COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (SEPTEMBER 28 – OCTOBER 2)

By John Polyzogopoulos on October 2, 2026

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Good afternoon.
Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of September 28, 2026.

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In Caruso v. Law Society of Ontario, the Court confirmed that By-Law 4 confines Ontario paralegals’ immigration and refugee practice to work connected with proceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Board and does not authorize them to provide legal services on applications to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada or the Canada Border Services Agency. The Court held that By-Law 4 does not conflict with the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, since Parliament left the regulation of paralegals to provincial law societies.

In Schuringa v Svetkoff, the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from vesting orders made on an urgent motion in family law litigation. The court found the order was final despite being marked “Temporary,” so the appeal properly came to the Court. Because the jurisdiction to make the vesting orders under s. 9 of the Family Law Act and s. 100 of the Courts of Justice Act was questionable, and given the lack of reasons given for the vesting orders, they were set aside, although the Court gave no opinion on whether there was sufficient jurisdiction in this case to make the orders. The Court refrained from commenting on whether the vesting orders were contrary to public policy in that they may have resulted in defeating the interests of creditors of the appellants, who were in receivership and at risk of bankruptcy.

In Chamseddine v. Ghani, the Court dismissed a husband’s family law appeal and upheld the trial judge’s order for unequal division of net family property, her income imputation and support awards, and her finding that there was no vendor take-back mortgage on the matrimonial home.

In Centre de Services à l’emploi Prescott-Russell Inc. v. Forage M3 Drilling Services Inc., the Court set aside the motion judge’s interpretation of an indemnity agreement that it found led to a commercially absurd result in light of a related loan agreement and GSA and the surrounding circumstances.

In Appgear Mortgage Investment Limited Partnership v. Longobardi, the Court dismissed the moving party’s motion for a stay of enforcement of an order for possession of her property by the mortgagee pending appeal. The appellant had not defended and only sought to appeal when the Sheriff arrived on her doorstep more than two years after she defaulted under the mortgage.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Civil Decisions

Caruso v. Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONCA 677

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Paralegals, Immigration, Licensing, Statutory Interpretation, Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, ss. 1(5), 1(6), 1(7), 26.1(1), 27(1), 62(0.1)4, 6(2), 6(1), 1(1), 4.1, 4.2, 50, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 91(1), 91(2), 167(1), Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7, An Act for the better regulating the Practice of the Law, S.U.C. 1797 (37 Geo. III), c. XIII, College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants Act, S.C. 2019, c. 29, Access to Justice Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Rules of Professional Conduct (Toronto: LSO, 2000), r. 6.1-1, Provincial Offences Act, 1980. C. 400, s. 51, Solicitor’s Act, R.S.O. 1980. c. 478, s. 1, Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No. 1, S.C. 2019, c. 29, Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 92(13), 92(14), 91(25), Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1987, c. 25, s. 26, Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, ss. 30, 69(1), Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, S.O.R./2004-59, Caruso v. The Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 6744, Green v. Law Society of Manitoba, 2017 SCC 20, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Ontario (Health) v. Association of Ontario Midwives, 2022 ONCA 458, Auer v. Auer, 2024 SCC 36, Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2025 SCC 15, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, R. v. Basque, 2023 SCC 18, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, Regina v. Lawrie and Pointts Ltd. (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 161 (C.A.), Regina ex rel. Smith v. Mitchell, [1952] O.R. 896 (C.A.), Regina v. Engel and Seaway Divorcing Service (1976), 11 O.R. (2d) 343 (Prov. Ct. Crim. Div.), Law Society of Upper Canada v. Stoangi (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 122 (C.A.), R. v. Romanowicz (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 506 (C.A.), R. v. McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686, Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, 2001 SCC 67, Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69, Reference re Impact Assessment Act, 2023 SCC 23, R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, Murray-Hall v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2023 SCC 10, Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, 2018 SCC 48, J.A. Flood & F.H. Zemans, “Unauthorized Legal Practice Prosecutions and Independent Paralegals in Ontario and the United States”, published as an appendix to R. W. Ianni, Report of the Task Force on Paralegals (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 1990), Law Society of Upper Canada, A Submission to the Attorney General of Ontario on the Provision of Legal Services by Unsupervised Persons (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 1986), Law Society of Upper Canada, Interim Report on the Special Committee on Paralegals and Access to Legal Services (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 1992), Law Society of Upper Canada, Paralegal Task Force Report (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2000), A Framework for Regulating Paralegal Practice in Page: 28 Ontario (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 2000), An Analysis of a Framework for Regulating Paralegal Practice in Ontario (Ontario: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2000), A Consultation Document on a Proposed Regulatory Framework (Ontario: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2002), Report to Convocation (Ontario: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004), Bill 14, An Act to promote access to justice by amending or repealing various Acts and by enacting the Legislation Act, 2005, Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Reports of Debates (Hansard), 38-2 (26 April 2006), Law Society of Upper Canada, Convocation, Public Session (Transcript) (29 March 2007), Law Society of Upper Canada, Convocation, Public Session (Transcript) (26 April 2007), House of Commons Debates, 40-3, No. 112 (7 December 2010)

Schuringa v. Svetkoff, 2026 ONCA 682

Keywords: Family Law, Separation Agreements, Enforcement, Vesting Orders, Civil Procedure, Appeal, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasons for Decision, Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), Family Law Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. F.3, s. 9(1)(d)(i), Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 100, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society v. C.S.D., 2017 ONCA 743, Hendrickson v. Kallio, [1932] O.R. 675 (Ont. C.A.), Drywall Acoustic Lathing Insulation Local 675 Pension Fund v. SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., 2020 ONCA 375, Frick v. Frick, 2016 ONCA 799, 132 O.R. (3d) 321, Lynch v. Segal (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.) leave to appeal refused, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 84, R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, R. v. Vuradin, 2013 SCC 38, R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, R. v. Chung, 2020 SCC 8

Chamseddine v. Ghani, 2026 ONCA 697

Keywords: Family Law, Child Support, Spousal Support, Imputed Income, Property, Equalization of Net Family Property, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Admissibility, Admissions, Privilege, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 5(6), Child Support Guidelines, s. 19(1), Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, Karatzoglou v. Commisso, 2023 ONCA 738, Morris v. Nicolaidis, 2021 ONSC 2957, R. v. MacDonald, 2010 ONCA 178, OZ Merchandising Inc. v. Canadian Professional Soccer League Inc., 2021 ONCA 520, Colivas v. Colivas, 2017 ONSC 4730, Frick v. Frick, 2016 ONCA 799, Czieslik v. Ayuso, 2007 ONCA 305, A.E. v. A.E, 2021 ONSC 8189, Bak v. Dobell, 2007 ONCA 304

Centre de Services à l’emploi Prescott-Russell Inc. v. Forage M3 Drilling Services Inc., 2026 ONCA 692

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Debtor-Creditor, Guarantees, Indemnity Clause, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Earthco Soil Mixtures Inc. v. Pine Valley Enterprises Inc., 2024 SCC 20, Corner Brook (City) v. Bailey, 2021 SCC 29, Resolute FP Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 60, Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 423

Appgear Mortgage Investment Limited Partnership v. Longobardi, 2026 ONCA 711

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Possession, Civil Procedure, Default Judgments, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Rules of Civil Procedure, r 63.02(1), Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, 2014 ONCA 194, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, Carvalho Estate v. Verma, 2024 ONCA 222, Zafar v. Saiyid, 2017 ONCA 919, Dramel Limited v. Multani, 2023 ONCA 540, Starkman v. Home Trust Company, 2015 ONCA 436

CIVIL DECISIONS

Caruso v. Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONCA 677

[Paciocco, Thorburn and George JJ.A.]

Counsel:

AC, acting in person

R. Hasan and S. Aylward, for the respondent

Thompson, for the intervener, College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants

Khan, for the intervener, Ontario Paralegal Association

Choudhry, for the intervener, Canadian Immigration Lawyers Association

facts:

The appellant, a paralegal licensed by the Law Society of Ontario (the “LSO”) with interest in the practice of immigration law, objected to the LSO’s interpretation of its By-Law 4.

The LSO interprets By-Law 4 as permitting paralegals to represent applicants before the Immigration and Refugee Board (the “IRB”) and to prepare documents for use at IRB hearings, but prohibiting paralegals from drafting documents or providing other legal services for immigration and refugee clients where those documents and services are not related to an IRB hearing, such as applications to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (the “IRCC”) or the Canada Border Services Agency (the “CBSA”).

The appellant brought an application to the Divisional Court for declarations that paralegals in Ontario are authorized to provide immigration legal services in accordance with s. 91(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) and that any LSO by-laws that limit that authority are of no force and effect. The appellant argued that this “arbitrary” distinction was not supported by the legislation (the “interpretation issue”) and would cause By-Law 4 to conflict with ss. 91(1)-(2) and 167(1) of the IRPA, rendering By-Law 4 inoperative. He also argued that the LSO’s interpretation contravened s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Divisional Court rejected each of the appellant’s arguments. The appellant was granted leave to appeal the Divisional Court’s decision solely on the interpretation issue.

On the interpretation issue, the Appellant argued that, in effect, the grammatical and ordinary meaning of By-Law 4 authorizes paralegals to provide all legal services related to immigration and refugee matters, and that the Divisional Court erred by giving “proceeding”, “intended proceeding” and “tribunal” the narrow readings the LSO promoted. He argued that in adopting the LSO’s interpretation, the Divisional Court erred by failing to take account of the Law Society Act (“LSA”) and other relevant statutes. The appellant further argued that Ontario paralegals are authorized to provide broad immigration and refugee services as “other counsel”, as provided for in s. 167(1) of the IRPA and by the phrase “including a paralegal” in IRPA s. 91(2).

issues:

Did the Divisional Court err in interpreting the language of By-Law 4?
Did the Divisional Court err in failing to find that By-Law 4 must be interpreted consistently with federal legislation to provide broad authority to paralegals to provide immigration and refugee services?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

The Court deemed it unnecessary to resolve the issue regarding the standard of review because the LSO’s interpretation of By-Law 4 satisfied both the reasonableness and correctness standard.

The Court emphasized that modern principles of interpretation require the meaning of a statutory provision to be determined by reference to its text, context and purpose. Secondary principles, including the presumption against absurdity and in favour of constitutionality, are considered only when a contextual and purposive reading of the text still leaves ambiguity. The Court addressed the appellant’s arguments under each of the principles.

The grammatical and ordinary meaning

The Court expressed that the LSA delegates to the LSO the authority to pass by-laws to develop licenses and to define the scope of authority they confer. Section 6(2) of By-Law 4 identifies a closed list of legal services that paralegals are authorized to do, all of which are linked to “a proceeding”. No authority is conferred on paralegals to provide advice in any other context.

Though the Court agreed with the appellant that the IRPA confers on paralegals the authority to give advice, represent parties and provide various legal services relating to proceedings before tribunals established under the IRPA, it disagreed with the appellant’s position that legal services with respect to IRCC and the CBSA are being provided for a “proceeding” before an IRPA “tribunal”. When read in plain language and in its context, the term “proceeding” is used to refer to matters that are before the adjudicative bodies, as opposed to administrative decisionmakers.

The Court also rejected the appellant’s argument that any steps leading up to a possible IRB hearing should be viewed as an “intended proceeding” falling within the definition in s. 6(1) of By-Law 4, as there is a world of a difference between “intended proceeding” and “possible proceeding”. “Intended proceeding” is included in the definition of “proceeding” to permit paralegals to prepare for proceedings that are in the process of being undertaken, and to validate legal services where the intended proceeding is abandoned or fails to be held.

Lastly, the Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the word “tribunal” used in s. 6(2)2(iv) must be interpreted as including all IRPA civil servants who make decisions. “Tribunal” is not a term that is ordinarily used to describe a civil servant performing administrative functions.

The Court noted in its conclusion, that in any event, many IRCC issues are resolved by the Minister pursuant to executive authority rather than statutory authority. Since these decisions are not made under statutory authority, paralegals could not provide legal services relating to these matters even if the term “proceeding” was to be read as broadly as the appellant suggested.

The statutory context

The Court rejected the appellant’s submission that the definition of “adjudicative body” in s. 1(1) of the LSA somehow broadened the scope of the terms “proceeding” and “tribunal” in By-Law 4. Among the bodies administering IRPA, the IRCC and CBSA do not make decisions after the presentation of evidence or legal argument, only the IRB does.

Similarly, the Court held that the definition of “licensee” in s. 1(1) does not give paralegals the right to perform every activity included in the broad definition of legal services and cannot override s. 26.1(3) of the LSA, which provides that no licensee shall practice law or provide legal services in Ontario except to the extent permitted by the licensee’s license.

The Court also rejected appellant’s argument that the LSO’s interpretation of By-Law 4 undermined access to justice, by depriving individuals of legal services, and the equality of arms between paralegals and lawyers, by requiring paralegals, but not lawyers, to obtain additional licenses to do the work of immigration consultants. The LSO is not prevented from recognizing that paralegals require additional legal training to achieve comparable standards of learning in the area that those who are accredited as lawyers have achieved.

The purposive interpretation

The Court found that the Divisional Court interpreted By-Law 4 consistently with its purpose. A historical view of the matter confirmed that By-Law 4 was intended to preserve the distinction between advocacy work, which would be permitted by licensed paralegals, and solicitors’ work, which would not be permitted. Historically, non-lawyers have been prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, subject to exceptions where the law permits non-lawyers to do so otherwise. A broad range of exceptions have been developed permitting agents to act as advocates. In contrast, no statutory exceptions have been created to permit non-lawyers to do solicitors’ work.

The presumption against absurd interpretations

The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that it is arbitrary (and absurd, as the Court interpreted his argument) to permit paralegals to engage in complex litigation matters before the IRB, but not to file applications in immigration and refugee matters.

The presumption against absurd interpretation is a secondary rule of interpretation that only applies in cases of ambiguity. Where a provision is not ambiguous, the legislature’s intent must be enforced. The Court found that there was no reasonable interpretation of By-Law 4 that would support paralegal authority to engage in non-adjudicative legal work.

The Court further held that even if this secondary rule of interpretation was applied, there was nothing arbitrary about the Divisional Court’s interpretation of By-Law 4. Limiting the authority of licensed paralegals to doing only advocacy work is supported by the historical rationales.

2. Did the Divisional Court err in failing to find that By-Law 4 must be interpreted consistently with federal legislation to provide broad authority to paralegals to provide immigration and refugee services?

No.

Both provincial and federal governments have jurisdiction relating to legal representation in immigration matters. Both jurisdictions can legislate relating to the same subject pursuant to the double aspect doctrine, so long as the legislation does not conflict. Accordingly, the Court held that the double aspect doctrine applies and that both By-Law 4 and the IRPA can coexist.

The Court conceded that there is a principle of interpretation that a statute should be read in a manner that will uphold the constitutionality of the relevant legislative provisions. However, the Court rejected the appellant’s position, that this principle must be applied to read By-Law 4 as permitting paralegal to provide legal services that IRPA permits for paralegals, on the basis that By-Law 4 is not ambiguous and there is no conflict.

The appellant relied on Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat to support his position that By-Law 4 creates division of powers problems. The Court rejected his argument, finding that the Mangat decision did not assist the appellant’s position as the Mangat decision was confined to its facts. All of the legal services that Mr. Mangat provided related exclusively to IRB refugee hearings, which is advocacy work that would be permissible for paralegals under By-Law 4 anyways. Additionally, the federal legislation at issue in Mangat was materially amended after the decision was rendered.

The Court further held that the IRPA and By-Law 4 do not conflict. A high burden of proof is needed to establish a conflict. Section 167(1) of the IRPA creates the right of persons to be represented in proceeding by “other counsel” or non-lawyers in IRPA matters, but the right to be represented by “other counsel” is restricted in s. 91 in all IRPA matters to non-lawyers whose legal work is regulated. IRPA does not confer an unconditional right on every paralegal to provide every form of immigration service. The Court explained that permitting paralegals to do so would also defeat the purpose of s. 91 to ensure that non-lawyers providing legal services in IRPA matters are regulated.

Schuringa v. Svetkoff, 2026 ONCA 682

[Paciocco, Sossin, Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Broadus, for the appellant

A. Khattak, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Separation Agreements, Enforcement, Vesting Orders, Civil Procedure, Appeal, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasons for Decision, Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), Family Law Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. F.3, s. 9(1)(d)(i), Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 100, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society v. C.S.D., 2017 ONCA 743, Hendrickson v. Kallio, [1932] O.R. 675 (Ont. C.A.), Drywall Acoustic Lathing Insulation Local 675 Pension Fund v. SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., 2020 ONCA 375, Frick v. Frick, 2016 ONCA 799, 132 O.R. (3d) 321, Lynch v. Segal (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.) leave to appeal refused, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 84, R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, R. v. Vuradin, 2013 SCC 38, R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, R. v. Chung, 2020 SCC 8

facts:

The appellant, M.S., and the respondent, S.S., married in 2004. They separated on December 31, 2020, and entered into a separation agreement (the “Agreement”) dated December 6, 2022. The Agreement set out that (1) there would be no equalization payment except for a transfer to S.S. of 50% of the common shares owned by M.S. in a company called Flexiti (the “Flexiti Shares”) within 30 days of the date of the Agreement, and (2) the family Cottage would remain jointly owned until a triggering event.

In May 2024, S.S. notified M.S. that a buyout of the Cottage needed to be facilitated. In November 2024, she advised him that she intended to trigger a sale of the property. On May 2, 2025, S.S. made an application seeking partition and sale of the Cottage, an order that the proceeds of sale be divided equally with M.S., and an order that she receive certain credit for purchasing furniture for the Cottage. She did not seek a vesting order in relation to the Cottage or any other assets, including the Flexiti shares.

S.S. later learned that Garrington Group Inc. (“Garrington”) had made an application to appoint a receiver over the property, assets, and undertakings of M.S. and of corporations associated with him. M.S. provided S.S. with a forbearance agreement dated October 17, 2025, which he purported to have entered into with Garrington, which would resolve the receivership application. S.S. was concerned that Garrington would force M.S. to declare bankruptcy and asserted that M.S. had not transferred 50% of the Flexiti Shares to her.

On November 7, 2025, S.S. filed a Notice of Urgent Motion seeking, among other things, (1) an order for the immediate partition and sale of the Cottage, (2) an order vesting the Cottage in her name, and (3) an order vesting the Flexiti Shares in her name. Coats J. found S.S.’s motion met the threshold for urgency and added it to the regular motions list for November 19, 2025. The motion judge granted S.S.’s application and issued the order.

issues:

Did the motion judge have jurisdiction to make a vesting order for either the Cottage or the Flexiti Shares?
Did M.S. have reasonable notice of the claim for the vesting order?
As a matter of public policy, did the court make an order with the specific intent of defeating creditor claims in an alleged prospective bankruptcy?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

Yes.

At the outset of the appeal, the Court raised the concern that the order on its face was “Temporary” and therefore may be an interlocutory order from which an appeal lies to the Divisional Court rather than the Court. Apart from the motion judge ticking off the “Temporary” box at the top of the order, which is not binding with respect to the question of the Court’s jurisdiction, the substance of the order made it clear that it was a final order. The final effect of the order was to remove the property, including M.S.’s interest, from the bankruptcy proceedings. The order did not determine a collateral matter between the partes, but having regard to the pleadings, determined the real matter in dispute between the parties.

Unnecessary to determine.

S.S. neither sought the orders appealed from in her initial application, nor amended her application to add this relief going into the urgent motion. The claims appeared for the first time in her urgent motion. While the Court has previously held that not all material facts need to be set out in a family law application, notice should be given so the spouse has a fair opportunity to meet the case. Although it was unnecessary for the Court to resolve this issue to determine this appeal, there was an open question as to whether that was achieved in this case.

The granting of a vesting order as a matter of enforcement in family law litigation is an exercise of a judge’s discretionary authority, and absent an error in principle or an error in law in the exercise of that discretion, the Court will not interfere.

This appeal raised real jurisdictional issues. There appeared to be two possible sources for the jurisdiction to make the vesting orders in this case, s. 9 of the Family Law Act, and s. 100 of the Courts of Justice Act. In this case, the availability of both sources was questionable.

Section 9 of the Family Law Act empowers courts to vest property in a spouse during an application for equalization of net family property. In this case the parties had agreed on the division of their net family property and therefore no application for equalization was required. In substance, S.S. was seeking to enforce the terms of a separation agreement. It was not evident whether s. 9 could provide a basis for the vesting order.

With respect to s.100 of the Courts of Justice Act, the Court has made clear that in the family context, s. 100 is an enforcement provision permitting vesting orders to be made relating to existing interests or payment obligations.

M.S. argued that S.S. had no claim in his 50% interest in the cottage, and no interest in the Flexiti shares beyond his contractual obligation to transfer her 50% of his interest in the shares. It was not readily apparent where the motion judge’s jurisdiction to make vesting orders relating to the entirety of the cottage and the Flexiti Shares in S.S. came from.

Given the uncertainty relating to the motion judge’s jurisdiction to make the orders he did, he was obliged to explain the basis for the vesting orders he issued but he failed to do so. It was unclear what basis the motion judge had to exercise the discretion to issue the vesting orders for the entirety of both assets to be conveyed to S.S.

The Court did not accept that the record could supplement the reasons in this case. The exchanges between the motion judge and the parties did not address the motion judge’s basis to issue the vesting orders dealing with M.S.’s share of the cottage proceeds or the Flexiti Shares. Further, the order issued by the motion judge did not reflect the comments he made during the hearing.

The motion judge provided a conclusory endorsement stating only that the application was granted and the vesting orders would be issued. That was the proper place to explain the basis for the vesting orders, what they would contain, and why they were necessary. The failure of the motion judge to address these issues constituted a reversible error. The Court stopped short of deciding affirmatively that the motion judge lacked the jurisdiction to make the vesting orders he made. Nonetheless, the vesting orders dealing with the proceeds of the Cottage and Flexiti Shares were set aside. It was also unnecessary for the court to address the other ground of appeal relating to public policy concerns and whether the vesting orders should be set aside for attempting to defeat creditor claims during a prospective bankruptcy.

Chamseddine v. Ghani, 2026 ONCA 697

[Paciocco, Sossin and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Dror and N. Heslop, for the appellant

Delaney, for the respondent

facts:

The parties married in 2010 and separated in April 2023.

The appellant is a carpenter and business owner. He incorporated a company in 2014 (“C.D.”), which ran into some financial difficulties and made an assignment in bankruptcy in 2019. In March 2019, a new company was incorporated (“C.W.”) to which the appellant’s brother (“Y.”) held all shares. Both the appellant and Y. worked for C.W., providing the same services C.D. had previously provided. In March 2024, C.W. ceased operations. Another company was incorporated (“Aspen”), to which Y. held all shares and both the appellant and Y. worked for Aspen, providing the same services and products as C.D. and C.W.

The respondent was primarily responsible for the children and running the household. From 2014 to 2021, she also assisted as an office administrator for C.D. and then C.W.

In 2016, the parties purchased a property (“Quinn Road”). Due to the appellant’s credit difficulties, Quinn Road was registered the in name of the respondent and the appellant’s uncle. Quinn Road was previously owned by G.K. and G.K.’s brother, D.K., negotiated the purchase. Quinn Road comprised of a single-family dwelling and a commercial space for C.W.’s operations. In 2017, title to Quinn Road was transferred to the appellant’s name. Two months before separation, the appellant transferred title of Quinn Road to his brother, Y.

Among the trial judge’s findings, the trial judge found that unequal division of net family property (“NFP”) was appropriate; imputed income to the appellant; and determined that the parties were the beneficial owners of the matrimonial home, that there was no vendor take-back mortgage (“VTB”) against it, and ordered that it be sold.

issues:

Did the trial judge err in finding that the appellant was always the beneficial owner of C.W.?
Did the trial judge err in ordering unequal division of net family property?
Did the trial judge err in her conclusions on imputation of income?
Did the trial judge err in finding that there was no VTB mortgage in favour of D.K., and by failing to provide adequate reasons as to why D.K.’s evidence was not accepted to arrive at this conclusion?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

The Court noted that the trial judge found credibility issues with the appellant and Y., and that the analysis and conclusions of the trial judge must be read in the context of the appellant’s failure to make full and frank disclosure over the course of the proceedings.

The trial judge found that the appellant was the beneficial owner of C.W., which grounded her decision for unequal division of NFP under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act.

The trial judge considered a letter from Y.’s counsel to all parties, stating that he was agreeable to a declaration that he was holding C.W. in trust for the appellant through the presumption of resulting trust. The appellant argued that the letter was covered by settlement privilege, as it was sent in the context of pre-trial settlement discussions and could be inferred to be a settlement letter. The trial judge held a voir dire on this issue and held that on the face of the letter, it was impossible for her to come to the conclusion that it was a settlement offer. The Court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the letter was not intended to be privileged. However, the Court also noted that an admission is evidence only against the party who made it, which in this case was Y., and that the trial judge impermissibly used Y.’s admission against the appellant. Nonetheless, the Court found that the misstep did not affect the conclusion. The trial judge cited at least nine other compelling bases for her determination that the appellant was the beneficial owner of C.W. and there was no indication that her conclusion would have been any different without the letter.

2. No.

The appellant argued that ordering unequal division was procedurally unfair, as it was not previously pleaded and was only formally asserted a day before the trial, and that the trial judge erred in focusing on unconscionable conduct rather than an unconscionable result.

The Court stated that unequal division did not need to be pleaded where the other party had notice of it. The Court upheld the trial judge’s reasoning, that the appellant had always been aware of the respondent’s position that Y. was not the rightful owner of C.W. Furthermore, the Court also found no error with the trial judge’s finding of unconscionability in an equalization. The trial judge specifically considered whether the financial result of equalization would be unconscionable and found that the equalization amount would not recognize the parties’ partnership.

3. No.

The appellant did not provide the necessary disclosure to assess his true income for support purposes and ton the evidence before the trial judge, the appellant had access to significantly greater financial resources than disclosed on his tax returns. The Court further stated that the trial judge was clear in how she arrived at the appellant’s income estimates and that if the appellant wanted greater precision, he ought to have complied with his disclosure obligations.

4. No.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to give credit for a claimed VTB mortgage on Quinn Road, claiming that D.K. provided clear evidence of the VTB. The trial judge found that the appellant provided no documentary evidence of this mortgage other than a one-page mortgage commitment signed in 2021 by D.K. as the lender, and the appellant and Y. as borrowers or owners.

The Court held that the trial judge’s conclusion was available on the record before her, that there was no evidence supporting the existence of a valid VTB mortgage entered into at the time that Quinn Road was bought.

Centre de Services à l’emploi Prescott-Russell Inc. v. Forage M3 Drilling Services Inc., 2026 ONCA 692

[Rouleau, Thorburn, Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

E.C. Conway, for the appellant

P. Snelling, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Debtor-Creditor, Guarantees, Indemnity Clause, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Earthco Soil Mixtures Inc. v. Pine Valley Enterprises Inc., 2024 SCC 20, Corner Brook (City) v. Bailey, 2021 SCC 29, Resolute FP Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 60, Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 423

facts:

The litigation between the parties arose from a share purchase of Forage M3 Drilling Services Inc. (“Forage”). The appellants were owners of shares in Forage, along with Mr. M.M. In 2019, the appellants sold their shares to Mr. L.C. At the time of the sale, Forage owed money to various entities, including a loan it had obtained from Centre de Services à l’emploi Prescott-Russell Inc. (“CSEPR”). As part of the share purchase transaction Mr. L.C. and Mr. M.M. agreed to indemnify the appellants for personal guarantees they gave to CSEPR and other entities.

In 2021, after Mr. L.C had acquired the shares, Forage defaulted on its loan from CSEPR. CSEPR brought an action against a number of defendants, including Mr. T.B. and Mr. S.C. In turn, they brought a third-party claim against Mr. L.C and the C Family Trust. Mr. T.B and Mr. S.C. reached an agreement with CSEPR to settle the main action. As part of the settlement, Mr. T.B. and Mr. S.C. agreed to pay $80,000 to CSEPR. They then brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment from Mr. L.C. and the C Family Trust of the amount of the settlement and their legal costs on the basis of the indemnity agreement.

There were three key agreements on the motion: (1) the indemnity agreement between Mr. T.B. and Mr. S.C. on the one hand, and Mr. L.C. and Mr. M.M. on the other hand (the “Indemnity Agreement”); (2) the loan agreement between Forage and CSEPR (the “Loan Agreement”); and (3) a general security agreement (the “GSA”).

Relying on the Indemnity Agreement, the appellants sought reimbursement for the amount of the settlement and their full costs of the litigation. The motion judge dismissed the appellants’ motion, and, instead, granted summary judgment in favour of Mr. L.C. and the C Family Trust and dismissed the third-party claim.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in finding that the appellants did not provide personal guarantees to CSEPR?
Did the motion judge err in finding that the C Family Trust was not a party to the indemnity clause?
Can the Court decide whether Mr. L.C. must indemnify the appellants?

holding:

Appeal allowed in part.

reasoning:

Yes.

The motion judge started her analysis by focusing on the wording of the Loan Agreement. She found that, because the provision in the Loan Agreement dealing with personal guarantees used the future tense “prendra”, the Loan Agreement could not itself be interpreted as providing for personal guarantees given by the appellants. The motion judge then turned to the GSA and found that, because it did not refer to the Loan Agreement or personal guarantees, it too could not be interpreted as providing for personal guarantees given by the appellants. The motion judge next looked at the Indemnity Agreement and held that it was irrelevant to determining whether the appellants gave personal guarantees to CSEPR because it could not be used to discern the objective intentions of the parties to the Loan Agreement and GSA.

This analysis failed to properly apply the principles of contractual interpretation. In particular, it failed to take account of the surrounding circumstances and improperly zeroed in on an isolated word in the Loan Agreement. The starting point should have been the Indemnity Agreement because this was a dispute between the parties to that agreement. The motion judge should have focused on the wording of the Indemnity Agreement and the objective surrounding circumstances at the time the parties entered into the Indemnity Agreement.

Instead, the motion judge started her analysis with the Loan Agreement and the GSA. These did not govern the relationship between the parties to this appeal. Rather, these agreements formed part of the surrounding circumstances for interpreting and understanding the Indemnity Agreement. This was an error. In the context of the third-party claim, the motion judge was not adjudicating a dispute between CSEPR and the appellants over whether the appellants provided personal guarantees. Instead, she was adjudicating a dispute between the appellants and Mr. L.C., who expressed his agreement and understanding, by signing the Indemnity Agreement, that the appellants gave CSEPR personal guarantees.

It may have been open to the motion judge to find that Mr. L.C. had no obligation to indemnify the appellants if it turned out that there was no evidence that the appellants had provided guarantees to CSEPR. But that was not the case here. Rather, the Loan Agreement reflected the intention of the parties that Mr. S.C. and Mr. T.B. were to provide personal guarantees for the loan from the CSEPR.

The word “prendra” must be placed in its proper context. Contrary to the motion judge’s categorical determination that the use of the future tense signaled an intention that Mr. S.C. and Mr. T.B. would enter into personal guarantees in the future, read in context, “prendra” could be translated as “will take” or “will hold”. Either of these translations supported a finding that the Loan Agreement also supported this interpretation. The structure of the Loan Agreement also supported this interpretation. The Loan Agreement was in the form of a letter of offer to Forage, Mr. S.C., Mr. T.B., and Mr. M.M. as “emprunteur” or borrower. The clause referring to personal guarantees was therefore contingent on the borrower accepting its terms. Once they accepted the terms by signing the “Acceptation de l’emprunteur”, the intention that CSEPR would take or hold personal guarantees from Mr. S.C. and Mr. T.B. crystalized.

The motion judge took an overly narrow and technical approach when interpreting the Loan Agreement.

The motion judge also relied on her finding that only Mr. S.C. and Mr. M.M., and not Mr. T.B., signed the Loan Agreement, and it was not clear whether they did so in their personal capacities or as representatives of Forage. This was a palpable and overriding factual error. Mr. T.B. did in fact sign the Loan Agreement, twice, as the respondents conceded in their factum. Regardless, by focusing on this finding, the motion judge again disregarded the contextual circumstances of the Indemnity Agreement. The Indemnity Agreement showed Mr. L.C. accepted that Mr. S.C. and Mr. T.B. gave personal guarantees to CSEPR, even if there may have been technical deficiencies in the Loan Agreement.

The interpretation and approach adopted by the motion judge would lead to an absurd result and great unfairness to the appellants. Where a given construction of a contract leads to an absurd result, courts can assume that this could not have been intended by rational commercial actors in making their bargain.

The Court agreed with the motion judge that the C Family Trust had no liability in this case. The C Family Trust was not a party to the Indemnity Agreement, and the appellants provided no legal basis for finding that it should be responsible for indemnifying them.

This issue must be decided before a final determination can be made on whether Mr. L.C. is to indemnify the appellants for the amount of the settlement and their legal costs. The Court remitted this issue back to the Superior Court.

Appgear Mortgage Investment Limited Partnership v. Longobardi, 2026 ONCA 711

[Monahan J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

K.S. Randhawa, for the appellant/moving party

E. Babayev, for the respondent/responding party Appear Mortgage Investment Limited Partnership

No one appearing for the respondent/responding party T.B.C.

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Possession, Civil Procedure, Default Judgments, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Rules of Civil Procedure, r 63.02(1), Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, 2014 ONCA 194, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, Carvalho Estate v. Verma, 2024 ONCA 222, Zafar v. Saiyid, 2017 ONCA 919, Dramel Limited v. Multani, 2023 ONCA 540, Starkman v. Home Trust Company, 2015 ONCA 436

facts:

On May 2, 2023, the responding party, Appgear Mortgage Investment Limited Partnership (“Appgear”) advanced $300,000 to the moving party and defendant, A.L., and T.B.C, her co-defendant in the underlying mortgage enforcement action. Appgear secured the loan by placing a second mortgage on a Mississauga property owned by A.L. (the “Subject Property”).

The mortgage went into default and in June 2024 Appgear issued and served a Notice of Sale in respect of the Subject Property. A.L. agreed that she received the Notice, read it and understood it, but did nothing about it. Appgear issued a statement of claim on the basis that A.L. had defaulted on the mortgage. A.L. testified that she received the statement of claim and chose to ignore it. A higher priority mortgage on the Subject Property was also in default, and the mortgagee, SCIV Inc. (“SCIV”), commenced proceedings to enforce its security. Appgear paid out SCIV in order to protect its security position and served an amended statement of claim on May 13, 2025, seeking to recover the amounts it had paid to the first mortgagee. A.L. agreed that she read and understood the amended statement of claim but once again chose to ignore it.

On August 20, 2025, Appgear obtained a default judgment for possession of the Subject Property and a judgment for $761,257.69, representing the funds advanced to A.L. and T.B.C. as well as the amounts Appgear had paid to SCIV.

On August 25, 2025, A.L. received a copy of the default judgment and a notice demanding possession of the Subject Property. Although she retained a lawyer on September 5, 2025, she took no steps to set aside the default judgment until May 13, 2026, when she received notice from the Sheriff’s office requiring her to vacate the Subject Property on May 28, 2026. Only then did A.L. bring an urgent motion to stay the writ of possession and set aside the default judgment.

The motion judge correctly identified the test to set aside the default judgment in Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen and found that there was no plausible excuse or explanation for A.L.’s default in complying with the rules. She was aware of the judgment against her but chose to ignore the court process until the last moment when she received the Sheriff’s notice to vacate. The motion judge also found that A.L. had no arguable defence on the merits. A.L. admitted that she received the mortgage proceeds and had received independent legal advice. However, she pleaded that she was defrauded by T.B.C. and that Appgear should have recognized her vulnerability and taken steps to protect her.

The motion judge rejected this submission, finding that while A.L. may well have claims against T.B.C. or her legal advisors, Appgear had no way of knowing of A.L.’s vulnerability and had no responsibility for the actions of T.B.C. or A.L.’s counsel. The motion judge therefore dismissed A.L.’s motion to set aside the default judgment.

A.L. sought a stay of enforcement pending appeal of the July 3, 2026 order of the motion judge dismissing her motion to set aside the August 20, 2025 default judgment.

issues:

Should A.L.’s motion for a stay of enforcement of the July 3, 2026 order pending appeal be granted?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

The Court reviewed the test for staying an order under the three-factor framework outlined in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General): 1) a preliminary assessment must be made of the merits of the case to ensure that there is a serious question to be tried; 2) it must be determined whether the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the application were refused; and 3) an assessment must be made as to which of the parties would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of the remedy pending a decision on the merits. The factors are interconnected considerations, and the overarching consideration is whether the interests of justice call for a stay.

Regarding the first factor, the motion judge found that there was little merit to A.L.’s appeal and that she failed to establish that there was a serious question to be tried with respect to the appeal.

A.L. argued that the motion judge erred in applying the test from Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen by adjudicating whether her undue influence defence to the mortgage enforcement action would succeed on the merits as opposed to determining whether her defence had an air of reality. The Court disagreed with A.L.’s argument. The motion judge expressly found that there was no air of reality to A.L.’s defence against the enforcement of the mortgage. He came to this conclusion largely on the basis of A.L.’s own admission that although she was the victim of a fraudulent scheme orchestrated by T.B.C., Appgear was not at fault.

The Court found that in the absence of any identified legal error in the motion judge’s reasons, A.L.’s appeal was, in substance, a request for this court to reweigh findings of fact which were open to the motion judge on the record. The Court saw little basis upon which it could overturn these factual findings, based as they were on A.L.’s own evidence.

The Court further found that A.L. failed to demonstrate that she would suffer irreparable harm if a stay of enforcement was not granted. While A.L. would be evicted from her home, this was a consequence of the fact that she defaulted on the mortgage over two years ago and subsequently treated the court process with what the motion judge described as “complete disregard”. The Court emphasized that a party cannot create irreparable harm by deliberately failing to take any reasonable steps to deal with their default on a mortgage and then, at the eleventh hour when the Sheriff is on the doorstep with an eviction notice, seek a stay of enforcement.

The Court concluded that the balance of convenience also did not favour granting a stay. Appgear had suffered and continued to suffer increasing financial losses. In addition to the mortgage proceeds advanced to A.L. and T.B.C., Appgear paid a substantial sum to SCIV to protect its security position. Appgear also argued that there was now a significant shortfall between the value of the Subject Property and the judgment debt, which exceeded $743,500.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Soumare v. Diallo, 2026 ONCA 679

[Huscroft, Trotter and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

OS, acting in person.

DD, acting in person.

Keywords: Family Law, Child Support, Section 7 Expenses, Parenting

Sohal v. Bhatthal, 2026 ONCA 688

[van Rensburg, Miller and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Kirby, for the appellant

E. Vine, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Relocation, Support, Imputed Income, Property, Equalization of Net Family Property, Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3, s. 16.9

Country Wide Homes Upper Thornhill Estates Inc. v. Chen, 2026 ONCA 664

[Fairburn A.C.J.O., Zarnett and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Buhlman and L. Boritz, for the appellant

E. Bisceglia and S. Turajlich, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Enforceability, Environmental Disclosure, Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19, s. 197, Starport Landing Inc. v. Laurel Springs Water Corp., 2015 ONCA 772

Gryn v. Gryn, 2026 ONCA 691

[Huscroft, Trotter and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. H. Tweyman, for the appellant

A. S. Zaslavsky, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Post-Separation Adjustments, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, r. 2

Family & Children’s Services of Guelph and Wellington County v. C.H, 2026 ONCA 6841

[van Rensburg, Miller and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Rae, for the appellant S.H. and as agent for counsel for the appellant A.D.

Quadry, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Child Protection, Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. V. L., 2012 ONCA 890

Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2026 ONCA 701

[Roberts, Monahan and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

AR, acting in person

Love, for the respondent/responding party

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Abuse of Process, Res Judicata, Appeals, Reconsideration, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 21.01, 59.06, Scaduto v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, Talwar v. Grand River Hospital, 2025 ONCA 35

Chauhan v. 2074874 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 685

[Thorburn, Madsen and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

T. Laan, for the appellants

J.S.G. Macdonald, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agency, Assignments, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email