In Rajic v. MacDonald, the Court held that the public interest threshold under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act is low and content-driven, and that even a private complaint can qualify where it raises broader concerns of interest to a community. The Court remitted the motion for rehearing by a different judge.

In InFrontier AF LP v Rahmani, the Court considered whether a foreign arbitral award should be refused recognition and enforcement under Articles V 1(d) and V 2(b) of the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, where the arbitration had been conducted under the DIAC Rules rather than the DIFC-LCIA Rules originally specified in the parties’ agreement. The Court upheld the application judge’s finding that the parties had agreed to arbitral rules that could be amended from time to time, and that the application judge was entitled to consider Dubai law in determining that the DIAC Rules were an amended version of the rules to which the parties had originally agreed. Thus, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that no error had been established under Article V 1(d) and that the public policy and procedural fairness arguments were meritless.

In 1396929 Ontario Inc. v. Valladares, the Court dismissed the appellants’ appeal from summary judgment against them for payment under a mortgage.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Rajic v. MacDonald, 2026 ONCA 288

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Civil Procedure, Anti-SLAPP, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 6, 137, Benchwood Builders, Inc. v. Prescott, 2025 ONCA 171, Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 645, 1704604 Ontario Ltd. V. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22,  Thorman v. McGraw, 2022 ONCA 851, Zeppa v. Rea, 2023 ONCA 668, 1704604 Ontario Ltd. V. Pointes Protection Association, 2018 ONCA 685, Mazhar v. Farooqi, 2021 ONCA 355, Galati v. Toews, 2025 ONCA 568, The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. West Face Capital Inc., 2023 ONCA 53, UM Financial Inc. v. Butler, 2025 ONCA 844

InFrontier AF LP v. Rahmani, 2026 ONCA 289

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Arbitration Clauses, Debtor-Creditor, Private International Law, Civil Procedure, International Commercial Arbitration, Foreign Arbitral Awards, Recognition and Enforcement, Arbitral Procedure, International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 2, Sched. 5, s. 2, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Articles V, V 1 b), V 1 d), V 2 b), UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Teal Cedar Products Ltd. v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 32, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, GreCon Dimter inc. v. J. R. Normand inc., 2005 SCC 46, Peace River Hydro Partners v. Petrowest Corp., 2022 SCC 41, Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Systems Inc., 623 F (3d) 832 (9th Cir. 2010), Union des consommateurs c. Dell Computer Corp., 2007 SCC 34, Corporacion Transnacional de Inversiones, S.A. de C.V. v. STET International, S.p.A., 45 O.R. (3d) 183 (S.C.), aff’d (2000) 49 O.R. (3d) 414 (C.A.), DFL v DFM, [2024] SGHC 71, aff’d [2024] SGCA 41, Baker Hughes Saudi Arabia Company Limited v. Dynamic Industries, Incorporated, 126 F (4th) 1073 (5th Cir. 2025), Clayton v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 581, Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 3rd ed. (Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1994), Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2014), Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958, (The Hague: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1981), International Council for Commercial Arbitration, ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention, 2nd ed. (2024)

1396929 Ontario Inc. v. Valladares, 2026 ONCA 282

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Defences, Independent Legal Advice, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Rozin v. Ilitchev et al. (2003), 175 O.A.C. 4, McDowell v. Fortress Real Capital Inc., 2019 ONCA 71

Short Civil Decisions

Riva Plumbing Limited v. Ferrari, 2026 ONCA 297

Keywords: Contracts, Sale of Business, Restrictive Covenants, Settlements, Economic Torts, Breach of Fiduciary Duty

CIVIL DECISIONS

Rajic v. MacDonald, 2026 ONCA 288

[Paciocco, Copeland and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Macdonald, T. Obradovic, and R. Davis, for the appellant

J. Samac, T. Mathews, N. Lagore and M. Mann, for the respondent

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Civil Procedure, Anti-SLAPP, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 6, 137, Benchwood Builders, Inc. v. Prescott, 2025 ONCA 171, Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 645, 1704604 Ontario Ltd. V. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22,  Thorman v. McGraw, 2022 ONCA 851, Zeppa v. Rea, 2023 ONCA 668, 1704604 Ontario Ltd. V. Pointes Protection Association, 2018 ONCA 685, Mazhar v. Farooqi, 2021 ONCA 355, Galati v. Toews, 2025 ONCA 568, The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. West Face Capital Inc., 2023 ONCA 53, UM Financial Inc. v. Butler, 2025 ONCA 844

facts:

The respondent, Fr. R., a Serbian Orthodox priest, swore an affidavit in 2022 in support of one party in a family law proceeding in which the appellant, RM, was the opposing party. Later that year, RM filed a complaint with the Serbian Orthodox Church’s ecclesiastical authorities alleging misconduct by Fr. R., which resulted in disciplinary action being taken against him.

Fr. R. subsequently commenced a defamation action against RM based on the contents of her complaint. RM responded by bringing an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, seeking to have the action dismissed on the basis that her expression related to a matter of public interest. The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the complaint did not meet the public interest threshold, and RM appealed.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in finding that the appellant’s expression did not relate to a matter of public interest under s. 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

Yes. The Court held that the motion judge made reversible legal errors in his analysis of the threshold requirement in s. 137.1(3), and that those errors were reviewable on a correctness standard. Although anti-SLAPP rulings are generally entitled to deference on appeal, the Court found that the motion judge’s reasons disclosed errors of law in how he understood and applied the “matter of public interest” requirement.

The Court focused on two main errors. First, the motion judge misread this Court’s decision in Benchwood Builders. He treated that case as having “put to rest” the idea that the public-interest threshold under s. 137.1(3) is low. The Court held that this was incorrect. Benchwood Builders did not raise the threshold; rather, it addressed a narrower point about whether online consumer reviews should automatically be treated as relating to matters of public interest. That case did not displace the settled principle, drawn from Pointes Protection, that the threshold burden under s. 137.1(3) is purposefully not onerous and does not involve any qualitative assessment of the value, merit, or correctness of the expression. The inquiry is simply whether the expression relates to a matter about which some segment of the community would have a genuine interest. By treating Benchwood Builders as authority for a higher threshold, the motion judge erred in law.

Second, the motion judge wrongly treated the private or limited dissemination of the complaint as effectively fatal to the public-interest inquiry. He repeatedly emphasized that the complaint had not entered the “public market square of ideas,” that there was no evidence the appellant intended it to reach a public forum, and that it had only been communicated to those within the church institution charged with receiving it. The Court held that this was inconsistent with governing authority. The relevant question is not how widely the expression was circulated, but what the expression is really about. Audience may be relevant contextually, but it is not determinative. Statements made to a small number of people (or even between two people) can still relate to matters of public interest if their subject matter is one in which some segment of the community would have a genuine interest. The Court relied on Pointes Protection, which expressly states that public interest does not turn on the size of the audience, and on later cases such as Mazhar and Galati, which recognized that confidential complaints to those in authority can satisfy s. 137.1(3).

The Court held that the motion judge therefore focused too heavily on the size and privacy of the audience and paid too little attention to the content of the appellant’s complaint. Read in context, the complaint was not confined to a private grievance arising from the family law proceeding. It also raised broader concerns about whether it was appropriate for a priest to take sides in litigation between church members rather than remain neutral, particularly without church approval; whether such conduct could harm the reputation of the Serbian Orthodox Church; and whether it could expose the church to litigation. Those concerns were capable of engaging the genuine interest of the church community and parishioners. In that sense, the complaint went beyond the appellant’s purely private interests and raised institutional and community concerns. The fact that those concerns were communicated to church authorities, rather than directly to the broader congregation, did not deprive them of their public-interest character.

The Court also emphasized that at the s. 137.1(3) stage there is no qualitative assessment of the expression. It was therefore irrelevant whether the appellant’s views about the priest’s conduct were correct, whether her allegations were true, or whether she was acting in good faith. Those questions belong elsewhere in the anti-SLAPP framework, not at the threshold public-interest stage. All that mattered for s. 137.1(3) was whether the complaint, viewed contextually, related to issues that some segment of the community would genuinely care about. The Court held that this low threshold was met.

The Court further noted that the complaint contained additional allegations, including accusations of corruptly receiving payment to swear a false affidavit, drug use, and tax fraud, some of which the appellant herself acknowledged were speculative. Even these allegations, however, touched on the respondent priest’s suitability to carry out the duties of his office and were made in the context of a complaint to ecclesiastical authorities. As such, they too arguably related to matters of public interest within the church community. In any event, expression can relate to more than one matter, and if at least one of those matters is of public interest, the moving party satisfies s. 137.1(3). Reading the complaint as a whole, the Court was satisfied that it qualified as expression relating to matters of public interest.

Having found reversible legal error at the threshold stage, the Court set aside the dismissal of the anti-SLAPP motion. It declined, however, to go on and decide the motion itself under s. 137.1(4). Because the motion judge had disposed of the matter at s. 137.1(3), he had never conducted the second-stage analysis, and the Court was not prepared to undertake that multi-stage inquiry as a court of first instance without full findings and reasons below. The motion judge’s comments about the apparent strength of the parties’ positions were not an adequate substitute for a proper s. 137.1(4) analysis. The motion was therefore remitted to be reheard by a different judge.

InFrontier AF LP v. Rahmani, 2026 ONCA 289

[Huscroft, Zarnett and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

E. Morgan and O. Wookey, for the appellant

M. D. Schafler and E. Cinar, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Arbitration Clauses, Debtor-Creditor, Private International Law, Civil Procedure, International Commercial Arbitration, Foreign Arbitral Awards, Recognition and Enforcement, Arbitral Procedure, International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 2, Sched. 5, s. 2, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Articles V, V 1 b), V 1 d), V 2 b), UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Teal Cedar Products Ltd. v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 32, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, GreCon Dimter inc. v. J. R. Normand inc., 2005 SCC 46, Peace River Hydro Partners v. Petrowest Corp., 2022 SCC 41, Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Systems Inc., 623 F (3d) 832 (9th Cir. 2010), Union des consommateurs c. Dell Computer Corp., 2007 SCC 34, Corporacion Transnacional de Inversiones, S.A. de C.V. v. STET International, S.p.A., 45 O.R. (3d) 183 (S.C.), aff’d (2000) 49 O.R. (3d) 414 (C.A.), DFL v DFM, [2024] SGHC 71, aff’d [2024] SGCA 41, Baker Hughes Saudi Arabia Company Limited v. Dynamic Industries, Incorporated, 126 F (4th) 1073 (5th Cir. 2025), Clayton v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 581, Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 3rd ed. (Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1994), Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2014), Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958, (The Hague: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1981), International Council for Commercial Arbitration, ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention, 2nd ed. (2024)

facts:

This appeal dealt with the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards in Ontario pursuant to the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “Convention”), which has force of law in Ontario through the International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017 (“ICAA”). Article V 1d) of the Convention states that recognition and enforcement may be refused where the resisting party establishes that the arbitral authority’s composition or the arbitral procedure used did not accord with the parties’ agreement, or failing such agreement, did not accord with the law of the nation where the arbitration was held. Additionally, under Article V 2b) recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused where an Ontario court finds that recognition or enforcement would violate Canadian public policy.

The appellant, RR, an Afghani citizen living in Ontario, founded a university and several schools in Afghanistan. Under a 2020 Term Loan Agreement (the “Agreement”), the respondent, a UK-based private equity firm, loaned a substantial amount to two of the schools, with RR guaranteeing repayment. When the Agreement was made, the Dubai International Financial Centre Arbitration Institute (“DIFC”) had partnered with the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), forming the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre (the “Centre”). The Centre’s Rules of Arbitration (the “DIFC-LCIA Rules”) contemplated that any agreement to arbitrate under them was to be read as agreeing to arbitrate using any amended version of the rules that the Centre might adopt. The Agreement provided for disputes resolved by DIFC arbitration held under the DIFC-LCIA Rules.

In 2023, the respondent instigated arbitration, alleging that the schools had defaulted on the loan. Notably, by this time the Dubai government had enacted Decree 34, a law that abolished the DIFC and replaced it with the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (“DIAC”). Under Decree 34, the rules used by the DIFC remained in force until new DIAC Rules came into effect, which occurred on March 21, 2022. On March 29, 2022, DIAC and LCIA issued a joint press release stating that all arbitrations commencing after March 21, 2022, under agreements naming the DIFC-LCIA Rules would be administered by the DIAC using the DIAC Rules, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Despite RR’s objections, an arbitrator was appointed and an arbitration conducted under the DIAC Rules. The arbitrator heard the dispute and made an award requiring that the schools and RR pay the respondent US$2.5 million (the “Award”). Subsequently, the respondent applied in the Superior Court for recognition and enforcement of the Award in Ontario.

The application judge recognized the Award as binding and enforceable in Ontario and ordered that RR pay the amounts owed. He rejected RR’s Convention arguments, namely that: 1) the arbitration did not accord with the parties’ agreement since it followed the DIAC Rules, not the DIFC-LCIA Rules, 2) procedural unfairness made RR unable to present his case, and 3) enforcing the Award would offend public policy. Although the Agreement explicitly specified the DIFC-LCIA Rules, the application judge observed that these rules themselves stated that any agreement to their application was an agreement to arbitrate according with the DIFC-LCIA Rules or “such amended version” of those rules as might be in place at the time of arbitration. Moreover, the application judge reviewed Decree 34 and the press release, concluding that Decree 34 replaced the DIFC-LFIA Rules with the DIAC Rules, which were, in effect, an amended version of the rules agreed to in the Agreement. It was thus unnecessary to determine whether distinctions between the DIFC-LCIA Rules and the DCIA Rules were material. Hence, RR failed to prove the refusal conditions from Article V 1d). RR’s public policy argument failed on similar grounds, and the application judge rejected his procedural unfairness argument since RR failed to show procedural injustice with regard to the arbitration’s duration, his legal representation or his access to documents.

issues:

1. Did the application judge err in his approach to Article V 1d) of the Convention by considering Dubai law, namely Decree 34?
2. Did the application judge err in recognizing and enforcing an award by an authority under an unfair procedure to which the parties did not consent, contrary to Ontario public policy and Articles V 1b) and V 2b) of the Convention?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. RR submitted that correctness was the applicable standard of review. He contended that the application judge erred in law since he did not compare the arbitral procedure that was followed with the Article V 1d) alternatives; the procedure established in the arbitration agreement, or absent an agreement the procedure under the law of the place of arbitration. RR asserted that since the Agreement specified arbitral procedure from the DIFC-LCIA Rules, the application judge should have solely considered whether such rules were followed. The application judge’s reliance on Dubai law was improper since the law of the place of arbitration in RR’s submission was irrelevant where parties have contracted for a specific arbitral procedure. The respondent characterized the application judge’s approach differently, submitting that the application judge correctly appreciated that he had to compare the actual procedure followed with the procedure agreed upon, and in doing so appropriately considered Decree 34.

After affirming the Convention’s role in facilitating parties’ autonomy to agree upon preferred arbitral procedure, the Court stated that the central issue was whether the arbitral procedure followed did not accord with the parties’ agreement. This analysis required interpreting the Agreement. The application judge noted that the Agreement specified the DIFC-LCIA Rules, and that those rules contemplated future amendments which would apply to parties who had specified the original rules. The Court affirmed that the application judge was entitled to find that the parties had not agreed upon a static set of rules, but rules that could be amended. Although the Court concurred with RR that the branches of Article V 1d) are mutually exclusive, it did not follow that, under the first branch, the law of the place of arbitration can never be relevant. Parties to an arbitration agreement are free to choose any procedures of their liking, including procedures based on local or foreign law. Here, the Agreement made the law of the place of arbitration relevant to the question of agreed upon-procedural rules. The application judge explained that he looked at Decree 34 since the DIFC Arbitration Centre, which enacted the DIFC-LCIA Rules, was subject to Dubai laws, including Decree 34, which expressly impacted these rules. This was not a legal error. Turning to RR’s assertion that the application judge erred by relying solely on Dubai law to find that the DIAC Rules were an amended version of the DIFC-LCIA Rules, the Court disagreed that the application judge had done so, holding that the application judge’s chain of analysis could be inferred from his reasons. The application judge mentioned the press release which clearly showed an adoption of the DIAC rules by the entity governing the parties’ arbitration.

RR further contended that the application judge failed to consider that the parties had “agreed otherwise” in the original Agreement by specifying the DIFC-LCIA Rules, ousting the application of the DIAC Rules. This argument was unpersuasive, since the application judge had reasonably interpreted “agreed otherwise” to mean an agreement made after the DIAC Rules came into effect. No such agreement was made.

2. No. First, the Court held that RR’s argument that the procedure followed was not consented to by the parties was derivative of its main Article V 1d) argument and failed for the same reasons. On public policy, case law confirmed that arbitral awards will not be recognized/enforced on a public policy basis only when the award offends the most basic principles of justice and fairness or where there is evidence of intolerable ignorance or corruption by the arbitral tribunal. The application judge made no reversible error in finding that such circumstances did not exist on these facts.

1396929 Ontario Inc. v. Valladares, 2026 ONCA 282

[Gillese, Madsen and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Sterns and S.R. Ramesh, for the appellants
A. Sidhu and B.S. Lailna, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Defences, Independent Legal Advice, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Rozin v. Ilitchev et al. (2003), 175 O.A.C. 4, McDowell v. Fortress Real Capital Inc., 2019 ONCA 71

facts:

On August 25, 2023, the respondent advanced the appellants $96,000 by way of a Second Mortgage registered against a house (the “Property”), with the appellant, L.V. as guarantor. The appellants had separate legal representation and signed a certificate confirming their lawyer had independently advised them of the rights, obligations, consequences and liabilities relating to the Second Mortgage. The appellants defaulted on the First Mortgage. The Second Mortgage matured on September 1, 2024, and was not paid out.

The respondent moved for summary judgment for the outstanding indebtedness and possession of the Property. The motion judge found that the appellants had: (1) admitted they executed the Second Mortgage documentation; (2) admitted having received the benefit of the Second Mortgage; (3) made proposals to pay off the Second Mortgage; and (4) defaulted under the Second Mortgage both by defaulting on the First Mortgage, which constituted default on the Second Mortgage, and by failing to pay off the Second Mortgage when it came due.

The motion judge rejected the claim that C.V. was the beneficial owner of the property, noting that she was not a party to the action nor a signatory to the Second Mortgage, and only signatories to a contract may sue or be sued under the contract. The motion judge also rejected the appellants’ submission that they did not understand the Second Mortgage documentation when they signed it because they did not speak English. Finally, the motion judge found the appellants had failed to adduce “any evidence” to suggest fraud, illegality or undue influence on the part of the respondent. Because the motion judge was satisfied that all persons in actual possession of the property had received notice of the proceeding, she granted the respondent leave to issue a writ of possession (the “Eviction Order”).

The appellants then moved to stay the Eviction Order pending appeal which was granted (the “Stay”). The judge concluded it was in the interests of justice to stay the Judgment pending appeal, on condition that the appellants amended their grounds of appeal to include the grounds raised before him. The appellants filed an amended notice of appeal in which they claimed they have limited or no proficiency in English and signed the Second Mortgage in circumstances that involved coercion, misunderstanding and deficient legal advice (their “claim”).

issues:

Did the motion judge fail to properly consider the circumstances in which the appellants entered into the Second Mortgage and that those circumstances raised genuine issues requiring a trial?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No.  The Court saw no basis for appellate interference with the Judgment. It fully supported the motion judge’s finding that there was “no evidence” of conflict of interest, improper tactics or other such circumstance. The appellants admitted that they signed the Second Mortgage and accepted the benefit of the funds. They also admitted they failed to pay out the Second Mortgage when it came due.

The Court also rejected the claim that they did not sufficiently understand the English language or the circumstances surrounding the Second Mortgage when they entered into it. First, the ILA Certificate was a standard document that confirmed the basis on which the appellants entered into the Second Mortgage. It includes their lawyer’s acknowledgement that he explained the terms of the Second Mortgage and their obligations under it to the appellants. The appellants made no claim against their lawyer nor did they seek to introduce fresh evidence on the appeal to show any wrongdoing on his part or to support any other aspect of their claim. As the motion judge correctly observed, a self-serving affidavit was not sufficient to create a triable issue in the absence of detailed facts and supporting evidence.

Second, the appellants’ evidence established that C.V. attended the meetings between the appellants and their lawyer and interpreted what was said for their benefit. Third, the claim rang hollow in light of the fact that title documents for the Property showed the appellants had executed at least six mortgages on this Property. This fact alone belied the appellants’ assertion that they did not understand mortgage documentation. Fourth, the appellants had every opportunity, prior to entering into the Second Mortgage and receiving the funds, to review the documentation and satisfy themselves as to its nature. Fifth, the appellants acknowledged that they tried to settle this matter by entering into a third mortgage with the respondent.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Riva Plumbing Limited v. Ferrari, 2026 ONCA 297

[George, Copeland and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Cuervo-Lorens and A. Stabb, for the appellants

W. MacDougall, for the respondents, A.F. and 531302 Ontario Inc.

J. Maggisano and V. Maggisano, for the respondents, Icon Plumbing and Heating Ltd., M.L. and J.F.

Keywords: Contracts, Sale of Business, Restrictive Covenants, Settlements, Economic Torts, Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.