COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (FEBRUARY 9 – FEBRUARY 13)

By John Polyzogopoulos on February 13, 2026

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Good evening.
Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of February 9, 2026.

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In Yan v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), a declared vexatious litigant sought to abandon her appeal concerning election candidacy eligibility after Elections Canada re-interpreted the relevant statutory provision. Under Elections Canada’s old interpretation, the appellant was rendered ineligible to run for office as a result of a failure to make financial disclosure in the prescribed form. After the appeal was commenced, Elections Canada changed its interpretation and the appellant was no longer ineligible, making her appeal moot, except for the issue of costs. The Court confirmed that vexatious litigants must obtain fresh leave from the Superior Court for each step in a proceeding, including the initiation of an appeal. In the unusual circumstances of this case, the Court granted the appellant leave to seek costs of the abandoned appeal against Elections Canada, but denied her any such costs. The Court was of the view that the government should not be penalized for changing its interpretation of a statute in good faith and to advance Charter values.

In Unity Health Toronto v. 2442931 Ontario Inc., the Court upheld a decision lifting a receivership stay under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and rejected lenders’ claims to a large interim construction payment. The Court held that the contractual milestone triggering payment had not been achieved and that the agreement allocated the completion risk to the project company, leaving no basis for the relief sought.

In Elizabeth Casey Cooke Family Trust v. Dioguardi, the Court dismissed a negligence claim against a solicitor who drafted a will, holding that the action was an abuse of process because the will had already been probated. The negligence action was therefore a collateral attack on the certificate of appointment of estate trustee that authenticated the will. What the appellant should have one was to seek rectification of the will before it was probated or move to set aside the probate order.

In 2668602 Ontario Inc. v. GWL Realty Advisors Inc. the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Liquidation Process Order was properly interpreted as applying to the warehouse racking system and that the deemed abandonment provision was irrebuttable. Because 266 failed to remove the racking after the lease disclaimer and did not seek to vary the Order, the Landlord was entitled to dispose of it without liability for conversion.

In Wright v. Wright, 2026 ONCA 106, the Court allowed an appeal from an order that had refused to enforce an option to purchase real property entered into between mother and daughter on the basis of undue influence and breach of fiduciary duty. The Court was of the view that there was no automatic presumption of undue influence just because the agreement was between mother and daughter and the daughter held powers of attorney. The mother had independent legal advice when she entered into the agreement and there was therefore no undue influence.

In Castle Homes Design Inc. v. McKenzie, a motion to transfer an appeal to the Divisional Court was dismissed, but a motion to extend time to perfect the appeal before the Court was granted. The Court signaled the possibility that a panel of five judges may decide this case in order to resolve an apparent conflict in the case law on the appropriate appeal route for construction lien matters.

In Daud v. Temor, the Court dismissed the appeal from a family law decision made following an uncontested trial. The appellant’s pleading had been struck for failure to comply with his disclosure obligations and the trial judge was entitled to rely on the wife’s uncontested evidence.

In Quantrix Plastics Inc. v. 2818881 Ontario Inc., the Court dismissed a tenant’s appeal from partial summary judgment in favor of the landlord that had validated the landlord’s termination of the lease.

In Formula First Collision v. Aviva Canada, the Court granted a motion to strike out an affidavit sworn in support of a motion for leave to appeal in a Small Claims Court matter.

In Arumugasamy v. Subaschandiran, the Court allowed the appeal and restored an action that had been administratively dismissed for delay, holding that the justice of the case favoured relief where the delay was primarily caused by counsel’s inadvertence and there was no significant prejudice to the respondent.

Wishing everyone a happy Family Day long weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Civil Decisions

Yan. v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2026 ONCA 95

Keywords: Elections Law, Statutory Interpretation, Eligibility, Financial Disclosure, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Abandonment, Costs, Vexatious Litigants, Leave to Commence or Continue Proceedings, Appeals, Mootness, Costs, Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 65(i), Courts of Justice Act, ss. 13(2), 131, 140, 140(1), 140(3), 140(4), Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 2.03, 2.2.09(5), 38.13, 61.14(1), 61.14(3), 61.14(4), College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario v. Yan & Bahadur v. Yan, 2025 ONSC 352, Varma v. Rozenberg, 1998 CanLII 4334 (Ont. C.A.), Interpretation Note 2025-08, Effect of Late Reporting on Eligibility, issued by the Elections Canada on November 14, 2025

Unity Health Toronto v. 2442931 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 82

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Construction, Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Receiverships, Lifting of Stay Proceedings, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 193, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 6(1)(b), s. 7(5), Cardillo v. Medcap Real Estate Holdings Inc., 2023 ONCA 852, Global Royalties Limited v. Brook, 2016 ONCA 50, Hillmount Capital Inc. v. Pizale, 2021 ONCA 364, Business Development Bank of Canada v. Aventura II Properties Inc., 2016 ONCA 408, Ting (Re), 2022 ONCA 258, McEwen (Re), 2020 ONCA 511, North House Foods Ltd. (Re), 2025 ONCA 563, Enroute Imports Inc. (Re), 2016 ONCA 247, Romspen Investment Corporation v. Courtice Auto Wreckers Limited, 2017 ONCA 301, 2403177 Ontario Inc. v. Bending Lake Iron Group Limited, 2016 ONCA 225, Business Development Bank of Canada v. Pine Tree Resorts Inc., 2013 ONCA 282

Quantrix Plastics Inc. v. 2818881 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 93

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20, Commercial Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7, s. 19(2), Ledcor Construction Ltd. v. Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co., 2016 SCC 37, Malik v. Attia, 2020 ONCA 787

Daud v. Temor, 2026 ONCA 83

Keywords: Family Law, Property, Equalization of Net Family Property, Support, Civil Procedure, Disclosure, Orders, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Uncontested Trials, Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, Child Support Guidelines, s. 16, 17, 18, 19, Kovachis v. Kovachis, 2013 ONCA 663, 367 D.L.R. (4th) 189

Castle Homes Design Inc. v. McKenzie, 2026 ONCA 98

Keywords: Contracts, Construction, Liens, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Perfection, Extension of Time, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 110, Construction Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. C.30, ss. 50, 71, Mechanics’ Lien Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 267, RS Components Ltd. v. Devlan Construction Ltd., 2015 ONCA 294, MGW-Homes Design Inc. v. Pasqualino, 2024 ONCA 422, Villa Verde L.M. Masonry Ltd. v. Pier One Masonry Inc. (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 76 (C.A.), Durall Construction Ltd. v. W.A. McDougall Ltd. (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 371, Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. v. Avison Young Real Estate Management Services LP, 2024 ONCA 251, Codina v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2020 ONCA 116

Elizabeth Casey Cooke Family Trust v. Dioguardi, 2026 ONCA 85

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Wills, Torts, Solicitor’s Negligence, Partial Intestacy, Probate, Certificates of Appointment of Estate Trustee, Collateral Attack Doctrine, Testamentary Intention, Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. ss. 26, 45, 46, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 74 and 75, Neuberger v. York, 2016 ONCA 191, , Panda Estate (Re), 2018 ONSC 6734, Silano v. Silano, 2019 ONSC 2776, Nordlander v. Nordlander Estate, [1998] O.J. No. 4039 (Gen. Div.), Ali Estate (Re), 2011 BCSC 537, Hofman v. Lougheed et al., 2023 ONSC 3437, Rondel v. Robinson Estate, 2011 ONCA 493, Barylak v. Figol (1995), 9 E.T.R. (2d) 305 (Ont. C.J. Gen. Div.), Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, Becker v. Walgate, 2025 ONCA 696, Aba-Alkhail v. University of Ottawa, 2013 ONCA 633, Winter v. Sherman Estate, 2018 ONCA 703, Ontario v. Lipsitz, 2011 ONCA 466, Abarca v. Vargas, 2015 ONCA 4, Amtim Capital Inc. v. Appliance Recycling Centers of America, 2014 ONCA 62, Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, Saskatchewan (Environment) v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, 2025 SCC 4, Albert H. Oosterhoff et al., Oosterhoff on Wills, 9th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2021)

Formula First Collision v. Aviva Canada, 2026 ONCA 109

Keywords: Contracts, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Leave to Appeal, Evidence, Admissibility, Affidavits, Striking Documents, Sault Dock Co. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1973] 2 O.R. 479 (C.A.), Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp. v. Iness (2002), 62 O.R. (3d) 255 (C.A.), Optiva Inc. v. Tbaytel, 2021 CanLII 78438 (Ont. C.A.), Ballard Estate v. Ballard Estate, [1991] S.C.C.A. No. 239

2668602 Ontario Inc. v. GWL Realty Advisors Inc., 2026 ONCA 96

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Sales Processes, Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Disclaimer, Personal Property, Torts, Conversion, Defences, Abandonment, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3., s. 50.4(1), Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, Boma Manufacturing Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 727, 373409 Alberta Ltd. (Receiver of) v. Bank of Montreal, 2002 SCC 81, Aizic v. Natcan Trust Company, 2025 ONCA 719, Kuang v. Young, 2023 ONSC 2429, Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation v. South Bruce Peninsula (Town), 2024 ONCA 884, Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, Koroluk v. KPMG Inc., 2022 SKCA 57, Warde v Slatter Holdings Ltd., 2016 BCCA 63, Onion Lake Cree Nation v. Stick, 2020 SKCA 101, Yu v. Jordan, 2012 BCCA 367, Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 ONCA 688, St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Ottawa (City), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 616, Sharbern Holding Inc. v. Vancouver Airport Centre Ltd., 2011 SCC 23, St. Leon Village Consolidated School District 1425 v. Ronceray (1960), 23 D.L.R. (2d) 32 (Man. C.A.), Target Canada Co. (Re), 2016 ONSC 316, SFC Litigation Trust v. Chan, 2019 ONCA 525, Naylor Group Inc. v. Ellis-Don Construction Ltd., 2001 SCC 58, Asamera Oil Corp. v. Sea Oil & General Corp., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 633, 2105582 Ontario Ltd. (Performance Plus Golf Academy) v. 375445 Ontario Limited (Hydeway Golf Club), 2017 ONCA 980, Koeneman v. Horne, 2024 MBCA 36, 496 D.L.R. (4th) 366, Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law for Commercial Tenancies, (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2016), The Law of Damages, (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1991)

Wright v. Wright, 2026 ONCA 106

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Options to Purchase, Enforceability, Incomplete Terms, Defences, Undue Influence, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Unconscionability, Geffen v. Goodman Estate, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 353, Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, 2020 SCC 16, Canada Square Corp. et al. v. VS Services Ltd. et al. (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 250 (C.A.), Kavanagh v. Lajoie, 2014 ONCA 187, Morreale v. Romanino, 2017 ONCA 359, Vanier v. Vanier, 2017 ONCA 561, Richardson (Estate Trustee of) v. Mew, 2009 ONCA 403, JGB Collateral v. Rochon, 2020 ONCA 464, Boult Ent. Ltd. v. Bissett (1985), Banton v. Banton (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 176 (Ont. Gen. Div.), 67 B.C.L.R. 273 (C.A.), Hole v. Hole, 2016 ABCA 34, Monette Farms Ltd. v. Dutcyvich, 2026 BCCA 1, Woodstock Public Utility Comm. v. McKay, 1989 CarswellOnt 1471 (H.C.)

Arumugasamy v. Subaschandiran, 2026 ONCA 102

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Orders, Administrative Dismissal for Delay, Setting Aside, Inadvertence of Counsel, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 37.14 and 48.14, H.B. Fuller Company v. Rogers (Rogers Law Office), 2015 ONCA 173, Finlay v. Paassen, 2010 ONCA 204, Ali v. Fruci, 2014 ONCA 596, Benhaim v. St‑Germain, 2016 SCC 48, Marché D’Alimentation Denis Thériault Ltée v. Giant Tiger Stores Limited, 2007 ONCA 695

Short Civil Decisions

Home Trust Company v. Campbell, 2026 ONCA 92

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Civil Procedure, Judgments, Enforcement, Writs of Possession, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Miner v. Home Trust Company, 2025 ONCA 55, Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, Jarvis v. Morlog, 2016 ONSC 4476, Clintock v. Karam, 2017 ONCA 277, Henderson v. Henderson, 2014 ONCA 571

Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONCA 91

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Licensing, Discipline, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Cross-appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Procedural and Natural Justice, Right to be Heard, Mirza et al. v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 6727, Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 257

R.W. Tomlinson Limited v. Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 527, 2026 ONCA 107

Keywords: Costs, Climans v. Latner, 2020 ONCA 554, Van Delst v. Hronowsky, 2020 ONCA 402

Conti v. Duca, 2026 ONCA 104

Keywords: Real Property, Costs

Deng v. Han, 2026 ONCA 110

Keywords: Costs

Haytham Elzayat v. Rogers Communication, 2026 ONCA 111

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Limitation Periods, Appeals, Fresh Evidence, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B. ss. 4, 5, 7, Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181

CIVIL DECISIONS

Yan. v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2026 ONCA 95

[Monahan J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

NXYY, acting in person
A. Bourke, for the responding party

facts:

NXYY was a candidate in the 2021 federal general election. Although she filed financial reports required by the Canadian Elections Act (the “Act”), she failed to do so in the proper form by the statutorily prescribed deadline. When NXYY tried to run in the April 2025 federal election, Elections Canada informed her that she was ineligible by virtue of s. 65(i) of the Act. NXYY quickly brought an application to extend the time to file her 2021 financial report and/or for relief from ineligibility (the “Application”). In unrelated January 2025 proceedings, NXYY was declared a vexatious litigant pursuant to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act and thus was required to seek leave to institute new proceedings or continue existing proceedings. The application judge granted NXYY leave to bring the Application, which was not an abuse of process, but he nevertheless dismissed it on its merits, since he lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested extension and since NXYY had been insufficiently diligent when filing her financial reports. NXYY appealed this order.

Without seeking leave to do so, NXYY subsequently brought a motion seeking to abandon her appeal, as well as an order for costs of her abandoned appeal and the underlying Application against the respondent, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada (the “Officer”). She desired abandonment because following the 2025 federal election, Elections Canada reinterpreted s. 65(i) such that NXYY was no longer deemed ineligible for election candidacy, rendering her appeal moot. Elections Canada published an Interpretation Note explaining that an inconsistency existed between the English and French versions of s. 65(i), and that it would apply the English version going forward. Hence, NXYY and others who filed necessary financial reports late were no longer ineligible to run in future federal elections.

issues:

1. Did NXYY require leave under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to bring this motion?
2. Was NXYY entitled to her costs of her abandoned appeal?

holding:

Motion granted in part.

reasoning:

Yes. Even though NXYY was granted leave to commence the underlying Application, her vexatious litigant order (“VLO”) required that she bring a fresh leave request to a Superior Court judge to appeal the Application and bring this motion. The Court confirmed that a grant of leave does not carry forward, only applying to the specific action, application or motion for which it was granted. While NXYY failed to obtain fresh leave, in the exceptional circumstances of this case, the Court was prepared to grant leave itself, for several reasons. First, NXYY had abandoned her appeal, a litigation step not requiring leave or Court approval, making costs the only remaining live issue. Second, the issue of whether a s. 140 grant of leave extends to appeal proceedings had never been squarely addressed in the jurisprudence, so NXYY could not be faulted for her failure to seek leave. Finally, and most importantly, NXYY’s appeal and her costs motion each had reasonable grounds and were not an abuse of process. Thus, the Court granted NXYY leave to seek costs of her abandoned appeal but emphasized that future litigants subject to a VLO must obtain leave before filing a notice of appeal or bringing related motions.
No. The Court first established that the respondent Officer was not entitled to costs of the appeal since it had not filed responding materials or sought costs of the associated motion. NXYY requested $150,000 in costs or a “justified number,” arguing that had Elections Canada changed its interpretation of s. 65(i) earlier, this litigation would have been unnecessary. The Court declined to award her any costs and held that statutory bodies should not be penalized via costs for modifying their interpretations of a statute when they did so in good faith and to advance Charter values, as was the case here.

Unity Health Toronto v. 2442931 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 82

[Sossin, Favreau and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. P. Gottlieb, H. G. Chaiton, and D.L. Marr, for the moving party
S. E. Batner, A. Kalamut and M. Cui, for the responding party

facts:

This case arose from the financing and construction of a major redevelopment project at St. Michael’s Hospital in Toronto. The hospital entered into a fixed-price project agreement with a project company affiliated with a large construction firm. The project was funded through a syndicated construction loan of roughly $230 million, with the Bank of Montreal acting as an administrative agent for the lenders. Under the project agreement, the project company was entitled to a significant interim payment once it achieved a defined construction milestone known as “Tower Interim Completion” (“TIC.”)

In 2018, the construction firm’s affiliate became insolvent, placing the project company in default under the financing and triggering receivership proceedings and a stay of claims. The lenders chose not to exercise their contractual step-in rights. Construction continued under revised arrangements, but the project was altered, and the TIC milestone was never formally achieved. The lenders’ agent later sought declarations that TIC had been achieved, or, that the hospital should take steps to achieve it and make the interim payment, while the hospital moved to lift the stay to fully terminate the project agreement. The motion judge lifted the stay and dismissed the agent’s claims, leading to this appeal.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in lifting the stay of proceedings to permit the hospital to terminate the project agreement?
2. Did the motion judge err in dismissing the claims of the lenders’ agent for the two declarations?
3. Did the motion judge err in interpreting the project agreement and the TIC provisions?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court held that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion in lifting the stay imposed in the receivership proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. A stay in a BIA receivership is intended to protect the debtor’s estate and facilitate an orderly restructuring or realization process, not to indefinitely freeze contractual relationships where doing so serves no insolvency purpose. Here, the project company was in receivership, the lenders had declined to exercise their contractual step-in rights, and there was no realistic prospect that the project agreement could proceed as originally contemplated.
In those circumstances, the motion judge was entitled to conclude that the stay no longer advanced the objectives of the receivership and instead prevented the hospital from moving forward with the redevelopment. Lifting the stay allowed the parties to proceed according to their contractual rights and reflected the practical realities of the insolvency. The Court found no error in principle or unreasonable exercise of discretion under the BIA framework that would justify appellate intervention.

2. No. The Court agreed with the motion judge that the contractual milestone of TIC had not been achieved under the terms of the agreement. The agreement set out specific, objective conditions that had to be satisfied before the interim payment became due, and those conditions were never formally met. The argument of the lenders’ agent that the milestone should be treated as achieved (or that the hospital should be compelled to take steps to achieve it) was inconsistent with the contract’s express terms.

The Court held that the project agreement placed the risk of non-completion squarely on the project company, and that the insolvency and resulting changes to the project did not shift that risk to the hospital. Because the contractual preconditions to payment were not satisfied, there was no basis for declaratory relief. The motion judge’s interpretation of the agreement was reasonable and disclosed no palpable and overriding error.

3. No. The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge correctly treated the TIC provisions as a contractual bargain with defined preconditions, not a flexible standard that could be satisfied “in substance” once the project changed. The agreement’s structure showed that the interim payment was triggered only if TIC was achieved as defined, and the motion judge was entitled to conclude that the parties did not contract for an alternative trigger if the project was altered or if insolvency intervened.

The Court also agreed that the contract allocated completion risk to the project company and that the lenders’ agent could not use contratual interpretation to rewrite that allocation after the fact. In particular, the lenders’ request would effectively convert a conditional milestone payment into an entitlement despite the TIC milestone not being met, which the contract did not support. Because the motion judge’s reading was grounded in the text, context, and commercial purpose of the agreement, there was no reversible error.

Quantrix Plastics Inc. v. 2818881 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 93

[Sossin, Copeland and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Hussain, for the appellant

D. Yiokaris and L. Kung, for the respondent

facts:

The appeal was from a partial summary judgment arising out of a commercial landlord and tenant dispute. The landlord, 2818881 Ontario Inc. (the “Landlord” or “281”) was the owner of a property in Milton, Ontario (the “Property”). The tenant, Quantrix Plastics Inc. (“Quantrix”), was a manufacturer of plastic bottles. Prior to the Property being sold to 281, Quantrix was a tenant of 24818881 Ontario Inc. (the “Prior Landlord”).

In 2019, Quantrix entered into a fixed-term, five-year lease with the Prior Landlord to rent commercial warehousing space and a trucking terminal on the Property. In 2020, Quantrix wished to increase its existing leased space by renting an additional warehouse (collectively, the “Leased Premises” or the “Premises”). Quantrix and the Prior Landlord entered into a Lease Amending Agreement dated September 1, 2020, which set out all the terms of the tenancy agreement (the “Lease”). The Lease included new terms that were different from the 2019 Lease.

Around 2020, the Prior Landlord investigated selling the Property to 281. Important to the proposed transaction was the Prior Landlord’s ability to secure an estoppel certificate from Quantrix, confirming the Lease terms. Quantrix signed an Estoppel Certificate in favour of the Prior Landlord and the new Landlord on April 24, 2021. Pursuant to the Certificate, Quantrix acknowledged the Lease to be validly executed, in full force and effect, and that it was the entire agreement between Quantrix and the Prior Landlord.

281 bought the Property on May 3, 2021. 281 then delivered a notice of termination to Quantrix on May 31, 2021, requiring it to vacate the Leased Premises by July 31, 2021. Quantrix did not vacate. It issued a statement of claim against 281 on August 17, 2021, seeking declaratory relief and damages. 281 filed a statement of defence and counterclaim. 281 then successfully moved for partial summary judgment on the action and its counterclaim. Quantrix appealed.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err by resolving disputed factual and credibility issues by way of summary judgment?
2. Did the motion judge err by failing to apply the doctrine of waiver and election to the termination of the Lease?
3. Did the motion judge err in her interpretation of the change of ownership clause in the Lease?
4. Did the motion judge err in her interpretation and application of the Commercial Tenancies Act to this case?
5. Were the motion judge’s remedies, including her awarding of double base rent pursuant to the Lease’s overholding clause, granting a writ of possession to 281, and declaring Quantrix a trespasser, disproportionate outcomes in a summary judgment motion on a disputed record?
6. Did the motion judge err in her application of the law of good faith and honest performance?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

Did the Court err in any of the issues raised by the Appellant?

No. The Court did not err in deciding on any of the issues raised by the Appellant. The Court did not see the need to go through each of the alleged errors. In the Court’s view, individually and cumulatively, the appellant’s arguments amounted to an invitation to relitigate the motion. Each of these areas was the subject of considered reasons by the motion judge, and in none did the Court see any error. The Court affirmed that there was no basis for appellate interference with the exercise of the motion judge’s remedial discretion.

Daud v. Temor, 2026 ONCA 83

[van Rensburg, Paciocco and Thorburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Oommen and A. Kumar, for the appellant
C. Baker, for the respondent

facts:

The appellant appealed two orders made concerning a family law trial. The first was made at the commencement of the trial and granted the respondent’s motion to strike the appellant’s pleadings. The second was made after the uncontested trial the following day. The appellant did not file materials in response to the motion, although he attended without counsel to oppose it. He was not present at the trial.

The financial issues at trial included child support and equalization of net family property. The appellant was ordered to pay monthly table child support based on an imputed income of $80,000 per year, and an equalization payment of $506,978.73. The trial judge’s conclusions on both issues were, in part, informed by his findings about the appellant’s interest in Ishan General Trading LLC (“Ishan”), a Dubai-based company owned and operated by the appellant, his brother, his father and another partner.

issues:

1. Did the trial judge err in law and deny the appellant procedural fairness in striking his pleadings?

2. Did the trial judge err in the net family property equalization by overvaluing the appellant’s interest in Ishan?

3. Did the trial judge err in imputing income to the appellant for the purpose of child support?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court found that the trial judge did not err in law or deny the appellant procedural fairness in striking his pleadings. The main reason for the order striking the appellant’s pleadings was the appellant’s deliberate and persistent non-compliance with his financial disclosure obligations. The appellant provided no reason to believe that he would provide the required disclosure within a short period or at all. Additionally, the Court concluded that the transcript of the hearing in respect of the motion showed that the appellant had ample notice that he was at risk of having his pleadings struck.

2. No. The Court found that the trial judge did not err in the net family property equalization by overvaluing the appellants’ interest in Ishan. The respondent provided evidence by affidavit and orally about her knowledge of Ishan, including the nature of the business and locations of its operations, and her belief that the appellant received substantial income from Ishan during their marriage. In the absence of the disclosure and valuation of Ishan that the appellant failed to provide, the trial judge was entitled to rely on the evidence put forward by the respondent. The Court found that the trial judge did not do so uncritically. The trial judge asked questions of the respondent about the status of Ishan before and after the date of separation.

3. No. The Court found nothing unreasonable in the income that the trial judge imputed. In arriving at the $80,000 figure, the trial judge specifically stated that he drew an adverse inference from the appellant’s non-disclosure. The Court stated that in the absence of the appellant’s financial disclosure the trial judge was entitled to use what he had to determine the appellant’s income for child support purposes, including undisclosed self-employment income. Contrary to the appellant’s submission, the trial judge was not obliged to accept the notices of assessment as the sole evidence of the appellant’s income at the relevant times.

Castle Homes Design Inc. v. McKenzie, 2026 ONCA 98

[Monahan J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

T. Gleason and M. Phyper, for the moving party
N.J. Kasozi and P. Sooresrafil, for the responding party

facts:

Castle Homes was a construction company which contracted with the responding party, D.W., to build and install an outdoor swimming pool and deck on her property. A dispute arose regarding the work performed under the contract, because of which Castle Homes registered a lien against D.W.’s property and brought a lien action (the “Lien Action”) pursuant to s. 50 of the Construction Act (the “Act”).

Castle Homes missed several deadlines prescribed by the Rules, as well as two court-ordered timetables set in case management conferences. It also failed to pay costs orders. D.W. brought a motion to dismiss the Lien Action due to Castle Homes’ failure to comply with timetables and court orders. The motion judge dismissed the Lien Action, discharged the lien, and awarded costs to D.W. on a substantial indemnity (the “Dismissal Order”). Castle Homes submitted a notice of appeal of the Dismissal Order to the Court on September 22, 2025. On November 17, 2025, counsel for D.W. advised counsel for Castle Homes that the appeal should have been filed in the Divisional Court due to the statutory appeal route in s. 71 of the Act. After reviewing the matter, counsel for Castle Homes agreed and sought consent to an extension of time to file an appeal in the Divisional Court, but that consent was refused.

On November 26, 2025, Castle Homes was warned by the Registrar that the appeal would be dismissed for delay if it was not perfected by December 17, 2025. The appeal was not perfected by that date. On December 17, 2025, Castle Homes brought the present motion seeking to transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court or extend the time to perfect the appeal in the Court.

issues:

1. Should the Court transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act?

2. In the alternative, should the Court extend the time to perfect the appeal?

holding:

Motion granted in part.

reasoning:

No. A condition precedent to transferring an appeal to another court under s. 110 of the CJAwas a finding that the appeal had been brought in the wrong court. The Court was unable to come to that conclusion in this case since, depending on which of the conflicting precedents govern between TRS Components and Arcamm, the appeal may well have been properly brought to the Court. The interests of justice also favoured the appeal remaining with the Court. There was a strong public interest in clarifying the appeal route in construction disputes, consistent with the purpose of the Act to provide an efficient and cost-effective method for resolving such matters. Unlike the Divisional Court, the Court could resolve apparent conflicts between its own precedents and provide the needed clarity, if necessary, through a five-judge panel.
Yes. The Court did not need to consider the factors from Codina in any detail since in the circumstances of this case the interests of justice favoured granting a modest extension of time to perfect the appeal. The parties had agreed that the appeal should have been brought to the Divisional Court rather than the Court. This was well prior to the perfection deadline set by the Registrar. It would have been contrary to the interests of justice to deny the moving party the opportunity to perfect the appeal when it and the responding party were both operating under the assumption that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Elizabeth Casey Cooke Family Trust v. Dioguardi, 2026 ONCA 85

[Paciocco, George and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P. D’Angelo, for the appellants
A. V. Mayeski and A. E. Colquohoun, for the respondents

facts:

This case arose from an alleged error in the drafting of a will that resulted in part of the testator’s estate passing on an intestacy. After the testator’s death, a Certificate of Appointment of estate trustee was issued and the estate was administered on the basis that the will did not dispose of the entire residue. As a result, a portion of the estate passed to beneficiaries under the rules of intestacy rather than under the terms of the will.

The disappointed beneficiary later commenced an action against the drafting solicitor, alleging negligence in the preparation of the will and seeking damages for the loss caused by the partial intestacy. The solicitor brought a summary judgment motion, arguing that the claim was an abuse of process because the plaintiff had not sought rectification of the will or challenged the probate order before suing for damages. The motion judge agreed and dismissed the action, prompting this appeal.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in finding that the negligence action against the drafting solicitor was an abuse of process?
2. Did the motion judge err in granting summary judgment?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court agreed that the action against the solicitor was an abuse of process because it effectively amounted to a collateral attack on the probate order. The estate had already been administered on the basis of the will as probated, which resulted in a partial intestacy. Rather than first seeking rectification of the will or moving to set aside or vary the probate order, the appellant attempted to recover the alleged loss directly from the solicitor.
The Court held that held that where a will is said to fail to reflect the testator’s true intentions because of a drafting error, the proper course is to seek rectification so that the estate can be administered in accordance with the corrected will. Allowing a negligence action to proceed without first pursuing that remedy would undermine the finality of probate orders and permit an indirect challenge to the distribution of the estate. In these circumstances, the motion judge correctly concluded that the claim was an abuse of process.
The Court also held that a finding of negligence would contradict the legal effect of the Certificate of Appointment, which confirmed the will as the operative testamentary document. Allowing the negligence action to proceed would therefore undermine the finality and authority of the probate order. Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that probate never bars a negligence claim, holding that such claims cannot proceed where they contradict the legal effect of the Certificate.

2. No. Given that the abuse of process conclusion was determinative, there was no genuine issue requiring a trial: the negligence action could not properly proceed in its existing form without first addressing the underlying probate/rectification problem. Summary judgment was an appropriate procedural vehicle to dispose of the claim, since the key issue was a legal and procedural bar (collateral attack / abuse of process), not a factual dispute needing viva voce evidence. Once the court accepted that the action improperly failed to seek rectification and effectively relitigate the will’s effect after probate, dismissal on summary judgment followed.

Formula First Collision v. Aviva Canada, 2026 ONCA 109

[Coroza J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

A.G. Rodriguez and J. Conway, for the moving party
W. Xavier Navarrete, for the responding party

facts:

The underlying proceeding was an appeal of a Small Claims Court decision. Cars in need of repairs were either driven or towed to Formula First’s shop at the direction of the cars’ owners. At Formula First’s request, each of the owners signed a document titled “Assignment”. The document purported to assign to Formula First any and all rights of action for damages with respect to repairs and other costs arising out of a contract with Aviva. In each case, Formula First prepared a preliminary estimate for the repairs. Aviva also prepared its own estimate for the repairs, outlining the work that it considered necessary and the amount that it was willing to pay for that work. Formula First proceeded to repair the vehicles. In five cases, invoices were rendered for an amount greater than the amount Aviva said it would pay, leaving balances owing on each of the invoices, the total of which Formula First sued for in Small Claims Court.

The Small Claims Court dismissed Formula First’s claim. The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal. Formula First moved for leave to appeal to the Court. This was a motion brought by Aviva to strike the affidavit of F.G. sworn November 27, 2025, in support of the Formula First’s motion for leave to appeal.

issues:

Should the Court strike the affidavit of F.G. sworn November 27, 2025?

holding:

Motion granted.

reasoning:

Yes. The Court applied the governing principles relevant to this motion set out in Optiva Inc. v. Tbaytel:

1. An affidavit cannot express an opinion that the proposed appeal raises issues of public importance, since that is for the panel to decide.

2. An affidavit cannot “seek by way of experts’ opinion, to buttress an attack on the decisions from which leave to appeal is sought”.

3. An affidavit will only be proper if it sets out facts that may help the panel appreciate the public importance of the issues raised.

4. In general, whether a legal issue is of public importance is not something on which an affidavit would be helpful.

5. However, an affidavit may in some cases be helpful if it is not apparent from the rest of the materials why, for example, the decision sought to be appealed is alleged to establish a precedent that is unworkable in practice, or otherwise is likely to have a problematic impact or jurisprudential importance not apparent on its face.

6. The Court accepted Formula First’s submission that the impact of a court’s decision beyond the parties and on the wider public is relevant to the issue of public importance. However, relevance was not the only question to consider when granting leave to file affidavits. As Optiva Inc. made clear, the affidavit must confine itself to appropriate factual information as to the effects of a decision that may be of assistance.

The F.G. affidavit revealed that it strayed well beyond providing factual information for the assistance of the panel deciding leave. Instead, it was replete with argument and opinion. They were not facts that may help the panel appreciate the alleged wide impact that the Divisional Court’s decision has had on independent autobody shops and owners of cars.

The affidavit offered an opinion on the importance of granting leave, an issue that lay squarely within the panel’s discretion. It also made assertions without proper facts, relying on anecdotal assertions rather than supporting data, statistics, or corroborating evidence. Although some portions of the affidavit were non controversial, the appropriate remedy was to strike the affidavit in its entirety, as those isolated paragraphs could not meaningfully assist the panel on their own.

2668602 Ontario Inc. v. GWL Realty Advisors Inc., 2026 ONCA 96

[Gillese, Pepall and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Gottlieb, N. Campion, and J. Kaufman for the appellant/respondent by way of cross-appeal
W. Kaufmann, G. Galati and D. Baker, for the respondents/appellants by way of cross-appeal

facts:

The respondents, GWL Realty Advisors Inc., The Great-West Life Assurance Company, and London Life Insurance Company (collectively, the “Landlord”), leased a distribution centre/warehouse to an integrated group of homeware retail companies consisting of Fluid Brands Inc., 11041037 Canada Inc., and 11041045 Canada Inc., (collectively, the “Tenants”). FB was the sole officer and director of each of the three homeware retail companies.

The Tenants each filed a Notice of Intention to make a Proposal pursuant to s. 50.4(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and obtained a Liquidation Process Order that provided guidelines for the sale of their assets including a racking system (the “Racking”) located in the Landlord’s distribution centre/warehouse. The appellant, 2668602 Ontario Inc. (“266”), purchased the furniture, fixtures, and equipment (“FF&E”) from the warehouse, including the Racking, which were to be removed by January 15, 2019, or as agreed upon with the Landlord. FB was 266’s sole officer and director.

The Tenants delivered a disclaimer notice for the lease with an effective date of January 22, 2019, following which the Landlord repossessed the premises. The Racking remained after the sale concluded, after the January 15 deadline, and after the effective disclaimer date. The Landlord wrote to 266 regarding the presence of the Racking and asked whether 266 had plans to remove it. No removal plan was provided. The Landlord advised that the Racking would be assumed abandoned. 266 stated that the Racking had not been abandoned but again provided no plan for removal. The Landlord removed and sold the Racking to a third party.

266 sued the Landlord for conversion. The Landlord defended the claim on the basis of deemed and actual abandonment and trespass and counterclaimed for lost revenue due to the continuing presence of the Racking at the distribution centre/warehouse. The trial judge dismissed 266’s action, concluding that the Racking was deemed abandoned pursuant to the Liquidation Process Order. She also dismissed the counterclaim. 266 appealed from that judgment, and the Landlord cross-appealed the trial judge’s damages assessment in the event 266 was successful on appeal.

issues:

1. Did the trial judge err in interpreting the Liquidation Process Order?

2. Did the trial judge err in holding that the deemed abandonment provision in the Liquidation Process Order was irrebuttable and if so, did she err in failing to consider whether it was rebutted?

3. Did the trial judge err in the assessment of damages?

holding:

Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court held that the Liquidation Process Order was correctly interpreted by the trial judge. The distribution centre/warehouse met the definition of Store, and the Racking constituted FF&E as described in the documents. It would be inconsistent with not only the text but the purpose and context of the Order to interpret it as not including the distribution centre/warehouse as a Store within the meaning of the agreement. Once the notice of lease disclaimer was given by the Tenants, it was evident that removal of FF&E would be required by the effective disclaimer date and would take some time. Given that the Liquidation Process Order was dated November 2, 2018, and the agreement which expressly agreed to the terms of the sale guidelines was signed by FB, the argument that the Racking removal time precluded the interpretation adopted by the trial judge and rendered it commercially unreasonable was unpersuasive. An interpretation that allowed for no end date for removal, which was implicit in the appellant’s position, would be commercially unreasonable.

2. No. The Court held that reading the Order as a whole and in context, the trial judge did not err in finding that the deeming provision was irrebuttable. The Liquidation Process Order, which included both the agreement and the sale guidelines, reflected a scheme whereby certain of the Landlord’s rights were curtailed including its ability to relet the premises until the disclaimer date when the premises were to be devoid of FF&E not belonging to the Landlord. The purpose of the Order would be seriously undermined if the guardrails contained in the governing documents were not enforced.

The language of paragraph 9 of the sale guidelines not only provided for a deemed abandonment, but also described the Landlord’s remedy, namely a right to dispose of the same as the Landlord chose, without any liability whatsoever on the part of the Landlord. Such provisions read together and in context did not create an interpretation that was rebuttable. Moreover, any potential concerns could have been addressed through the come-back provision in the Liquidation Process Order which stated that any interested party could apply to the court to vary or amend the Order. 266 never applied for such a variation.

3. No. The Court concluded that the trial judge did not err with respect to the Landlord’s defence of deemed abandonment and her interpretation of the Liquidation Process Order, therefore there was no need to address the issue of damages.

Wright v. Wright, 2026 ONCA 106

[Thorburn, Coroza and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Vries, J. Lindenberg and E. Yu, for the appellants/respondents by way of cross-appeal

D. Enright and D. Ciarabellini, for the respondent/appellant by way of cross-appeal

facts:

In July 2020, the parties signed a Property Partnership Agreement giving T.W. and her common law husband, R.L., an option to purchase a residential property from T.W’s mother, K.W. Two years later, K.W. told T.W. that she intended to list the property for sale without first giving T.W. and R.L. an opportunity to exercise their option to purchase. T.W. and R.L. sued K.W., seeking enforcement of the Agreement or alternative relief.

The application judge declined to grant T.W. and R.L’s claim for specific performance. He concluded that the Property Partnership Agreement was unenforceable. He further concluded that (i) T.W. had failed to rebut the presumption that she unduly influenced K.W.; (ii) T.W. had breached a fiduciary duty she owed to K.W.; and (iii) the Agreement was unconscionable. Despite this, the application judge ordered that, should K.W. put the property on the market, T.W. and R.L. would be entitled to seek to purchase it. He further ordered that, if K.W. were to sell the property to a third party, T.W. and R.L. would be entitled to an equal share of the proceeds of sale after the balance of the mortgage loan was repaid and K.W. received $150,000 for her contribution to the purchase of the property.

T.W. and R.L. appealed the application judge’s order declaring the Agreement unenforceable. K.W. cross-appealed the application judge’s order permitting T.W. and R.L. to participate in the purchase of the property on the open market and, in the case of a third-party sale, requiring K.W. to share any excess sale proceeds with T.W. and R.L.

issues:

1. Did the application judge err in fact and law in finding that s. 13(d) of the Agreement which provides that “the remaining amount shall be distributed among the parties ***”, was an essential but incomplete term?
2. Did the application judge err in law in presuming that T.W. unduly influenced K.W. to enter into the Agreement, and erred in fact and law in finding that the presumption was not rebutted?
3. Did the application judge err in fact and law in finding that T.W. breached a fiduciary duty owed to K.W.?
4. Did the application judge err in fact and law in finding that the Agreement was improvident and, as such, should be set aside as unconscionable?

holding:

Appeal allowed. Cross-appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. Did the application judge err in fact and law in finding that s. 13(d) of the Agreement which provides that “the remaining amount shall be distributed among the parties”, was an essential but incomplete term?

Yes. The application judge did err in fact and law in finding that s. 13(d) of the Agreement which provides that “the remaining amount shall be distributed among the parties ***”, was an essential but incomplete term. The Court of Appeal noted that the application judge’s interpretation of the Agreement was a determination of mixed fact and law and that the Court must defer to such findings unless they were based on an error of law or principle, or a palpable and overriding error of fact. The application judge found that the version of the Agreement signed by all parties was “admittedly incomplete” because s. 13(d) did not specify how excess proceeds of sale would be distributed in the event of a third party sale. The Court disagreed, outlining that in applying the governing legal principles, s. 13(d) was not essential to fulfill the main purpose of the parties’ agreement, and the Agreement was otherwise enforceable.

2. Did the application judge err in law in presuming that T.W. unduly influenced K.W. to enter into the Agreement, and erred in fact and law in finding that the presumption was not rebutted?

Yes. The application judge did err in law in presuming that T.W. unduly influenced K.W. to enter into the Agreement and erred in fact and law in finding that the presumption was not rebutted. The Court noted that the application judge found that “[a]s mother and daughter … the situation at hand” gave rise to a presumption of undue influence, and that T.W. and R.L. had not rebutted that presumption. The Court found that the application judge’s findings were insufficient, on applicable legal principles, to ground a presumption of undue influence. Even if such a presumption arose, the Court noted that T.W. and R.L. rebutted it. The Court found that based on the application judge’s findings, no presumption of undue influence could be established.

Moreover, the Court noted that the record clearly showed that K.W. received independent legal advice about the Agreement prior to signing it and that, having received this advice, she agreed to its terms. As a result, even if a presumption of undue influence arose, it was rebutted.

3. Did the application judge err in fact and law in finding that T.W. breached a fiduciary duty owed to K.W.?

Yes. The application judge erred in fact and law in finding that T.W. breached a fiduciary duty owed to K.W. The application judge found that the limited power of attorney in T.W’s favour that K.W. executed in 2019 in connection with her purchase of the property “placed T.W. in a conflict as to whose interests she was required to put first”. The Application judge rejected the argument that K.W. had obtained independent legal advice because this advice was not received until after K.W. obtained title to the Bay of Quinte property. The Court found that the application judge erred in principle in concluding that T.W. was in a conflict of interest as a result of the 2019 POA. The Court noted that he failed to consider the limited scope of the 2019 POA and the duties owed by an attorney when a grantor is of sound mind. Moreover, the Court noted that K.W. received timely and independent legal advice prior to signing the Agreement. In these circumstances, to the extent that T.W. owed K.W. a fiduciary duty based on the 2006 or 2019 POAs, that duty did not preclude an enforceable agreement between them. As a result, the Court found for T.W. and R.L.

4. Did the application judge err in fact and law in finding that the Agreement was improvident and, as such, should be set aside as unconscionable?

Yes. The application judge did err in fact and law in finding that the Agreement was improvident and, as such, should be set aside as unconscionable. The application judge found that there was an inequality in bargaining power between T.W. and K.W. when they reached their agreement, resulting in an improvident bargain. The Court noted that in applying the correct principles, the Agreement was not unconscionable. The Court found that the application judge’s analysis fell short of the analysis mandated in Uber. The Court outlined that K.W. and T.W’s mother/daughter relationship, standing alone, was not sufficient to ground the determination required on the first stage of the unconscionability analysis.

The Court concluded that the Property Partnership Agreement could not be set aside as an improvident bargain, even if the application judge was of the view that it did not adequately account for K.W’s contribution to the purchase of the property.

In light of the success of the main appeak, the cross-appeal was dismissed as moot.

Arumugasamy v. Subaschandiran, 2026 ONCA 102

[Roberts, Coroza and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Silver, for the appellants
G. M. Perinot, for the respondent

facts:

The appellants commenced an action in November 2017 seeking approximately $70,000 for unpaid loans, and the respondent defended and counterclaimed for approximately $730,000. The parties exchanged pleadings, engaged in settlement discussions in early 2018, and conducted discoveries, including the respondent’s examination in June 2018. In August 2018, the respondent’s counsel delivered a notice of intention to act in person. The litigation then proceeded, and by October 2021 the appellants had served and filed their trial record.

In February 2022, the appellants’ lawyer failed to attend the assignment court date, later explaining only that he had “lost sight” of it, and the action was struck from the trial list. Between September 2022 and January 2024, the appellants repeatedly contacted their lawyer seeking updates, but received no response. The lawyer eventually realized the oversight in May 2024 and scheduled a motion to restore the action to the trial list. Before that motion could be heard, however, the action was administratively dismissed for delay by the Registrar in September 2024 under Rule 48.14. The appellants then moved to set aside the dismissal and restore the action, but the motion judge refused, leading to the appeal.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in refusing to set aside the registrar’s administrative dismissal and restore the action to the trial list under Rule 48.14?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

Yes. The Court held that the motion judge erred in refusing to set aside the registrar’s administrative dismissal because the balancing of justice of the case favoured restoring the action, particularly given the role of counsel’s inadvertence in the delay and the absence of real prejudice to the respondent.

First, the Court found that the delay was primarily attributable to the appellants’ lawyer, not to the appellants themselves. The lawyer failed to attend the assignment court date, lost sight of the matter, and then failed for an extended period to respond to the appellants’ repeated requests for updates. The appellants were actively trying to move the case forward and relied on their counsel, who did not inform them of the status of the file. The Court emphasized that litigants should not automatically lose their claims because of their lawyer’s neglect where they themselves were diligent.

Second, the Court concluded that the appellants had demonstrated a continuing intention to proceed with the action. They had served and filed a trial record before the matter was struck from the trial list, and later repeatedly contacted their lawyer seeking progress. Once the lawyer realized the mistake, steps were taken to restore the action. This showed that the appellants did not abandon the litigation.

Third, the Court found that there was no significant non-compensable prejudice to the respondent. The action involved a financial dispute and could be addressed through costs or other terms. There was no evidence that the delay had caused the loss of evidence or otherwise impaired the respondent’s ability to defend the case.

Finally, the Court held that the motion judge placed too much weight on the length of the delay and did not properly consider the overall interests of justice, particularly the fact that the delay was caused by counsel and that the appellants were attempting to advance the action. In those circumstances, the action should have been restored, subject to appropriate terms to address the delay

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Home Trust Company v. Campbell, 2026 ONCA 92

[Monahan J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

LM, acting in person
A. McInnis, for the responding party

Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONCA 91

[Miller, Monahan and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Haylock and D. Christy, for the moving party
T. Gleason and M. Phyper, for the responding party

R.W. Tomlinson Limited v. Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 527, 2026 ONCA 107

[Tulloch C.J.O., Pepall and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D.P. Taylor and S. Grassie, for the appellants
E. Schirru and D. Rosenfeld, for the respondents

Keywords: Costs, Climans v. Latner, 2020 ONCA 554, Van Delst v. Hronowsky, 2020 ONCA 402

Conti v. Duca, 2026 ONCA 104

[Sossin, Copeland and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G.T. A. Gryguc, for the appellant
Jo. Duca, acting in person
J. Duca, acting in person

Keywords: Real Property, Costs

Deng v. Han, 2026 ONCA 110

[Tulloch C.J.O., Pepall and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Ostrom, for the appellant
S. Greaves and B. Markusoff, for the respondents

Keywords: Costs

Haytham Elzayat v. Rogers Communication, 2026 ONCA 111

[Gillese, Coroza and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

H.E., acting in person
S.C. Kolla, for the respondent

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email