In Heegsma v. Hamilton (City), the Court allowed an appeal by 14 unhoused people from the dismissal of their Charter challenge to the City of Hamilton’s by-law prohibiting tents and overnight stays in public parks. The Court ordered a new hearing before a different judge. The application judge had rejected the appellants’ evidence of overnight evictions because most of them had mental health or addiction issues. The Court held that relying on such stereotypes, and assessing credibility on a group basis, was an error of law. The Court also held that the application judge’s ss. 7 and 15 analyses were conclusory and did not apply the governing tests. He also erred in applying Canada (Attorney General) v. Power, which concerns legislation, to a municipal by-law. The Court held that Charter damages claims involving a by-law or its enforcement are governed by Vancouver (City) v. Ward. The Court declined to decide the Charter issues, or whether Victoria (City) v. Adams should be followed in Ontario, until a case comes up with a proper factual record. The matter was remitted to a rehearing by a new judge of the Superior Court.

In 2206747 Ontario Limited v. Webb, there was a failed purchase of a trailer park, resulting in a negligence claim against the appellant lawyer. The lawyer unsuccessfully argued before the motions judge and the Court that the claim was statute-barred. However, George J.A. dissented, finding that the claim was statute-barred.

In D.V. v. Cordocedo, the Court upheld a motion judge’s decision to reduce trial counsel’s contingency fee on the approval of a $12,750,000 birth injury settlement for a minor. The Court held that the reasonableness of a contingency fee must be assessed holistically, from the start of the retainer to the approval motion. The risk at the time of signing is important but not determinative. The Court rejected both a presumptively valid percentage-based fee and a presumption that a fair agreement yields a reasonable fee. Either would undermine the court’s parens patriae supervision, and fixing fee percentages is for the legislature. In this case, the parents of the minor had also been charged about $700,000 in fees outside the contingency fee agreement. The motion judge’s reduction of the contingency fee from over $2.5 million to $1.65 million was upheld. On the sealing order issue, the Court allowed the appeal in part and ordered that the parties’ names be initialized and certain identifying details be redacted to protect the minor plaintiff. It refused the broader redactions of the medical, damages, and settlement evidence.

In LAF Canada Company v. Woodbine Highway 7 Retail Inc., the Court dismissed the appellant landlord’s appeal of the application judge’s order that the force majeure clause in the parties’ contract operated to extend the parties’ lease, without rent owing, for a corresponding 348 days during which the facility was shut down due to COVID-19 government restrictions (during with time the tenant paid rent). The Court found that the application judge correctly interpreted the force majeure clause, identified the landlord’s obligation to provide premises for use as a health club and fitness facility, and concluded that the government-mandated COVID-19 restrictions prevented the landlord from performing that obligation, triggering the force majeure clause. As a result, the force majeure clause was properly invoked.

In Grillone (Re), the Court dismissed the moving party’s motion for an extension of time to perfect his appeal of an order declaring him as a vexatious litigant under s.140 of the Courts of Justice Act. While the Court found that the moving party met the first three factors of the test for an extension of time to perfect, the moving party’s appeal, including his claims that the motion judge erred in multiple respects of how he proceeded in designating him a vexatious litigant, had so little merit that the justice of the case warranted dismissal of the motion.

In Fernandez v. Norseman Inc., the Court dismissed an appeal from a summary judgment that dismissed the appellants’ action against a tent manufacturer. The appellants had earlier settled with the manufacturer’s dealer. The release they signed covered any claims relating to the product and its installation, and it also covered claims against anyone who could claim contribution or indemnity from the dealer, which included the manufacturer.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Heegsma v. Hamilton (City), 2026 ONCA 726

Keywords: Municipal Law, By-Laws, Enforcement, Torts, Trespass, Public Law, Constitutional Law, Charter Claims, Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the Person, Equality Rights, Charter Remedies, Damages, Poverty Law, Real Property, Housing, Civil Procedure, Applications, Evidence, Admissibility, Documents, Admissions, Authenticity, Hearsay, Public Documents Exception, Credibility, Sufficiency of Reasons, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7, 15, 24(1), Trespass to Property Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 51, Poff v. City of Hamilton, 2021 ONSC 7224, Canada (Attorney General) v. Power, 2024 SCC 26, Heegsma v. Hamilton (City), 2025 ONCA 554, Marketology Media Inc. v. DGA North American Inc., 2024 ONCA 799, R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, Ash v. Ontario (Chief Medical Officer), 2022 ONCA 849, Wunsche v. Wunsche (1994), 18 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), R. v. P. (A.) (1996), 109 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Caesar, 2016 ONCA 599, Canpotex Ltd. v. Graham (1985), 5 C.P.C. (2d) 233 (Ont. H.C.), Ontario v. Rothmans et al., 2011 ONSC 5356, Ontario v. Rothmans et al., 2013 ONCA 353, R. v. C.P., 2026 ONCA 333, R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 72, Victoria (City) v. Adams, 2009 BCCA 563, The Corporation of the City of Kingston v. Doe, 2023 ONSC 6662, The Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. Persons Unknown and to be Ascertained, 2023 ONSC 670, The Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. Persons Unknown and to be Ascertained, 2025 ONSC 4774, The Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. Named Respondents and Persons Unknown, 2026 ONSC 2971, Quebec (Attorney General) v. Kanyinda, 2026 SCC 7, Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, Mackin v. New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13, Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v. British Columbia, 2020 SCC 13, Brazeau v. Attorney General of Canada, 2020 ONCA 184, Francis v. Ontario, 2021 ONCA 197, Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Greater Winnipeg, [1971] S.C.R. 957, Nelson (City) v. Marchi, 2021 SCC 41

2206747 Ontario Limited v. Webb, 2026 ONCA 709

Keywords: Torts, Professional Negligence, Lawyers, Breach of Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Discoverability, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, ss. 4, 5, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21.01(1)(a), Salewski v. Lalonde, 2017 ONCA 515, Longo v. MacLaren Art Centre, 2014 ONCA 526, Albert Bloom Limited v. London Transit Commission, 2021 ONCA 74, Fercan Developments Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 ONCA 251, Fehr v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 2024 ONCA 847, Grant Thornton LLP v. New Brunswick, 2021 SCC 31, Gillham v. Lake of Bays (Township), 2018 ONCA 667, Ferrara v. Lorenzetti, Wolfe Barristers and Solicitors, 2012 ONCA 851, 407 ETR Concession Company Limited v. Day, 2016 ONCA 709, leave to appeal refused, [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 509, Crombie Property Holdings Ltd. v. McColl-Frontenac Inc., 2017 ONCA 16, Di Filippo v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2024 ONCA 33, Kaynes v. BP p.l.c., 2021 ONCA 36, Hamilton (City) v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corporation, 2012 ONCA 156, Davies v. Davies Smith Developments Partnership, 2018 ONCA 550, Smith v. Union of Icelandic Fish Producers Ltd., 2005 NSCA 145, Peixeiro v. Haberman, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 549, Brozmanova v. Tarshis, 2018 ONCA 523, Presidential MSH Corporation v. Marr Foster & Co. LLP, 2017 ONCA 325, Dass v. Kay, 2021 ONCA 565, Sosnowski v. MacEwen Petroleum Inc., 2019 ONCA 1005, A.I. Ogus, The Law of Damages (London, Butterworths, 1973), Victor Di Castri, The Law of Vendor and Purchaser, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2020)

D.V. v. Cordocedo, 2026 ONCA 705

Keywords: Contracts, Solicitor and Client, Contingency Fee Agreements, Civil Procedure, Persons Under Disability, Litigation Guardians, Settlements, Approval, Parens Patriae Jurisdiction, Sealing Orders, Open Court Principle, Appeals, Standard of Review, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 61, Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 24, Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 563/20, s. 6, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 135(1), (2), 137, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 7.08, Cannon v. Funds for Canada Foundation, 2013 ONSC 7686, Bonnick v. Krimker et al., 2025 ONSC 1151, Leduc (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dufour Estate, 2026 ONCA 3, Wu Estate v. Zurich Insurance Co. (2006), 268 D.L.R. (4th) 670 (Ont. C.A.), Bimman v. Igor Ellyn Professional Corp., 2022 ONCA 781, Cookish v. Paul Lee Associates Professional Corp., 2013 ONCA 278, Raphael Partners v. Lam (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), Krukowski v. Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, 2020 ONCA 631, Henricks-Hunter v. 814888 Ontario Inc. (Phoenix Concert Theatre), 2012 ONCA 496, Lima v. Kwinter, 2021 ONCA 47, Leduc v. Dufour, 2024 ONSC 6882, Laushway Law Office v. Simpson, 2011 ONSC 4155, Laushway Law Office v. Simpson, 2013 ONCA 317, R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, S.E.C. v. M.P., 2023 ONCA 821, Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Manitoba, 2021 SCC 33, Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43, P1 v. XYZ, 2022 ONCA 571, A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46, Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2018)

LAF Canada Company v. Woodbine Highway 7 Retail Inc., 2026 ONCA 708

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Force Majeure Clauses, Commercial Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7, s 20, Niagara Falls Shopping Centre Inc. v. LAF Canada Company, 2023 ONCA 159, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Teal Cedar Products Ltd. v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 32, Atlantic Paper Stock Ltd. v. St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp and Paper Company Limited, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 580, Windsor-Essex Catholic District School Board v. 2313846 Ontario Limited o/a Central Park Athletics, 2022 ONCA 235, Hudson’s Bay Company ULC v. Oxford Properties et al., 2021 ONSC 4515, aff’d Hudson’s Bay Company ULC Compagnie de la Baie D’Hudson SRI v. Oxford Properties Retail Holdings II Inc., 2022 ONCA 585, Porter Airlines Inc. v. Nieuport Aviation Infrastructure Partners GP, 2022 ONSC 5922

Grillone (Re), 2026 ONCA 720

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigants, Collateral Attack, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 140, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 3.02(1), Sergio Grillone (Re), 2023 ONSC 5710, Grillone (Re), 2024 ONCA 322, Bankruptcy of Sergio Grillone, 2025 ONSC 1259, Re Lang Michener et al. and Fabian et al. (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 353 (H.C.), College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario v. Yan, 2025 ONCA 520, 2363523 Ontario Inc. v. Nowack, 2018 ONCA 286, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Codina v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2020 ONCA 116, Ash v. Ontario (Chief Medical Officer), 2024 ONCA 398, Jodi L. Feldman Professional Corporation v. Foulidis, 2025 ONCA 150, Mahilum v. Consentino, 2024 ONCA 829, Derakhshan v. Narula, 2018 ONCA 658

Fernandez v. Norseman Inc., 2026 ONCA 716

Keywords:Contracts, Interpretation, Minutes of Settlement, Full and Final Releases, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Abuse of Process, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9

Short Civil Decisions

Komuro v. Lu, 2026 ONCA 718

Keywords:Family Law, Trials, In Absentia, Appeals, Extension of Time, Panel Review, Pomata Investment Corp. (Treasure Hill Homes) v. Yang, 2023 ONCA 618

Grace v. United Mexican States, 2026 ONCA 700

Keywords:International Trade Law, Contracts, Civil Procedure, International Commercial Arbitration, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32 I.L.M. 289 c. 11, International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 2, Sched. 5, s. 11, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 16(2)

1834537 Ontario Inc. v. Harmaz, 2026 ONCA 703

Keywords:Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Defences, Fraud, Forgery, Non Est Factum, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Procedural and Natural Justice, Evidence, Cross-Examinations, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33

Bradley Court Limited v. Tinkasimire, 2026 ONCA 724

Keywords: Real Property, Residential Tenancies, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, Frivolous, Vexatious, Abuse of Process, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.1, Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, Gao v. Ontario WSIB, 2014 ONSC 6497, Mohammad v. Bakr, 2024 ONCA 347

CIVIL DECISIONS

Heegsma v. Hamilton (City), 2026 ONCA 726

[Huscroft, Trotter, and Favreau JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

S. Choudry, S. Crowe, W. Poziomka and M. Kakkar, for the appellants

B. Shores, J. Diacur and J. King, for the respondent

A. Bolieiro and S. Badawi, for the intervener Attorney General of Ontario

S. Secter, for the intervener British Columbia Civil Liberties Association

M. Flynn and P. Doe, for the intervener Canadian Centre for Housing Rights

T.Q. Yang and N. Greckol-Herlich, for the intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association

R. Khawja and A. Krishna, for the intervener Ontario Human Rights Commission

A. Biscaro and E. Anschuetz, for the intervener Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund

A. Reeson, for the intervener Corporation of the City of Kingston

F. Fischer, M. Brady and M. Lowson, for the intervener City of Toronto

Keywords: Municipal Law, By-Laws, Enforcement, Torts, Trespass, Public Law, Constitutional Law, Charter Claims, Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the Person, Equality Rights, Charter Remedies, Damages, Poverty Law, Real Property, Housing, Civil Procedure, Applications, Evidence, Admissibility, Documents, Admissions, Authenticity, Hearsay, Public Documents Exception, Credibility, Sufficiency of Reasons, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7, 15, 24(1), Trespass to Property Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 51, Poff v. City of Hamilton, 2021 ONSC 7224, Canada (Attorney General) v. Power, 2024 SCC 26, Heegsma v. Hamilton (City), 2025 ONCA 554, Marketology Media Inc. v. DGA North American Inc., 2024 ONCA 799, R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, Ash v. Ontario (Chief Medical Officer), 2022 ONCA 849, Wunsche v. Wunsche (1994), 18 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), R. v. P. (A.) (1996), 109 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Caesar, 2016 ONCA 599, Canpotex Ltd. v. Graham (1985), 5 C.P.C. (2d) 233 (Ont. H.C.), Ontario v. Rothmans et al., 2011 ONSC 5356, Ontario v. Rothmans et al., 2013 ONCA 353, R. v. C.P., 2026 ONCA 333, R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 72, Victoria (City) v. Adams, 2009 BCCA 563, The Corporation of the City of Kingston v. Doe, 2023 ONSC 6662, The Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. Persons Unknown and to be Ascertained, 2023 ONSC 670, The Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. Persons Unknown and to be Ascertained, 2025 ONSC 4774, The Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. Named Respondents and Persons Unknown, 2026 ONSC 2971, Quebec (Attorney General) v. Kanyinda, 2026 SCC 7, Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, Mackin v. New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13, Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v. British Columbia, 2020 SCC 13, Brazeau v. Attorney General of Canada, 2020 ONCA 184, Francis v. Ontario, 2021 ONCA 197, Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Greater Winnipeg, [1971] S.C.R. 957, Nelson (City) v. Marchi, 2021 SCC 41

 FACTS:

The appellants were 14 people who lived in encampments in Hamilton at various times between August 2021 and August 2023. They challenged the respondent City’s parks by-law (the “By-law”) under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter. The By-law prohibited being in a park overnight and putting up tents or other structures in parks. The appellants also challenged the respondent’s removal of them from parks under its 2021 encampment process (the “2021 Encampment Process”). Under that process, by-law officers issued trespass notices and police responded under the Trespass to Property Act. The appellants sought declarations that the By-law was invalid and Charter damages under s. 24(1). A later protocol allowed tents in parks, subject to restrictions, but it was rescinded in March 2025. By the time of this appeal, the By-law‘s prohibition had come into effect again.

Many of the appellants had mental health conditions or addiction issues. Seven were Indigenous women, one was an Indigenous man, two were Black and one was a transgender woman. All reported being evicted from an encampment at least once, and four reported being evicted overnight.

Just before the hearing, the application judge struck three volumes of the respondent’s own documents that the appellants had put forward through requests to admit. He then dismissed the application. The application judge found that none of the appellants was removed from a park at night, and that s. 7 did not protect a right to shelter in parks during the daytime. He rejected the s. 15 claim on the basis that the appellants were disadvantaged by homelessness, not by the By-law. Relying on Canada (Attorney General) v. Power, the application judge also held that no damages would be available unless the respondent acted wrongly, in bad faith or in abuse of power. He found the respondent had not.

ISSUES:

1. Did the application judge err by excluding the documents the appellants sought to have admitted through their requests to admit?
2. Did the application judge err in finding that there were no overnight evictions?
3. Did the application judge err in his s. 7 Charter analysis?
4. Did the application judge err in his s. 15 Charter analysis?
5. Did the application judge err in holding that Charter damages are not available for breach of a by-law in the absence of a clear wrong, bad faith or an abuse of power?
6. What is the appropriate remedy?

HOLDING: Appeal allowed.

REASONING:

The Court held that reasons must set out a logical path from the evidence to the findings and conclusions. The application judge’s 14-page reasons on a 10,000-page record were conclusory on key issues. Since a new hearing was required, the Court did not address the appellants’ other evidentiary grounds, the s. 1 issue, or the respondent’s fresh evidence motion.

1. Yes.

The Court held that the application judge erred in striking the documents because they were not attached to an affidavit. Rule 51 applies to all proceedings, including applications, so no affidavit was required. However, the respondent’s admission of authenticity did not make the documents admissible for their truth. The application judge should have decided, document by document, whether each met the public documents exception to the hearsay rule. Under that exception, the document must be made by a public official, in the discharge of a public duty, intended as a permanent record, and available for public inspection.

The Court held that late delivery should not have been an obstacle to the documents’ admissibility. If lack of communication between the parties over the appellants’ intended use of the documents prejudiced the respondent, the application judge should have considered an adjournment rather than striking the documents. The Court rejected the respondent’s argument that the error did not affect the result. The application judge had said he relied on unidentified “public documents in the record”, so the ruling’s impact could not be known. On the rehearing, the appellants should identify the documents they seek to rely on.

2. Yes.

The application judge rejected the evidence of overnight evictions in two paragraphs. He reasoned that all but one of the appellants had mental health or addiction issues that “can affect perception and memory”. The Court held that assessing credibility and reliability on a group basis, without analyzing each appellant’s evidence, was an error. It held that relying on myths and stereotypes about mental illness and addiction was an error of law. Since the finding of no overnight evictions was central to the s. 7 conclusion, the error affected the whole decision. The Court declined the respondent’s invitation to conduct the credibility assessment itself.

3. Yes.

The Court held that the application judge did not set out or apply the s. 7 framework. To establish a breach of s. 7, the claimant had to show that state action deprived them of life, liberty or security of the person, and if so, that the deprivation was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. The application judge also did not consider the evidence on whether being unable to shelter in parks, including during the daytime, engaged s. 7. His view that homelessness, not the By-law, put people at risk did not engage with the issue. Under Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), state action need not be the dominant cause of the harm. Finally, the application judge’s analysis also conflated s. 7 and s. 1. He improperly weighed competing social interests and the public benefit of preserving parks under s. 7, when those interests should have been considered under s. 1.

The Court declined to decide whether the removal of unhoused persons from public parks breached s. 7 or to prescribe a framework for these cases. It noted that Victoria (City) v. Adams was the leading appellate authority and that recent Superior Court decisions generally followed it. The Court had not yet decided whether Adams should be followed in Ontario. The Court held that guidance on the protection s. 7 may offer should come with the benefit of a lower court decision that applied the s. 7 framework to a properly constituted factual record.

4. Yes.

The Court held that the application judge did not apply the s. 15 test reaffirmed in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Kanyinda. The claimant must show that the law disproportionately affects a protected group, and that the distinction reinforces, perpetuates or exacerbates that group’s disadvantage. Without deciding whether there was a breach, the Court found it a clear error to conclude without any s. 15 analysis that the By-law had no differential impact. The respondent’s own evidence of overcapacity in women’s shelters suggested a possible differential impact on women.

5. Yes.

The Court held that Power concerned Charter damages for unconstitutional legislation, not for municipal by-laws or their enforcement. Those claims were governed by Vancouver (City) v. Ward. The application judge did not apply the second and third steps of Ward or analyze the difference between legislation and by-laws. The Court noted that limiting municipal liability for an unconstitutional by-law may be appropriate because municipalities have good faith immunity for policy-making outside the Charter context. However, any such limit could not rest on legislative sovereignty and parliamentary privilege as in Power. The application judge’s reasons also confused the distinction between an unconstitutional by-law and its unconstitutional enforcement. Distinguishing the nature of the breach was crucial to the proper analysis as the Supreme Court set out in Ward.

6. The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The Court declined to grant declaratory relief or damages because the issues required findings of fact, including findings on credibility. It would have been inappropriate for the Court to substitute its own decision on the merits. The Court also declined to give general guidance beyond its reasons. It remitted the application to the Superior Court to be heard by a different judge. That judge was to make fresh findings, reassess the expert evidence and apply the ss. 7 and 15 frameworks. If the judge found a breach, the judge would then consider s. 1 and any remedy.

The Court noted that the conduct the appellants sought to challenge had been a “moving target”. Even on appeal, the appellants could not clearly say whether they challenged the By-law, the 2021 Encampment Process, or specific evictions. On the rehearing, the appellants had to clearly define what they were challenging. 

2206747 Ontario Limited v. Webb, 2026 ONCA 709

[Huscroft, George, Wilson JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

D. Zacks, A. Li, and A.D. Powell, for the appellant

T. Falldien, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Professional Negligence, Lawyers, Breach of Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Discoverability, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, ss. 4, 5, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21.01(1)(a), Salewski v. Lalonde, 2017 ONCA 515, Longo v. MacLaren Art Centre, 2014 ONCA 526, Albert Bloom Limited v. London Transit Commission, 2021 ONCA 74, Fercan Developments Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 ONCA 251, Fehr v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 2024 ONCA 847, Grant Thornton LLP v. New Brunswick, 2021 SCC 31, Gillham v. Lake of Bays (Township), 2018 ONCA 667, Ferrara v. Lorenzetti, Wolfe Barristers and Solicitors, 2012 ONCA 851, 407 ETR Concession Company Limited v. Day, 2016 ONCA 709, leave to appeal refused, [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 509, Crombie Property Holdings Ltd. v. McColl-Frontenac Inc., 2017 ONCA 16, Di Filippo v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2024 ONCA 33, Kaynes v. BP p.l.c., 2021 ONCA 36, Hamilton (City) v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corporation, 2012 ONCA 156, Davies v. Davies Smith Developments Partnership, 2018 ONCA 550, Smith v. Union of Icelandic Fish Producers Ltd., 2005 NSCA 145, Peixeiro v. Haberman, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 549, Brozmanova v. Tarshis, 2018 ONCA 523, Presidential MSH Corporation v. Marr Foster & Co. LLP, 2017 ONCA 325, Dass v. Kay, 2021 ONCA 565, Sosnowski v. MacEwen Petroleum Inc., 2019 ONCA 1005, A.I. Ogus, The Law of Damages (London, Butterworths, 1973), Victor Di Castri, The Law of Vendor and Purchaser, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2020)

FACTS:

In 2009, the respondents, 2206747 Ontario Limited and its director, Mr. M, retained the appellant lawyer, Mr. Y, to take care of the purchase of a property operating as a trailer park, including the transfer of title in the property, which was set to close on October 1. Immediately upon signing the agreement in mid-September, the respondents paid $50,000 towards the tax arrears and paid further expenses thereafter. The transaction did not close on October 1.

In November 2009, the Ministry of Natural Resources (the “MNR”) met with Mr. M to discuss an outstanding work order on the property. The trial judge found that at this meeting, Mr. M learned that the Ws were still the registered owners of the property. Over two years later, on December 15, 2011, Mr. M received a notice that the property had been sold to third parties.

The respondents sued the appellant lawyer, alleging he had failed to complete registration of the transfer of title in the property, that he did not properly advise them about material issues relevant to the transaction and transfer, and that he failed to produce his real estate file when requested. The appellant pleaded that the action was statute-barred.

The trial judge found that there was no reason for Mr. M to have known in November 2009 that the eventual closing of the transaction was in jeopardy, that the property could be sold to someone else or that the payment he had made for the tax arrears could be lost. The trial judge determined that the claim against the appellant was not statute-barred.

ISSUE:

Did the trial judge err in finding that the claim against the appellant was not statute-barred?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

Majority (Wilson J.A.)

No.

It was unnecessary and unhelpful to focus on the distinction between “damage” and “damages” to determine when the limitation period starts to run in this matter. The facts of the case had to be considered in light of the requirements of ss. 5(1)(a)(i)-(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002 to determine when the respondents knew or reasonably ought to have known they had suffered damage or loss caused by the appellant and that a lawsuit would be an appropriate way to remedy it.

A limitation period does not start to run until a plaintiff or a reasonable person in the circumstances of the plaintiff knew or ought to have known that: (a) injury, loss or damage occurred; and (b) it was caused or contributed to by the act or omission of someone against whom a claim is made; and (c) a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy it.

The appellant argues that the respondents knew that they had suffered damage caused by the appellant when Mr. M learned in November 2009 that title had not been transferred and that they ought to have commenced a claim against the appellant at that time.

The Court disagreed with this for two reasons. First, the evidence in this case did not support that finding. Second, it was not sufficient under s. 5(1) of the Limitations Act, 2002 that a claimant knows there is some sort of problem for the limitation period to start to run.

Mr. M testified that when he was told the Ws were still the registered owners of the property at the meeting in November 2009, he did not think that the purchase was in jeopardy. He understood that the Ws, who were accepting his money and encouraging him to move forward, could not sell the property to anybody else because of the agreement. Mr. M was taking steps associated with ownership and the MNR dealt with him exclusively on the work order issue.

Furthermore, the evidence about the respondent’s relationship with the appellant did not support a finding that, after learning in November 2009 that title had not been transferred, the respondents knew they had suffered damage caused by the appellant and ought to have commenced a claim against him. The respondents had retained the appellant to complete the purchase of the property and Mr. M’s evidence was that the appellant never told him that there were any issues with the transaction, never advised them they needed to get their name on title, and never demanded funds from them to close the transaction. The appellant also continued to represent the respondents in relation to the property and was compensated for his services. The respondent (or a reasonable person in his circumstances) would not have appreciated that the deal was in jeopardy:  Mr. M still believed that the Ws could not sell to anyone else under the signed agreement and was continuing to manage and make payments towards the property.

In any event, even if there was some basis for concluding that the respondents knew at that time that they had suffered damage, the evidence could not support a finding that they knew that a claim against their lawyer would be an appropriate means to seek a remedy.

The Court did not agree that as of the MNR meeting in November 2009, the respondents knew or ought to have known that: (a) they had suffered damage; (b) the damage was caused by something the appellant did or failed to do; and (c) bringing a claim against the appellant was appropriate.

Dissent (George J.A.)

Yes.

The respondents discovered their claim in November 2009, when Mr. M learned that the appellant had failed to close the real estate transaction and register the transfer of title.

What is the standard of review?

Where there is an extricable error in principle, the standard of review is correctness. George J.A. agreed with the appellant that the standard of correctness applied because the alleged error turned on a question of law.

What is the difference between “damage” and “damages” under the law of limitations?

The court in Hamilton (City) v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corporation described the difference between the meaning of “damage” and “damages”, stating, “Damage is the loss needed to make out the cause of the action. […] Damages on the other hand, is the monetary measure of the extent of that loss. All that the City had to discover to start the limitation period was damage.” Only “some damage”, and not the full extent of the damage, is sufficient to start the limitations clock. A plaintiff discovers that they have a claim when they have knowledge, either actual or constructive, “of the material facts upon which plausible inference of liability on the defendant’s part can be drawn” (Grant Thornton LLP v New Brunswick).

What does the difference between “damage” and “damages” mean in the context of this appeal?

In November 2009, the respondents knew or ought to have known the material facts upon which a plausible inference of liability on the appellant’s part could be drawn. This is because the respondents retained the appellant to complete the real estate transaction in question and register the ownership. The appellant did not do what he was retained to do, and, as a result, the respondents did not receive title. When the respondents learned in November 2009 that they did not own the property, and having previously thought they were the legal owners, their position changed for the worse. This is “damage” as it is understood in our jurisprudence.

The alleged negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty stemmed from the fact the respondents did not receive title which was the very thing that they retained the appellant to assist them with. The claim was discovered when Mr. M found that the appellant failed to do what he had been retained to do. The fact that Mr. M proceeded as if the transaction would eventually close and that the issue would resolve did not detract from him having knowledge of some damage from which the respondents could plausibly infer liability on the part of the appellant.

The respondents had knowledge of “some” damage caused by the appellant in November 2009, which is when the limitations clock began to run.

Is the fact the respondents learned of “damage” in November 2009 sufficient to dispose of this appeal?

Section 5(1)(a) of the Limitations Act, 2002 operates conjunctively, meaning that discovery requires knowledge of all elements listed in the subsection. George J.A. accepted the appellant’s submission that appropriateness – whether a proceeding is an appropriate means to seek to remedy the damage – did not arise on this appeal.

The appellant was retained to assist in a real estate transaction and he failed to register ownership to the property. The respondents then learned that they were not the registered owners of the property but proceeded as if they were, simply believing that the deal would eventually close. Once the respondents knew that the appellant had not registered title as required by the agreement, a court proceeding was the appropriate means to seek redress.

D.V. v. Cordocedo, 2026 ONCA 705

[Fairburn A.C.J.O., Rouleau, and Roberts JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

R.H. Shekter, L. Kilroy and B. Legate, for the appellants

J.Y. Obagi and E.A. Quigley, for the intervener Ontario Trial Lawyers Association

No one appearing for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Solicitor and Client, Contingency Fee Agreements, Civil Procedure, Persons Under Disability, Litigation Guardians, Settlements, Approval, Parens Patriae Jurisdiction, Sealing Orders, Open Court Principle, Appeals, Standard of Review, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 61, Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 24, Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 563/20, s. 6, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 135(1), (2), 137, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 7.08, Cannon v. Funds for Canada Foundation, 2013 ONSC 7686, Bonnick v. Krimker et al., 2025 ONSC 1151, Leduc (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dufour Estate, 2026 ONCA 3, Wu Estate v. Zurich Insurance Co. (2006), 268 D.L.R. (4th) 670 (Ont. C.A.), Bimman v. Igor Ellyn Professional Corp., 2022 ONCA 781, Cookish v. Paul Lee Associates Professional Corp., 2013 ONCA 278, Raphael Partners v. Lam (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), Krukowski v. Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, 2020 ONCA 631, Henricks-Hunter v. 814888 Ontario Inc. (Phoenix Concert Theatre), 2012 ONCA 496, Lima v. Kwinter, 2021 ONCA 47, Leduc v. Dufour, 2024 ONSC 6882, Laushway Law Office v. Simpson, 2011 ONSC 4155, Laushway Law Office v. Simpson, 2013 ONCA 317, R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, S.E.C. v. M.P., 2023 ONCA 821, Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Manitoba, 2021 SCC 33, Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43, P1 v. XYZ, 2022 ONCA 571, A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46, Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2018)

FACTS:

The minor appellant suffered severe birth asphyxia during his delivery in 2017. This caused permanent injuries to his brain and motor function, and he requires 24/7 care. His parents signed a contingency fee agreement with trial counsel to pursue a claim against the respondent midwives. It provided for a fee of 35% of any recovery before the action was set down for trial, and 40% after. The action claimed over $28 million in damages.

The action settled three months before a seven-week trial. The respondent midwives agreed to pay an all-inclusive $12,750,000. Trial counsel had docketed 2,208.37 hours, or $550,145.90 in fees before HST. They voluntarily reduced their contingency fee from 40% to just under 26%. On that basis, they proposed a fee for the minor appellant of $2,503,734.03 plus HST.

On a motion under r. 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion judge approved the settlement. She found that the contingency fee agreement was fair when the parties entered into it. However, she found the proposed fee for the minor appellant “too high” because the case was only “somewhat risky”. She reduced the fee to $1,650,000, which was about a 34% reduction and roughly three times counsel’s docketed fees. She also dismissed the appellants’ request for a sealing order. She did not address their alternative request to initialize names and redact the record.

Trial counsel appealed the fee assessment, and the appellants took no position on it. The appellants appealed only the failure to initialize and redact the record.

ISSUES:

1. Did the motion judge err by not approving the proposed counsel fee?
2. Did the motion judge err by failing to initialize and redact the record?

HOLDING: Appeal allowed in part.

REASONING:

1. No.

The Court held that a motion judge’s assessment of a proposed counsel fee attracted considerable deference, absent palpable and overriding error or an error in principle. The Court noted that this deference flowed from the court’s broad supervisory role. That role derives from its parens patriae jurisdiction over settlements involving persons under disability. Under the Contingency Fee Agreements regulation (the “CFA Regulation”), a contingency fee agreement signed by a litigation guardian is unenforceable unless the court approves it. The solicitor bears the onus of showing that the agreement is fair and reasonable under s. 24 of the Solicitors Act. Fairness is assessed as of the date the agreement was signed, while reasonableness is assessed as of the date of the hearing.

The Court rejected trial counsel’s reading of Leduc (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dufour Estate. Trial counsel argued that Leduc made the risk at the time of signing the only relevant risk. The Court held that the relevant passage in Leduc was obiter. It corrected a motion judge who had focused only on the risk of non-payment at the end of the retainer. The Court noted that the motion judge in Laushway Law Office v. Simpson had likewise not treated risk as a static factor.

The Court held that risk at the outset was important but could not overwhelm the analysis, because risk evolves as the litigation progresses. The analysis had to remain holistic. It must consider the beginning of the retainer, the progress of the proceeding and the proposed outcome.

The Court refused to adopt the presumptively valid percentage-based fee that trial counsel proposed. The Court held that such a model would undermine the court’s parens patriae supervision. It also held that mandating percentage-based fees was a matter for the legislature, not the courts. The Court also rejected the intervener’s proposed rebuttable presumption that a fair agreement produces a reasonable fee. It held that fairness and reasonableness under s. 24 are not synonymous.

Applying these principles, the Court found no error in the reduction. The reasons were sufficient, as the finding that the case was only “somewhat risky” explained why the fee was “too high”. That finding rested on three points, all of which were open for the motion judge to make: the midwives had no expert opinion that they met the standard of care during the critical period before the minor appellant’s birth, the damages case was not very risky given the range of damages proposed by the defendants’ experts, and causation was not disputed among the experts.

The motion judge also properly considered both the risk at the outset and how the file evolved up to the approval motion. The Court held that the $1,650,000 fee was reasonable and would not undermine contingency fee agreements or access to justice. This was especially so since counsel also charged over $700,000 in fees to the minor appellant’s parents.

2. Yes.

Since the motion judge did not address the alternative relief, the Court considered it afresh. The Court held that the open court principle applies to r. 7.08 settlement approval motions. Any limit on openness accordingly had to meet the Sherman Estate v. Donovan test.

At the first stage, the Court found that protecting the minor appellant’s identity was an important public interest at serious risk. Although the minor appellant was physically vulnerable, his intellect was believed to be intact, and he was adept with computers. Given the size of the settlement, he was particularly susceptible to online predation. The Court also noted expert evidence on the possible harm to his mental health. It held that protecting his identity necessarily extended to his parents’ names.

At the second stage, the Court held that initializing the names and redacting addresses, school name, date of birth and other identifying information was the least restrictive measure needed. The appellants’ broader requested redactions went beyond what was necessary to protect the minor appellant. Those requests covered medical and expert evidence, damages reports and the settlement details.

At the third stage, the Court held that the benefits of the order outweighed its negative effects on court openness because the public kept access to the substantive record. The parties were directed to prepare the initializations and redactions for the motion judge’s approval.

LAF Canada Company v. Woodbine Highway 7 Retail Inc., 2026 ONCA 708

[Thorburn, Gomery and Dawe JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

B.N. Radnoff and J. Kim, for the appellant

J. Haylock and E. Young, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Force Majeure Clauses, Commercial Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7, s 20, Niagara Falls Shopping Centre Inc. v. LAF Canada Company, 2023 ONCA 159, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Teal Cedar Products Ltd. v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 32, Atlantic Paper Stock Ltd. v. St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp and Paper Company Limited, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 580, Windsor-Essex Catholic District School Board v. 2313846 Ontario Limited o/a Central Park Athletics, 2022 ONCA 235, Hudson’s Bay Company ULC v. Oxford Properties et al., 2021 ONSC 4515, aff’d Hudson’s Bay Company ULC Compagnie de la Baie D’Hudson SRI v. Oxford Properties Retail Holdings II Inc., 2022 ONCA 585, Porter Airlines Inc. v. Nieuport Aviation Infrastructure Partners GP, 2022 ONSC 5922

FACTS:

The respondent tenant, LAF Canada Company, leased premises from the appellant landlord, Woodbine Highway 7 Retail Inc., to operate a fitness facility. During the COVID-19 pandemic, following government restrictions, the facility shut down for 348 days. The respondent tenant continued to pay rent during this period.

Section 1.9 of the lease provided that the “Primary Uses” of the premises “shall be for the operation of a health club and fitness facility…”. Section 22.3 of the lease contained a force majeure clause, providing that if either party was delayed, hindered in or prevented from the performance of any act required under the lease because of “restrictive laws”, the performance of such act was “excused for the period of delay caused by the Force Majeure Event” and the “period for the performance of such act” was “excused for the period of delay” and “extended for an equivalent period”.

The appellant landlord appealed the application judge’s order that the force majeure clause in the parties’ contract operated to extend the parties’ lease, without rent owing, for the 348 days in which the facility was shut down due to COVID-19 government restrictions.

ISSUES:

1. Did the application judge err in her interpretation of the lease?
2. Did the application judge err in finding that the court’s decision in Niagara Falls Shopping Centre Inc. v. LAF Canada Company was determinative, or alternatively, should the application judge have declined to apply Niagara on the basis that it was wrongly decided? and
3. Did the application judge fail to consider that her decision was commercially unreasonable and would create a new obligation for commercial landlords in Ontario, regardless of what their leases provided?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

1. No. 

The application judge made no palpable and overriding error in interpreting the lease.

The Court disagreed with the appellant landlord’s submission that the application judge was incorrect in finding that the force majeure clause was triggered. The Court held that whether a particular event triggers a force majeure clause depends on the wording of the clause and the event in question, and no independent contractual breach on the part of the landlord is required to invoke the force majeure clause. Only two factors are required: (1) a party must be delayed, hindered, or prevented from performing an act required under the lease; and (2) failure must result from a force majeure event. “Restrictive laws” were clearly a force majeure event under section 22.3 of the lease. The operation of an in-person fitness facility was required under the lease, and the landlord was required to provide premises for use as an in-person fitness facility. Therefore, the force majeure clause was properly invoked.

The appellant’s proposed alternative of virtual programming flied in the face of the text of the lease contemplating a “health club and fitness facility operated within the Premises”. The Court held that changing to ancillary uses would not have fulfilled the commercial purpose of the tenancy and was inconsistent with the agreement as a whole. There was no palpable and overriding error in the application judge’s decision that the landlord’s primary obligation under the lease was to provide premises to the respondent tenant for use as a fitness facility.

The COVID-19 pandemic and resultant government restrictions rendered the premises unfit for the primary uses contemplated in the lease and, as such, constituted a force majeure event, and prevented the landlord from performing its contractual obligation to provide premises fit for the primary uses constituting the central purpose of the lease. The force majeure clause addressed the circumstances which transpired such that the lease was extended for the 348-day duration of the government-mandated closures. Because the tenant had already paid rent for that period, the application judge correctly held that the tenant owed no rent for the 348-day extension.

2. No. 

The Court rejected the appellant landlord’s submission that Niagara was wrongly decided and found that its reasoning applied in this case. In Niagara, the Court considered a substantively similar force majeure clause involving a fitness facility owned by the same tenant, subject to the same COVID-19 restrictions. In that decision, the Court held that “the motion judge made no error” in finding that government restrictions constituted a force majeure event triggering the operation of the force majeure clause, and that the restrictions “prevented the Landlord from performing its obligation under the lease to provide the Premises for use as a fitness facility”. The Court upheld the motion judge’s determination that the landlord was required to provide premises upon which a health club could operate in-person. The fact that the landlord did not itself impose the closure, prevent access to the premises, or intentionally interfere with the tenant’s business did not change the analysis in Niagara. The Court found that the decisions cited by the landlord to suggest that Niagara was wrongly decided were distinguishable and concluded that the reasoning in Niagara applied in this case.

3. No. 

The Court disagreed with the appellant landlord’s claim that the application judge’s interpretation was commercially unreasonable and would create a new obligation for commercial landlords, regardless of what their leases provide. The terms of the lease specifically envisaged a rent-free extension for the period during which the force majeure clause operated. When entering into the lease, the parties clearly contemplated that, should the circumstances arise such that the force majeure clause was invoked, this would be the result. The result was particular to the wording in this contract.

Grillone (Re), 2026 ONCA 720

[Monahan J.A. (Motion Judge)]

COUNSEL:

S.G., acting in person

K. Kraft, for the responding party/respondent Bluecore Capital Inc.

Keywords : Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigants, Collateral Attack, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 140, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 3.02(1), Sergio Grillone (Re), 2023 ONSC 5710, Grillone (Re), 2024 ONCA 322, Bankruptcy of Sergio Grillone, 2025 ONSC 1259, Re Lang Michener et al. and Fabian et al. (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 353 (H.C.), College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario v. Yan, 2025 ONCA 520, 2363523 Ontario Inc. v. Nowack, 2018 ONCA 286, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Codina v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2020 ONCA 116, Ash v. Ontario (Chief Medical Officer), 2024 ONCA 398, Jodi L. Feldman Professional Corporation v. Foulidis, 2025 ONCA 150, Mahilum v. Consentino, 2024 ONCA 829, Derakhshan v. Narula, 2018 ONCA 658

FACTS:

The moving party, S.G., was a former lawyer whose license to practice law was revoked by the Law Society of Ontario following professional misconduct findings. Following the application of the responding party, Bluecore Capital Inc., one of S.G.’s creditors, S.G. was adjudged a bankrupt on October 12, 2023 (“the Bankruptcy Order”).

S.G. appealed the Bankruptcy Order to the Court and subsequently brought several related motions, beginning extensive proceedings where he challenged the Bankruptcy Order without success. S.G. continued to attack the Bankruptcy Order through motions alleging fraud and seeking contempt findings against Bluecore and its counsel. These motions were repeatedly found to be frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process. As a result, Bluecore brought a motion seeking an order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act (“CJA”) declaring S.G. to be a vexatious litigant. The motion judge reviewed the judicial findings in the 17 prior decisions (the “Prior Decisions”) relating in some way to S.G.’s bankruptcy. He found that S.G.’s behaviour met virtually all the indicia of vexatious litigation from Lang Michener and relied on multiple judicial findings of S.G.’s improper conduct. S.G.’s frivolous and vexatious conduct formed a persistent pattern, thereby justifying the s. 140 order (the “s. 140 Order”).

S.G. filed a Notice of Appeal on February 23, 2026, but did not perfect his appeal within 30 days as required by the Rules. Despite being provided notice from the Registrar that his appeal would be dismissed if not perfected by May 19, 2026, S.G. served his materials and amended materials on May 21 and May 25. On June 12, 2026, S.G. was informed that if he wanted to perfect his appeal, he would need to bring a motion seeking an extension of time. On August 19, 2026, S.G. obtained an order from a Superior Court judge granting him leave to seek an extension of time to perfect his appeal. S.G. accordingly brought a motion for an extension of time to perfect his appeal of the s.140 Order designating him as a vexatious litigant.

ISSUE:

Should S.G.’s extension of time to perfect his appeal of the s.140 Order be granted?

HOLDING:

Motion dismissed.

REASONING:

No.

The Court dismissed S.G.’s motion for an extension of time to perfect his appeal of the s.140 Order.

Rule 3.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court may order an extension of time on such terms as are just. The primary consideration is whether it is in the interests of justice to grant an extension given the circumstances of the case. The Court considers the following factors when applying this principle: (1) whether the appellant formed an intention to appeal within the relevant period; (2) length of, and explanation for delay; (3) prejudice to respondent; and (4) merits of the appeal. The onus is on the moving party to demonstrate that the extension of time should be granted.

S.G. met his burden in respect of the first three factors. He formed an intention to appeal within the relevant period. Although he failed to perfect by May 19, 2026, he made diligent efforts to meet that deadline and was able to file all the necessary perfection materials by May 25, 2026. Bluecore did not identify any prejudice specifically attributable to the delay in perfection.

Regarding the fourth factor, S.G. submitted that prior judicial findings of vexatiousness could not in themselves form the basis for a s. 140 order, and where a moving party relies on prior judicial findings that a litigant has conducted themselves in a frivolous and vexatious manner, the motion judge is required to consider the underlying evidentiary record that led to the findings, as mandated in Lang Michener. S.G. argued that the motion judge erred in refusing to consider the evidentiary record underlying the Prior Decisions, which included his 8,000-page motion record, and that the motion judge designated him a vexatious litigant without a proper evidentiary foundation. The motion judge rejected S.G.’s invitation to consider the evidentiary record underlying the Prior Decisions on the basis that doing so would “add a little…to the court’s ability to make an informed finding.”

The Court saw little merit in S.G.’s objections to how the motion judge proceeded in designating him a vexatious litigant. S.G. was seemingly attempting to convert the s. 140 hearing into an opportunity to re-litigate the Prior Decisions, an exercise that could have led the motion judge to make findings that were inconsistent with those made by prior courts, based on evidence which the motion judge had not himself heard. The procedure proposed by S.G. also appeared to represent a collateral attack on the Prior Decisions, which S.G. had either not appealed or appealed unsuccessfully.

S.G.’s reliance on Henry J.’s statement in Lang Michener that the court considering a s. 140 motion must consider the “whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action” was misplaced. Henry J. was simply pointing out that, even when there was “originally a good cause of action”, a litigant can subsequently act in a vexatious manner and that such behaviour is, in fact, “a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings”. The Court found that it was only through a consideration of “the whole history of the matter”, in this instance S.G.’s earlier bankruptcy proceedings and his subsequent litigation conduct, that the motion judge was able to establish the necessary foundation for the s. 140 Order. There was virtually no chance of success with S.G.’s argument, as if the motion judge revisited whether the Prior Decisions were adequately supported by the relevant evidentiary record, he would have run the risk of converting the s. 140 hearing into a quasi-appeal and/or a collateral attack on the Prior Decisions.

The Court also found that S.G.’s secondary grounds of appeal were no stronger: 1. that the motion judge failed to properly address his claim that Bluecore officials acted improperly and were coming to court with “unclean hands”; and 2. that he erred by granting relief that exceeded what was necessary was in the bankruptcy proceeding. The motion judge carefully considered S.G.’s claim and found that Bluecore brought its motion in good faith and out of understandable frustration with S.G.’s tactics. This was a discretionary, fact-based decision that was unlikely to be overturned on appeal. Further, Bluecore’s obligation to continue responding to proceedings initiated by an undischarged bankrupt was arguably inherently prejudicial, since it required the expenditure of time and money that was likely unrecoverable.

The Court concluded that even though S.G. satisfied the first three factors of the relevant test, this was one of the rare cases in which the appeal had so little merit that the justice of the case warranted dismissal of the motion for an extension of time to perfect.

Fernandez v. Norseman Inc., 2026 ONCA 716

[Gillese, Coroza and Copeland JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

A.M.F, acting in person

E.K, acting in person

K. Dhaliwal, for the respondent Norseman Inc.

A. Subzwari, for the respondent VOD Steel Buildings Inc.

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Minutes of Settlement, Full and Final Releases, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Abuse of Process, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9

FACTS:

This appeal depended on the interpretation of minutes of settlement and the full and final release attached thereto.

A.M.F and E.K (the “Appellants”) wanted to buy, and have installed, a tent structure that would enclose their outdoor tennis courts. They bought a tent manufactured by Norseman Inc. (“Norseman”). In 2022, they entered into two contracts: (1) a purchase contract with VOD Steel Buildings Inc. (“VOD”), Norseman’s authorized dealer for sales in Ontario, for the supply of the tent structure at a cost of $81,358.87; and (2) an installation contract with VOD Construction Services Ltd. (a related entity to VOD) for the delivery and installation of the tent structure at a cost of $41,753.50 (the “Installation Contract”).

VOD and Norseman were parties to a dealer agreement dated February 15, 2022 (the “Agreement”). The Agreement included an indemnity term stating that VOD shall hold Norseman harmless “from and against any liabilities, claims, suits or actions, costs, damages and expenses. The Appellants paid the full purchase price for the tent structure, and, in December 2022, VOD delivered the tent structure to them. The Appellants then made a deposit payment of $20,876.75 to VOD, pursuant to the Installation Contract. On December 20, 2022, VOD terminated the Installation Contract, citing project complexity and timing. The following day, the Appellants sought a full refund of their $20,876.75 installation deposit on the grounds VOD had repudiated the contract and performed no work.

The Appellants retained a lawyer and, through negotiation, the Appellants and VOD reached a settlement. The terms of the settlement were set out in minutes of settlement drafted by the Appellants’ lawyer (the “MOS”). The key elements of the settlement were that VOD would pay the Appellants the sum of $20,876.75 and, “in exchange”, the parties agreed to the full and final release attached to the MOS (the “Release”). The MOS refers to Norseman in two places: (1) the first preamble recites that the Appellants entered into a contract with VOD to erect a Norseman structure on their property; and (2) clause 2 stated that the parties agree the settlement was not an admission of liability by VOD or by Norseman.

The most relevant provisions of the Release for this appeal were the following:

1. A preamble in which the Appellants “release and forever discharge” VOD and “all parent or related corporations, subsidiaries, entities and affiliates … from any and all liabilities, actions or causes of action, suits, contracts and covenants, whether express or implied, debts, complaints, claims and demands for damages, indemnity, entitlements, costs, interest, loss or injury of any kind … which the parties may have had, may now have or may have in the future, whether presently known or unknown, which in any way relate to the building, the product and or, the erecting of the structure in dispute…”.
2. In clause 7, the Appellants confirmed they “shall not make any claim or institute any proceedings against [VOD] or any other person who might claim contribution or indemnity from [VOD] in connection with any matter for which this Release is given”.
3. In clause 8, the Appellants “understand and agree” that the Release is a complete bar to any proceedings that the Appellants might commence in respect of the matters released.
4. In clause 12, the Appellants confirmed “they have obtained independent legal advice with respect to the details of the MOS as well as the terms of this Release, that [they] understand the meaning of the provisions herein and the consequences of signing them and that [they] are executing this Release freely, voluntarily, and without coercion or duress.”

In October 2023, the Appellants filed a statement of claim against Norseman, in which they claimed for breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence and negligent misrepresentation in respect of the tent structure (the “Action”). In February 2024, Norseman filed a statement of defence, in which it maintained the Action was a breach by the Appellants of their obligations under the Release and the Release was a bar to the action. They filed a third-party claim against VOD on March 4, 2024. On March 5, 2025, Norseman brought a motion for summary judgment to have the Action dismissed or permanently stayed as an abuse of process.

The motion judge found there was no genuine issue for trial because the issues in the Action had been fully settled, as expressed in clear and unambiguous language in the MOS and the Release. He rejected the Appellants’ submission that those documents governed only their complaints about VOD and did not encompass their allegations against Norseman. He found that the terms of the Release clearly prevented any action against VOD and any action against a person that may claim contribution and indemnity against VOD. The motion judge concluded by explaining the “practical reality” that, taken together, the MOS, the Release, and the Agreement rendered the Action of no value to the Appellants. Thus, as the motion judge stated, the Appellants would ultimately be responsible to pay any damages they might obtain in an Action against either Norseman or VOD. Accordingly, by order dated October 1, 2025, the motion judge granted summary judgment, dismissed the Action and third-party claim, and ordered costs against the Appellants.

ISSUES:

1. Did the motion judge err in law by failing to consider the surrounding circumstances when interpreting the Release?
2. Did the motion judge err in law by failing to address their contention that the Release was obtained by misrepresentation?

HOLDING: Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

1. No. 

The Court held the motion judge correctly determined there was no genuine issue requiring a trial. The motion judge set out the legal principles in Hryniak v. Mauldin that govern a motion for summary judgment under r. 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. He then interpreted the MOS and the Release in accordance with the dictates of the leading authorities on contract interpretation, including Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp. He found that, on the clear, specific and plain meaning of the MOS and the Release, the Action was barred.

2. No. 

The motion judge found that the purpose of the MOS and the Release was to fully settle any past, present or future claims relating to the “building, product and/or erection of the [tent] structure in dispute” and to bar the Appellants from bringing any sort of legal action relating to those matters as against VOD and third parties. Norseman was a third party within the terms of the documents because, among other things, it was a person that may claim contribution and indemnity against VOD.

The motion judge looked at the circumstances surrounding the execution of the MOS and the Release when interpreting their terms but correctly observed that the circumstances must not be allowed to overwhelm the words of the documents in question, citing Sattva. This Court agreed. The surrounding circumstances raised by the Appellants, including prior correspondence with Norseman, could not overwhelm the clear and express scope of the Release. Thus, the Appellants’ allegations of misrepresentation and breach of statutory consumer protections in the Action did not affect the motion judge’s conclusion that there was no issue warranting a trial because the MOS and the Release together were dispositive of the Action. The Court found no error on the part of the motion judge’s interpretation of those documents.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Komuro v. Lu, 2026 ONCA 718

[Paciocco, Sossin and Madsen JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

C. L. in person

D. Eddenden, for the responding party

Keywords: Family Law, Trials, In Absentia, Appeals, Extension of Time, Panel Review, Pomata Investment Corp. (Treasure Hill Homes) v. Yang, 2023 ONCA 618

Grace v. United Mexican States, 2026 ONCA 700

[Huscroft, Trotter and Wilson JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

E. Sherkey and N. Williams, for the moving parties

B. S. Wray and M. Folinas, for the responding party

Keywords: International Trade Law, Contracts, Civil Procedure, International Commercial Arbitration, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32 I.L.M. 289 c. 11, International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 2, Sched. 5, s. 11, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 16(2)

1834537 Ontario Inc. v. Harmaz, 2026 ONCA 703

[van Rensburg, Miller and Monahan JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

V. Nakka, for the appellants

S. A. Bilato, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Defences, Fraud, Forgery, Non Est Factum, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Procedural and Natural Justice, Evidence, Cross-Examinations, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33

Bradley Court Limited v. Tinkasimire, 2026 ONCA 724

[Favreau, Madsen and Osborne JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

C. T in person

B. Turville, for the respondent

Keywords: Real Property, Residential Tenancies, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, Frivolous, Vexatious, Abuse of Process, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.1, Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, Gao v. Ontario WSIB, 2014 ONSC 6497, Mohammad v. Bakr, 2024 ONCA 347