In Eyelet Investment Corp. v. Zhou, the Court dismissed the appellant vendor’s appeal from summary judgment dismissing its claim for breach of contract damages arising from the respondent purchaser’s failure to close on the purchase of real property. The motion judge found that the appellant failed to mitigate its damages, based on the lack of evidence about its marketing strategy, the delay in selling the property, and the fact that the property sold below appraised value. The Court upheld the motion judge’s use of the appellant’s own appraisal to assess damages and confirmed that summary judgment was appropriate where both parties had agreed to proceed on that basis.

In Grozelle (Re), the Court denied leave to appeal a costs decision made in a bankruptcy involving a Ponzi scheme.

In Bennett v Chadwick, the Court dismissed an appeal from a judgment finding that the appellants continued to enjoy the same right-of-way that had existed since 1961, that a 1974 agreement did not create a different right-of-way, and that a fence erected by the respondent did not substantially interfere with the 1961 right-of-way.  There was therefore no oppression.

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Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Eyelet Investment Corp. v. Zhou, 2026 ONCA 453

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Damages, Mitigation, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Southcott Estates Inc. v. Toronto Catholic District School Board, 2012 SCC 51, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Hav-A-Kar Leasing Ltd. v. Vekselshtein, 2012 ONCA 826, Taylor v. 1103919 Alberta Ltd., 2015 ABCA 201, Celestini v. Shoplogix Inc., 2023 ONCA 131, Broadgrain Commodities Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company, 2018 ONCA 438

Grozelle (Re), 2026 ONCA 464

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Costs, Leave to Appeal, Bankruptcy, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 193, 197, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 107, RREF II BHB IV Portofino, LLC v Portofino Corporation, 2015 ONCA 906, Dal Bianco v Deem Management Services Limited, 2020 ONCA 585, Business Development Bank of Canada v Astoria Organic Matters Ltd., 2019 ONCA 269, 2403177 Ontario Inc. v Bending Lake Iron Group Limited, 2016 ONCA 225, Osztrovics Estate v Osztrovics Farms Ltd., 2015 ONCA 463, North House Foods Ltd. (Re), 2025 ONCA 563, Bank of Canada v Pine Tree Resorts Inc., 2013 ONCA 282, Hamilton v Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9

Bennett v. Chadwick, 2026 ONCA 468

Keywords: Real Property, Rights of Way, Corporations, Not-for-Profit Corporations, Remedies, Oppression, Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010, SO 2010, c. 15, Wilson v Alharayeri, 2017 SCC 39, Markowski v Verhey, 2020 ONCA 472, Reddick v Robinson, 2024 ONCA 116, Mihaylov v 1165996 Ontario Inc., 2017 ONCA 116, Fallowfield v Bourgault (2003), 68 OR (3d) 417 (CA), Drumonde v Moniz (1997), 105 OAC 295 (CA), BCE Inc. v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69

Short Civil Decisions

Chalimon v. Warda, 2026 ONCA 462

Keywords: Substitute Decisions, Guardianships, Property, Personal Care

De Bartolo v. Initiatives Canada Corporation, 2026 ONCA 466

Keywords: Contracts, Acceptance, Guarantees, Lawyer-Client, Statute of Frauds, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.19, Richter v McKeachie, 2009 BCSC 288

Massaar v. Moneck, 2026 ONCA 467

Keywords: Property, Gifts, Contracts, Loans, Evidence, Witnesses, Credibility, Cook v. Joyce, 2017 ONCA 49, Rudin-Brown v. Brown, 2023 ONCA 151

Nabrotzky v. McKague, 2026 ONCA 474

Keywords: Limitation Period, Delay, Dismissal, Courts of Justice Act

Scott v. Kwong, 2026 ONCA 473

Keywords: Family Law, Separation Agreements, Property, Matrimonial Home

CIVIL DECISIONS

Eyelet Investment Corp. v. Zhou, 2026 ONCA 453

[Copeland, Monahan, Gomery, JJ.A]

Counsel:

G.J. Tighe and S.M. Citak, for the appellant

Leddy, J.H. Omran and S. Hsia, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Damages, Mitigation, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Southcott Estates Inc. v. Toronto Catholic District School Board, 2012 SCC 51, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Hav-A-Kar Leasing Ltd. v. Vekselshtein, 2012 ONCA 826, Taylor v. 1103919 Alberta Ltd., 2015 ABCA 201, Celestini v. Shoplogix Inc., 2023 ONCA 131, Broadgrain Commodities Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company, 2018 ONCA 438

facts:

The respondent agreed to buy a home in a development built by the appellant for $1,680,151.38 and paid deposits amounting to $127,500. The scheduled closing date was September 28, 2017. On September 11, 2017, the respondent’s counsel told counsel for the appellant that the respondent was terminating the agreement of purchase and sale (the “APS”). The appellant advised that it would treat the termination of the APS as an anticipatory breach and take steps to mitigate its damages. The appellant ultimately sold the property six months later for $1,300,000, approximately $380,000 less than the contract price with the respondent.

The appellant brought a claim for breach of contract, seeking damages of $253,981.97, which was the difference between the APS price and the ultimate sale price six months later, plus carrying costs and less the deposit paid by the respondent.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claim on the basis that the appellant had failed to mitigate its damages.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err by reversing the onus on the respondent to establish that the appellant failed to mitigate its damages?
2. Did the motion judge err by using an appraisal of the property’s value as of the date of the respondent’s breach (provided by the appellant) to calculate damages?
3. Did the motion judge err in proceeding by way of summary judgment?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No, the motion judge did not reverse the burden on the respondent to prove that the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate. Rather, she reviewed the evidentiary record before her and concluded that the respondent met her burden to show that the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate its damages.

This conclusion was based on (1) the appellant’s failure to provide evidence about the marketing strategy for the particular property; (2) the delay in selling the property; and, (3) the fact the property sold below the value of the appraisals of both parties as of the date the APS was terminated and the date of the ultimate sale. The motion judge’s findings were open to her on the record.

2. No, the motion judge did not err by using an appraisal of the property’s value as of the date of the respondent’s breach (provided by the appellant) to calculate damages. Without providing extensive reasoning, the Court determined that based on the motion judge’s factual findings, this was an appropriate way to assess damages based on the value of the property as of September 11, 2017.
3. No, the motion judge did not err in proceeding by way of summary judgment. Before the motion judge, both parties agreed that the matter was appropriately determined by summary judgment. It is well-established that the parties to a summary judgment must put their best foot forward. A judge hearing a summary judgment motion is entitled to proceed on the basis that all of the relevant evidence has been placed before the court and there would be nothing further if the issue were to go to trial. The fact that the appellant may have failed to put its best evidentiary foot forward does not retrospectively make proceeding by summary judgment inappropriate.

Grozelle (Re), 2026 ONCA 464

[Roberts]

Counsel:

J. Gibson, for the appellants/moving parties

D. Ward and A. Ranjbar, for the respondent/responding party

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Costs, Leave to Appeal, Bankruptcy, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 193, 197, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 107, RREF II BHB IV Portofino, LLC v Portofino Corporation, 2015 ONCA 906, Dal Bianco v Deem Management Services Limited, 2020 ONCA 585, Business Development Bank of Canada v Astoria Organic Matters Ltd., 2019 ONCA 269, 2403177 Ontario Inc. v Bending Lake Iron Group Limited, 2016 ONCA 225, Osztrovics Estate v Osztrovics Farms Ltd., 2015 ONCA 463, North House Foods Ltd. (Re), 2025 ONCA 563, Bank of Canada v Pine Tree Resorts Inc., 2013 ONCA 282, Hamilton v Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9

facts:

The moving parties were investors in a Ponzi scheme that was carried out by DG, who is now bankrupt. At first instance, the trustee in bankruptcy successfully obtained a clawback order on investment returns received by the appellants, that were found to be fraudulent conveyances. The appellants brought various cross-motions which were all dismissed, with costs against the appellants. The appellants moved for leave to amend their notice of appeal to seek leave to appeal the costs order. The appellants did not appeal the dismissal of their cross-motions but did appeal the clawback order, arguing that the clawback order was inextricably linked with the issues in the cross-motions and the costs order.

issues:

1. Was the cost order made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA)?
   1. If so, are the appellants required to obtain leave to appeal the costs order pursuant to section 193(e) of the BIA? If so, should leave to appeal be granted?
2. If leave to appeal is granted, should the appellants be granted leave to amend their notice of appeal?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. The Court concluded that the appellant’s appeal of the costs order was made under section 193 of the BIA. The Court held that the costs order resulted from the appellants’ unsuccessful cross-motions which were centered around administrative and procedural matters within the bankruptcy. The Court concluded that where the BIA and provincial legislation confer authority to make an order in bankruptcy proceedings, the rules of paramountcy dictate that the appeal is governed by the BIA.
   1. Yes, and leave to appeal should not be granted. The judge rejected the appellants’ argument that that the costs order was made pursuant to section 193(c) of the BIA and therefore there is an automatic right to appeal. Section 193(c) of the BIA is to be narrowly construed and does not apply to orders that are: (1) procedural in nature, (2) that do not bring into play the value of the debtor’s property, and (3) that do not result in a loss. It would be contrary to the bankruptcy regime’s legislative purpose of efficient and expeditious resolution of bankruptcies to allow an automatic right of appeal from orders that would otherwise require leave to appeal. The Court accordingly held that leave to appeal was required due to the appeal’s procedural nature.
   2. The appellants further argued that leave to appeal should be left to an appeal panel. However, the Court concluded that there was no jurisdiction for this. Recent jurisprudence held that motions for leave to appeal that are brought pursuant to section 193(e) of the BIA are to be brought before a single judge of the Court in chambers. Although the Court recognized that motions for leave to appeal may be heard before an appeal panel, it noted that this is not a mandatory requirement. The Court also concluded that the leave to appeal the costs order was not in the interests of justice. The proposed appeal did not raise any important issues regarding bankruptcy and insolvency matters. Moreover, costs orders are discretionary and owed considerable appellate deference that are displaced where the order was made on an error in principle or plainly wrong. Consequently, there is a high threshold to obtain leave to appeal a costs order, which the appellants did not satisfy. The proposed appeal was therefore not prima facie meritorious. Lastly, the appellants’ appeal would hinder the progress of the bankruptcy proceedings, forcing the bankrupt to use his scare resources to respond to a meritless appeal.

2. Since the Court determined that leave to appeal should not be granted, it was unnecessary to consider the issue of amending the notice of appeal.

Bennett v. Chadwick, 2026 ONCA 468

[Tulloch C.J.O., Rouleau and Lauwers JJ.A]

Counsel:

C. Brown, for the appellants

A.Ciccone, for the respondent K.C.

P.Lombardi, for the respondent Cressview Lakes also known as Cressview Lakes Corporation (the “corporation respondent”)

Keywords: Real Property, Rights of Way, Corporations, Not-for-Profit Corporations, Remedies, Oppression, Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010, SO 2010, c. 15, Wilson v Alharayeri, 2017 SCC 39, Markowski v Verhey, 2020 ONCA 472, Reddick v Robinson, 2024 ONCA 116, Mihaylov v 1165996 Ontario Inc., 2017 ONCA 116, Fallowfield v Bourgault (2003), 68 OR (3d) 417 (CA), Drumonde v Moniz (1997), 105 OAC 295 (CA), BCE Inc. v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 

facts:

This appeal concerned a longstanding dispute over access to Lot 52 within the Cressview Lakes development. The appellants, the owners of Lot 52, appealed from the judgment of the application judge that dismissed their application concerning access to Lot 52. The appellants contended that a fence erected by the respondent, K.C., unlawfully interfered with their right-of-way over Lot 46 and prevented them from enjoying access rights historically associated with their property. They asserted that a written agreement executed in 1974 created a right-of-way by express grant across Lot 46. They further submitted that the corporate respondent acted oppressively by permitting the construction of the fence without adequate consultation, failed to disclose relevant corporate records, and relied upon the appellant’s alleged regulatory non-compliance to restrict their participation in corporate affairs.

The application judge dismissed the appellants’ application. He rejected their argument that the right-of-way began on Lot 46. Instead, after interpreting a 1961 shareholder resolution, he found that the right-of-way commenced on Lot 45 and ran along a different route through Lot 46 to reach Lot 52. He further concluded that the fence did not interfere with this right-of-way and that there was no evidence of oppression by the corporation.

issues:

1. Did the application judge err in concluding that the governing right-of-way remained the route established by the 1961 shareholder resolution, rather than finding that the 1974 agreement created a right-of-way by express grant across Lot 46?
2. Did the application judge err in failing to find that the fence erected by the respondent had the practical effect of relocating and narrowing the right-of-way, thereby impairing access to the appellants’ property?
3. Did the application judge err in rejecting the appellants’ oppression claim against the corporate respondent?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The application judge found that the instrument creating the right-of-way, the 1961 shareholder resolution, established that it originated on Lot 45 and proceeded across Lot 46 to Lot 52, and that there was no admissible evidence demonstrating that the location of the right-of-way had ever been altered. The 1974 agreement did not identify the location of any right-of-way and could not be interpreted as creating a new and distinct right-of-way different from the one already created by the 1961 shareholder resolution. It contained no description of the route to be followed across Lot 46, nor did it purport to terminate, relocate or replace the access arrangement that had existed since 1961. The appellants’ preferred access route was not a right-of-way by express grant but a licence, a personal non-proprietary right revocable by the respondent, K.C., at will, which she lawfully revoked when the appellants refused to remove their property from Lot 46.
2. No. The application judge found that the fence did not block the original right-of-way that the 1961 shareholder resolution created by express grant. That route was never changed, remained available, and was capable of being exercised by vehicles, including a pickup truck. The Court determined that what the appellants sought was not access to Lot 52 itself, but the continued convenience of using the respondent’s driveway. The fence was built on land unencumbered by the right-of-way and, thus, could not constitute a substantial interference. The fact that the appellants could find access less convenient than before did not establish a right to modify the granted route.
3. No. The application judge was entitled to conclude that the evidence did not establish conduct that was oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly disregarded the appellants’ interests. Unfairness is also required, and the construction of the fence was not unfair. Instead, it was a response to the appellants’ improper storage of property on Lot 46 and failure to remove it even though the respondents gave them the opportunity to remedy the situation.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Chalimon v. Warda, 2026 ONCA 462

[Roberts, Coroza and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G.J. Tighe and S.M. Citak, for the appellant

Leddy, J.H. Omran and S. Hsia, for the respondent

Keywords: Substitute Decisions, Guardianships, Property, Personal Care

De Bartolo v. Initiatives Canada Corporation, 2026 ONCA 466

[Sossin, Monahan and Wilson JJ.A]

Counsel:

A.D.B, for the appellant

A. Flesias, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Acceptance, Guarantees, Lawyer-Client, Statute of Frauds, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.19, Richter v McKeachie, 2009 BCSC 288

Massaar v. Moneck, 2026 ONCA 467

[Roberts, Coroza and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A.J. Kania and M. H. D’Mello, for the appellant

A.Bhardwaj, for the respondent Massaar

F. White, for the respondent Moneck

Keywords: Property, Gifts, Contracts, Loans, Evidence, Witnesses, Credibility, Cook v. Joyce, 2017 ONCA 49, Rudin-Brown v. Brown, 2023 ONCA 151.

Nabrotzky v McKague, 2026 ONCA 474

[Roberts, Coroza and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

K.Peacocke, for the appellant

M.Polvere, for the respondents

Keywords: Limitation Period, Delay, Dismissal, Courts of Justice Act

Scott v Kwong, 2026 ONCA 473

Roberts, Coroza and Pomerance JJ.A.

Counsel:

J. Stangarone and A. MacEachern, for the appellant

C. Baker, for the respondent

M. McCarthy and N. Burrows, for the interveners

Keywords: Family Law, Separation Agreements, Property, Matrimonial Home