In Sidhu v. Jain, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the motion judge’s determination that the respondent’s claim for a monetary remedy to compensate her for a claimed one-third beneficial interest in Lot 16 was governed by the Real Property Limitations Act, not the Limitations Act, 2002. Even though a monetary remedy was sought rather than the land itself (which had already been sold), that did not take the claim out of the RPLA.

In G.G. v. Ontario, the Court granted intervener status to four organizations in a class action appeal that will be considering whether the Ragoonanan principle should continue to apply in Ontario class proceedings. That principle requires that there be a representative plaintiff (and not merely any member of the proposed class) with a cause of action against each defendant.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Sidhu v. Jain, 2026 ONCA 151

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Trusts, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Summary Judgment, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, s. 4, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, 1250140 Ontario Inc. v. Bader, 2022 ONCA 197, Studley v. Studley, 2022 ONCA 810, McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86

G.G. v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 164

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Certification, Ragoonanan Principle, Interveners, Friends of the Court, Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss. 2(1), 5(1)(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 5, 10, 13.03(2), Ragoonanan Estate v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 603 (S.C.J.), Hughes v. Sunbeam Corporation (Canada) Ltd. (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 433 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 446, Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 164 (C.A.), Foster v. West, 2021 ONCA 263, Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 29, Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 669, Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 619, Baker v. Van Dolder’s Home Team Inc., 2025 ONCA 578, Jones v. Tsige (2011), 106 O.R. (3d) 721 (C.A.), Caruso v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 270, Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, 2014 SCC 55, AIC Limited v. Fischer, 2013 SCC 69, Louie v. Lastman (2001), 208 D.L.R. (4th) 380 (Ont. C.A.)

Short Civil Decisions

Matas Management Services Inc. v. Voreon Inc., 2026 ONCA 157

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Orders, Final or Interlocutory, Matas Management Services Inc. v. Voreon Inc., 2021 ONSC 4281, Matas Management Services Inc. v. Voreon Inc., 2023 ONCA 745

Pitters v. Home Trust Company, 2026 ONCA 155

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigation, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.01

Porter v. Kik, 2026 ONCA 159

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Orders, Costs, Enforcement, Uncontested Trials, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C 43, s. 19(1)(a.1), “Practice Direction Concerning Civil Appeals at the Court of Appeal for Ontario” (March 1, 2017), s. 7.2.5

Epshtein v. Shvartzman, 2026 ONCA 162

Keywords: Family Law, Property, Equalization of Net Family Property, Marriage Contracts, Setting Aside, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 56(4)

Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. v. Harrison Pensa LLP, 2026 ONCA 156

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Lawyer and Client, Retainer Agreements, Contingency Fee Agreements, Quantum Meruit, Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. v. Ontario, 2022 ONCA 579, leave to appeal refused, [2022] S.C.C.A. No. 357; Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. v. Ontario, 2022 ONCA 629, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Royal Bank of Canada v. Peace Bridge Duty Free Inc., 2025 ONCA 54

1238915 Ontario Limited v. Ferri, 2026 ONCA 169

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Orders, Setting Aside, Costs, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Uncontested Trials, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 19.08, 59.06

Shiralian v. Wyldewood Creek Inc., 2026 ONCA 163

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Limitation of Liability Clauses, Enforceability, Unconscionability, Public Policy, Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.31, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and Highways), 2010 SCC 4, Ritchie v. Castlepoint Greybrook Sterling Inc., 2021 ONCA 214, leave to appeal refused, [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 153

CIVIL DECISIONS

Sidhu v. Jain, 2026 ONCA 151

[Sossin, Copeland and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Zibarras, for the appellants

H. Dhaliwal, for the respondent SPKS 

E. Moore, for the respondent NS

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Trusts, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Summary Judgment, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, s. 4, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, 1250140 Ontario Inc. v. Bader, 2022 ONCA 197, Studley v. Studley, 2022 ONCA 810, McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86

facts:

The respondents, SPKS and NS, were married. The appellant SJ was business partners with the husband NS. The other appellant, Soneil Lincoln Inc. (“SLI”), is a corporation controlled by SJ. NS, SPKS and SJ bought a property in Clinton, Ontario (“Lot 16”) together. Lot 16 was purchased under the title of SLI. SPKS, SJ, and SLI entered an agreement (the “Agreement”) documenting SPKS’s entitlement to a one-third interest in Lot 16.

In 2016, NS and SPKS separated. That same year, SJ and SLI sold Lot 16, without accounting for the proceeds or paying SPKS. NS commenced an action against SJ and SLI (the “2016 action”) for breach of contract and unjust enrichment in relation to several properties including Lot 16. SPKS did not commence her own action, believing that the 2016 action sufficed to protect her interests. However, in 2024, after learning that SJ was asserting that NS lacked standing to pursue the 2016 action, SPKS commenced her own action with respect to Lot 16 (the “2024 action”). In this action, she claimed that she was the beneficial owner of one third of Lot 16 and that SJ and SLI were trustees. She claimed damages flowing from breach of trust following the sale and mortgage of Lot 16.

SPKS and NS moved to consolidate the 2016 and 2024 actions. SJ and SLI served a cross-motion seeking summary judgment in both actions and security for costs. They argued that that NS had no standing in the 2016 action and that SPKS’s 2024 action was statute-barred because it was governed by the Limitations Act, 2002 (“LA”), rather than the Real Property Limitations Act (“RPLA”).

The motion judge rejected the appellants’ argument that SPKS’s claim was statute-barred. He concluded that the RPLA was the applicable limitation regime, rather than the LA, because the claim was related to an ownership interest in land. To the extent that the claim sought damages, it was as a remedy for the alleged breach of SPKS’s contractual and trust interest in Lot 16. Under the RPLA, the applicable limitation period was ten years.

issue:

Did the motion judge err in finding that the RPLA, rather than the LA, applied to SPKS’s claim?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No. The Court found no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that the RPLA applied because SPKS’s claim was for an interest in land or damages in lieu of that interest. A trust claim over real property was an action to recover any land within the meaning of s. 4 of the RPLA. The Court further held that an alternative claim for monetary compensation based on a trust entitlement to real property was also within the scope of s. 4 of the RPLA. SPKS’s claim fell within that definition.

The Court disagreed that the motion judge failed to consider whether SPKS had performed her obligations under the Agreement in his assessment of whether the RPLA applied. The appellants’ motion sought summary judgment solely on the ground that SPKS’s claim was statute-barred. Further, the manner in which the appellants pursued the limitation period argument did not raise any issue about whether SPKS had fulfilled her obligations under the Agreement and established an interest in land. An appeal from a failed summary judgment motion was not an opportunity for the party who brought the motion to advance new arguments not made to the motion judge. The questions of what obligations SPKS was required to perform under the Agreement to be entitled to the one-third interest in Lot 16 and whether she fulfilled those obligations remained open issues for the eventual trial in the matter.

G.G. v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 164

[Zarnett J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

M. Waddell, K. Bédard, T. Q. Yang, and M. Anderson, for G.G. and W.W., appellants in COA-25-CV-0957 and respondents in COA-25-CV-0958

E. Bowker, J. DiFederico, S. Katirai, T. Russell, G. Murdoch, and Z. Sherman, for the Children’s Aid Societies, respondents in COA-25-CV-0957

L. Brost, W. Malik, S. Nestico-Semianiw, E. Guilbault, A. Huckins, and N. Ghobrial, for His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of Ontario, respondent in COA-25-CV-0957 and appellant in COA-25-CV-0958

D. M. Peebles, B. Kain, and A. Schechner, for the proposed intervenor, Ontario Chamber of Commerce

J. Sayce, C. Leach, and L. Clerk, for the proposed intervenor, Class Action Clinic at the University of Windsor Faculty of Law

G. Nayerahmadi and J. Marshall, for the proposed intervenor, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association

S. Lombardi, C. Rioux-McCormick and E. Assini, for the proposed intervenor, Women of Class

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Certification, Ragoonanan Principle, Interveners, Friends of the Court, Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss. 2(1), 5(1)(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 5, 10, 13.03(2), Ragoonanan Estate v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 603 (S.C.J.), Hughes v. Sunbeam Corporation (Canada) Ltd. (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 433 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 446, Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 164 (C.A.), Foster v. West, 2021 ONCA 263, Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 29, Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 669, Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 619, Baker v. Van Dolder’s Home Team Inc., 2025 ONCA 578, Jones v. Tsige (2011), 106 O.R. (3d) 721 (C.A.), Caruso v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 270, Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, 2014 SCC 55, AIC Limited v. Fischer, 2013 SCC 69, Louie v. Lastman (2001), 208 D.L.R. (4th) 380 (Ont. C.A.)

facts

These reasons addressed motions to intervene on an issue arising in one of two grouped appeals from a May 21, 2025 order. That order certified an action as a class proceeding against His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of Ontario (“Ontario”) but declined to certify the action against 49 Children’s Aid Societies (“CASs”) across the province.

The representative plaintiffs appealed the decision denying certification of the action against the CASs. Ontario appealed the decision certifying the action against it.

The underlying action concerned the now-defunct use of “Birth Alerts.” These were notifications issued by a CAS to hospitals and other healthcare providers when it believed a child-protection concern existed regarding an unborn child. The alerts requested that the healthcare provider notify the relevant CAS upon the child’s birth.

One of the reasons the motion judge declined to certify the action as against the CASs was the “Ragoonanan principle”, which requires that there be a representative plaintiff (and not merely any member of the proposed class) with a cause of action against each defendant.

Four organizations moved for leave to intervene as a friend of the court under r. 13.03(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to address the question of whether the Ragoonanan principle should continue to be applied. The proposed interveners were: (1) the Ontario Chamber of Commerce (the “Chamber of Commerce”); (2) the Class Action Clinic at the University of Windsor Faculty of Law (the “Clinic”); (3) the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (“CCLA”); and (4) Women of Class (“WOC”).

The representative plaintiffs did not oppose the motions for leave to intervene but argued that the Chamber of Commerce’s intervention should be more limited than proposed. Ontario took no position on the motions, except to request a right of reply if the CCLA were permitted to raise an additional issue, namely, whether a group granted public interest standing can act as a representative plaintiff. The CASs opposed all of the motions for leave to intervene except that of the Ontario Chamber of Commerce.

issues:

Should leave to intervene be granted?

holding:

Motions granted.

reasoning:

Yes. The Court granted the motions to intervene on the terms described below.

The court applied the three-part test considering (1) the nature of the case, (2) the issues which arose, and (3) the likelihood of the applicant being able to make a useful contribution to the resolution of the appeal without causing injustice to the immediate parties: Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada (1990). The overarching consideration was whether the intervener was likely to make a useful contribution. Usefulness could arise from the fact that an intervener brought a different perspective to bear on the issue, even if its arguments overlapped to some extent with those of a party.  However, totally duplicative arguments were not useful. Where the litigation at issue was a private dispute, a more onerous standard applies.

The Court held that the continued application of the Ragoonanan principle in Ontario class proceedings was an issue that transcended the interests of the immediate parties and had policy implications. This issue was quintessentially one in which it was important for the Court to “have all of the relevant possibilities brought to its attention, including submissions on the impact of its judgment, not only on the parties, but on those not before the court whose positions might be similar to but not the same as the parties”: Louie v. Lastman (2001), at para. 12.

The Chamber of Commerce’s proposed intervention provided a perspective from the business community, whose members were frequently defendants in class proceedings. Although its proposed arguments about the Ragoonanan principle overlapped to some extent with those of the CASs, the Chamber of Commerce’s different perspective could be useful to the Court. However, the Court agreed with the representative plaintiffs that input from an intervener on the principle of horizontal stare decisis was of limited utility at best and therefore did not grant leave to the Chamber of Commerce to address that issue.

Regarding the interventions of the Clinic, the CCLA and WOC, the CASs’ principal objection was that their arguments about the Ragoonanan principle overlapped with those of the representative plaintiffs. The Court found there was some, but not total, overlap, and that, moreover, the perspectives of the representative plaintiffs and proposed interveners differed. The Clinic’s focus was on the interests of class members in various circumstances that arose broadly in class proceedings, distinct from the interests of those who sought to represent them. WOC’s focus was generally on vindicating the interests of marginalized persons through class actions, beyond the circumstances of this action. The CCLA’s interest was in class proceedings as a means of advancing or defending civil liberties, constitutional rights and democratic accountability. Those added perspectives could be useful to the Court. The Court did not consider WOC’s lack of a lengthy track record of interventions to mean that it would not offer a perspective in this case that could be useful.

However, the Court agreed that to the extent the CCLA wished to argue that the Ragoonanan principle interfered with the ability of an organization to serve as a representative plaintiff through a grant of public interest standing, it would be raising a new issue that would expand the scope of the appeal. Such an argument would require examining the implicit premise that a person without private interest standing to advance a claim against any defendant could nonetheless serve as a representative plaintiff. As that issue did not arise in this case, the Court did not permit the CCLA to raise it.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Matas Management Services Inc. v. Voreon Inc., 2026 ONCA 157

[Simmons, Paciocco and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Mathew, for the moving parties

C. I. R. Morrison and R. Allan, for the responding parties

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Orders, Final or Interlocutory, Matas Management Services Inc. v. Voreon Inc., 2021 ONSC 4281, Matas Management Services Inc. v. Voreon Inc., 2023 ONCA 745

Pitters v. Home Trust Company, 2026 ONCA 155

[Simmons, Favreau and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

mP, acting in person

A. McInnis, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigation, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.01

Porter v. Kik, 2026 ONCA 159

[Gillese, Coroza and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. M. Van Buskirk, for the appellant

G. McLeod, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Orders, Costs, Enforcement, Uncontested Trials, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C 43, s. 19(1)(a.1), “Practice Direction Concerning Civil Appeals at the Court of Appeal for Ontario” (March 1, 2017), s. 7.2.5

Epshtein v. Shvartzman, 2026 ONCA 162

[Lauwers, Huscroft and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Harvey, for the appellant

B. Tseitlin, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Property, Equalization of Net Family Property, Marriage Contracts, Setting Aside, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 56(4)

Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. v. Harrison Pensa LLP, 2026 ONCA 156

[Huscroft, Trotter and Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

T. J. Curry and D. Knoke, for the appellant

M. A. Davis, R. D. Davis and Y. Kogan, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Lawyer and Client, Retainer Agreements, Contingency Fee Agreements, Quantum Meruit, Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. v. Ontario, 2022 ONCA 579, leave to appeal refused, [2022] S.C.C.A. No. 357; Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. v. Ontario, 2022 ONCA 629, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Royal Bank of Canada v. Peace Bridge Duty Free Inc., 2025 ONCA 54

1238915 Ontario Limited v. Ferri, 2026 ONCA 169

[van Rensburg, Miller and Coroza JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Sigler and R. Ahmed, for the appellant
C. D. Neil, for the respondent

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Orders, Setting Aside, Costs, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Uncontested Trials, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 19.08, 59.06 

Shiralian v. Wyldewood Creek Inc., 2026 ONCA 163

[Fairburn A.C.J.O., Rouleau and Roberts JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N. G. Wilson and H. Sardar, for the appellants
M. Jilesen and Z. Rosen, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Limitation of Liability Clauses, Enforceability, Unconscionability, Public Policy, Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.31, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 633, Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and Highways), 2010 SCC 4, Ritchie v. Castlepoint Greybrook Sterling Inc., 2021 ONCA 214, leave to appeal refused, [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 153