COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (MARCH 30-April 3)

By John Polyzogopoulos on April 4, 2026

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Good afternoon.
Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of March 30, 2026.

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In Miranda v. Balita Media Inc., the Court upheld the trial judge’s finding that the 2022 publications were defamatory and confirmed that 2020 defamatory articles that could not be sued upon because those claims were statute-barred could be considered for context, even if there was no liability for that defamation. It declined to interfere with the damages award. However, the Court held that the permanent injunction was overly broad and insufficiently defined, set it aside, and remitted the rewording of the injuction to the Superior Court if the parties could not agree on it.

R (H.C.) v. Ontario Special Education Tribunal arose from a father’s administrative challenge of his special needs child’s placement with the Toronto District School Board. The Court dismissed the father’s motion seeking reconsideration of a prior decision denying a stay of Divisional Court proceedings, holding that the motion was moot because the Divisional Court had already granted the Ontario Special Education Tribunal’s requested publication ban and anonymization order, thereby eliminating any live controversy on the motion to reconsider the refusal to grant the stay. Moreover, the there was no issue of public importance to be determined on the reconsideration motion.

In MacRae v. Cassan, 2026 ONCA 242, R.M., a lawyer whose license was suspended after the respondent lawyers reported concerns about his fitness to practice to the Law Society of Ontario, sued for damages alleging causes of action including intentional interference with business relations, negligence and defamation. The Regional Senior Justice dismissed his action under Rule 2.1.01 as a collateral attack on the Law Society’s investigation. R.M. was granted an extension to appeal the RSJ’s order.

In Head v. 859530 Ontario Inc., the Court upheld certification of causation and damages as common issues in a COVID-19 class action against a long-term care facility. The Court confirmed that a workable methodology for causation was sufficient at the certification stage and any concerns about the quantification of punitive damages could be addressed by sequencing them after compensatory damages were determined. The Court declined to interfere with the motion judge’s discretionary costs award.

In Stingelin Estate v. Woods, the Court upheld a summary judgment dismissal, finding that the respondent lawyer hired to prepare a will owed no duty of care or fiduciary duty to the appellant. The appellant was neither a client of the lawyer nor a beneficiary or intended beneficiary under the will and therefore the lawyer owed him no duty of care or fiduciary duty.

In Bensen v. Bensen, the Court determined there was no basis to interfere with the application judge’s factual findings that there was no breach of undertaking, no oppression, and no basis to remove a trustee where the impugned conduct was found to benefit the corporation and trust.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Civil Decisions

Miranda v. Balita Media Inc., 2026 ONCA 223

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Libel, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Simplified Procedure, Ordinary Procedure, Remedies, Injunctions, Damages, Costs, Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.12, s. 5(1), ss. 5, 6, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 76, Grant v. Torstar, Corp., 2009 SCC 61, Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 183 v. Castellano, 2020 ONCA 71

Stingelin Estate v. Woods, 2026 ONCA 240

Keywords: Torts, Professional Negligence, Lawyers, Duty of Care, Causation, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Breach of Contract, Wills and Estates, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Summary Judgment, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, s. 4, Sched. B, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, Ross v. Caunters, [1979] 3 All E.R. 580 (Ch. Div.), White v. Jones, 2 A.C. 207 (H.L.), Hall v. Bennett Estate (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 191 (C.A.), Rankin (Rankin’s Garage & Sales) v. J.J., 2018 SCC 19, Graham v. Bonnycastle, 2004 ABCA 270, Harrison v. Fallis, 2006 CanLII 19457 (Ont. S.C.), Johnston Estate v. Johnston, 2017 BCCA 59, Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24, Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2008 SCC 27, Stirrett v. Cheema, 2020 ONCA 288, Espartel Investments Limited v. Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 993, 2024 ONCA 18, Grant Thornton LLP v. New Brunswick, 2021 SCC 31

MacRae v. Cassan, 2026 ONCA 242

Keywords: Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Professional Misconduct, Torts, Intentional Interference with Business Relations, Negligence, Defamation, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, Frivolous, Vexatious, Abuse of Process, Appeals, Extension of Time, Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.1.01, r. 61.04(1), Law Society of Ontario Rules of Professional Conduct, r. 7.1-3, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Robson v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONCA 709, Paulsson v. University of Illinois, 2010 ONCA 21, Reid v. College of Chiropractors of Ontario, 2016 ONCA 779, Issasi v. Rosenzweig, 2011 ONCA 112, Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625, Sumner v. Ottawa (Police Services), 2023 ONCA 140

Head v. 859530 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 231

Keywords: Torts, Systemic Negligence, Causation, Remedies, Punitive Damages, Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Certification, Common Issues, Costs, Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c.6, Levac v. James, 2023 ONCA 73, Andersen v. St. Jude Medical Inc., 2012 ONSC 3660, Hollick v. Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft Corporation, 2013 SCC 57, Robertson Estate v. Ontario, 2022 ONSC 5127, Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18, Carcillo v. Ontario Major Junior Hockey League, 2025 ONCA 652, Robinson v. Rochester Financial Ltd., 2010 ONSC 463, Barry v. Anantharajah, 2025 ONCA 603, Brad-Jay Investments Limited v. Village Developments Limited (2006), 218 O.A.C. 315 (C.A.), Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9

R (H.C.) v. Ontario Special Education Tribunal, 2026 ONCA 249

Keywords: Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Education, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Reconsideration, Mootness, Orders, Setting Aside, Variation, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 2.1.01, 59.06(1), 59.06(2), Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 7(5), Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, Dagg v. Cameron Estate, 2017 ONCA 366, Mujagic v. Kamps et al., 2015 ONCA 360, leave to appeal dismissed, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 330, Render v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator (Canada) Limited, 2022 ONCA 512

Bensen v. Bensen, 2026 ONCA 234

Keywords: Corporations, Oppression, Business Judgment Rule, Trusts, Removal of Trustees, Fiduciary Duties, Conflicts of Interest, Business Corporations Act, R.S.O 1990, c. B.16, s. 248, Kasanda v. Sartarelli, 2025 ONCA 27

Short Civil Decisions

Equitable Bank c. Bitchoka, 2026 ONCA 232

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, l’Énoncé économique de l’automne de 2023 du gouvernement fédéral, Ottawa, Ministère des Finances, 2023

Condoman Developments Inc. v. Cannect International Mortgage Corporation, 2026 ONCA 237

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Orders, Costs, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Condoman Developments Inc. v. Cannect International Mortgage Corporation, 2025 ONSC 4529

Chijindu v. Rathod, 2026 ONCA 239

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, Frivolous, Vexatious, Abuse of Process, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.1.01, Rathod v. Chijindu, 2024 ONCA 715, Rathod v. Chijindu, 2024 ONCA 317, Rathod v. Chijindu, 2024 ONCA 420, Rathod v. Chijindu, 2024 ONCA 625, Rathod v. Chijindu et al, 2024 ONSC 939, Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, Khan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 320, 2257573 Ontario Inc. v. Furney, 2026 ONCA 124

Royal Bank of Canada v. Suretrust Systems Inc., 2026 ONCA 247

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Extension of Time, Fresh Evidence

Seo v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2026 ONCA 246

Keywords: Privacy Law, Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 6(1)(a)(b), s. 21(5), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.1.01, Chowdhury v. Unity Health Toronto, 2025 ONCA 90, Bernard Property Maintenance v. Taylor, 2019 ONCA 830

Strutzenberger v. Strutzenberger, 2026 ONCA 253

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Extension of Time, Machado v. Ontario Hockey Association, 2019 ONCA 210, SS & C Technologies Canada Corp. v. The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, 2021 ONCA 913, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Liu v. Chan, 2024 ONCA 699

CIVIL DECISIONS

Miranda v. Balita Media Inc., 2026 ONCA 223

[Sossin, Gomery and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N. Holmberg and H. Wong, for the appellants

M. Seddigh, for the respondent

facts:

Balita Newspaper was a community newspaper serving the Filipino Canadian community in the Greater Toronto Area. TC was its editor and publisher. LM was the principal of A & L Hammer Workforce Management Inc., a recruitment agency for seasonal agricultural workers. In 2018, LM was arrested and charged with six counts of human trafficking under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The charges were ultimately withdrawn in 2019.

In 2020, Balita Newspaper published two articles focused on assisting Filipino Canadians in avoiding being victimized by scammers. The articles referred to civil judgments entered against LM but did not reference her by name. As a result, LM delivered a libel notice pursuant to s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act. In 2022, Balita Newspaper published another article that further addressed community concerns about scams and made specific express references to LM. LM delivered a second libel notice in January 2023. In February 2023, LM commenced an action under the Rule 76 simplified procedure.

The trial judge found that the 2022 articles were defamatory and rejected the defences pleaded. However, he found that any claim in respect of the 2020 articles was barred due to the expiry of the limitation period pursuant to ss. 5 and 6 of the Libel and Slander Act. He awarded general damages of $150,000 and punitive damages of $100,000 and granted a permanent injunction which enjoined the appellants from publishing further defamatory statements concerning the respondent and required the removal of all publications and social media posts not subject to the limitation period defence. The appellants sought to set aside the judgment, vacate the injunction and set aside the award of costs.

issues:

1. Did the trial judge make an error of law when he relied on statute-barred publications to find that the appellants had engaged in a defamatory “campaign” against LM?

2. Did the trial judge make an error of law by awarding damages and costs which exceeded the monetary limit for damages awards under Rule 76?

3. Did the trial judge err in failing to find that the defamatory publications caused LM harm?

4. Did the trial judge make an error of law in imposing an overly broad and vague permanent injunction?

holding:

Appeal allowed in part.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court found no error of law. The trial judge expressly stated in his reasons that, to the extent that the court was provided evidence of the 2020 publications, they were admitted for background and context only and did not separately attract liability. He recognized and acknowledged that the 2020 publications were not actionable because of the statutory limitation period. Even excluding those articles, his description of the actions as a “campaign” was open to him on the evidence.

2. No. The Court held that since the proceeding continued under the ordinary procedure, the trial judge did not err in awarding damages and costs as he did. Although the appellants objected in their statement of defence to the action proceeding under Rule 76 as the total amount of damages claimed by the respondent exceeded the monetary limit, the respondent did not abandon their claim for the excess $50,000 in damages, as required pursuant to r. 76.02(5)(a) of the Rules. Therefore, the action continued under the ordinary procedure. Under rr. 76.02(5) and (6) of the Rules, the respondent was then required to give notice stating that the action and any related proceedings were continued as an ordinary action. However, the record did not show that such notice was ever delivered or filed. The appellants made no complaint about this failure at any time during the proceedings and therefore, could not raise the issue for the first time on appeal.

3. No. The Court found no basis to intervene with the amount of damages awarded given the nature and extent of the defamation, and the appellants’ litigation history. If a plaintiff in a defamation action proved that the impugned words were defamatory, the words referred to the plaintiff, and the words were published, damages were presumed.

4. Yes. The Court held that in the circumstances of the case, and given the conduct of the appellants, it was open to the trial judge to award an injunction that was permanent in nature. However, the scope of the injunction was overly broad, not proportionate and not properly defined. The order enjoined the appellants from publishing any statements about the respondent “which in their plain or ordinary meaning or by innuendo be similar” to the defamatory statements made in the 2022 article or by TC on social media. It did not define, and the trial judge did not provide an exhaustive list of, the specific defamatory statements in either the articles or on social media, either by reference to the libel notices issued or at all. In imposing the injunction with such a scope, the trial judge made an order that was both broader than reasonably necessary to effect compliance and also incapable in practical terms of enforcement.

Accordingly, the Court set aside paragraph three of the judgment to be replaced with a new paragraph that accorded with the Court’s reasons. The Court was unable to determine the terms of a properly scaled and defined injunction order and encouraged the parties to agree on revised language of an order to be submitted. If they could not agree, the scope of injunctive relief was to be determined by the Superior Court.

Stingelin Estate v. Woods, 2026 ONCA 240

[Tulloch C.J.O., Sossin J.A. and O’Marra J. (ad hoc)]

Counsel:

C. Crisman-Cox, for the appellant’

A. Rauff, for the respondent

facts:

In 1992, M.S. executed a declaration of trust under which she held legal title to four residential properties in Kitchener for the benefit of her sister, S.E., despite holding no beneficial interest in those properties. M.S.’s 2004 will purported to transfer her trusteeship of those properties into a new trust arrangement under which they would be held for S.E. during her lifetime and thereafter in a Henson trust for S.E.’s disabled son.

M.S. died in 2011, and S.E.’s nephew, the appellant, became estate trustee. Despite the trust arrangement, the appellant did not transfer the properties to S.E. In 2015, S.E. retained the respondent lawyer to prepare her will. The appellant met the respondent only twice, at meetings attended by S.E.’s attorney for property, P.C.

When S.E. died in 2016, her will left her estate equally to her sons. Neither the appellant nor M.S.’s estate was a beneficiary and the appellant was not an intended beneficiary of S.E.’s estate. In 2017, S.E.’s estate demanded transfer of the properties, but the appellant refused. In 2019, Justice Sloan held that the 1992 trust remained valid, the properties were beneficially owned by S.E., and that M.S.’s estate had no beneficial interest in them. The appellant subsequently commenced an action alleging that he relied on the respondent’s legal advice and suffered damages. The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment to dismiss the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge commit an error in proceeding by way of summary judgment?

2. Did the motion judge err in concluding that no duty of care existed?

3. Did the motion judge err in dismissing a claim that the respondent owed a fiduciary duty to the appellant?

4. Did the motion judge make an error in concluding that causation and damages were not established?

5. Did the motion judge properly conclude that the action was statute-barred?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The motion judge correctly rejected the submission that factual disputes concerning what the respondent said at the meetings and whether S.E. would have drafted her will differently required a trial. The Court believed that even accepting the appellant’s version of events, the claim failed because the respondent owed him no duty, the alleged losses were not caused by the respondent, and the claim was out of time.

2. No. The appellant was not an intended beneficiary of S.E.’s will and S.E.’s 2016 will provided equally for S.E.’s sons. It did not name the appellant or M.S.’s estate. The appellant’s theory would have required recognition of a new duty of care extending beyond the limited class recognized in will-drafting cases. The motion judge made no error in declining to recognize such a duty, which required foreseeability and proximity. Neither requirement was met.

First, it was not reasonably foreseeable that advice given to S.E. about her will would expose the respondent to liability to a stranger to the estate who, relying on a different will and trust arrangement, asserted control over property beneficially owned by S.E. Second, proximity was not established. The respondent never undertook to act for the appellant and owed undivided loyalty to her client S.E.

Courts have repeatedly refused to extend the narrow will-drafting duty to beneficiaries under prior wills or to persons asserting that the testator would have made different testamentary arrangements if given different advice.

3. No. Such a relationship required an undertaking to act in the claimant’s best interests and defined beneficiaries vulnerable to the fiduciary’s discretionary power affecting their legal or substantial practical interests. The Court determined none of those elements were present. The respondent acted solely for S.E. and owed her undivided loyalty. She neither undertook to act in the appellant’s best interests nor exercised discretionary power over his legal or substantial practical interests.

4. No. The losses claimed by the appellant were not caused by the respondent. Justice Sloan determined that the 1992 trust remained valid, that S.E. was the beneficial owner of the properties, and that M.S.’s estate had no beneficial interest in them. The consequences that followed flowed from that judicial determination. Both negligence and breach of fiduciary duty required proof that the defendant caused the loss complained of before awarding compensation.

5. No. By March 24, 2017, S.E.’s estate had demanded the transfer of the properties. At that point, the appellant knew that the estate alleged that he had breached the trust and that litigation might follow. The appellant did not commence this action until August 2019. The motion judge properly concluded that the action was out of time.

MacRae v. Cassan, 2026 ONCA 242

[Gomery J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

R.M., acting in person

D. So, for the respondents/responding parties

facts:

The appellant, R.M., is a lawyer. The individual respondents, also lawyers, wrote to the Law Society of Ontario on three occasions raising concerns about R.M.’s fitness to practice. After his licence was suspended, R.M. sued the respondents and their law firm for damages. He alleged that they were liable under an array of causes of action, including intentional interference with business relations, negligence and defamation.

After being served with R.M’s action, the respondents requested that the Senior Regional Justice (the “RSJ”), stay or dismiss it as an abuse of process under r. 2.1.01. The court registrar sent a notice to R.M. that the RSJ was considering the request and invited him to make submissions. R.M. did not file any submissions in response. He instead took steps to bring a motion to extend the time for his submissions and for leave to adduce evidence.

After the deadline for the receipt of submissions from R.M. had passed, the RSJ proceeded to consider whether the action should be dismissed under r. 2.1.01. The RSJ concluded that R.M’s lawsuit amounted to a “collateral attack” on the Law Society’s investigation and dismissed it.

issues:

Should R.M. receive an extension of time to serve and file a notice of appeal from the RSJ’s dismissal of his action?

holding:

Motion granted.

reasoning:

Yes, R.M. should receive an extension of time to serve and file a notice of appeal from the RSJ. R.M. said that he promptly acted to bring this motion once he learned his action had been dismissed; that the respondents will suffer no prejudice if the extension is granted; and that his appeal has arguable merit. The Court found that the proposed grounds were not clearly devoid of merit. The Court noted that the determination that the proposed appeal raised arguable grounds did not imply that it should or will succeed. The Court also noted that it was in the interests of justice to grant the motion.

Head v. 859530 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 231

[Tulloch C.J.O., Lauwers J.A. and O’Marra J. (ad hoc)]

Counsel:

D. Berlach, G. Campisi, T. Russell and Z. Sherman, for the appellants

G.T. Brock, N.A. Fleming, R. Durante and B. Irantalab, for the respondents

facts:

This was an appeal of a certification motion in a class action against the appellant Roberta Place, a long-term care residence, by residents who contracted COVID-19 there, the estates of those residents who died of COVID-19 and their families. The claimants, the respondents on appeal, claimed systemic gross negligence by those responsible for Roberta Place for failing to properly plan for and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and for failing to properly implement institutional policies and procedures to prevent the mass spread of COVID-19. The classes of claimants were the Residents Class, the Estates Class and the Family Class.

The motion judge certified the action as a class proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992. Roberta Place agreed that the duty of care, the standard of care and whether the breaches amounted to gross negligence should have been certified as common issues. However, the claimants also sought certification of causation, aggregate damages and punitive, exemplary and aggravated damages. While the motion judge declined to certify aggregate damages, she certified causation and punitive damages. Roberta Place appealed only the certification of causation, punitive, exemplary and aggravated damages as common issues.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in certifying causation as a common issue?

2. Did the motion judge err in certifying punitive, exemplary and aggravated damages as a common issue?

3. Did the motion judge err in her award of costs for the certification motion?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court held that the motion judge did not err in certifying causation as a common issue. The test to certify causation as a common issue was that the claimants had to put forward a workable methodology. The claimants offered some evidence of the availability of data collected by an objective agency, and a basis (the “risk ratio approach”) to draw the rebuttable inference of causation from numerical data together with the documented deficits in Roberta Place’s infection control practices. Definite proof that there was an available norm to compare to in the risk ratio analysis was not necessary at the certification stage. Roberta Place’s own expert, Dr. ML, effectively admitted that the approach was workable. The Court concluded that the preferable procedure analysis was not to be repeated in determining a single common issue. In determining preferability, the common issues were considered together after each individual issue had already been found to advance the litigation.

2. No. The Court found that the motion judge did not err in certifying punitive, exemplary and aggravated damages as a common issue. The Court rejected Roberta Place’s argument that its conduct was in no way “malicious or reprehensible” or “deliberate” so as to justify punitive damages. The types of conduct that might justify punitive damages were not closed. Punitive damages might, depending on the specific facts, extend to gross negligence. Additionally, the Court noted that, any concern about quantifying punitive damages before compensatory damages could be addressed by sequencing trials so that punitive damages were assessed after compensatory damages had been determined.

3. No. The Court saw no strong grounds upon which to find that the motion judge erred in exercising her discretion in fixing costs in the amount she did and therefore denied leave to appeal costs. The motion judge’s costs award was detailed and addressed the legal principles, including the obligation to consider the paying party’s reasonable expectations and the sheer size of the award. Although the claimants did not achieve total success because the motion judge did not certify aggregate damages as a common issue, this did not merit much reduction because it was not a complex issue, there was no evidence to substantiate it, and the issue did not consume a significant portion of the time or submissions. The motion judge reduced costs to account for the fact that Roberta Place had already prepared to respond to a claimant expert on aggregate damages, whose evidence was ultimately not relied upon at the hearing. The Court concluded that while Roberta Place might have preferred a larger reduction, it did not point to a reviewable error.

R (H.C.) v. Ontario Special Education Tribunal, 2026 ONCA 249

[Rouleau, Thorburn and Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

H.C., acting in person

O. Filetti and V. Crystal, for the responding party, Ontario Special Education Tribunal

N. Simmons and A. Smith, for the responding party, Toronto District School Board

facts:

The moving party appellant, HC, purporting to act on behalf of his child, R, who has learning disabilities, filed an appeal with the Ontario Special Education Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) challenging his child’s placement with the Toronto District School Board (the “Board”). HC applied early on to have the hearing panel members recuse themselves for reasonable apprehension of bias. The Tribunal dismissed this application, at which point HC applied to the Divisional Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s dismissal. Pursuant to r. 2.1.01, the Divisional Court dismissed HC’s judicial review application, holding that it was premature and there was no basis to interfere with the ongoing Tribunal proceeding. The Divisional Court also directed HC to bring a motion for a sealing order or non-publication order to continue the Tribunal’s equivalent orders, imposed on the second day of the Tribunal proceeding. HC refused to do so, submitting that the Divisional Court was biased against him, and that while he desired anonymization, he did not want to pursue these orders, citing the open court principle. HC also moved before the Court for leave to appeal the Divisional Court’s dismissal of his judicial review, which has yet to be determined.

Meanwhile, the Tribunal filed its own Divisional Court motion seeking an order anonymizing identifying information for the child and family, as well as a publication ban. It sought to continue its own similar orders throughout the Divisional Court’s judicial review decisions. HC then pursued another motion before a single judge of the Court seeking to stay all further Divisional Court proceedings (including the Tribunal’s motion to continue the anonymization order and publication ban) pending the Court’s determination of the leave application. He asserted that once the Divisional Court dismissed his recusal request, it became functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to impose further orders.

The motion judge dismissed HC’s motion to stay the Divisional Court proceedings, and HC sought reconsideration before the Court. He claimed that a stay was required to preserve the status quo and prevent procedural unfairness pending the Court’s decision on his motion for leave to appeal. Furthermore, HC argued that the stay was in the public interest since the underlying proceedings involved claims of systemic discrimination against non-verbal autistic children in special education. However, after the motion judge’s order was issued and before the hearing of this reconsideration motion, the Divisional Court granted the Tribunal’s motion for a publication ban and anonymization order, adding an addendum to its judicial review decision. Hence, before the Court the Board and Tribunal submitted that the Divisional Court proceedings had concluded with the granting of the Tribunal’s motion, rendering HC’s reconsideration motion moot.

issues:

Was HC’s motion seeking reconsideration of the stay decision moot?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

Yes. Applying the two-pronged mootness test from Borowski, the Court confirmed that HC’s reconsideration motion was moot. The first prong asks whether any live controversy remains between the parties, reflecting the principle that courts do not adjudicate abstract questions that do not resolve an actual dispute. Acknowledging that subsequent events can render a legal issue between litigants hypothetical, the Court observed that the motion judge’s order under reconsideration was about whether the Divisional Court proceedings should be stayed to prevent that court from ordering an anonymization order and publication ban. Since the Divisional Court had now made this order, no live issue remained between the parties.

The second Borowski prong requires determining whether the Court should exercise its discretion to hear an issue notwithstanding its mootness. Guiding factors are i) whether parties with a stake in the outcome will fully argue the issues, ii) judicial economy, and iii) court’s need to remain cognizant of the proper limits of its law-making function. The Court declined to exercise its discretion on these facts, holding that this reconsideration motion did not deal with any issue of public importance or issues extending beyond the immediate parties’ concerns. Despite HC’s allegations of systemic discrimination in public education, the within reconsideration motion addressed only the very narrow issue of whether to prevent the Divisional Court from issuing the publication ban and anonymization order, which it had now done. The Tribunal was scheduled to address substantive issues arising from R’s school placement in April 2026.

Finally, the Court held that HC’s reliance on r. 59.06 was misplaced. Rule 59.06 permits limited amendments to correct errors arising from accidental slips or omissions, fraud, or newly discovered evidence. Orders are reopened on a reconsideration motion sparingly and only when clearly in the interests of justice. This case did not fit the bill, and even where r. 59.06 is engaged, parties cannot reargue issues after a decision has been rendered. Although s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act empowered a panel of the Court to review a single motion judge’s decision, here there was no basis to exercise that discretion since the motion was moot.

Bensen v. Bensen, 2026 ONCA 234

[Sossin, Gomery and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.L. Solmon and N. J. Tourgis, for the appellants

H.M. Rosenberg and L. Stanic, for the respondents, RB, RB Family Holdings Inc., The Charlton Centre for Specialized Treatment Inc., and Charlton Health Inc.

A. Porter and L. Paparousis, for the respondents, SC and CW

D. Touesnard, for the respondent, AK

facts:

The appellants, including LB, challenged a series of agreements entered into on April 30, 2021, between a corporation controlled by LB’s former spouse, RB, and an employee, AK, shortly after the parties’ separation. The agreements (which included settlement, retainer and independent contractor arrangements) replaced AK’s prior employment agreement and altered the terms of her compensation and role within the business. The appellants alleged that these agreements were improperly motivated by RB’s romantic relationship with AK, rather than the best interests of the corporation.

Following their separation, LB and RB had entered into a mutual undertaking dated January 25, 2021, which prohibited either party from operating the business outside the ordinary course or making commitments on behalf of their companies without notice and consent until April 19, 2021. The appellants alleged that negotiations and steps leading to the agreements breached this undertaking.

The corporate and trust structure underlying the dispute included a family trust of which both LB and RB were trustees and beneficiaries, and related holding companies with differing ownership and voting rights in the operating entities. The appellants claimed that the impugned agreements were oppressive, unfairly prejudicial and disregarded their interests as shareholders, creditors and trust beneficiaries. They sought to set aside the agreements, recover payments made under them and remove RB as trustee.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding that the undertaking had expired before the agreements were executed and had not been breached, that the negotiations were not improper or secretive, that the agreements were not oppressive and in fact benefited the business, and that there was no basis to remove RB as trustee.

issues:

1. Did the application judge err in declining to set aside the agreements?

2. Did the application judge err in refusing to remove RB as trustee of the trust?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court held that this issue turned primarily on findings of fact and mixed fact and law which are entitled to deference absent palpable and overriding error. The appellants failed to identify any such error.

First, the application judge did not err in concluding that there was no breach of the undertaking. The undertaking expired on April 19, 2021, whereas the Agreements were executed on April 30, 2021. The application judge found that no binding commitments, business arrangements, operational steps or expenditures occurred prior to the expiry. He further held that negotiations alone (even if ongoing before the expiry) did not constitute a breach. The Court saw no basis to disturb these findings.

Second, the application judge properly rejected the oppression claim. He found that the negotiations with AK were not secretive and that any reasonable expectation LB had of being informed or involved was satisfied. The evidence showed that opportunities to participate in or be informed about the negotiations were extended but declined.

With respect to the substance of the Agreements, the application judge concluded that they were not oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or in disregard of the appellants’ interests. He applied the appropriate business judgment framework and found that the appellants had failed to demonstrate that a clearly superior alternative transaction was available. On the contrary, the evidence, accepted by the application judge, showed that the Agreements benefitted the Charlton entities, including through business growth, improved contractual terms (such as non-competition provisions) and the resolution of prior compensation entitlements.

The Court also rejected the appellants’ arguments regarding conflict of interest, noting that while the personal relationship between RB and AK was known, the application judge was alive to it and nevertheless concluded that the directors exercised their business judgment responsibly.

The appellants’ attempt to draw adverse inferences from the non-disclosure of draft agreements was also properly rejected. The application judge was under no obligation to draw such inferences, particularly given that the burden of proving a breach of the undertaking rested with the appellants.

Finally, the Court noted that aspects of the appellants’ position were undermined by findings regarding their legal interest in the corporation. The application judge accepted that LBFHI’s shares had been redeemed and, in any event, carried no voting rights. To the extent oppression was advanced in a creditor capacity, there was no evidence that the impugned conduct impaired any ability to recover on a debt.

In sum, the appellants’ arguments amounted to an impermissible attempt to relitigate the factual record. The application judge’s findings were open to him and disclosed no reversible error.

2. No. The Court affirmed that the removal of a trustee is a discretionary decision entitled to deference and will only be interfered with for an error in principle, a material misapprehension of the evidence or a clearly wrong result. None was established.

The application judge found that RB had not acted improperly or oppressively, and that his conduct had, in fact, benefited the Trust. These findings were grounded in the evidentiary record and were entitled to deference.

The Court also confirmed that interpersonal conflict or distrust between co-trustees or beneficiaries is not, on its own, a sufficient basis for removal. While there was clear friction between LB and RB following their separation, the application judge correctly held that this did not meet the threshold for intervention.

Further, the Court emphasized the nature of the beneficiaries’ interests in the Trust. LB’s interest was as a beneficiary under an absolute discretionary trust, meaning she had no entitlement to income or capital unless and until the trustees exercised their discretion unanimously. LBFHI was not a beneficiary at all. This significantly limited the appellants’ ability to claim that the Trust’s administration had improperly prejudiced their interests.

In light of these findings, the application judge properly concluded that there was no basis to remove RB as trustee, and the Court saw no reason to interfere with that discretionary determination.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Equitable Bank c. Bitchoka, 2026 ONCA 232

[Rouleau, Thorburn and Favreau J.A.]

Counsel:

J.B.B., in person

A.J.F. Lenz and M. Nemr, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, l’Énoncé économique de l’automne de 2023 du gouvernement fédéral, Ottawa, Ministère des Finances, 2023

Condoman Developments Inc. v. Cannect International Mortgage Corporation, 2026 ONCA 237

[Rouleau, Thorburn and Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

H. Youhanan, acting in person for the appellants

M.P. Gottlieb and D. Gagnier, for the respondents

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Orders, Costs, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Condoman Developments Inc. v. Cannect International Mortgage Corporation, 2025 ONSC 4529

Chijindu v. Rathod, 2026 ONCA 239

[Zarnett, Monahan and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.R. Kestenberg and B.C. Jusko, for the moving parties, A.S. and B.B.

I.C., acting in person

J.C., acting in person

C.C.C., acting in person

Royal Bank of Canada v. Suretrust Systems Inc., 2026 ONCA 247

[Rouleau, Thorburn and Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Tubie, for the moving party Data & Scientific Inc.

M. Lici, for the responding party Grant Thornton Limited, in its capacity as Receiver of Suretrust Systems Inc. and 11860925 Canada Inc.

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Extension of Time, Fresh Evidence

Seo v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2026 ONCA 246

[Zarnett, Monahan and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

I.S., acting in person

D.A. Gourlay, for the moving party, the City of Toronto

L.H.C. Chen, for the respondent, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario

Strutzenberger v. Strutzenberger, 2026 ONCA 253

[Gillese, Madsen and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P.A.S., acting in person

P. Howie and H. Puchala, for the responding party

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email