In Hartman v. Canada (Attorney General), the Court dismissed an appeal arising from the tragic death of a 17-year-old 33 days after receiving a Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine. His father sued the federal government for negligence and misfeasance in public office. The motion judge struck the claim in its entirety as disclosing no reasonable cause of action without leave to amend. The Court upheld the dismissal. The statutory scheme governing vaccine approval imposed duties owed to the general public rather than to particular individuals, and therefore no private law duty of care arose. The misfeasance in public office claim failed because the pleadings contained only bald conclusory assertions of bad faith without material facts demonstrating that the respondents had subjective awareness that their conduct was unlawful or likely to harm the appellant’s son.

In V2 Investment Holdings Inc. v. Mizrahi, the Court upheld judgment on a $12.9 million loan, finding that alleged oral agreements to extend the loan were unsupported and that ongoing negotiations did not create a binding contract. It also confirmed that the matter was properly resolved by application, as no material factual disputes required a trial and no viable defence of equitable set-off arose. The Court declined to determine the doctrinal question of whether a judge hearing an application has the same enhanced fact-finding powers as a judge on a rule 20 motion. The judge did not use such fact-finding powers in this case. The question was therefore left for another day.

In R.J.F. v. L.L.S.P., the Court largely upheld the motion judge’s grant of summary judgment against an employee for fraud and conversion arising from the misappropriation of over $1.1 million from her employer’s principal. It found no reversible error in his credibility determinations or use of enhanced fact-finding powers under rule 20.04(2.1). The Court also upheld the $100,000 punitive damages award in favour of the principal, but set aside the inclusion of the corporate employer as a joint payee. Regarding the claim against the employee’s partner for knowing assistance of breach of trust and knowing receipt of trust property, the Court allowed his appeal. It held that the motion judge erred by finding liability without satisfying the strict tracing requirement of knowing assistance and by directing a reference on a question that went to liability, rather than directing the claim to trial.

In Nigro v Luciano, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a dog walker’s claim against the owners for damages after being bitten, finding that she qualified as an “owner” under the Dog Owner’s Liability Act herself because she was in physical possession and control of the dog at the time of the attack. As an owner, she was jointly and severally liable for the dog’s conduct and could not recover against the respondents. The Court affirmed that DOLA ownership turns on possession and control, not on who holds the greatest authority over the dog or where the incident occurs.

In Alyousef v. Alyousef, the Court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge’s calculation of the parties’ partnership net profits during the contract period. The Court directed the appellant to provide income statements and notices of assessment from CRA by way of affidavit so that income taxes paid can be deducted from the ultimate damages award.

In Gutcher v. Welland Retirement Suites Limited, the Court dismissed the appeal from an order dismissing the appellants’ action for delay. The Court held that the motion judge did not err in finding the delay to be intentional because the entire history of the proceedings supported that conclusion. The motion judge was not required to make a specific finding of prejudice since inordinate delay can itself be prejudicial, and the evidentiary burden lay on the appellants to disprove it.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2026 ONCA 280

Keywords: Contracts, Partnerships, Corporations, Damages, Net After-Tax Profit

Gutcher v. Welland Retirement Suites Limited, 2026 ONCA 273

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Dismissal for Delay, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 1.04(1), Barbiero v. Pollack, 2024 ONCA 904, Langenecker v. Sauvé, 2011 ONCA 803, Ticchiarelli v. Ticchiarelli, 2017 ONCA 1

Hartman v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 270

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Duty of Care, Misfeasance in Public Office, Crown Liability, Statutory Duties, Health Law, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 s. 61(1), Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, s 30.1, Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C., c. 870, C.08.001, Department of Health Act, S.C. 1996, c. 8, s. 4(1), Public Health Agency of Canada Act, S.C. 2006, c. 5, Preamble, s. 7(1.1), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21.01(1)(b), Nelson (City) v. Marchi, 2021 SCC 41, R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42, Cooper v. Hobart, 2001 SCC 79, Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, Childs v. Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18, Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock, 2020 SCC 19, Tran v. University of Western Ontario, 2015 ONCA 295, Fernandez Leon v. Bayer Inc., 2023 ONCA 629, The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. Dundee Kilmer Developments Limited Partnership, 2020 ONCA 272, PMC York Properties Inc. v. Siudak, 2022 ONCA 635, Conway v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONCA 72, Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 ONCA 479,  Rausch v. Pickering (City), 2013 ONCA 740, Das v. George Weston Limited, 2018 ONCA 1053, Marks v. Ottawa (City), 2011 ONCA 248, Abarquez v. Ontario, 2009 ONCA 374, McCreight v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONCA 483, Heaslip Estate v. Mansfield Ski Club Inc., 2009 ONCA 594, McFadden v. Psutka, 2024 ONCA 203, Williams v. Ontario, 2009 ONCA 378, Gratton-Masuy Environmental Technologies Inc. v. Ontario, 2010 ONCA 501, Shaulov v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONCA 95, Robson v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 ONCA 944, Attis v. Canada (Health), 2008 ONCA 660, Trillium Power Wind Corporation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 2013 ONCA 683, Darmar Farms Inc. v. Syngenta Canada Inc., 2019 ONCA 789, Ceballos v. DCL International Inc., 2018 ONCA 49, Spar Roofing & Metal Supplies Limited v. Glynn, 2016 ONCA 296, Fowler v. Family and Children’s Services of the Waterloo Region, 2024 ONCA 41, R. v. Morgan, 2020 ONCA 279,  St. John’s Port Authority v. Adventure Tours Inc., 2011 FCA 198, Painblanc v. Kastner (1991), 58 C.P.R. (3d) 502 (F.C.A.), Spencer v. Canada (Health), 2021 FC 621, Lavergne-Poitras v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FC 1232, Eliopoulos (Litigation Trustee of) v. Ontario (Minister of Health and Long-Term Care) (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), Adam, Abudu v. Ledesma-Cadhit et al, 2014 ONSC 5726, Three Rivers District Council v. Bank of England (No. 3), [2000] 2 W.L.R. 1220

V2 Investment Holdings Inc. v. Mizrahi, 2026 ONCA 275

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Real Property, Mortgages, Defences, Equitable Set-Off, Civil Procedure, Applications, Evidence, Witnesses, Credibility, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 14.05, 20.04, R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, Gatoto v. 5GC Inc., 2024 ONCA 210, Obolus Ltd. v. International Seniors Community Care Inc., 2023 ONCA 708, Thompson v. Casey, 2020 ONCA 5, Genstar Development Partnership v. The Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of the Diocese of Hamilton in Ontario, 2019 ONCA 506, Pennyfeather v. Timminco Limited, 2017 ONCA 369, Penner v. Niagara Regional Police Services Board, 2013 SCC 19, Collins v. Canada (Attorney General), (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 228, Grand River Conservation Authority v. Ramdas, 2021 ONCA 815, Temagami (Municipality) v. Temagami Barge Ltd., 2025 ONCA 315, Royal Bank of Canada v. 1643937 Ontario Inc. et al, 2021 ONCA 98, Pichelli v. Kegalj, 2021 ONCA 445

R.J.F. v. L.L.S.P., 2026 ONCA 277

Keywords: Torts, Fraud, Conversion, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Knowing Assistance of Breach of Trust, Knowing Receipt of Trust Property, Punitive Damages, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Fact-Finding Powers, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Rules of Civil Procedure,  rr. 20.04(2)(b), 20.04(2.1), 20.04 (2.2), 20.04 (3), 20.04 (5), Dealer Financial Corporation v. Toronto Fine Cars and Leasing Inc., 2023 ONCA 256, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18, Christine DeJong Medicine Professional Corp. v. DBDC Spadina Ltd., 2019 SCC 30,  DBDC Spadina Ltd. v. Walton, 2018 ONCA 60, Caja Paraguaya de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Personal de Itaipu Binacional v. Garcia, 2020 ONCA 412

Nigro v. Luciano, 2026 ONCA 283

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Occupier’s Liability, Strict Liability, Joint Liability, Statutory Interpretation, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Standard of Review, Correctness, Dog Owners’ Liability Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. D.16, Occupiers’ Liability Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.2, Wilk v. Arbour, 2017 ONCA 21

Short Civil Decisions

Wright v. Wright, 2026 ONCA 268

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Options to Purchase, Enforceability, Defences, Undue Influence, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Unconscionability, Costs

Rabbani v. Furney, 2026 ONCA 271

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Orders, Final or Interlocutory, Security for Costs, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43, s. 19(1)(b), Nazarinia Holdings Inc. v. 2049080 Ontario Inc., 2012 ONCA 652, Leslie v. Encanto Potash Trading Corporation, 2021 ONCA 464, Kapital Produce Limited v. Farm Credit Canada, 2026 ONCA 114, Paulpillai Estate v. Yusuf, 2020 ONCA 655, Drywall Acoustic Lathing Insulation Local 675 Pension Fund v. SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., 2020 ONCA 375, J.N. v. Durham Regional Police Service, 2012 ONCA 428

12563789 Canada Inc. v. Tiki Tours International Corp., 2026 ONCA 269

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Beach of Fiduciary Duty, Joint Ventures, Torts, Defamation, Damages, Punitive Damages, Civil Procedure, Counterclaims, Evidence, Costs

Bank of Montreal v. Dua, 2026 ONCA 265

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Counterclaims, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Costs

Williamson v. Brandt Tractor Inc., 2026 ONCA 272

Keywords: Contracts, Employment, Wrongful Dismissal, Damages, Defences, Just Cause, Mitigation, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Brake v. PJ-M2R Restaurant Inc., 2017 ONCA 402

Singh v. Seth, 2026 ONCA 276

Keywords: Family Law, Spousal Support, Equalization of Net Family Property, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Evidence, Financial Disclosure, Procedural Fairness, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, Peerenboom v. Peerenboom, 2020 ONCA 240, Singh v. Seth, 2022 ONCA 837, Hickey v. Hickey, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518

CIVIL DECISIONS

Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2026 ONCA 280

[Roberts, Trotter and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

O.S. Chaudhry, for the appellants

A.R.A, acting in person

Keywords: Contracts, Partnerships, Corporations, Damages, Net After-Tax Profit

facts:

On February 6, 2026, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, pending resolution of an issue regarding the calculation of the parties’ partnership net profit. This calculation affects the respondent’s damages during the contract period with Milkman Inc. from 2013 to 2017. These reasons supplement the earlier ones found at 2026 ONCA 78.

The trial judge determined that, to calculate the partnership net profits owed to the respondent, certain amounts should have been included in the income of 2390246 Ontario Inc. (“239”), including diverted wages, personal credit card charges, unreconciled cash, shareholder receivables and arrears on delivery invoices. The judge also found that the net income of 2296411 Ontario Inc. (“229”) and the respondent’s $63,000 business income for the contract period should be considered. Based on these findings, the trial judge calculated the total net profit for the contract period at $948,246, with the respondent’s 50% share being $474,123.

The 239 net income figure of $274,777 was calculated after deducting income taxes. However, the other figures did not include notional income taxes payable. The parties and the trial judge did not address this issue at trial. Likewise, the figures for 229’s net income and the respondent’s business income are not net of income tax. The appellants asked to reduce 229’s income by offsetting taxes they claimed to have paid over the years and included in “the income statements.” The trial judge declined because “no records were led at trial to substantiate any of their proposed tax offset amounts.”

As a result, the parties submitted additional written submissions and revised calculations to determine the net after-tax profit for each year of the contract period. This formed the basis of the addendum to the appeal.

issues:

Should notional income taxes be taken into account when calculating net after-tax profit?

holding:

Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No. The Court accepted the respondent’s position that notional income taxes should not be deducted from the amounts the trial judge ordered included in 239’s income. The Court found no evidence that the appellants had remitted taxes on these amounts, and the appellants appeared to have received the full benefit. Regarding the $400,000 in arrears of delivery invoices, the trial judge found that these were satisfied by offsetting the invoice amount against the purchase price of a property that Mr. A purchased from Milkman Inc. after the contract period. It was therefore reasonable for the trial judge not to deduct notional income taxes from that amount. To keep the calculation consistent, the Court also declined to deduct notional income taxes from the respondent’s $63,000 business income, as there was no evidence that the respondent paid any income taxes on it and thus appeared to have fully benefited from it.

With respect to 229’s income, the Court noted that the appellants had provided amounts in their costs submissions to the trial judge. They said these amounts were paid for income taxes over the relevant period and were based on income statements. The trial judge declined to order the deduction because no records were led at trial to substantiate any proposed tax offset amounts. On appeal, the calculations in the appellants’ most recent submissions were inconsistent with the amounts referenced in their appeal factum. The figures in the appeal factum were consistent with those provided to the trial judge. The court was unable to resolve these contradictions.

It was observed that 229’s income statements did not appear in the appeal record, nor was there any other documentation verifying the actual amounts remitted for income taxes. The Court held this was a simple factual issue that should be easy to resolve. It was only fair that if the appellants did remit 229’s income taxes, those amounts should be deducted from 229’s net income, consistent with the trial judge’s treatment of 239’s net income. Accordingly, the Court directed the appellants to provide 229’s income statements and notices of assessment and reassessment from the Canada Revenue Agency proving the remittance of 229’s income taxes, to be attested by affidavit.

Gutcher v. Welland Retirement Suites Limited, 2026 ONCA 273

[Huscroft, George and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

C.M.J. Kealy and R. Rabinovitch, for the appellants

D.S. Young and N.G. Somayaji, for the respondents Welland Retirement Suites Limited, M.H., E.D., and J.F.

S.A. Crocco, for the respondent Constable T.C.

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Dismissal for Delay, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 1.04(1), Barbiero v. Pollack, 2024 ONCA 904, Langenecker v. Sauvé, 2011 ONCA 803, Ticchiarelli v. Ticchiarelli, 2017 ONCA 1

facts:

The appellants began an action in 2017 alleging negligent investigation and malicious prosecution in relation to a criminal charge against S.G. in 2013 which was later withdrawn. The appellants had counsel throughout the proceeding. In 2021, they certified to the court that the case was ready for trial, and the trial was set accordingly.

A judicial pre-trial conference was held on July 13, 2022. At that time, the appellants had not complied with their obligations under the Rules to serve their expert reports before the pre-trial. They also had not answered their undertakings from the discovery held several years earlier. The pre-trial judge ordered a timetable (the “Timetable Order”) requiring the appellants to fulfill their undertakings by August 31, 2022, and to deliver all expert reports by November 30, 2022. After that, a further judicial pre-trial would be arranged.

Between November 2022 and September 2023, the respondents repeatedly wrote to the appellants requesting compliance with the Timetable Order. The appellants did not comply. Only some undertakings were fulfilled, and no expert report was delivered. The action was struck from the trial list on October 30, 2023.

Nearly two years passed during which the appellants took no action to move the matter forward. In July 2025, the respondents brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay. The appellants responded with a motion seeking to restore the action to the trial list and for leave to examine Constable T.C. and serve an expert report. The motions were heard by the same judge who presided over the judicial pre-trial and made the Timetable Order. On August 21, 2025, the motion judge rejected the explanations of the appellants’ counsel for the delay, found the delay lengthy, unexplained, inexcusable, and deliberate, and dismissed the action.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err by finding that the delay was intentional in the absence of evidence?

2. Did the motion judge err by failing to address and determine whether there was any prejudice caused by the delay.

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. 

The motion judge did not err. There was a two-year period between the discoveries and the appellants’ filing of the trial record. After the action was set down for trial in 2021, it remained dormant for another year. Then, after the court tried to get the proceeding back on track through the Timetable Order, the appellants breached that order. They made no meaningful efforts to ensure the action was ready for trial for nearly three more years, despite the respondents’ repeated requests. At the hearing of the motion, counsel for the appellants offered explanations for the delay, including her workload, staff turnover at her office, the pandemic and her personal circumstances. The motion judge rejected all these explanations, concluding they did not account for the full extent of the delay. In the absence of a reasonable explanation, the motion judge was entitled to conclude that the appellants’ inaction was intentional. His finding was entitled to deference on appeal. The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that the motion judge wrongly inferred intention from breaching a single court order. The judge appropriately considered the entire context, including delays both before and after the breach of the Timetable Order. The Court emphasized there is no formula for assessing delay. The analysis cannot be reduced to the number of orders breached or the years that have passed. Instead, the Court must determine whether, given the history of the action, the delay justifies dismissal.

2. No.

The motion judge was not required to find prejudice specifically. The judge correctly noted that the passage of time alone can constitute prejudice, citing Barbiero at para. 15. The Court rejected the appellants’ claim that inordinate delay only creates a presumption of prejudice and that respondents had to prove actual prejudice. Instead, inordinate delay can be prejudicial in itself. Moreover, the evidentiary burden was always on the party who initiated the claim to prove that the delay had not caused prejudice: Ticchiarelli at para. 29. The respondents were not required to present evidence of prejudice. The motion judge found the delay inordinate. The appellants pointed to no error warranting interference with this finding and offered no evidence to rebut the finding of prejudice. The Court also rejected the appellants’ argument that the delay did not prejudice the respondents because the appellants bore the burden of proof at trial. It held that there was no basis to conclude the delay did not prejudice the respondents’ ability to defend the claim. Lost evidence or inability to call the best evidence does not primarily affect the party initiating the claim. The respondents were entitled to know early the case they had to meet. Nothing was done between the 2019 examinations for discovery and the 2025 motions to clarify the case against respondents, which the Court found unfair.

Hartman v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 270

[Miller, Monahan and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

U. Sheikh, for the appellant

M. Keramati and A. Zita-Bennett, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Duty of Care, Misfeasance in Public Office, Crown Liability, Statutory Duties, Health Law, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 s. 61(1), Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, s 30.1, Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C., c. 870, C.08.001, Department of Health Act, S.C. 1996, c. 8, s. 4(1), Public Health Agency of Canada Act, S.C. 2006, c. 5, Preamble, s. 7(1.1), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21.01(1)(b), Nelson (City) v. Marchi, 2021 SCC 41, R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42, Cooper v. Hobart, 2001 SCC 79, Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, Childs v. Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18, Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock, 2020 SCC 19, Tran v. University of Western Ontario, 2015 ONCA 295, Fernandez Leon v. Bayer Inc., 2023 ONCA 629, The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. Dundee Kilmer Developments Limited Partnership, 2020 ONCA 272, PMC York Properties Inc. v. Siudak, 2022 ONCA 635, Conway v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONCA 72, Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 ONCA 479,  Rausch v. Pickering (City), 2013 ONCA 740, Das v. George Weston Limited, 2018 ONCA 1053, Marks v. Ottawa (City), 2011 ONCA 248, Abarquez v. Ontario, 2009 ONCA 374, McCreight v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONCA 483, Heaslip Estate v. Mansfield Ski Club Inc., 2009 ONCA 594, McFadden v. Psutka, 2024 ONCA 203, Williams v. Ontario, 2009 ONCA 378, Gratton-Masuy Environmental Technologies Inc. v. Ontario, 2010 ONCA 501, Shaulov v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONCA 95, Robson v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 ONCA 944, Attis v. Canada (Health), 2008 ONCA 660, Trillium Power Wind Corporation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 2013 ONCA 683, Darmar Farms Inc. v. Syngenta Canada Inc., 2019 ONCA 789, Ceballos v. DCL International Inc., 2018 ONCA 49, Spar Roofing & Metal Supplies Limited v. Glynn, 2016 ONCA 296, Fowler v. Family and Children’s Services of the Waterloo Region, 2024 ONCA 41, R. v. Morgan, 2020 ONCA 279,  St. John’s Port Authority v. Adventure Tours Inc., 2011 FCA 198, Painblanc v. Kastner (1991), 58 C.P.R. (3d) 502 (F.C.A.), Spencer v. Canada (Health), 2021 FC 621, Lavergne-Poitras v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FC 1232, Eliopoulos (Litigation Trustee of) v. Ontario (Minister of Health and Long-Term Care) (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), Adam, Abudu v. Ledesma-Cadhit et al, 2014 ONSC 5726, Three Rivers District Council v. Bank of England (No. 3), [2000] 2 W.L.R. 1220

facts:

This appeal arose from the tragic death of the appellant’s son, 17-year-old S.H., who passed away on September 27, 2021, 33 days after receiving a Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine (the “Vaccine”). The appellant commenced an action under s. 61(1) of the Family Law Act against the respondents for negligence and misfeasance in public office (the “Claim”).

The Claim alleged that the respondents were negligent, recklessly indifferent and/or willfully blind in their approval, monitoring, and promotion of the Vaccine, and that S.H’s death was a foreseeable and proximate result of the respondents’ conduct.

While recognizing that S.H’s death at such a young age was a devastating loss to his family and his community, the motion judge struck the Claim in its entirety on the basis that it was plain and obvious that the Claim had no reasonable prospect of success, even if supplemented with amendments proposed by the appellant.

The motion judge held that the claim in negligence was bound to fail because the statutory scheme established only general duties to the public, there were no specific interactions alleged between the respondents and S.H., and the respondents’ actions in approving and promoting the Vaccine were an expression of core policy decisions taken in order to protect the Canadian public as a whole. The motion judge further concluded that even if she had found a prima facie basis for recognizing a private law duty of care, there were residual policy concerns that would negate the existence of such a duty. In particular, the imposition of a private law duty of care in these circumstances would create a chilling effect on government decision-makers who were responsible for protecting the general Canadian public during a pandemic.

The claim in misfeasance was bound to fail because there were no material facts pleaded upon which it could be concluded that the respondents had a subjective awareness that harm to the appellant’s son was a likely consequence of their actions. The motion judge found that the appellant’s proposed amendments to the Claim did not address these shortcomings but were merely a repetition and detailed expansion of the same facts already pleaded. The motion judge therefore struck the Claim in its entirety without leave to amend.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err by misapplying the “plain and obvious” test for striking a pleading and failing to read the Claim generously, thereby prematurely dismissing arguable claims?

2. Did the motion judge err by finding it was plain and obvious that the respondents owed no private law duty of care to S.H.?

3. Did the motion judge err by classifying all the impugned government conduct as immune “core policy”, thereby failing to distinguish between policy and operational acts?

4. Did the motion judge err by striking the claim for misfeasance in public office where the necessary elements of the tort were pleaded?

5. Did the motion judge err by refusing to grant leave to amend the Claim.

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. Did the motion judge err by misapplying the “plain and obvious” test for striking a pleading and failing to read the Claim generously, thereby prematurely dismissing arguable claims?

The Court did not address this issue.

2. Did the motion judge err by finding it was plain and obvious that the respondents owed no private law duty of care to S.H.?

No. Based on governing principles, the motion judge correctly found that neither the statutory scheme nor the relationship between the parties was sufficient to establish a private law duty of care. Moreover, as the motion judge explained, any prima facie private law duty of care that might have been found to exist would have been negated for residual policy reasons.

The Court outlined that the statutory scheme applicable in this case establishes duties that are owed to the general public rather than to particular individuals or groups. In particular, s. 4(1) of the Department of Health Act, defines the powers, duties and functions of the Minister as extending to all matters within federal jurisdiction “relating to the promotion and preservation of the health of the people of Canada”. This includes the promotion and preservation of “the physical, mental and social well-being of the people of Canada”; the protection of “the people of Canada against risks to health and the spreading of diseases”; and “investigation and research into public health, including the monitoring of diseases”.

The Court outlined that these statutory references to the Minister’s duty to protect and promote the health of “the people of Canada”, along with the PHAC’s mandate “to identify and reduce public health risk factors and to support national readiness for public health threats”, entail duties to Canadians as a whole, rather than to particular individuals or groups. The Court outlined that the motion judge’s finding that the statutory scheme establishes duties owed to the general public rather than to particular individuals or groups was consistent with a growing body of jurisprudence which had declined to impose private law duties of care in the context of government policy decisions made in response to health emergencies impacting the general population.

3. Did the motion judge err by classifying all the impugned government conduct as immune “core policy”, thereby failing to distinguish between policy and operational acts?

The Court did not address this issue.

4. Did the motion judge err by striking the claim for misfeasance in public office where the necessary elements of the tort were pleaded?

No. A key governing principle in establishing liability for misfeasance in public office is that the defendant was subjectively aware, reckless or wilfully blind to the fact that their conduct was unlawful and would likely harm the plaintiff. The Court outlined that the motion judge correctly identified this as the key shortcoming in the appellant’s pleading of this cause of action. The Claim baldly alleged that the respondents were reckless or wilfully blind to the fact that (1) their conduct in approving, overseeing and promoting the Vaccine was unlawful and (2) their unlawful conduct was likely to injure S.H. Neither assertion could be supported by the facts pleaded.

5. Did the motion judge err by refusing to grant leave to amend the Claim?

No. The motion judge was correct when he found that amendments proposed by the appellant were insufficient, since they merely repeated and expanded upon the same facts already pleaded without addressing the primary deficits in the Claim. Even with the proposed amendments, the Claim failed to plead material facts upon which it could be concluded either that the respondents had a private law duty of care towards the appellant’s son, or that they had subjective awareness that their actions were unlawful and likely to injure the appellant’s son. Having reviewed the proposed amendments, the Court saw no basis to interfere with the motion judge’s findings that the proposed amendments would not have cured the deficiencies in the Claim.

V2 Investment Holdings Inc. v. Mizrahi, 2026 ONCA 275

[Simmons, Paciocco and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Lisus and A. Pang, for the appellants

D. Rosenbluth and R. Shah, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Real Property, Mortgages, Defences, Equitable Set-Off, Civil Procedure, Applications, Evidence, Witnesses, Credibility, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 14.05, 20.04, R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, Gatoto v. 5GC Inc., 2024 ONCA 210, Obolus Ltd. v. International Seniors Community Care Inc., 2023 ONCA 708, Thompson v. Casey, 2020 ONCA 5, Genstar Development Partnership v. The Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of the Diocese of Hamilton in Ontario, 2019 ONCA 506, Pennyfeather v. Timminco Limited, 2017 ONCA 369, Penner v. Niagara Regional Police Services Board, 2013 SCC 19, Collins v. Canada (Attorney General), (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 228, Grand River Conservation Authority v. Ramdas, 2021 ONCA 815, Temagami (Municipality) v. Temagami Barge Ltd., 2025 ONCA 315, Royal Bank of Canada v. 1643937 Ontario Inc. et al, 2021 ONCA 98, Pichelli v. Kegalj, 2021 ONCA 445

facts:

The appellants, led by SM, a real estate developer, sought to set aside a judgment granted in favour of the respondent lender, V2, relating to an outstanding $12.9 million loan used to finance a partially completed mixed-use condominium development project in Ottawa (the “Project”). The loan was advanced in 2019 as bridge financing and was guaranteed by several corporate entities controlled by SM.

The Project was primarily financed by a separate senior lender, Trez Capital Limited Partnership (“Trez”), which held a first-ranking mortgage over the property. Under the Trez financing, no additional encumbrances could be registered on title without Trez’s consent. As a result, although V2 was granted a debenture and mortgage security over the property, that security was initially unregistered, with the loan agreement expressly permitting V2 to register its mortgage upon default, even without Trez’s consent.

SM defaulted on multiple obligations under the loan, including failing to make required interest payments and failing to repay the loan at maturity. Although the parties entered into an amending agreement extending the maturity date to December 31, 2023, SM again failed to repay the loan. Following this default, the parties engaged in negotiations regarding a further extension and a potential intercreditor agreement between V2 and Trez which would have allowed V2’s mortgage to be registered without triggering a default under the Trez financing.

SM alleged that an oral agreement was reached at a meeting on March 3, 2024, to extend the loan maturity date and proceed with such arrangements. V2 denied that any binding agreement was concluded, maintaining that negotiations remained ongoing and incomplete. No further written agreement was executed.

On April 15, 2024, V2 issued a notice of intention to enforce its security and registered its mortgage on title to the property, triggering a default under the Trez mortgage. V2 then commenced an application seeking judgment on the unpaid loan and related relief, including enforcement of its security. The application judge granted judgment in favour of V2, finding that no binding amending agreement had been reached and that the debt was owing.

issues:

1. Did the application judge err in determining the matter by way of application rather than converting it to an action?

2. Did the application judge err in foreclosing the appellants’ ability to advance a defence of equitable set-off and counterclaim?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No.

The Court held that the application judge made no reviewable error in refusing to convert the proceeding to an action. Read as a whole, his reasons were clear, sufficient and permitted meaningful appellate review. Although he did not separately devote extensive reasons to the conversion request, he expressly acknowledged that request and his analysis made plain why he rejected it: in his view, the lender was clearly entitled to judgment on a liquidated debt and the issues could be properly resolved on the application record.

The Court emphasized that the decision whether to convert an application to an action is a discretionary decision entitled to deference on appeal. Appellate intervention is warranted only where the application judge misdirected himself, reached a clearly wrong result amounting to an injustice, or gave no or insufficient weight to a relevant consideration. The governing principle is that an application should not be converted merely because there is some factual dispute. Rather, conversion is justified only where there is a justifiable reason, such as when the judge cannot fairly determine the issues on the application record. The disputed facts must be material to the issues, and even where material facts are disputed, a trial is unnecessary if the dispute can still be resolved on the paper record. Viva voce evidence is only required where credibility on material issues cannot otherwise be properly assessed.

Applying those principles, the Court agreed with the application judge that this was not a close case. The record involved a sophisticated borrower and commercial lender, both represented by counsel, dealing with a troubled development project and documented loan arrangements. There was no dispute that the funds had been advanced, that the loan had not been repaid, and that defaults had occurred. The key issue raised by the appellants was whether a further oral agreement had been reached on March 3, 2024, to amend the loan and extend the maturity date. The application judge was entitled to conclude, based on the documentary record, that no such agreement had been reached and that the post-meeting communications instead reflected continuing, inconclusive negotiations.

The Court placed particular emphasis on the documentary record. It accepted the application judge’s finding that the correspondence and conduct of the parties after March 3, 2024, were inconsistent with any completed agreement and instead demonstrated ongoing back-and-forth over proposed terms. The application judge found that proposals continued to be negotiated and revised through April 2024, with no definitive consensus either before or after V2 registered its mortgage on title on April 15, 2024. This finding was well supported by the evidence. For example, on April 18, 2024—about six weeks after the alleged oral agreement—SM sent HW a proposed second amending agreement for consideration and HW responded that it was “totally unacceptable.” The very fact that a draft extension agreement was still being proposed at that stage strongly undermined the assertion that a binding oral agreement had already been concluded on March 3.

The Court also relied on SM’s own contemporaneous communications. In an email of March 15, 2024, roughly two weeks after the meeting, SM wrote that he “would like to extend [the] loan to January 1, 2025”, to align with anticipated project milestones. The Court agreed with the application judge that this was inconsistent with the position that the extension had already been agreed to at the March 3 meeting. More broadly, the absence of any evidence that SM asserted, in the period immediately after the meeting, that a binding deal had already been struck supported the inference that the parties had not yet come to terms.

The Court further held that the appellants’ reliance on the alleged intercreditor arrangement with Trez did not create a triable issue requiring conversion to an action. By its nature, any such intercreditor agreement would have required the participation and consent of both V2 and Trez. Yet, the appellants led no evidence from Trez about any commitment to such an arrangement, even though they could have done so. In any event, the Court held that even if there had been movement toward an intercreditor agreement between V2 and Trez, that would not resolve the fundamental issue before the court: whether SM and HW themselves had reached a binding agreement to extend the loan maturity date. The absence of evidence from Trez therefore reinforced, rather than undermined, the conclusion that no trial was needed.

The Court rejected the submission that the application judge improperly engaged in credibility findings on a paper record. A fair reading of the reasons showed that he did not need to resort to credibility assessments to decide the matter. His conclusion rested on the objective documentary evidence, which clearly showed that negotiations were ongoing and incomplete. The Court specifically endorsed his reliance on the record of texts, emails and draft documents, and held that these materials were sufficient to resolve the issue without viva voce evidence. Even to the extent credibility might have been engaged, the Court noted that credibility issues do not invariably require oral testimony. Here, the record already contained the evidence of the only two witnesses whose credibility could matter—SM and HW. The appellants had the opportunity to cross-examine HW and did so, yet they did not cross-examine him on his evidence that no agreement had been reached on March 3, 2024. That significantly weakened their complaint that the matter could not fairly be decided on the written record.

The Court also noted several procedural points that undercut the appellants’ position. They did not seek, in the alternative, a trial of an issue before the application judge. They did not seek leave to call oral evidence at the application hearing. On appeal, they were unable to identify any material documents that were unavailable on the application record but should have been before the Court. They also complained that HW had contemporaneous notes of the March 3 meeting that were never produced, but they had not sought their production by undertaking during cross-examination or otherwise pursued the matter when it was open to them to do so. These omissions supported the conclusion that the appellants had already had a fair opportunity to build the record they said was lacking.

The Court additionally addressed the appellants’ argument concerning the scope of the application judge’s fact-finding powers under r. 14. The appellants contended that he either improperly exercised enhanced fact-finding powers akin to those available on summary judgment under r. 20, or, alternatively, failed to expressly consider whether to do so once contradictions in the evidence had been identified. The Court declined to engage that broader doctrinal question. It held that it was unnecessary to decide whether a judge hearing an application has fact-finding powers analogous to those of a summary judgment motion judge, because the application judge in this case did not rely on any such enhanced powers. He found there were no material facts in dispute requiring a trial, and that finding was amply supported by the documentary record. Since he did not need expanded fact-finding authority to dispose of the case, any debate about the outer limits of fact-finding under r. 14 was left for another day.

Finally, the Court underscored the narrowness of the relief sought below. The application was simply for judgment on the unpaid loan. There was no dispute that the money had been advanced and not repaid. Given the admitted debt, the loan documents authorizing registration of the mortgage upon default, and the absence of any binding amending agreement, the Court agreed there was no need for discoveries, a trial or conversion of the proceeding to an action. Rule 38.10 gave the application judge the power to direct that the whole application or any issue proceed to trial if necessary, but he found that unnecessary, and that determination disclosed no reviewable error.

2. No.

The Court held that equitable set-off could not arise because it depended on the existence of a further amending agreement, which the application judge found had not been reached. In any event, such claim would belong to a corporate entity, not SM personally, and therefore could not ground a viable defence in this proceeding.

R.J.F. v. L.L.S.P., 2026 ONCA 277

[Zarnett, Monahan and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

L.L.S.P. and M.P.S., acting in person

J.L. King and J. Buchan, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Fraud, Conversion, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Knowing Assistance of Breach of Trust, Knowing Receipt of Trust Property, Punitive Damages, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Fact-Finding Powers, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 20.04(2)(b), 20.04(2.1), 20.04 (2.2), 20.04 (3), 20.04 (5), Dealer Financial Corporation v. Toronto Fine Cars and Leasing Inc., 2023 ONCA 256, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18, Christine DeJong Medicine Professional Corp. v. DBDC Spadina Ltd., 2019 SCC 30,  DBDC Spadina Ltd. v. Walton, 2018 ONCA 60, Caja Paraguaya de Jubilaciones y Pensiones del Personal de Itaipu Binacional v. Garcia, 2020 ONCA 412

facts:

Between October 2022 and January 2025, the appellant, L.L.S.P. (“L.L.S.P.”), served as office manager of Capital Canada Limited (“Capital Canada”), an investment firm owned and operated by the respondent, R.J.F. (“R.J.F.”). During that time, in addition to her salary from Capital Canada, significant amounts were transferred from R.J.F.’s personal accounts to L.L.S.P.

R.J.F. denied authorizing any transfers. The respondents alleged L.L.S.P. misused her access to R.J.F.’s banking codes, cheques and electronic signature to misappropriate funds. They sued L.L.S.P. for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and conversion. They sued her husband, the appellant, M.P.S. for knowing assistance in L.L.S.P.’s fraud or knowing receipt of property obtained through her breaches of duty.

Investigations facilitated by Mareva and Norwich orders revealed that the transfers included 31 e-transfer payments from R.J.F.’s bank account to L.L.S.P.’s bank account. L.L.S.P. made all transfers using R.J.F.’s bank access code. There were also 17 cheques totalling $315,886.67 drawn on R.J.F.’s account and payable to L.L.S.P. Additionally, payments from R.J.F.’s account to L.L.S.P.’s Platinum Amex Card totalled $563,232.70 for luxury goods, cosmetic medical treatments, business class flights and an $18,000 tattoo.

In response, L.L.S.P. alleged that R.J.F. expressly authorized the transfers. M.P.S. denied any participation in or knowledge of the transfers or knowingly receiving any of the funds. The parties agreed to convert motions for directions under existing Mareva and Norwich orders into a summary judgment motion under r. 20.04(2)(b). The respondents sought judgment on their claims and the appellants sought dismissal of the action.

The Motion Judge’s Decision

The motion judge found that L.L.S.P., as a fiduciary with access to R.J.F.’s personal accounts, bore the onus of showing R.J.F. authorized the transfers. He accepted R.J.F.’s evidence that he did not authorize the transfers. This was supported by the lack of motive and the fact that R.J.F. had not noticed the transfers until a new assistant flagged a suspicious transaction.

The motion judge found L.L.S.P.’s evidence overall to be “spurious” and rejected her explanations for each category of transfers. Her claim that the e-transfers were bonuses was untenable. She tried to mask some transfers by making R.J.F.’s wife the apparent recipient. There was no evidence justifying $305,000 in additional income, about three times her annual pre-tax salary. She did not report any of these amounts for tax purposes. Her assertion that the cheques were gifts or third-party payments on R.J.F.’s behalf was unsupported, especially given the lack of any close personal relationship between them. L.L.S.P. claimed a $100,000 cheque was a gift to help buy a home, yet she and her husband were not looking for one at the time. Regarding the Amex charges, L.L.S.P. said they were R.J.F.’s expenses but could not identify any purchases made on his behalf.

On L.L.S.P.’s evidence alone, the motion judge found no reason to conclude that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial. He concluded the only reasonable inference was that L.L.S.P. drew the funds for her own benefit. Exercising his enhanced fact-finding powers under r. 20.04(2.1), he reached the same conclusion on credibility and the evidence as a whole. He awarded damages for fraud and conversion against L.L.S.P. totalling $1,189,119.37, and punitive damages of $100,000.

Regarding M.P.S., although the respondents conceded there was no evidence he participated in the transfers, the motion judge found he must have known L.L.S.P. had funds beyond her salary. This was based on his knowledge of the tattoo and its cost, as well as the fact that L.L.S.P. paid their rent. The motion judge awarded damages against M.P.S. to be confirmed after a reference to trace misappropriated funds, without quantifying the benefit or identifying the exact property M.P.S. received.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in applying summary judgment and punitive damages?

2. Did the motion judge err by not dismissing the knowing assistance claim, finding liability on the knowing receipt claim, and directing a reference instead of the entire knowing receipt claim to trial?

holding:

Appeals allowed in part.

reasoning:

1. No. 

The Court found that the motion judge did not err. The motion judge’s initial conclusion was “problematic” because it required rejecting the credibility of L.L.S.P.’s evidence and accepting R.J.F.’s to find liability. However, this did not matter because the motion judge also considered, alternatively, the result of weighing the evidence, evaluating credibility, and drawing reasonable inferences under r. 20.04(2.1), reaching the same conclusion. The Court found no reversible error in his use of those enhanced powers or in his decision not to order a mini-trial under r. 20.04(2.2). As for the conclusion that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, the Court found no error warranting appellate interference. The motion judge analyzed each group of transactions, applied the correct legal framework and explained his findings by relating the framework to the evidence and arguments. It was unnecessary to explain his conclusions on a transfer-by-transfer basis. The parties’ competing positions made it appropriate to group the transfers for analysis. The Court rejected L.L.S.P.’s submission that an issue of credibility requiring a trial arose simply because she claimed the transfers were authorized. R.J.F. claimed they were not. This was the type of case where the motion judge could make essential evidentiary determinations using the fact-finding powers available on a motion for summary judgment.

The Court acknowledged that the motion judge used language that was “sharply critical—even dismissive” of the veracity of L.L.S.P.’s explanations and could have been more temperate. Nevertheless, the Court was not persuaded that his language showed any prejudgment of the issues or a reasonable apprehension of bias, holding that sharp language alone is not a reversible error. The Court noted that where there is no extricable error of law, a motion judge’s exercise of powers on a summary judgment motion attracts deference on appeal.

With respect to punitive damages, the Court found no reversible error in awarding them to R.J.F. It held that punitive damages may be imposed where there is high-handed conduct departing from ordinary standards of decent behaviour: Whiten at para. 36. The motion judge found L.L.S.P.’s conduct fit this description. The quantum awarded was reasonably proportionate to the harm caused, the degree of misconduct and other relevant factors: Whiten at para. 74. However, including Capital Canada as a joint recipient of the punitive damages was an error of law and was set aside. Naming Capital Canada as an additional payee lacked a rational connection to the purpose of the damages. The motion judge’s goal of estopping L.L.S.P. from asserting a constructive dismissal claim was outside the purpose of a punitive damages award.

2. Yes.

The Court held that the motion judge erred in three respects: he failed to dismiss the knowing assistance claim, he found liability on the knowing receipt claim without sufficient evidence and he directed a reference instead of directing the entire knowing receipt claim to trial.

The Court noted that the tort of knowing assistance imposes liability on a stranger to a fiduciary relationship who participates in a fiduciary’s breach of trust. Participation or assistance by the stranger in the fiduciary’s fraudulent or dishonest conduct is a prerequisite to liability: Christine DeJong Medicine Professional Corp at para. 1. The motion judge noted the respondents’ concession that there was no evidence M.P.S. participated in the frauds but failed to give effect to it. The motion judge should have dismissed the claim for knowing assistance against M.P.S., as there was no evidence of an essential element of that tort.

The Court applied the test set out by Paciocco J.A. in Caja Paraguaya de Jubilaciones at para. 57, which requires that the stranger receive trust property for their own benefit with actual or constructive knowledge that the trust property is being misapplied. The Court emphasized the strict tracing requirement in Quantum at para. 54. Although the motion judge found that M.P.S. had to have known L.L.S.P. had a source of funds beyond her salary, pointing only to M.P.S.’s knowledge of the tattoo and its cost and L.L.S.P. paying their rent, he appeared to recognize that these findings did not equal a finding that M.P.S. had taken title to, possession of, or control of trust property sufficient to meet the strict tracing requirement. This was apparent from his direction of a reference to address that requirement.

The evidence before the motion judge did not justify summary judgment holding M.P.S. liable for knowing receipt. There was a genuine issue, which the motion judge acknowledged by ordering a reference, that could not be decided on summary judgment: whether M.P.S. knowingly received any trust property. This issue concerned liability and quantum and could not be assigned to a reference. Since actual receipt of trust property by M.P.S. was a precondition to liability, neither r. 20.04(3) nor (5) authorized a reference on that issue. The motion judge should have directed the issue to trial.

Nigro v. Luciano, 2026 ONCA 283

[Gillese, Madsen and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Katz, for the appellant

E. Lewin, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Occupier’s Liability, Strict Liability, Joint Liability, Statutory Interpretation, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Standard of Review, Correctness, Dog Owners’ Liability Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. D.16, Occupiers’ Liability Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.2, Wilk v. Arbour, 2017 ONCA 21

facts:

This appeal addressed the definition of “owner” in the Dog Owner’s Liability Act (the “DOLA”). In November 2021, the respondents hired the appellant as a part-time dog walker for their two dogs, FG, a large male Boxer, and B. The appellant attended at the respondents’ home around three times weekly to walk and play with the dogs. In February 2022, when FG was about five years old, he developed an infected paw. The veterinarian advised that FG’s paw should not come in contact with mud or anything that could cause infection and thus recommended that FG wear rubber booties when walking in wet areas.

In mid-March of 2022, the respondent AL informed the appellant that FG’s toenails had been removed and that booties would be purchased for him, and asked that the appellant only walk FG on snow, avoiding mud. The appellant confirmed that she would put booties on FG as needed. On March 24, 2022, the appellant was alone in the respondents’ home attending to the dogs. FG had refused to go out in the front yard, so later that morning the appellant tried to take FG to the backyard, which had both snow and mud. The appellant decided to put FG in booties before taking him out. This was the first time she had attempted to dress him in booties. As the appellant approached FG holding the booties, FG lunged, bit into her left arm and began shaking it. FG continued to attack after the appellant extricated her arm. The appellant sustained bite injuries to her abdomen, left upper thigh, and both arms. FG had no prior history of aggressive behaviour.

The appellant subsequently sued the respondents, claiming damages totalling $1 million. On the respondents’ summary judgment motion, the motion judge dismissed the claim, holding that the appellant was an “owner” as defined in the DOLA and interpreted in Wilk. As an owner, the appellant was jointly and severally liable for injuries caused by FG and could not recover damages against the other owners, the respondents. The motion judge considered and rejected the appellant’s argument that as a hired dog walker she was merely carrying out directions set by the respondents who were the “true” owners.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in holding that the appellant dog walker was an “owner” under the DOLA?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No. The Court reviewed the motion judge’s decision on a correctness standard, since it involved statutory interpretation, which is a question of law. Section 1(1) of the DOLA defines “owner” when used in relation to a dog as including “a person who possesses or harbours the dog…”, while ss. 2 and 3 confirm that the owner of a dog is liable for damages resulting from that dog’s attack, and multiple owners are jointly and severally liable. Notably, liability is strict and does not depend upon knowledge of the dog’s aggressive tendencies or any negligence by the owner, though the plaintiff’s contributory negligence will reduce damages awarded. In Wilk, the court interpreted “owner” in the DOLA to include a person who is in physical possession and control over a dog immediately before it attacks another person or animal. The Court affirmed this interpretation, noting that the legislature chose to impose liability on individuals who are best placed to control the dog and prevent damage to others.

Both the appellant’s attempts to distinguish Wilk were rejected. First, the appellant submitted that because the attack occurred in the respondents’ home, the respondents as both homeowners and DOLA owners should be liable for FG’s actions. The Court deemed this a distinction without a difference, since liability is not tied to the location of the incident. The DOLA at s. 3(1) explicitly ousts application of the Occupier’s Liability Act where a dog bite occurs on a homeowner’s premises. This reflects the aforementioned policy choice to hold liable for dog attacks those best able to prevent them, wherever they occur. Regarding the appellant’s other submission that she was not the true owner because she was following the respondents’ directions to place booties on FG, the Court held this fact had no legal significance. Dog owners commonly give instructions to people hired to care for their dogs. The person possessing the dog must decide how such instructions should be carried out. Moreover, per Wilk, the DOLA does not restrict liability to those with the greatest authority over the dog, meaning ownership can capture people who possess and harbour the dog to varying extents.

Ultimately, there was no doubt that the appellant was a DOLA owner of FG at the critical time. She was the only human at home with the dogs, was employed to care for them and attended the house regularly to do so. The appellant had been in possession of the dogs on prior occasions and was in possession of them at the time of the attack. Although the appellant attempted to raise various hypothetical scenarios, the Court noted that determining whether a person is an owner under the DOLA is highly contextual, making it unhelpful to speculate about how the statute applies in imaginary cases.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Wright v. Wright, 2026 ONCA 268

[Thorburn, Coroza and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Vries and E. Yu, for the appellants/respondents by way of cross-appeal

D. Enright, for the respondent/appellant by way of cross-appeal

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Options to Purchase, Enforceability, Defences, Undue Influence, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Unconscionability, Costs

Rabbani v. Furney, 2026 ONCA 271

[Paciocco, Copeland and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

AF and MF, acting in person

L. Vittas and D. Tepelenas, for the respondent

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Orders, Final or Interlocutory, Security for Costs, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43, s. 19(1)(b), Nazarinia Holdings Inc. v. 2049080 Ontario Inc., 2012 ONCA 652, Leslie v. Encanto Potash Trading Corporation, 2021 ONCA 464, Kapital Produce Limited v. Farm Credit Canada, 2026 ONCA 114, Paulpillai Estate v. Yusuf, 2020 ONCA 655, Drywall Acoustic Lathing Insulation Local 675 Pension Fund v. SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., 2020 ONCA 375, J.N. v. Durham Regional Police Service, 2012 ONCA 428

12563789 Canada Inc. v. Tiki Tours International Corp., 2026 ONCA 269

[Huscroft, George and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J.W.L. Griffiths, for the appellants

R. Hosseini and S. Kebeich, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Beach of Fiduciary Duty, Joint Ventures, Torts, Defamation, Damages, Punitive Damages, Civil Procedure, Counterclaims, Evidence, Costs

Bank of Montreal v. Dua, 2026 ONCA 265

[Huscroft, George and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

HKD also known as HD, acting in person

NPS also known as NS, acting in person

M. Asad, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Counterclaims, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Costs

Williamson v. Brandt Tractor Inc., 2026 ONCA 272

[Huscroft, George and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

L. Sarabia, for the appellant

D. Vaughan and N. Flanagan, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Employment, Wrongful Dismissal, Damages, Defences, Just Cause, Mitigation, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Brake v. PJ-M2R Restaurant Inc., 2017 ONCA 402

Singh v. Seth, 2026 ONCA 276

[Huscroft, Copeland & Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

JJS, acting in person

A.S. Dhillon and R. Malik, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Spousal Support, Equalization of Net Family Property, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Evidence, Financial Disclosure, Procedural Fairness, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, Peerenboom v. Peerenboom, 2020 ONCA 240, Singh v. Seth, 2022 ONCA 837, Hickey v. Hickey, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.