In Dorceus v. Ontario, the Court dismissed an appeal brought by more than 400 healthcare workers challenging Ontario’s COVID-19 vaccination policies and related employment consequences. The Court upheld the motion judge’s decision to strike the Amended Statement of Claim as an abuse of process and for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, finding that the claim improperly sought to use the courts to conduct a broad inquiry into Ontario’s pandemic response rather than adjudicate concrete legal disputes. The Court also held that the Charter and intentional tort claims were not viable and upheld the motion judge’s jurisdictional rulings requiring the unionized and privileged hospital staff appellants to pursue their claims through the appropriate statutory and labour relations processes.

In BMO v Ieradi, the Court upheld the trial judge’s finding that an unsecured line of credit was a personal obligation, even though neither party could produce the loan agreement, which dated back to 2007. The trial just was not wrong in refusing to make an adverse inference against the bank as to whether the loan was a personal obligation. The appellant could not produce the loan agreement either. While the trial judge made some palpable errors of fact, including whether personal unsecured loans of this size were rare in 2007, such errors were not overriding, as they did not affect the result. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

In Friel v. HUB International Limited, the Court upheld the finding that a dispute over share options was governed by the forum selection clause in an Option Agreement, rather than the arbitration clause in the appellant’s Employment Agreement.

In Riley v. Riley, the Court upheld a motion judge’s order striking the appellant’s application seeking an equalization payment. There was no error in the exercise of discretion where the appellant’s prolonged and egregious failure to comply with multiple disclosure orders made it unfair to expect the respondent to defend the claim without the ordered financial information.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Bank of Montreal v. Ieradi, 2026 ONCA 311

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Adverse Inferences, Spoliation, Standard of Review, Facts, Palpable and Overriding Error, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 262, K.K. v. K.W.G., 2008 ONCA 489, Benhaim v. St-Germain, 2016 SCC 48, Billimoria v. Mistry, 2022 ONCA 276, H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, Waxman. v. Waxman (2004), 186 O.A.C. 201 (C.A.), Clifford v. Ontario Municipal Employee Retirement System, 2009 ONCA 670, R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, SS&C Technologies Canada Corp. v. The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, 2024 ONCA 675, Parris v. Laidley, 2012 ONCA 755

Friel v. HUB International Limited, 2026 ONCA 313

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Employment, Arbitration, Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, Peace River Hydro Partners v. Petrowest Corp., 2022 SCC 41, Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., 2011 SCC 15, Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, 2020 SCC 16, Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC 34, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Fuller v. Aphria Inc., 2020 ONCA 403, Rose v. Carnival Corporation, 2022 ONSC 6506

Dorceus v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 321

Keywords: Labour and Employment, Wrongful Dismissal, Unions, Labour Arbitration, Jurisdiction, Charter Claims, Intentional Torts, Conspiracy, Misfeasance in Public Office, Intimidation, Intentional Infliction of Mental Anguish, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, Abuse of Process, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Evidence, Admissibility, Judicial Notice, Costs, Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.9, s. 7.0.1, Health Protection and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.7, s. 77.7, Public Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 2, 6, 7, 9, 15, Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A., s. 48(1), Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, rr.21.01(1)(b), rr. 21.01(3)(d), Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, Nelson (City) v. Marchi, 2021 SCC 41, Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Provincial Court Judges’ Association of British Columbia, 2020 SCC 20, Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), 2007 SCC 2, Ontario Teachers’ Federation v. Ontario (Attorney General), (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 140 (Gen. Div.), Everywoman’s Health Centre Society (1988) v. Bridges (1991), 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 294 (C.A.), Appleyard v. Zealand, 2022 ONCA 570, Foy v. Foy (No. 2) (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 220 (C.A.), Davidson v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2005 BCSC 1765, Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138, Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, Bowman v. Ontario, 2022 ONCA 477, Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock, 2020 SCC 19, R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42, Owsianik v. Equifax Canada Co., 2022 ONCA 813, RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, Dickson v. Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10, Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, Sagen v. Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, 2009 BCCA 522, Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, Tanase v. College of Dental Hygienists of Ontario, 2021 ONCA 482, Quebec (Attorney General) v. Kanyinda, 2026 SCC 7, Lewis v Alberta Health Services, 2022 ABCA 359, Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, Gratton-Masuy Environmental Technologies Inc. v. Ontario, 2010 ONCA 501, R. v. Find, 2001 SCC 32, R. v. Morgan, 2020 ONCA 279, Taylor v. Hanley Hospitality Inc., 2022 ONCA 376, Northern Regional Health Authority v. Horrocks, 2021 SCC 42, National Organized Workers Union v. Sinai Health System, 2022 ONCA 802, Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929, Kadiri v. Southlake Regional Health Centre, 2015 ONCA 847, Beiko v. Hotel Dieu Hospital St. Catharines, 2007 ONCA 860, Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, Solgi v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan, 2022 SKCA 96, Manuge v. Canada, 2010 SCC 67, Administrative Law Treatise, vol. 2 (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1958)

Riley v. Riley, 2026 ONCA 328

Keywords: Family Law, Property, Remedies, Equalization of Net Family Property, Civil Procedure, Orders, Disclosure, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, r. 1(8), r. 2(2), Roberts v. Roberts, 2015 ONCA 450, Norris v. Norris, 2019 ONSC 2795, Manjunath v. Kuppa, 2024 ONCA 668, Mullin v. Sherlock, 2018 ONCA 1063

Short Civil Decisions

Man Kin Ng (Re), 2026 ONCA 319

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Discharge, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Boyce Estate v. 2113626 Ontario Inc., (Hampton Inn and Suites), 2026 ONCA 323

Keywords: Contracts, Employment, Wrongful Dismissal, Common Employers, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Res Judicata, Abuse of Process

Tehama Group Inc. v. Pythian Services Inc., 2026 ONCA 326

Keywords: Contracts, Arbitration Agreements, Civil Procedure, Arbitral Awards, Setting Aside, International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 2, Sched. 5

Chayil Church v. Soneil Pickering Inc., 2026 ONCA 325

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Termination

Zeppa v. Rea, 2026 ONCA 338

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Civil Procedure, Anti-SLAPP, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, r. 137.1, McFlow Capital Corp. v. James, 2021 ONCA 753

CIVIL DECISIONS

Bank of Montreal v. Ieradi, 2026 ONCA 311

[Tulloch C.J.O., Lauwers J.A., and O’Marra J. (ad hoc)]

Counsel:

K. Borg-Olivier, for the appellant
A. Fox, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Adverse Inferences, Spoliation, Standard of Review, Facts, Palpable and Overriding Error, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 262, K.K. v. K.W.G., 2008 ONCA 489, Benhaim v. St-Germain, 2016 SCC 48, Billimoria v. Mistry, 2022 ONCA 276, H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, Waxman. v. Waxman (2004), 186 O.A.C. 201 (C.A.), Clifford v. Ontario Municipal Employee Retirement System, 2009 ONCA 670, R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, SS&C Technologies Canada Corp. v. The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, 2024 ONCA 675, Parris v. Laidley, 2012 ONCA 755

facts:

The respondent bank, BMO, advanced a $400,000 unsecured line of credit to the appellant, JI, in 2007. The parties agreed that the loan existed, but neither could produce the original agreement documentation. The central dispute was whether the line of credit was issued to JI personally or on behalf of several corporations he controlled.

JI asserted that the loan was an “umbrella” facility intended for multiple corporations, supported by evidence that the credit approval process referenced corporate net worth and that such large unsecured personal loans were rare at the time. BMO maintained that the line of credit was personal, relying on internal records describing it as a personal line of credit, monthly statements addressed solely to JI, and evidence that he alone drew and used the funds.

At trial, the judge accepted BMO’s position, finding that the documentary evidence and JI’s conduct supported the conclusion that the loan was personal. Judgment was granted against JI for the outstanding balance and costs, and he appealed.

issues:

1. Did the trial judge err in failing to draw an adverse inference from the bank’s failure to produce the line of credit agreement documents?
2. Did the trial judge err in overlooking evidence that a $400,000 unsecured personal line of credit was rare in 2007?
3. Did the trial judge err in overlooking evidence that the funding decision was based on a recorded net worth exceeding $10,000,000?
4. Did the trial judge err in his assessment of the commercial reasonableness of the alleged “umbrella” line of credit facility?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court held that the trial judge did not commit a palpable and overriding error in declining to draw an adverse inference. Drawing an adverse inference for failure to produce evidence is a discretionary determination that depends on the circumstances, including whether the evidence was uniquely within one party’s control. Here, both parties failed to produce the agreement, and there was no allegation of spoliation or strategic non-disclosure. The document was equally unavailable to both sides, such that any adverse inference could just as easily have been drawn against the appellant. In any event, even if an adverse inference had been drawn against the bank, the Court found that it would not have affected the outcome. The trial judge’s conclusion that the loan was a personal line of credit was amply supported by the documentary evidence, including the bank’s internal records, account statements identifying the facility as a personal line of credit, and the appellant’s own conduct in drawing and using the funds. Accordingly, the failure to draw an adverse inference was neither an error nor one that would have altered the result.

2. No. The Court acknowledged that the trial judge did not expressly address this evidence, and that this amounted to a palpable error, as it was relevant to the nature of the loan. However, the error was not overriding and did not justify appellate intervention.
The Court held that even if such loans were uncommon, that fact did not undermine the trial judge’s central finding that this particular loan was personal. The documentary record, including bank records describing the facility as a personal line of credit and the appellant’s use of the funds, continued to strongly support that conclusion. Accordingly, while the trial judge ought to have addressed the evidence regarding the rarity of such loans, the omission was not sufficiently significant to vitiate the finding that the appellant entered into a personal line of credit.

3. No. As with issue 2, the Court accepted that the trial judge’s failure to address this evidence was a palpable error, because it was potentially relevant to whether the facility was personal or corporate. However, the error was not overriding. The same bank documents relied on by the appellant, which referenced the $10 million net worth, also repeatedly described the facility as a Personal Line of Credit. In light of that documentary record, and the appellant’s use of the account as a personal line of credit, the omission did not undermine the trial judge’s finding that the loan was personal.

4. No. The Court held that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence in rejecting the appellant’s “umbrella facility” theory. The appellant argued that the line of credit was available not only to several existing corporations, but also to future corporations he could later add. The trial judge rejected this as commercially unreasonable, particularly because the corporations had different shareholders and directors, and there was no corroborating evidence one would expect for such an arrangement. The appellant produced no corporate authorizations, accounting records, tax records or other documentation showing that the corporations treated the line of credit as their indebtedness. Given that absence of evidence, and the bank records identifying the facility as personal, the trial judge’s rejection of the umbrella facility theory was open to him and disclosed no palpable and overriding error.

Friel v. HUB International Limited, 2026 ONCA 313

[Trotter, Zarnett, and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Wozniak and K. Stone, for the appellant
A. McLachlan and C. Murray, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Employment, Arbitration, Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, Peace River Hydro Partners v. Petrowest Corp., 2022 SCC 41, Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., 2011 SCC 15, Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, 2020 SCC 16, Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC 34, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Fuller v. Aphria Inc., 2020 ONCA 403, Rose v. Carnival Corporation, 2022 ONSC 6506

facts:

The appellant’s employment with HUB International HKMB Limited (“HUB Ontario”) commenced September 21, 2012 (the “Employment Agreement”). The Employment Agreement was governed exclusively by the laws of Ontario and the parties agreed that disputes would be resolved by in accordance with the Arbitration Act (the “ADR clause”).

The appellant subsequently entered into an agreement with Hockey Parent Holdings L.P (“HPH”) to purchase Class A units in HPH, which incorporated an “Equityholders Agreement.” In December 2014, the appellant was granted an option by Hockey Parent Inc. (“HPI”) to purchase Class B shares in HPI (the “options”). He entered into a share option agreement with HPI (the “Option Agreement”) which provided that the options would vest and become exercisable on December 22, 2021. The Option Agreement similarly incorporated an Equityholders Agreement that designated a Delaware Court as the forum for the resolution of any disputes. 

The appellant resigned from HUB Ontario on December 23, 2021, one day after the Class B options vested, to work for a competitor. In March 2022, he served notice to exercise his vested options in HPI so as to acquire Class B shares pursuant to the Option Agreement. The respondents notified the appellant that while they did not dispute that the options had vested and that he was entitled to exercise them, his employment with a competitor constituted “misconduct” under the Equityholders Agreement. Therefore, if he were to purchase the shares, they would be entitled to buy them back at cost, and any value would be forfeited.

The appellant commenced proceedings in Ontario, seeking a declaration that the dispute about the options in HPI is governed by the ADR clause in the Employment Agreement, an order appointing an arbitrator, and a declaration that the forum selection clause in the Equityholders Agreementwas unconscionable. The motion judge determined that the ADR clause did not apply to the options dispute and the forum selection clause was valid and enforceable, giving the Delaware Court exclusive jurisdiction.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in determining that the proper forum for the resolution of the options dispute was the Delaware Court rather than arbitration under the dispute resolution provisions of the appellants employment agreement?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. First, the Court saw no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motion judge’s finding that an exception to the competence-competence principle was engaged in this case. In this case, the issue of jurisdiction turned on the interpretation of three contracts: the Employment Agreement, the Option Agreement, and the Equityholders Agreement. The necessary legal conclusions flowed from this interpretation and there was no need to delve further into the record.

Second, the motion judge did not err in her interpretation of the relevant clauses of the three agreements and resulting conclusion that the ADR clause in the Employment Agreement did not apply to the dispute. Examining the terms of the Option Agreement, she found that the grant of options in HPI was not part of his employment with HUB Ontario and that the dispute was therefore not “contemplated by” or “in connection with” the Employment Agreement. The Option Agreement unambiguously stated that the grant of options did not constitute employment compensation, was not a term or condition of employment and did not form part of the Employment Agreement.

The Option Agreement also stated that if the optionee ceased to be an employee, the Option Agreement “shall not be interpreted to form an employment contract or relationship with the Company or any of its Affiliates.” The Option Agreement also specified that the laws of the Delaware Court governed the Option Agreement. Moreover, the Employment Agreement did not contain any reference to the appellants’ entitlement to equity other than Schedule C, which provided for a different grant of options in an entity not involved in this dispute. The motion judge’s reasons demonstrated she read the agreements as a whole and gave effect to their clear and unambiguous language.

Finally, the motion judge did not err in her conclusion that the forum selection clause was not unconscionable and therefore applied, giving the Delaware Court exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. While the respondents acknowledged an inequality of bargaining power, the motion judge found, and they agreed, that this case was distinguishable from the authorities relied on by the appellant.

Dorceus v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 321

[Tulloch C.J.O., Roberts and George JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Galati, for the appellants
E. Owens and S. Kissick, for His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, Ontario Premier Doug Ford, Former Minister of Health Christine Elliot, Current Minister of Health Sylvia Jones, and Former Minister of Long-Term Care Paul Calandra
F.C. and S. Chopra, for the remaining respondents

Keywords: Labour and Employment, Wrongful Dismissal, Unions, Labour Arbitration, Jurisdiction, Charter Claims, Intentional Torts, Conspiracy, Misfeasance in Public Office, Intimidation, Intentional Infliction of Mental Anguish, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, Abuse of Process, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Evidence, Admissibility, Judicial Notice, Costs, Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.9, s. 7.0.1, Health Protection and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.7, s. 77.7, Public Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 2, 6, 7, 9, 15, Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A., s. 48(1), Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, rr.21.01(1)(b), rr. 21.01(3)(d), Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, Nelson (City) v. Marchi, 2021 SCC 41, Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Provincial Court Judges’ Association of British Columbia, 2020 SCC 20, Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), 2007 SCC 2, Ontario Teachers’ Federation v. Ontario (Attorney General), (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 140 (Gen. Div.), Everywoman’s Health Centre Society (1988) v. Bridges (1991), 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 294 (C.A.), Appleyard v. Zealand, 2022 ONCA 570, Foy v. Foy (No. 2) (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 220 (C.A.), Davidson v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2005 BCSC 1765, Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138, Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, Bowman v. Ontario, 2022 ONCA 477, Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock, 2020 SCC 19, R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42, Owsianik v. Equifax Canada Co., 2022 ONCA 813, RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, Dickson v. Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2024 SCC 10, Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, Sagen v. Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, 2009 BCCA 522, Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, Tanase v. College of Dental Hygienists of Ontario, 2021 ONCA 482, Quebec (Attorney General) v. Kanyinda, 2026 SCC 7, Lewis v Alberta Health Services, 2022 ABCA 359, Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, Gratton-Masuy Environmental Technologies Inc. v. Ontario, 2010 ONCA 501, R. v. Find, 2001 SCC 32, R. v. Morgan, 2020 ONCA 279, Taylor v. Hanley Hospitality Inc., 2022 ONCA 376, Northern Regional Health Authority v. Horrocks, 2021 SCC 42, National Organized Workers Union v. Sinai Health System, 2022 ONCA 802, Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929, Kadiri v. Southlake Regional Health Centre, 2015 ONCA 847, Beiko v. Hotel Dieu Hospital St. Catharines, 2007 ONCA 860, Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, Solgi v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan, 2022 SKCA 96, Manuge v. Canada, 2010 SCC 67, Administrative Law Treatise, vol. 2 (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1958)

facts:

The appellants, a group of more than 400 current and former healthcare workers, alleged that a provincial public health directive had resulted in the suspension or termination of their employment for declining COVID-19 vaccination. Most of the appellants were unionized, and eight of them were hospital staff with privileges governed by the Public Hospitals Act. They challenged an order which struck their Amended Statement of Claim against 59 defendants, the provincial Crown, four government officials, and 54 healthcare organizations.

On August 17, 2021, the Chief Medical Officer of Health issued Directive 6 under s. 77.7 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act. Directive 6 required certain healthcare organizations to establish and ensure compliance among employees and staff with a vaccination policy. Pursuant to the directive, that policy was required to mandate either vaccination, written proof of a medical reason for non-vaccination together with regular COVID-19 testing, or completion of an educational session about the benefits of vaccination together with regular testing. The directive did not mandate dismissal or discipline. Those decisions remained within the discretion of individual employers.

The appellants’ Amended Statement of Claim asserted that the COVID-19 pandemic was fabricated, that vaccines and PCR testing constituted crimes against humanity, that vaccine passports violated the Charter, that lockdown measures amounted to “martial law,” and that government officials committed criminal acts. The claim also asserted numerous torts and sought damages and declarations against employers, the provincial Crown, and government officials

The motion judge ruled that the unionized and privileged hospital staff appellants had advanced their claims against the healthcare respondents in the wrong forum. He determined that the unionized appellants’ claims were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators and that the claims of the privileged hospital staff should have been brought before the governing bodies of their hospitals and the Health Professionals Appeal and Review Board (“HPARB”).

The motion judge struck the claims against all respondents as an abuse of process. He ruled that the appellants had attempted to aggregate hundreds of unrelated claims while advancing scandalous and speculative allegations which risked politicizing the judicial process. The motion judge also struck the claims against all respondents for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, as the Charter and tort claims lacked the necessary material facts and were foreclosed by existing jurisprudence.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in striking the claim as an abuse of process?
2. Did the motion judge err in concluding that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action?
3. Did the motion judge improperly take judicial notice?
4. Did the motion judge err in dismissing the claims of the unionized and privileged hospital staff appellants on jurisdictional grounds?
5. Was there any procedural unfairness or error in the costs award?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court held that the motion judge had committed no error in concluding that the action was an abuse of process. The Court upheld the motion judge’s conclusion that the claim had attempted to use the court as a forum to conduct a sweeping inquiry into the scientific validity and policy wisdom of Ontario’s pandemic response. The allegations contained in the Amended Statement of Claim were not tied to individualized facts concerning the appellants’ employment circumstances. They did not answer the specific factual questions necessary for adjudication. The Court agreed with the motion judge’s assessment that debates about the effectiveness of public health measures untethered from the interpretation and application of specific laws to the facts of concrete cases were better conducted by scientists, policymakers and public health authorities than by courts. Those were matters entrusted to the political branches of government. The claim, therefore, went beyond the proper purpose of challenging the constitutionality of specific laws and governmental acts.

2. No. The Court held that the motion judge correctly struck the pleadings for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. First, the Court held that the motion judge correctly struck these claims because the Charter did not apply to the 47 healthcare respondents because they were private entities rather than public bodies and the activity at issue, the suspension or termination of employment, was private rather than inherently governmental. Second, the Court found that the motion judge had correctly concluded that the pleadings disclosed no viable Charter claims. The appellants’ s. 7 claims were not viable because the Directive did not deprive the appellants of the right to refuse to consent to medical treatment. The heart of the complaint was that they faced employment consequences for choosing not to vaccinate or test. Those consequences did not engage s. 7 because that section of the Charter does not protect the right to pursue a particular occupation. The s. 15 claims were not viable because s.15 prohibits discrimination based on enumerated or analogous grounds. Vaccination status was neither. The ss. 2, 6, and 9 claims were not viable because the appellants did not plead any material facts demonstrating how Directive 6 or “vaccine passports” allegedly breached any of those rights.

Third, the Court found that the appellants’ intentional tort claims for conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, intimidation and intentional infliction of mental anguish were also not viable. Each of these torts required proof of intent or malice, matters which required particularized allegations. As the motion judge determined, the pleading contained none. Its bald allegations of wrongdoing were insufficient. The Court further held that the appellants’ challenge to the provincial emergency declaration under the EMCPA was doomed to fail as pleaded. The appellants did not plead any material facts to support their argument that the statutory prerequisites were not met.

3. No. The Court held that the motion judge did not err by taking judicial notice of the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the fact that governments enacted public health measures. Those additional facts had no bearing on the motion judge’s central conclusion that the proceeding was an abuse of process that failed to disclose reasonable causes of action.

4. No. The Court upheld the motion judge’s jurisdictional rulings concerning the claims of the unionized and privileged hospital staff appellants against the healthcare respondents. First, the Court agreed with the motion judge that the unionized appellants had to arbitrate their dispute with the healthcare respondents because labour arbitrators had exclusive jurisdiction over its subject matter. The motion judge properly applied the governing principles and the Court’s precedents. The appellants could not evade the dispute’s essential character through legal labels such as Charter breaches or intentional torts. Second, the Court agreed with the motion judge that the eight privileged hospital staff appellants were subject to the Public Hospitals Act dispute resolution regime. Thus, their claims against the healthcare respondents should have been stayed unless and until they exhausted that process.

5. No. The Court found that the motion judge issued comprehensive reasons that addressed all issues raised by the parties. The appellants were fully heard. Further, the costs award of $15,000 was modest given the scope of the proceeding and the number of plaintiffs involved.

Riley v. Riley, 2026 ONCA 328

[Miller, Zarnett and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

L.M. Belowus, for the appellant

N. Wilson, for the respondent
Keywords: Family Law, Property, Remedies, Equalization of Net Family Property, Civil Procedure, Orders, Disclosure, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, r. 1(8), r. 2(2), Roberts v. Roberts, 2015 ONCA 450, Norris v. Norris, 2019 ONSC 2795, Manjunath v. Kuppa, 2024 ONCA 668, Mullin v. Sherlock, 2018 ONCA 1063

facts:

The parties separated in 2015, after 20 years of marriage. In 2016, the appellant commenced an application seeking an equalization payment, among other relief. Orders for disclosure were made in 2016 and 2018. Nine years after its commencement, the equalization claim remained unresolved, despite case management by the motion judge.

On duelling motions brought by the parties concerning compliance with court-ordered disclosure, the motion judge found that the appellant had not complied, that his non-compliance was egregious, and that it was unfair to expect the respondent to defend the appellant’s equalization claim without the ordered disclosure. Concluding that the appellant “[did] not intend to help the court come to a just resolution”, the motion judge made an order striking his application under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in the exercise of her discretion to strike the appellant’s application?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No.  The whole point of requiring disclosure from the appellant was to allow the respondent to defend against the appellant’s contention about his assets. As the motion judge found, it would be unfair to expect the respondent to defend the equalization claim without the ordered disclosure. The non-disclosure showed that the appellant “did not intend to help the court come to a just resolution.”

The Court disagreed with the appellants’ argument that the motion judge’s approach was inconsistent with the framework set out in Mullin v. Sherlock for failure to obey a disclosure order. To assess a party’s net family property and equalization claim, the Court required a complete financial picture. Because the appellant did not provide all his bank account statements or documents related to the businesses in which he was alleged to have an interest, the motion judge found that the Court could not fairly assess his equalization claim. This was an assessment of relevance. The fact that the appellant did not own an interest in the businesses at the relevant valuation date was also contested, as the motion judge found the appellant’s evidence to be rife with inconsistencies.

The motion judge made each of the disclosure orders, case managed this matter for years and was intimately familiar with the issues in the litigation. She found that the non-disclosure was egregious, that it would be unfair to expect the respondent to defend the equalization claim without the information ordered disclosed, and that the appellant evinced an intention not to assist the court in coming to a just resolution. These findings undercut any assertion that the non-disclosure lacked relevance to the issues in dispute.

The Court also did not accept the appellant’s submission that the motion judge failed to consider the disclosure the appellant did make. The motion judge did not lose sight of what had been produced by the appellant. She correctly looked beyond what was produced to consider what had not been produced, what efforts had been made to comply, the explanations for non-compliance, and the effect of the non-compliance on the prospect of a just resolution of the matter.

Finally, the appellant did not propose any alternative remedy that would address the prejudice caused by non-disclosure. Simply asserting that the matter should proceed without the disclosure was not an alternative remedy, where the non-disclosure makes it unfair to expect the party entitled to the disclosure to respond to the claim against them. The Court will ultimately not interfere with a discretionary order unless the lower Court misdirected itself, came to a decision that was so clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice, or gave no or insufficient weight to relevant considerations.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Man Kin Ng (Re), 2026 ONCA 319

[Miller, Favreau and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G.M.K.N., acting in person
M. Stephenson and J. Chung, for the respondent, KSV Restructuring Inc., in its capacity as trustee in bankruptcy of G.M.K.N.

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Discharge, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Boyce Estate v. 2113626 Ontario Inc., (Hampton Inn and Suites), 2026 ONCA 323

[Miller, Favreau and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Schwartz, for the appellant
D. Sinko, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Employment, Wrongful Dismissal, Common Employers, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Res Judicata, Abuse of Process

Tehama Group Inc. v. Pythian Services Inc., 2026 ONCA 326

[George, Copeland and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Schafler, C. A. Snider and E. Cinar, for the appellant
A. Merskey and K. Byers, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Arbitration Agreements, Civil Procedure, Arbitral Awards, Setting Aside, International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 2, Sched. 5

Chayil Church v. Soneil Pickering Inc., 2026 ONCA 325

[Miller, Favreau and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Radnoff and A. Khan, for the appellant
S. Rogers and D. Poliwoda, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Termination

Zeppa v. Rea, 2026 ONCA 338

[Miller, Favreau and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

E. Bisceglia and A.D. Biase, for the appellant
C.D. Carlo and S. Fooks, for the respondent

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Civil Procedure, Anti-SLAPP, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, r. 137.1, McFlow Capital Corp. v. James, 2021 ONCA 753