offences, Fresh Evidence

R. v. B., 2019 ONCA 998

[Watt, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Anthony Moustacalis and Christen Cole, for the appellant
Katie Doherty, for the respondent

R. v. B., 2019 ONCA 989

[MacPherson, Sharpe and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Nathan Gorham, for the appellant
Andrew Hotke, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing, Criminal Code, s. 719, R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, R. v. U.A., 2019 ONCA 946

R. v. C-C., 2019 ONCA 1002

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Lauwers and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Alan D. Gold and Alex I. Palamarek, for the appellant
Alexander Alvaro and Jennifer Trehearne, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Dangerous Driving Causing Death, Dangerous Driving Causing Bodily Harm, Right to Speedy Trial, Waiver, Fresh Evidence, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 11(b) R. v. Hazout, (2005), 199 C.C.C. (3d) 474 (Ont. C.A.), R v McNeil, 2009 SCC 3

R. v. D., 2019 ONCA 993

[MacPherson, Sharpe and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

NJD, acting in person
Matthew Gourlay, as duty counsel
Jessica Smith Joy, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing

R. v. L., 2019 ONCA 1001

[MacPherson, Sharpe and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

DL, acting in person
Matthew Gourlay, appearing as duty counsel
Jessica Smith Joy, for the respondent

R. v. P-M., 2019 ONCA 997

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Lauwers and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

James Zegers, for the appellant
Yael Pressman, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking, Sentencing, R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64

Ontario (Labour) v. N., 2019 ONCA 999

[Huscroft, Paciocco and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Daniel Kleiman and Indira Stewart, for the appellant
Ian R. Smith and Andrew Guaglio, for the respondent
Andrew Nugent Jeremy Warning, for the respondent RG
Richard Stephenson, for the respondent TB

Keywords: Criminal Law, Provincial Offences, Labour and Employment, Occupational Health and Safety, Criminal Negligence Causing Death, Right to Speedy Trial, Jordan Application, 11(b) Application, Unreasonable Delay, Presumptive Ceiling, Criminal Code, Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.1, Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 131(1), R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, R. v. J.M., 344 C.C.C. (3d) 217, R. v. K.G.K., 2019 MBCA 9, R. v. Jurkus, 2018 ONCA 489, R. v. Majeed, 2019 ONCA 422, R. v. Regan, 2018 ABCA 55, R. v. Saikaley, 2017 ONCA 374

R. v. C., 2019 ONCA 1004

[Doherty, van Rensburg and Hourigan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Geoff Haskell, for the appellant
Scott Patterson, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing

R. v. S., 2019 ONCA 1008

[Brown, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Amit Thakore, for the appellant
Jeremy D. Tatum, for the respondent

R. v. A., 2019 ONCA 1006

[Watt, Tulloch and Lauwers JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Jason J. Wakely and Bradley Reitz, for the appellant
Nader R. Hasan, Emily Quail, and Maureen Elaine Addie, for the respondent
Anil K. Kapoor and Dana Achtemichuk, for the intervener, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association

R. v. T., 2019 ONCA 1011

[Watt, Lauwers and Paciocco JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Frank Miller, for the appellant
Brian Puddington, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking, Garofoli Hearing, Search Warrants, Sentencing, R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65

ONTARIO REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS

M (Re), 2019 ONCA 1003

[Feldman, Tulloch and Jamal JJ.A]

Counsel:

Jeffrey A. Marshman, for the appellant
Jeffrey Wyngaarden, for the respondent, the Attorney General of Ontario
Julie A. Zamprogna Balles, for the respondent, the Person in Charge for the Southwest Centre for Forensic Mental Health Care

Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Not Criminally Responsible, Criminal Code, s. 672.54, R. v. Lamanna, 2009 ONCA 612, Mazzei v. British Columbia (Director of Adult Forensic Psychiatric Services), 2006 SCC 7, Re Collins, 2018 ONCA 563, R. v. Ferguson, 2010 ONCA 810, Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, Re Foote, 2019 ONCA 731, Re Woods, 2019 ONCA 87, Re Krivicic, 2018 ONCA 535, Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625

G (Re), 2019 ONCA 1009

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Simmons and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Anita Szigeti, for the appellant
Joanne Stuart, for the respondent, Attorney General of Ontario
Michele Warner, for the respondent, the Person in Charge of the Centre of Addiction and Mental Health

Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Not Criminally Responsible, Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 20, R. v. Winko, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625

M (Re), 2019 ONCA 1010

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Lauwers and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Suzan E. Fraser, for the appellant
Adam Wheeler, for the respondent Attorney General of Ontario
Janice Blackburn, for the respondent Person in Charge of the Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care

Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Not Criminally Responsible

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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John Polyzogopoulos Blaney McMurtry LLP 416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

CIVIL DECISIONS

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holding:

reasoning:

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Counsel:

CRIMINAL DECISIONS

Counsel:

Counsel:

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Counsel:

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Counsel:

Counsel:

Counsel:

Counsel:

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Counsel:

Counsel:

Counsel:

Counsel:

ONTARIO REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS

Counsel:

Counsel:

Counsel:

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email