COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (MAY 19 – 22, 2020)

By John Polyzogopoulos on May 24, 2020

Jump To: Table of Contents | Civil Decisions | Criminal Decisions

Good morning.

Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario released this past week.

Topics covered this week included rescission of a settlement agreement as a result of an innocent misrepresentation in an historical institutional sexual abuse case, trespass to university property, stay of appeal pending satisfaction of terms in the family law context, setting aside summary judgment in the repair and storage liens context and stay pending an appeal from a default judgment for possession to prevent the sale of a property under power of sale.

The weather is nice, so hopefully everyone enjoys the outdoors this weekend while still practicing physical distancing.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Civil Decisions

Deschenes v. Lalonde, 2020 ONCA 304

Keywords: Contracts, Settlements, Remedies, Rescission, Innocent Misrepresentation

MCC Mortgage Holdings Inc. v. Mundulai, 2020 ONCA 312

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Power of Sale, Civil Procedure, Default Judgments, Setting Aside, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Mortgages Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.40, ss. 12, 22 and 23, Chandra v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2016 ONCA 448, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311

R. v. University of Toronto, 2020 ONCA 305

Keywords: Torts, Trespass, Human Rights, Education Law, Health Law, Civil Procedure, Injunctions, RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311

Abu-Saud v. Abu-Saud, 2020 ONCA 314

Keywords: Family Law, Support Order, Equalization, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 63.01(1), Murphy v. Murphy, 2015 ONCA 69, Dickie v. Dickie (2006), 78 OR (3d) 1, Popa v. Popa, 2018 ONCA 972

Kitchen v. Brian Garratt (Garratt’s Garage), 2020 ONCA 309

Keywords: Breach of Contract, Repair and Storage Liens, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Costs

Criminal Decisions

R. v. L., 2020 ONCA 230

Keywords: Criminal Law, Fraud, Mens Rea, Double Jeopardy, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(h), R. v. Théroux, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5, R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33, R. v. Graveline, 2006 SCC 16, R. v. Katigbak, 2011 SCC 48, R. v. McRae, 2013 SCC 68

R. v. R., 2020 ONCA 306

Keywords: Criminal Law, Drug Trafficking, Juries, Alternate Jurors, Evidence, Admissibility, Prior Convictions, Delay, Criminal Code, ss. 631(2.1), 631(2.2), 643(1), 652.1, 686(1)(b)(iv), Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b), R. v. Noureddine, 2015 ONCA 770, R. v. O’Brien, 2011 SCC 29, R. v. Chouhan, 2020 ONCA 40, R. v. Stubbs, 2013 ONCA 514, R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56, R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, R. v. Seegmiller (2004), 191 C.C.C. (3d) 347 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Steele, 2012 ONCA 383, R. v. J.C.P., 2018 ONCA 986, R. v. Picard, 2017 ONCA 692

R. v. B., 2020 ONCA 315

Keywords: Criminal Law, Bail Pending Appeal, Criminal Code, s. 679(3)(c), R. v. Sekhon, 2014 SCC 15, R. v. Oland, 2017 SCC 17, R. v. Jesso, 2020 ONCA 280

R. v. Becker Bros. Trucking Inc., 2020 ONCA 316

Keywords: Provincial Offences, Appeals, Method of Hearing, Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 84(1), Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990. c. P.33, s. 131, The Rules of the Court of Appeal in Appeals Under the Provincial Offences Act, O. Reg. 721/94, Rules 2(2), 3, 3.7, 4(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 61.03, 63.03.1(1), York (Regional Municipality) v. Irwin, 2020 ONCA 44, Ontario (Environment, Conservation and Parks) v. Thomas Cavanagh Construction Limited, 2019 ONCA 686, Antorisa Investments Ltd. v. Vaughan (City), 2012 ONCA 586

R. v. H., 2020 ONCA 307

Keywords: Criminal Law, Second Degree Murder, Manslaughter, Mens Rea, Intoxication, Expert Evidence, Admissibility, Jury Instructions, Criminal Code, ss. 229(a)(i), 229(a)(ii), R. v. Daley, 2007 SCC 53, R. v. Chretien, 2014 ONCA 403, R. v. MacKinlay (1986), 28 C.C.C. (3d) 306 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Canute (1993), 80 C.C.C. (3d) 403 (B.C.C.A.), R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683, R. v. Seymour, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 252, R. v. Lemky, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 757, R. v. Srun, 2019 ONCA 453, R. v. Calnen, 2019 SCC 6, R. v. Jacquard, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 314, R. v. Patel, 2017 ONCA 702, R. v. Shafia, 2016 ONCA 812, R. v. Mills, 2019 ONCA 940, White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23, R. v. Abbey, 2017 ONCA 640, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Jury Instructions, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2015)

R. v. P., 2020 ONCA 308

CIVIL DECISIONS

Deschenes v. Lalonde, 2020 ONCA 304

[van Rensburg, Paciocco and Thorburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. K. Downing and B. Whitwham for the appellants

L. P. Merritt for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Settlements, Remedies, Rescission, Innocent Misrepresentation

facts:

The respondent alleged that she was sexually assaulted as a child by a priest in the early 1970s. She sued the priest and the appellants, claiming vicarious liability for the priest’s actions and negligence in failing to prevent the assaults. The Diocese claimed that it had no knowledge of the priest’s prior abuse of others until 1989. As a result, the respondent settled in 2000. However, in 2006 it was revealed that the Diocese knew about additional assaults years before the respondent was assaulted. She subsequently commenced a new action in 2008 claiming rescission of the settlement agreement and the parties moved for summary judgment to determine the enforceability of the 2000 settlement. The appellants asserted that the motion judge erred in rescinding the settlement agreement, but they did not appeal the declaration of vicarious liability.

issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err in rescinding the settlement agreement on the basis of unilateral mistake?

(2) Did the motion judge err in his assessment of materiality?

(3) Did the motion judge err in not giving effect to the “finality of settlements” and in relying on findings in another action in deciding whether to grant the equitable remedy of rescission?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No. The Court determined that while a settlement agreement will not be rescinded on the basis of information that has come to light following the settlement, it may be rescinded on the basis of misrepresentation. In a case of misrepresentation, the interest in the finality of settlements will not “trump” the need to rescind a settlement agreement. Rescission is an equitable remedy available for false or misleading representations that induce a contract, and rescission is available even if the misrepresentation was made innocently. For rescission to be granted, the plaintiff must have acted promptly upon discovery of the misrepresentation. A settlement agreement may also be rescinded on the basis of unilateral mistake, and while the motion judge did find a “unilateral mistake by the Diocese,” the judge correctly applied the principle of innocent misrepresentation. The appellants assert that the motion judge erred in law when he rescinded the settlement agreement based on unilateral mistake because at the time the Diocese had no actual or constructive knowledge of the mistake and there was no evidence of unconscionable conduct on the part of the Diocese. This Court however found that whether or not the motion judge imputed knowledge to the Diocese had no bearing on his decision to rescind the settlement agreement, because it was rescinded on innocent misrepresentation, which does not require a finding that the Diocese had actual or constructive knowledge that the representation was false at the time that it was made.

(2) No. The appellants submitted that the motion judge erred in finding that the nondisclosure of the 1962 police statements (that proved that there were assaults prior to the respondent’s) were material to the respondent’s decision to settle her claim in 2000. The Court found that the conclusion that the misrepresentation was material to the respondent’s decision to settle on the terms she did was fully supported by the evidence, and that she would not have settled her claim if she had known about the previous assaults. The 1962 police statements were material to the case.

(3) No. The appellants asserted that the judgment rescinding the settlement agreement was contrary to the principle of finality of litigation. The Court disagreed. The motion judge applied the appropriate framework to consider whether there were grounds to rescind the settlement agreement on the basis of the Diocese’s innocent misrepresentation, and in deciding whether to grant rescission, to address the equitable considerations of whether the remedy would be fair and just. This Court determined that it is important to consider the fact that the Diocese attempted to cover up allegations of sexual assault, and that this evidence was relevant in the consideration of fairness and justice to be weighed in the balance with the argument that litigation should have an air of finality.

MCC Mortgage Holdings Inc. v. Mundulai, 2020 ONCA 312

[Pardu J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

J. Kukla, for the responding party

AM, acting in person

facts:

This motion was brought on short notice by the defendant mortgagor, Mr. M, to prevent the proposed sale of real property that was scheduled to close on the date this motion was heard. The responding mortgagee (the “mortgagee”) wished to sell the property to realize the amounts owing on the mortgage, which were long in default.

The mortgagee recovered possession of the property the day before this motion was heard, when the writ of possession was executed for a second time. The mortgage was dated May 31, 2016, given by Mr. M and his then spouse. It was a second mortgage. The default in payment on the mortgage occurred on July 1, 2018. Property taxes remain in arrears in the sum of $29,562.15, a further event of default under the mortgage. The mortgage matured on June 1, 2019, and has not been discharged.

The mortgagee issued a statement of claim on August 22, 2018, seeking judgment for payment of the amounts owing and possession. The defendant mortgagors, including Mr. M, did not defend the action and a default judgment was thus issued on February 12, 2019 for the sum of $218,025.47 plus interest and for possession of the mortgaged property and costs. The Superior Court granted leave to the mortgagee to issue a writ of possession on April 12, 2019, and the writ of possession was issued on April 26, 2019.

Mr. M brought a motion to set aside the default judgment, which was dismissed on July 23, 2019. McCarthy J. ultimately found that there was no explanation for the delay in bringing the motion to set aside the default judgment, and that the mortgagors had been well aware of the substance of the claim and would have had time to formulate a defence. He noted further that the mortgagors had no evidence that the amounts set out in the discharge statement were inaccurate or not amenable to calculation as a liquidated sum by the registrar. There was no subsequently concluded agreement arriving at a compromise amount. McCarthy J. also found that the mortgagee would be prejudiced by an order setting aside a properly obtained default judgment and doubted that the mortgagors had the ability to pay the amounts owing.

The writ of possession was enforced and the mortgagee took possession on January 8, 2020. Mr. M. was asked to remove his personal belongings. He did not do so, and his belongings were placed in storage by the mortgagee.

The mortgagee later entered into an agreement of purchase and sale of the property with a closing date set for May 12, 2020. The proposed purchasers sold their property in anticipation of acquiring this new home. After the agreement was entered into, the mortgagee discovered that the locks had been changed by Mr. M.

Competing motions were subsequently brought in the Superior Court. The mortgagee sought a further writ of possession and removal of Mr. M from the property. Mr. M in turn sought an order staying mortgage enforcement proceedings, setting aside the default judgment, and discharging the mortgage upon payment into court. By order of April 30, 2020, Boswell J. dismissed Mr. M’s motion and granted the mortgagee’s motion. Mr. M proposed to appeal from that order, and also sought to extend the time to appeal from the order of McCarthy J. refusing to set aside the default judgment of July 23, 2019.

issues:

(1) Should Mr. M’s request for an extension of time to appeal be granted?

(2) Should Mr. M’s request for a stay of the writ of possession pending the appeal be granted?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No. The Court held that in determining whether a request for an extension of time to appeal should be granted, the court is required to consider the following factors:

Whether the appellant had an intention to appeal within the relevant period
The length of the delay and the explanation for the delay
Any prejudice to the respondent
The merits of the appeal
Whether the justice of the case requires granting an extension

As was noted by the Court, the governing principle is whether the justice of the case requires that an extension be granted: Chandra v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2016 ONCA 448 at paras. 13-14.

Applying the foregoing factors, the Court found that there was no evidence that Mr. M intended to appeal within the relevant period. Furthermore, the length of delay, being close to ten months, was substantial and without explanation. In this regard, the Court noted that it was relevant that Mr. M was a former practicing lawyer, and thus ought to have been aware of the importance of acting promptly. The Court further found that there would be substantial prejudice to the mortgagee in this case, given that the mortgagee had taken steps to sell the property to realize the money owed. This prejudice was further bolstered by the fact that no payments had been made since September 2018. Similarly, the municipal taxes were in substantial arrears and there was no indication as to how these taxes would be paid.

(2) No. The Court held that the factors to be considered in granting a stay of the writ of possession were set out by the Supreme Court in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311. Specifically, a court must consider the following three factors:

Is there a serious issue to be tried?
Will the appellant suffer irreparable harm if they stay is not granted?
Does the balance of convenience favour granting a stay?

In light of the answer to issue (1) above, the Court was not satisfied that there was a serious issue to be tried as to the amount owed on the mortgage. Given the appellant’s limited occupation of the property, the Court was also not satisfied that Mr. M would suffer irreparable harm if the stay was not granted. The Court further noted that Mr. M’s spouse and co-owner agreed to vacate the property and appeared to have no interest in holding onto it. Finally, in dismissing the motion, the Court held that the balance of convenience did not favour granting a stay, particularly given Mr. M’s long, unexplained delay. In this regard, the Court held that it was unlikely that Mr. M could raise the funds to discharge the mortgage.

Based on the foregoing, the Court dismissed the motion and ordered costs in favour of the mortgagee in the sum of $3,300 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

R. v. University of Toronto, 2020 ONCA 305

[Doherty, Juriansz and Paciocco JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.O. Parsons and C. Breton, for the appellant

R.A. Centa and E. Home, for the respondent

Keywords: Torts, Trespass, Human Rights, Education Law, Health Law, Civil Procedure, Injunctions, RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311

facts:

The appellant, a student enrolled at the respondent University, was involuntarily committed for psychiatric review in the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (“CAMH”). Four days later, the respondent issued a Trespass Notice to the appellant, which is the subject of this appeal. The letter containing the Trespass Notice affirmed that the trespass Notice would not be rescinded until the University was satisfied that he “do[es] not pose a threat to the health and safety of others” and sought the appellant’s “consent to undergo a psychiatric risk assessment by a qualified expert who will report to the University”.

The appellant furnished the university with a letter from his treating physician, but the University did not find the letter to be adequate to allay its concerns. The appellant initiated a court application alleging that the University breached its contractual and fiduciary duties in its dealings with him. He also filed a complaint with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (the “Tribunal”) before amending his application, adding a request for an interlocutory injunction restraining the University from enforcing the Trespass Notice pending the proceeding before the Tribunal. The application judge dismissed the application in its entirety.

issues:

(1) Did the application judge commit palpable and overriding errors?

(2) Did the application judge err in the application of the legal test for an interlocutory injunction?

(3) Did the application judge unreasonably conclude that the “balance of convenience” favoured denying the interlocutory injunction?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) . No. The application judge committed no palpable and overriding error in her treatment of the medical notes. Nor did the application judge commit a palpable and overriding error by relying on what the appellant claimed was an “irrelevant” finding that his threats were linked to animosity against University staff. The Court also rejected the submission that the application judge misapprehended the evidence by noting an offer of compromise by the University, when the University was, in fact, insisting on a psychiatric risk assessment. There was clear evidence of an offer to compromise on the record. The fact that the University’s repeatedly called for a psychiatric risk assessment did not alter this fact.

(2) No. The application judge correctly set out the legal test for an interlocutory injunction from RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311. The Court was satisfied that the application judge considered the weight of each component of the test and was satisfied that this was not a case where, in all the circumstances, the strength of the factors that favoured the appellant could sustain the appellant’s application.

(3) No. The Court found no basis for impugning the reasonableness of the application judge’s finding that the balance of convenience favoured the University. Her reasons were clear, grounded in the evidence, and compelling. The conclusion that, on balance, the balance of convenience favoured the University was entirely reasonable

Abu-Saud v. Abu-Saud, 2020 ONCA 314

[Benotto J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

W. R. Clayton, for the responding party

S. E. Hassan, for the moving party

facts:

The parties, who were married for 27 years, separated in 2015 and the respondent brought the underlying application seeking spousal support and an equalization of net family property. The highly contested litigation continued until 2019 when the trial judgment was released. The trial judge awarded the respondent spousal support retroactive to the date of separation. The support was ordered on both a compensatory and a needs basis, recognizing her important contribution to the management of the household and to the appellant’s business.

The appellant has not complied with the support order that he sought to appeal. The respondent brings this motion to adjourn the appeal. She also requests a partial lifting of the automatic stay for a portion of the equalization payment, security for costs and an extension of time to file her factum.

issues:

(1) Should the appeal be adjourned and partial stay of the order appealed from be lifted?

holding:

Motion granted.

reasoning:

(1) Yes. The appeal was stayed on terms. The Court ordered that the appellant to pay the respondent the support owed together with the portion of the equalization. These payments were to be paid, together with outstanding interest.

Rule 63.01(5) provides that the court may order that the stay provision in Rule 63.01(1) does not apply. Usually, the court looks to the merits of the appeal, the need for funds, and whether there is a danger that the payment will not be made: Popa v. Popa, 2018 ONCA 972, at para. 7. This is not a case like Popa. Here the appellant acknowledges that a portion of the equalization payment is owed. There is therefore no dispute about the funds requested by the respondent. In light of all the circumstances, the Court found that it would be just that the funds be paid now. The automatic stay on the equalization payment was therefore lifted to the extent of half of the admitted amount owing.

Kitchen v. Brian Garratt (Garratt’s Garage), 2020 ONCA 309

[Lauwers, Huscroft and Thorburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

BG, acting in person

S. McMahon, for the responding parties

Keywords: Breach of Contract, Repair and Storage Liens, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Costs

facts:

This is an appeal from the order of the motion judge granting summary judgment to the respondents.

The respondents hired the appellant to conduct a partial restoration of their 1974 Corvette (the “Corvette”). The appellant also had possession of other vehicles owned by the respondents. The respondents claimed they paid the appellant roughly $79,000 over a 15-year period to restore the Corvette.

In 2016, the relationship between the respondents and appellant deteriorated. The respondents subsequently brought an action against the appellant seeking the return of the Corvette and damages. The appellant brought a counterclaim for unpaid accounts and storage fees, but it was dismissed because of his failure to deliver an affidavit of documents. The respondents obtained an order compelling the return of the Corvette and purported to discover that very little work had been completed.

A trial date was adjourned at the appellant’s request on the day of the trial, and the respondents were permitted to bring a motion for summary judgment. Although he had been represented by counsel in the past, at the return of the summary judgment motion, the appellant was self-represented. He did not file any affidavit evidence on the motion, although he did arrive with some photographs of the vehicle in hand, which were made an exhibit at the motion.

The motion judge ultimately granted the motion for summary judgment, awarding $78,565.16 to the respondents as a return of monies paid to the appellant to restore the Corvette, plus pre-judgment interest and costs for a total of $103,949.79.

issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err in finding that there was no genuine issue for trial?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

(1) Yes. The Court held that contrary to the motion judge’s endorsement, there was photographic evidence before the motion judge which depicted that at least some work had been performed on the Corvette including painting and polishing. The Court further held that while the respondents conceded that “very little” work was done on the Corvette, there was evidence before the motion judge which implied that the return of all funds paid to the appellant may not have been warranted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the motions judge granting summary judgment and costs, and remitted the case back for trial. The Court held that the respondents were free to bring another summary judgment motion on proper evidence.

With respect to the appeal, costs were fixed by the Court in the amount of $5,000, which were left to the judge who finally disposes of the matter. In making its determination, however, the Court noted that the appellant had several opportunities to file evidence in support of his position that he did work on other vehicles and stored other vehicles for the respondents, but he did not do so. As a result of his failure, the Court found that the appellant wasted the time of counsel for the respondents and therefore was required to pay some costs thrown away on the summary judgment motion. The Court ordered that the appellant pay to the respondents costs thrown away of the summary judgment motion in the amount of $5,000

CRIMINAL DECISIONS

R. v. L., 2020 ONCA 230

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Nordheimer and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Friesen, for the appellant

H. K. Krongold, for the respondent

R. v. R., 2020 ONCA 306

[Strathy C.J.O., Harvison Young and Jamal JJ.A.]

Counsel:

I. Grant, for the appellants

I. Bell, for the respondent

R. v. B., 2020 ONCA 315

[Pardu J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

B. Vandebeek, for the applicant

J. Streeter, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Bail Pending Appeal, Criminal Code, s. 679(3)(c), R. v. Sekhon, 2014 SCC 15, R. v. Oland, 2017 SCC 17, R. v. Jesso, 2020 ONCA 280

R. v. Becker Bros. Trucking Inc., 2020 ONCA 316

[Paciocco J.A. (Case Management Judge) ]

Counsel:

P. Moore, for the moving party
J. Manson, for the responding party

R. v. H., 2020 ONCA 307

[van Rensburg, Miller and Fairburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Doucette, Z. Shariff, and N. Rouleau, for the appellant

A. Alyea, for the respondent

R. v. P., 2020 ONCA 308

[Watt, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

E. Brown, for the appellants BryP, RW, and TT

J. R. Presser and J. Marshman, for the appellant BraP

L. Paine and N. Demontigny, for the respondent provincial Crown

B. Reitz, for the respondent federal Crown

Keywords: Criminal Law, Juries, Challenges for Cause, Language Rights, Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 16, Criminal Code, ss. 530(1), 530(1)(c), 530(4), 626(1), 632, 638(1)(b), 638(1)(f), Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, Juries Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.3, Official Languages Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.), s. 16, Protecting What Matters Most Act (Budget Measures), S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sched. 35, s. 2, Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29, ss. 5(1)(d), 5(1)(e), Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.31, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, R. v. Find, 2001 SCC 32, R. v. Sherratt, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 509, R. v. Jimenez Leon, 2012 ONSC 575 , aff’d 2014 ONCA 813, R. v. Smith and Mathers, 2019 ONSC 4816, R. v. E., 2019 ONSC 3813, R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, R. v. Munkonda, 2015 ONCA 309, Bessette v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 31, R. v. Leon, 2014 ONCA 813, R. v. Husbands, 2017 ONCA 607, R. v. Province, 2019 ONCA 638, R. v. Hubbert (1975), 29 C.C.C (2d) 279 (Ont. C.A.), aff’d [1977] 2 S.C.R. 267, R. v. Yumnu, 2010 ONCA 637, aff’d 2012 SCC 73, R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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John Polyzogopoulos Blaney McMurtry LLP 416.593.2953 Email

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CIVIL DECISIONS

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John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email