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Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of February 10, 2025.
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In Beaumont v Beaumont, the Court dismissed the appellants’ appeal from the trial judge’s finding that the appellant father had “banked” his respondent sons’ earnings and an award of punitive damages and substantial indemnity costs.
In Rivard v Ontario, the Court upheld the Divisional Court’s ruling that the respondent had sufficiently pleaded negligence claims against the Chief of Police but found that the allegations against the Police Services Board did not support a direct negligence claim, as the Board’s role is limited to oversight and policy-setting. The Court affirmed the Board’s vicarious liability for officers’ torts but struck allegations related to systemic issues such as racism and police brutality, as they lacked sufficient factual support to establish a direct negligence claim.
In Sundial Homes (Sharon) Limited v Wei, the Court dismissed the main appeal but allowed the cross-appeal on costs. The appellant obtained judgment for less than the $100,000 simplified procedure threshold (as it then was). Accordingly, it was found not to be entitled to costs under the mandatory costs consequences of Rule 76.13. There was no good reason to depart from the rule in this case.
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Table of Contents
Civil Decisions
Beaumont v. Beaumont, 2025 ONCA 94
Keywords: Employment Law, Wages and Benefits, Remedies, Damages, Punitive Damages, Piercing Corporate Veil, Civil Procedure, Costs, Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 133(b), Boucher v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp., 2014 ONCA 419, O’Reilly v. ClearMRI Solutions Ltd., 2021 ONCA 385, Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18, Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, Baker v. Blue Cross Life Insurance Company of Canada, 2023 ONCA 842, NDrive Navigation Systems S.A. v. Zhou, 2022 ONCA 602
Rivard v. Ontario, 2025 ONCA 100
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Police Liability, Civil Procedure, Pleadings, Particulars, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 8, 9, 12, Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, ss. 31(1), 31(3), 41, 50(1), Criminal Code, s. 25, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 21.01, 25.11, 25.06, Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, Guergis v. Novak, 2013 ONCA 449, Frank v. Legate, 2015 ONCA 631, Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, Connor v. Scotia Capital Inc., 2018 ONCA 73, R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42, Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, Miguna v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2005), 262 D.L.R. (4th) 222 (Ont. C.A.) (Miguna No. 1), Miguna v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2008 ONCA 799, 301 D.L.R. (4th) 540 (Miguna No. 2), Pringle v. London (City) Police Force, [1997] O.J. No. 1834 (C.A.), Haggerty v. Rogers, 2011 ONSC 5312, Solak v. Brantford Police Services Board, 2022 ONSC 4025, Rebello v. Ontario, 2023 ONSC 3574, Romagnuolo v. Hoskin, [2001] O.T.C. 673 (S.C.), Dawson v. Baker, 2017 ONSC 6477, Lilleyman v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 2024 ONCA 606, PMC York Properties Inc. v. Siudak, 2022 ONCA 635, Jensen v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., 2023 FCA 89, Castrillo v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, 2017 ONCA 121, Meekis v. Ontario, 2021 ONCA 534, Burns v. RBC Life Insurance Company, 2020 ONCA 347
Sundial Homes (Sharon) Limited v. Wei, 2025 ONCA 102
Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Remedies, Damages, Mitigation, Civil Procedure, Simplified Procedure, Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 76.13, Azzarello v. Shawqi, 2019 ONCA 820, Garisto v. Wang, 2008 ONCA 389, Michael Foulds & Peter Henein, eds., Watson & McGowan’s Ontario Civil Practice 2025 (Toronto: Carswell, 2024)
Short Civil Decisions
Wang v. Li, 2025 ONCA 101
Keywords: Family Law, Costs
MCC Mortgage Holdings Inc. v. Robinson, 2025 ONCA 104
Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment
Hamilton v. Vaughan, 2025 ONCA 98
Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Libel, Slander, Civil Procedure, Anti-SLAPP, Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.12, ss. 5(1), 6, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s.137.1(8), Levant v. Day, 2019 ONCA 244, Veneruzzo v. Storey, 2018 ONCA 688
Extreme Toronto Sports Club v. Razor Management Inc., 2025 ONCA 114
Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Canada Emergency Commercial Rent Assistance, Sattva Capital Corp v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53
CIVIL DECISIONS
Beaumont v. Beaumont, 2025 ONCA 94
[Hourigan, Wilson and Madsen JJ.A.]
Counsel:
J. Waxman and C. DeMarinis, for the appellants
L. Century and A. Chen, for the respondents
Keywords: Employment Law, Wages and Benefits, Remedies, Damages, Punitive Damages, Piercing Corporate Veil, Civil Procedure, Costs, Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 133(b), Boucher v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp., 2014 ONCA 419, O’Reilly v. ClearMRI Solutions Ltd., 2021 ONCA 385, Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18, Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, Baker v. Blue Cross Life Insurance Company of Canada, 2023 ONCA 842, NDrive Navigation Systems S.A. v. Zhou, 2022 ONCA 602
facts:
This appeal arose from litigation between family members related to a family business. At trial, the respondent sons testified that their father, one of the appellants who runs several companies including the appellant businesses, “banked” their earnings, with the intention that they would be paid at a later date. In contrast, the father testified that there was no plan to bank wages. Instead, he said that money advanced to his sons were loans from him and his wife, another appellant.
The trial judge accepted the respondent’s evidence that the payments were banked wages and found that the appellant father was liable. The trial judge also awarded the respondents $75,000 each in punitive damages and substantial indemnity costs of $302,189.99.
issues:
Did the motion judge err in:
- Characterizing the payments as banked wages instead of loans?
- Piercing the corporate veil?
- Awarding punitive damages?
- Awarding costs on a substantial indemnity basis?
holding:
Appeal dismissed.
reasoning:
No. The Court held that the appellant’s submission that the trial judge erred in characterizing the payments as banked wages instead of loans essentially asked the Court to reweigh the evidence and reach an alternate finding. The Court explained that this is not the role of an appellate court, but found, in any event, that the trial judge’s finding in this regard was well rooted in the evidence.
The Court disagreed with the appellant’s submission that the trial judge pierced the corporate veil. Instead, the Court explained that he correctly focused on whether the parties intended to contract about employment with each other: O’Reilly v. ClearMRI Solutions Ltd. The trial judge found that the appellant father exercised personal control over the respondents by, among other things, banking their earnings and paying them from his personal funds. Further, by suing personally for repayment he effectively sued to recover paid wages received by them. The Court held that this was clear and objective evidence that the appellant exercised personal control over the respondents as employees and personally acted as their employer. The trial judge also found that the respondents had established that they had a reasonable expectation that the appellant was a party to their employment contract. The Court concluded that there was no basis to interfere with those findings.
The Court held that there was no merit in the appellant’s submission with respect to punitive damages. The trial judge identified an independent actionable wrong in the employer’s failure to comply with the Employment Standards Act consistent with Boucher v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp. Further, the Court noted that the trial judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s conduct towards his employees and his sons “qualifies as harsh, offensive, and reprehensible by any measure” was borne out by the evidence and owed deference on appeal.
The Court also rejected the appellant’s submission on the quantum of punitive damages. As the Supreme Court stated in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance, “punitive damages are directed to the quality of the defendant’s conduct, not the quantity (if any) of the plaintiff’s loss.” Therefore, the Court held that the punitive damages awarded were reasonable, proportional, and rational.
The Court held that where an appeal from the main award is dismissed, the appellant needs leave to appeal the costs order pursuant to s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, which will not be granted except in obvious cases where the party seeking leave convinces the Court there are “strong grounds upon which the appellate court could find that the judge erred in exercising his discretion”: Baker. The Court explained that this test is designed to impose a high threshold because appellate courts recognize that fixing costs is highly discretionary and that trial judges are best positioned to understand the dynamics of a case and to render a costs decision that is just and reflective of what actually happened on the ground: Baker. The Court held that the appellants did not meet the onus, but that in any event, there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s costs award.
Rivard v. Ontario, 2025 ONCA 100
[George, Favreau and Gomery JJ.A.]
Counsel:
S. Zacharias, for the appellants
R. Boggs, for the respondent
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Police Liability, Civil Procedure, Pleadings, Particulars, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 8, 9, 12, Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, ss. 31(1), 31(3), 41, 50(1), Criminal Code, s. 25, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 21.01, 25.11, 25.06, Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, Guergis v. Novak, 2013 ONCA 449, Frank v. Legate, 2015 ONCA 631, Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, Connor v. Scotia Capital Inc., 2018 ONCA 73, R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42, Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, Miguna v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2005), 262 D.L.R. (4th) 222 (Ont. C.A.) (Miguna No. 1), Miguna v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2008 ONCA 799, 301 D.L.R. (4th) 540 (Miguna No. 2), Pringle v. London (City) Police Force, [1997] O.J. No. 1834 (C.A.), Haggerty v. Rogers, 2011 ONSC 5312, Solak v. Brantford Police Services Board, 2022 ONSC 4025, Rebello v. Ontario, 2023 ONSC 3574, Romagnuolo v. Hoskin, [2001] O.T.C. 673 (S.C.), Dawson v. Baker, 2017 ONSC 6477, Lilleyman v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 2024 ONCA 606, PMC York Properties Inc. v. Siudak, 2022 ONCA 635, Jensen v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., 2023 FCA 89, Castrillo v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, 2017 ONCA 121, Meekis v. Ontario, 2021 ONCA 534, Burns v. RBC Life Insurance Company, 2020 ONCA 347
facts:
This appeal concerned what must be pled to advance a negligence action against a chief of police and a police services board. The respondent alleged that he was assaulted and permanently maimed by police officers during his arrest in September 2018, and that the appellants were directly liable for his damages based on their failure to comply with their duties under the Police Services Act then in force. Justice McCarthy, writing for the Divisional Court, found that the respondent was advancing tenable claims and that the material allegations of fact in his pleading were sufficient to allow them to proceed. In doing so, the Divisional Court declined to find that the motion judge erred in his reliance on a decision staying criminal charges against the respondent due to police officers having violated his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms during his arrest. The police appealed.
issues:
- Did the Divisional Court err in considering Justice Tranmer’s decision staying the criminal charges in determining the appellants’ motion to strike?
- Did the Divisional Court err in finding that the respondent’s pleading advanced a tenable claim in negligence against the Chief of Police?
- Did the Divisional Court err in finding that the respondent had pleaded sufficient material allegations for a claim in negligence against the Chief?
- Did the Divisional Court err in allowing the respondent’s action in negligence to proceed against the Board?
holding:
Appeal allowed in part.
reasoning:
- No.
The Court explained that the motion judge referred to Tranmer J.’s findings primarily to address the appellants’ contention that the pleadings were “boiler plate”. While the Divisional Court acknowledged that this reference could have been misplaced, it did not prevent the motion judge from applying the correct legal test for assessing the sufficiency of the pleading. The motion focused on whether the material facts in the pleading, if proven, would support the respondent’s claims.
The Court held that the Divisional Court’s reasons did not rely on Tranmer J.’s decision. The Court noted that the purpose of pleadings under r. 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules is not to present evidence but to state material facts that, if proven, would substantiate the claim. The Court held that the Divisional Court properly assessed the tenability of the respondent’s claims based solely on the pleading, not on evidence or prior decisions. As a result, the Court rejected the appellants’ argument and upheld the Divisional Court’s approach.
- No.
The appellants argued that a claim against a police chief could only be adequately pleaded if the chief was directly involved in the officer misconduct or was “one step removed” due to an alleged failure that was factually tied to the officer’s actions. However, the Court noted that a claim could only be struck under rule 21.01(1)(b) if it was “plain and obvious” that there was no reasonable prospect of success: Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.; Guergis v. Novak; Frank v. Legate. The Court emphasized that the pleadings should be generously read, with the assumption that all factual allegations are true unless they are patently ridiculous or incapable of proof: Operation Dismantle v. The Queen; Hunt; McCreight; Connor v. Scotia Capital Inc; R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.
The Court did not accept the appellants’ position, explaining that the Divisional Court’s conclusion was consistent with the principles established in the Supreme Court’s decision in Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse and the Court’s decision in Miguna v Ontario and Miguna v Toronto Police Services Board. Contrary to the appellants’ submissions, the Court held that neither Odhavji nor Miguna stand for the proposition that a claim in negligence against a police chief is untenable unless the plaintiff alleges that the chief was directly implicated in officer misconduct.
The Court clarified that the appellants’ interpretation of Odhavji and Miguna was incorrect, noting that the “one step removed” language in Odhavji referred to the causal connection between a chief’s failure to supervise and the misconduct of police officers. This does not mean that a claim against a police chief is only viable when they are directly implicated in the misconduct. Instead, the Court explained that the key issue is whether the failure of the chief to properly supervise the officers could foreseeably lead to harm, as was the case in Odhavji.
The respondent’s allegations in his Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, which included claims of inadequate training, supervision, and discipline of officers, were found to meet the necessary criteria for a tenable negligence claim against the Chief. The Court agreed with the Divisional Court’s decision that these allegations, if proven true, could establish the Chief’s personal liability. The appellants’ challenge to the Divisional Court’s application of legal principles in its analysis was rejected, and the Court affirmed that the respondent’s negligence claim could proceed.
- No.
The Chief challenged the sufficiency of the material facts in the negligence claim, suggesting that the allegations were too vague and failed to comply with Rule 25.06(1). However, the Court reiterated that while this rule required concise statements of material facts, it did not mandate evidence at this stage. Citing Burns v RBC Life Insurance Company, the Court explained that the core test was whether the claim provided enough specificity for the defendant to understand what they had been accused of, and in what context. The Court emphasized that, in this case, the material facts alleged in the statement of claim were sufficient to notify the Chief of the case he had to meet.
In determining the sufficiency of the material facts, the Court clarified that a claim need not contain every piece of evidence at the pleading stage, as much of the evidence may be under the defendant’s control. Citing Miguna No. 2, the Court explained that a claim should provide enough detail to allow the defendant to respond, and that while some allegations in the respondent’s claim were more general, it was fair for the plaintiff to make such allegations at this stage due to the difficulty in obtaining certain documents and evidence from the defendants.
- Yes.
The Court found that the respondent’s allegations against the Police Services Board did not support a direct negligence claim and struck those allegations, leaving only a claim against the Board for vicarious liability for the conduct of the individual officers. Under s. 31(1) of the Police Services Act, a police services board is broadly responsible “for the provision of adequate and effective police services in the municipality”. Under s. 31(3), a board “may give orders and directions to the chief of police, but not to other members of the police force”. Notwithstanding this limitation, the Court explained that in addition to any direct liability that a board may incur for its own negligence, a board is “liable in respect of torts committed by members of the police force in the course of their employment” by virtue of s. 50(1) of the Police Services Act.
However, the Court held that the allegations made by the respondent were insufficient to support a direct negligence claim against the Board. The Court specifically noted that, although the Board is responsible for establishing policies and objectives for police services, it does not have a day-to-day role in managing officers, and thus, establishing a direct causal link between the Board’s actions or omissions and the respondent’s injuries was difficult. The Court cited Odhavji and clarified that the Board’s broad discretion in setting policies and its lack of direct involvement in operational policing made it unlikely for the Board to be directly responsible for any police misconduct. Consequently, the respondent’s allegations against the Board were insufficient to establish direct liability.
The Court focused on two of the respondent’s allegations claim were highlighted: (1) that the Board failed to adequately address systemic racism and excessive force within the police service, and (2) that the Board and Chief’s failure to address police brutality created a systemic problem. The Court found these allegations problematic because they were either unsupported by facts directly connecting the respondent to the broader claims, or they lacked context to prove that the Board was directly negligent.
Regarding the first claim, the Court noted that the respondent did not connect his own experience or racial identity to systemic issues of racism or excessive force, making it a weak basis for a direct negligence claim. For the second, the Court pointed out that the respondent had not identified any prior incidents of police brutality that would establish a pattern of misconduct or justify a finding of direct liability for the Board. As a result, the Court determined that these two allegations should be struck from the claim, leaving only the possibility of vicarious liability for the Board in relation to the actions of individual officers. Therefore, the Court ruled that the Divisional Court had erred in failing to strike these allegations, ultimately concluding that no direct negligence claim could be sustained against the Board based on the allegations in the Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.
Sundial Homes (Sharon) Limited v. Wei, 2025 ONCA 102
[Tulloch C.J.O., Paciocco and Nordheimer JJ.A.]
Counsel:
K.A. Dhirani and D. Nishiguchi, for the appellant/respondent by way of cross-appeal
L. Li and K. Ludwig, for the respondent/appellant by way of cross-appeal
Keywords:
Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Remedies, Damages, Mitigation, Civil Procedure, Simplified Procedure, Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 76.13, Azzarello v. Shawqi, 2019 ONCA 820, Garisto v. Wang, 2008 ONCA 389, Michael Foulds & Peter Henein, eds., Watson & McGowan’s Ontario Civil Practice 2025 (Toronto: Carswell, 2024)
facts:
Sundial Homes appealed the trial judge’s decision to award it damages arising from a failed agreement of purchase and sale (“APS”) for a new home, arguing that the trial judge erred in not including the sum of $32,763.06 in that award of damages. The respondent cross-appealed on two issues. He contended that the trial judge erred in her conclusion that the appellant had mitigated its damages and in her order of costs.
issues:
- Did the trial judge err in the quantum of damages awarded to the appellant?
- Did the trial judge err in concluding that the appellant had mitigated its damages and in her costs award?
holding:
Appeal dismissed. Cross-appeal allowed in part.
reasoning:
- No.
The parties agreed on the proper calculation of the damages but for $32,763.06 that the respondent paid on account of certain upgrades. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s claim for this amount, directly addressing the issue of whether the amount for these upgrades was “non-refundable” based on language contained in the appellant’s Standard Purchaser’s Extras form. The trial judge concluded that this issue had not been raised at trial and that it should not be considered after the trial decision had been released. She also found that the amount should be treated as a deposit in the same fashion as the other deposits had been treated.
The Court held that the appellant failed to show any error in the trial judge’s analysis and that she was entitled to conclude that there was no proper legal basis for treating the upgrades any differently than the other upgrades. The Court found that this led her to treat the amount in issue as a deposit like all the other deposits, and that there was no error in doing so.
- Cross-Appeal: No in respect of mitigation. Yes, in respect of costs.
The Court found that, in reaching her conclusion, the trial judge listed seven factors that she took into account in deciding whether the appellant’s efforts to mitigate were reasonable. She concluded that they were. In particular, she pointed to the downturn in the market; the appellant’s continuing marketing efforts; and the relatively quick resale of the house. The Court explained that the respondent was required to show a palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s factual findings on this issue. The Court concluded that the respondent failed to do so, and thus, the cross-appeal on the mitigation issue failed.
Regarding the costs appeal, the respondent argued that the trial judge erred in awarding costs for an ex parte motion, failing to consider settlement offers, not critically assessing the quantum of costs, and improperly applying Rule 76.13 of the Rules. The Court found it unnecessary to address the first three alleged errors, as the issue of Rule 76.13 was dispositive. The trial judge had initially invited the appellant to make brief submissions on costs arising from settlement offers, but later restricted costs submissions to that issue alone. The Court held that this limitation was inappropriate in the circumstances, as the potential applicability of Rule 76.13 only arose after damages were finalized.
The Court explained that Rule 76.13 mandates cost consequences when an action is brought under ordinary procedure instead of simplified procedure, and the final damages awarded fall below the prescribed threshold—$100,000 at the relevant time. Here, the appellant originally sought over $1.67 million in damages, justifying the use of ordinary procedure. However, after the property was resold, the potential damages significantly decreased. The Court emphasized that once the resale price was known, the appellant should have recognized that its net claim would fall close to or below the $100,000 threshold after deducting deposits: Azzarello v. Shawqi.
The Court was particularly critical of the appellant’s attempt to keep its damages claim above the threshold by claiming an 11.95% prejudgment interest rate from a standard form contract and treating certain home upgrades as non-refundable. Both claims were rejected by the trial judge. Given that the appellant recovered only $70,036.31 in damages, the Court held that the cost consequences under Rule 76.13 were triggered, barring the appellant from recovering costs unless it was reasonable to have continued under the ordinary procedure. The Court found that it was not reasonable for the appellant to do so, given the clear risk that the final damages would fall below the threshold.
The Court reiterated that the purpose of simplified procedure is to expedite litigation and reduce costs for lower-value claims: Garisto v. Wang. The Court also underscored that Rule 76.13’s mandatory cost consequences are essential for maintaining the integrity of the rules of simplified procedure and ensuring litigants are held accountable for improperly using the ordinary procedure.
SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS
Wang v. Li, 2025 ONCA 101
[Simmons, Coroza and Sossin JJ.A.]
Counsel:
F. W., acting in person
M. L., acting in person
Keywords: Family Law, Costs
MCC Mortgage Holdings Inc. v. Robinson, 2025 ONCA 104
[Nordheimer, Madsen and Pomerance JJ.A.]
Counsel:
P. M. R., acting in person
J. K., for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment
Hamilton v. Vaughan, 2025 ONCA 98
[Hourigan, Wilson and Madsen JJ.A.]
Counsel:
J. V., acting in person
C. D. Salazar, for the respondent
Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Libel, Slander, Civil Procedure, Anti-SLAPP, Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.12, ss. 5(1), 6, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s.137.1(8), Levant v. Day, 2019 ONCA 244, Veneruzzo v. Storey, 2018 ONCA 688
Extreme Toronto Sports Club v. Razor Management Inc., 2025 ONCA 114
Pepall, Paciocco and Sossin JJ.A.
Counsel:
J. Diacur, for the appellant
R. A. J. Pyne-Hilton, for the respondents
Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Canada Emergency Commercial Rent Assistance, Sattva Capital Corp v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53
The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.