Please find below our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of August 3 to 7, 2020.
Shergar Development Inc. v. Windsor (City) confirms the power of the then OMB to award costs against a party whose land is expropriated when that party fails to accept a reasonable settlement offer made by the expropriating authority and takes unreasonable positions.
In Walia v. 2155982 Ontario Inc., the Court upheld a motion judge’s determination that an interest clause in a mortgage was unenforceable pursuant to section 8 of the Interest Act because the interest rate increased subsequent to default under the mortgage.
Becker v. Walgate deals with the determination of a property line between waterfront properties.
Finally, in Grasshopper Solar Corporation v. Independent Electricity System Operator, a breach of contract case, the Court discusses the doctrines of estoppel by convention and promissory estoppel.
Blaney McMurtry LLP
[Rouleau, Hoy and Hourigan JJ.A.]
John Doherty, Anne Tardif, Roberto Aburto and Michelle Cicchino, for the appellant
Stephen Waqué, Gabrielle Kramer, Patrick Brode, Julie Lesage and Andrew Baker, for the respondent
Keywords: Administrative Law, Municipal Law, Land Use Planning, Expropriations, Statutory Interpretation, Civil Procedure, Costs, Offers to Settle, Expropriations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.26, ss. 25, 32, Ontario Municipal Board Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.28, s. 43, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Popack v. Lipszyc, 2016 ONCA 135, Toronto Area Transit Operating Authority v. Dell Holdings Ltd,  1 S.C.R. 32, Re Rotenberg et al. and Borough of York (No. 2) , 1976 CanLII 735 (ON CA),
This case has a long and tortuous history spanning 22 years, and involves the expropriation by respondent of the “Subject Lands” along the Detroit River in Windsor owned by the appellant.
On December 8, 1995, the appellant acquired the Subject Lands and another parcel of land (the “Railcut Lands”) from the Canadian Pacific Railway Company (the “CPR”) for a total consideration of $750,000. The CPR took back a mortgage in the amount of $562,500. On April 29, 1998, the respondent expropriated the Subject Lands for completion of a waterfront park. The appellant retained ownership of the Railcut Lands. On December 21, 1998, after months of delay because the appellant would not grant access to the Subject Lands, the respondent served a joint offer of compensation on the appellant and the CPR in the amount of $500,000, in accordance with s. 25(1) of the Ontario Municipal Board Act (the “Section 25 Offer”). The appellant’s then counsel advised that his client would accept the offer. When the respondent inquired as to the amount of the CPR’s security interest in order to allocate the compensation between the CPR and the appellant, the appellant refused to cooperate. It maintained that it was not required to provide an allocation of compensation between itself and the CPR. The failure of the appellant to provide this information frustrated the ability of the respondent to pay out the Section 25 Offer and resulted in the acceptance of the Section 25 Offer being effectively withdrawn.
After various intervening proceedings in both the Federal Court and the Superior Court, the appellant finally took steps to commence an expropriation arbitration on July 5, 2013, when it issued its claim for compensation, after the CPR had already issued its own claim earlier that year. The respondent later made individual offers of settlement to each of the CPR and the appellant. The CPR accepted the offer of $400,000 made to it. In exchange, the respondent obtained an assignment of all of the CPR’s rights to compensation as determined by the OMB. The respondent’s offer of settlement to the appellant, made on June 2, 2015, was equivalent in value to $1,208,155 in compensation for the appellant’s interest in the Subject Lands (the “2015 Offer”). The appellant did not accept the 2015 Offer.
The OMB hearing to determine compensation commenced in February 2016. The appellant called two appraisers to provide expert evidence of market value who valued the Subject Lands at $3,937,000 and $5,150,000 respectively. In its May 25, 2016 decision, the OMB rejected the evidence of the appellant’s appraisers, and stated it was concerned that neither appraiser had “fulfilled their duty to provide the Board with opinion evidence that [was] fair, objective and non-partisan,” and that one of the opinions was “inadequate, inappropriate and unreasonable” and his conclusion “unreliable”.
The OMB found that the Subject Lands’ value was $710,000, consistent with the respondent’s appraisal evidence. The OMB concluded that the amount owed to the CPR for its mortgage interest in the Subject Lands was $443,167 and that the appellant’s residual interest in the compensation was $266,832.
The OMB awarded the appellant its costs of the proceeding. The respondent successfully sought a rehearing before the OMB pursuant to s. 43 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act, solely on the issues of interest and costs. In its decision on the rehearing (the “Rehearing Decision”), the OMB concluded that the 2015 Offer constituted “the amount offered by the statutory authority” and granted costs in favour of the respondent following the date of the 2015 Offer.
The appellant appealed the Rehearing Decision to the Divisional Court. The Divisional Court found the OMB’s decision to be reasonable, relying on the fact that s. 32 also applies to “no land taken” (injurious affection) claims, for which the statutory authority is not required to serve an s. 25 offer. The Divisional Court also concluded that the OMB acted reasonably in awarding costs against an expropriated party. The court held that the purpose of the discretion afforded to the OMB under s. 32 is to encourage an expeditious settlement of claims on an equitable basis.
1. Did the Divisional Court err in deciding that the reasonableness standard of review applies?
2. Did the Divisional Court err in upholding the following decisions by the OMB:
a. The “amount offered by the statutory authority” in s. 32 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act refers to any offer made by the respondent, not just an offer made pursuant to s. 25; and
b. The 2015 Offer was not dealt with in the Ontario Municipal Board Act, and regard can, therefore, be had to Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in exercising the Board’s discretion under s. 32(2), and costs can be awarded against the appellant.
1. No. The proper standard of review with respect to the interpretation of the Ontario Municipal Board Act was correctness. However, the exercise of discretion to award costs is afforded considerable deference, and is not subject to a standard of review of correctness.
2. a. No. The Court disagreed with the appellant’s interpretation that s. 32 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act only applies to offers made by a statutory authority under s. 25 of that Act. The OMB therefore was not restricted to only considering the Section 25 Offer, and not the 2015 Offer in deciding costs. The wording used by the legislature in s. 25 and in s. 32 does not support the interpretation submitted by the appellant. That interpretation was also contrary to the process prescribed by the Act.
It is an extraordinary thing for the state to seize an innocent party’s property. The Act must be interpreted so that the party whose property is being expropriated is treated fairly and its claim dealt with expeditiously, either through an agreement between the parties or as the result of an arbitration proceeding. A claimant receives all of its reasonable costs even if awarded as little as 85% of what the statutory authority offered. To potentially lose this entitlement, a claimant must reject an offer that significantly exceeded the ultimate award. Even in that scenario, costs lie at the discretion of the OMB.
An innocent party whose property is taken must be fully compensated, and it will not generally have to bear its costs for reasonably disagreeing with the amount offered for that taking, even where the offer exceeds the ultimate award by a considerable margin. But the statutory protection provided by the Act is not a blank cheque that permits a claimant to act unreasonably. At the very least, there must be a potential for adverse cost consequences where the claimant forces a wholly unnecessary proceeding or otherwise acts unreasonably.
In short, the objective of full and fair compensation cannot be divorced from the objective of the efficient resolution of claims. The appellant’s interpretation would permit the prospect of an unreasonable claimant delaying proceedings, running up legal costs, and wasting the OMB’s resources, all the while safe in the knowledge that unreasonable refusals of subsequent offers cannot adversely affect its entitlement to legal costs.
b. No. The OMB did not apply Rule 49. If it had, then the appellant would have only been entitled to costs on a partial indemnity scale to the date of the 2015 Offer, and thereafter the respondent would receive its partial indemnity scale costs. Instead, the OMB concluded that the appellant would receive its solicitor-client costs up to the date of the 2015 Offer and that the respondent would receive its partial indemnity costs after that. What the OMB did, quite appropriately, was draw upon Rule 49.10(2) to inform its analysis regarding the criteria for a proper offer, concluding that it must be certain, understandable, and open at the commencement of the hearing. It correctly found that the 2015 Offer met these criteria. The OMB then made an order in keeping with the jurisprudence under the Act, awarding the applicant its solicitor-client costs up to the time of the 2015 Offer. The awarding of costs against a claimant in an expropriation proceeding was not a new and undesirable precedent. Costs orders in favour of statutory authorities have been contemplated for decades.
This case served as an example of why the OMB must retain discretion to award costs against a claimant. It was undeniable that the appellant frustrated and delayed the determination of the issue of the appropriate compensation to be awarded for the expropriation of the Subject Lands. In addition, the appellant inexplicably refused an offer that was equivalent in value to $1,208,155, when its interest was limited to $266,832. This conduct was worthy of censure. The appellant’s actions resulted in significant delay and obfuscation, wasting the OMB’s valuable time. Suggesting that the OMB cannot control its processes by awarding costs against a claimant in these circumstances would be contrary to the Act’s policy objective of encouraging early settlement of claims on an equitable basis.
[Huscroft, Zarnett and Coroza JJ.A.]
Amandeep Sidhu and Shaun Singh, for the appellant
Gregory Weedon and Melissa Truong, for the respondents
Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Mortgages, Interest, Legality, Corporations, Indoor Management Rule, Interest Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-15, s. 8, Krayzel Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co. , 2016 SCC 18, P.A.R.C.E.L. Inc. v. Acquaviva, 2015 ONCA 331, Mastercraft Properties Ltd. v. El Ef Investments Inc. (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 519 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused,  S.C.C.A. No. 463
The appellant gave the corporate respondent a mortgage commitment for a four-month term with an interest rate of 12 percent. However, the second mortgage commitment also contained a condition that if the mortgage matured and was not paid, or there was a default of any payment, the interest rate would increase to 21 percent. After the mortgage went into default, the appellant sued to enforce the mortgage.
- Did the motion judge err in determining that the condition of the mortgage increasing the rate of interest from 12% to 21% upon a default was invalid because it violated s. 8 of the Interest Act?
- Did the motion judge err in finding that the renewal agreement was not valid because of the absence of the signature of the corporate respondent’s principal?
1. No. The motion judge concluded that the condition in the commitment that increased the rate of interest from 12 percent to 21 percent offended s. 8 of the Interest Act because it did not increase the rate of interest solely because of the passage of time. To the contrary, she held that once a mortgage has matured, and it has not been repaid on the date of maturity, the balance becomes outstanding and is in arrears. Therefore, the condition in this case increased the rate because of default. The Court agreed with the motion judge.
Section 8 creates an exception to the rule that lenders and borrowers are free to negotiate and agree on any rate of interest on a loan. The purpose of s. 8 is to prohibit lenders from levying fines, penalties, or rates of interest on any arrears of principal or interest that are secured by mortgage on real property. The prohibited effect is increasing the charge on arrears beyond the rate of interest payable on principal money not in arrears.
In assessing whether a term violates s. 8, what counts is how the impugned term operates, and the consequences it produces, irrespective of the label used to describe the term. If the effect of a term is to impose a higher rate on arrears than on money not in arrears, then s. 8 is offended. On the other hand, an interest rate increase triggered by the mere passage of time (and not by default) does not offend s. 8.
On a plain reading of the condition in this case, there was no doubt that the increase from 12 percent to 21 percent was triggered as a result of the nonpayment of the mortgage on the expiry of its term, which is a default.
2. No. The motion judge held that the indoor management rule did not apply in the circumstances of this case based on her assessment of the “factual constellation”. The Court saw no basis to disturb her careful finding of fact that the appellant knew or ought to have known that a signature of the corporate respondent’s principal was required to give effect to the renewal agreement and that, therefore, the indoor management rule did not apply.
[Rouleau, Hoy and Hourigan JJ.A.]
Izaak de Rijcke and Robert J. Fenn, for the appellant
Jeffrey D. Ayotte and Michael W. Gunsolus, for the respondents
Keywords: Real Property, Boundaries, Riparian Rights, Attorney General of Southern Nigeria v. John Holt & Co. (Liverpool) Ltd,  AC 599, Attorney General of British Columbia v. Neilson,  S.C.R. 819
This appeal arises out of a dispute between neighbours at Jack Lake over where the lot line between their properties ends. Jack Lake is a reservoir lake within the Trent-Severn Waterway. The lot line between the two properties – the most westerly parcel of Lot 41 and the most easterly parcel of Lot 42 – skews the water’s edge and strikes the lake at an oblique angle. At issue was what water level was to be used in determining the termination point of the lot line. Approximately 100 feet of valuable water frontage was at issue. In particular, the issues for determination by the trial judge were:
a) whether the lot line between Lots 41 and 42 ends where it intersects with the “High Water Mark” shown in Registered Plan 33 which created the lots in 1958, which the trial judge found was the water’s edge of Jack Lake at the Normal Controlled High Water Level (NCHWL), a contour elevation of 106.33 feet (assumed datum); or
b) whether, as the appellant contended, the terminus of the lot line began with reference to the water’s edge at the time of the 1902 Crown patent of lands, of which the disputed lands were a part.
- Did the trial judge err in concluding that it is unambiguous that the term “High Water Mark” in Plan 33 means the NCHWL? If so, does the term “High Water Mark” in Plan 33 create a latent ambiguity?
- If the term “High Water Mark” in Plan 33 creates a latent ambiguity, does the trial judge’s finding that the intent of JLL was to set the NCHWL as the water boundary constitute a reviewable error?
- If the trial judge erred in finding that the intent of JLL was to set the NCHWL as the water boundary, what is the boundary of Lots 41 and 42, and thus, the terminus of the lot line between them?
- What is the consequence of the trial judge’s alternative finding that the respondents have a riparian right of access along the lot line, beyond the intersection point with the NCHWL?
1. Yes. The trial judge’s conclusion that the term “High Water Mark” in Plan 33 is unambiguous and means the NCHWL, which is 106.33 feet (a.d.), was clearly wrong. Plan 33 does not define what is meant by “High Water Mark”. This conclusion necessarily relied on extrinsic evidence, presumably the evidence of Mr. O and the plans of subdivision prepared decades after Plan 33, which describe the water boundary for Lot 42 as the “Normal Controlled High Water Level Contour of Elevation 106.33 (feet) Also Limit of Lot 42 Reg’d Plan No 33”.
2. Yes. The trial judge’s conclusion that JLL intended to set the NCHWL as the water boundary in Plan 33 cannot stand. The trial judge’s statement that there was no admissible evidence permitting the court to determine whether JLL conveyed all or retained some of their land was incorrect. There was evidence based on which the trial judge could have made this determination, on a balance of probabilities. Essentially, the trial judge said that because he could not determine the water boundary of JLL’s land, he did not know whether JLL retained any land following its transfer. And, since he did not make that determination, there was nothing inconsistent with his conclusion that JLL intended to select the NCHWL as the water boundary in Plan 33. In effect, JLL might have conveyed all that it owned and, in any event, it conveyed sufficient title to permit the owners to construct the boathouses and slips referred to in the transfer documents.
However, on this record, the only reasonable inference was that JLL intended to transfer the full extent of the title that it had, whatever that title might be. The parties’ agreed statement of facts indicated, and the trial judge found, that JLL ceased operations after it transferred the property in 1974. It would not have made commercial sense for JLL to retain any land included in the Crown patent that was below the NCHWL – what the parties refer to as “drowned land”.
3. The determination of the boundary of Lots 41 and 42, and thus, the terminus of the lot line between them, should be returned to the trial court for determination. The effect of erosion or accretion on the water boundary since the time of the Crown patent, if any, should also be returned to the trial court. The determination of the water’s edge of Jack Lake, at the time of Crown patent, and the effects of erosion or accretion on that boundary, if any, will determine the terminus of the lot line between Lots 41 and 42.
4. The trial judge’s conclusion that the respondents had a riparian right of access along the line beyond the intersection point with the NCHWL cannot stand. The trial judge gave no reasons for his conclusion, nor did he explain what the riparian right of access he provided for was to consist of. It was unclear whether the respondents asserted below that they had a riparian right of access that permitted them to build and maintain a dock on the disputed lands. It is undisputed that the respondents already have access to Jack Lake. The respondents have a lakeside dock at another point on their waterfront. The dispute between the parties was triggered when they wished to construct a second dock on the disputed lands.
[Feldman, Lauwers and Huscroft JJ.A.]
Sarit E. Batner and Brandon Kain, for the appellants
Alan Mark and Melanie Ouanounou, for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Termination, Damages, Defences, Estoppel by Convention, Promissory Estoppel, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Standard of Review, Ryan v. Moore, 2005 SCC 38, Ledcor Construction Ltd. v. Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co. , 2016 SCC 37, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp. , 2014 SCC 53, Di Millo v. 2099232 Ontario Inc. , 2018 ONCA 1051, leave to appeal refused,  S.C.C.A. No. 55, Ajayi v. R.T. Briscoe (Nig) Ltd. ,  1 W.L.R. 1326 (P.C. (Nigeria)), Rossi v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,  O.J. No. 180 (C.A.), Loyola High School v. Quebec (A.G.) , 2015 SCC 12, Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co. , 2002 SCC 18, Cavendish Square Holdings BV v. Makdessi,  A.C. 1172 (U.K.S.C.), Central London Property Trust v. High Trees House,  K.B. 130, Soboczynski v. Beauchamp, 2015 ONCA 282
These companion appeals concerned the respondent Independent Electricity System Operator’s decision to terminate contracts with the appellants, renewable energy companies, as a result of their failure to achieve commercial operation of solar power facilities they were building by the “Milestone Date for Commercial Operation” set out in their contracts. The failure of the appellants to achieve commercial operation by the Milestone Date is not in dispute. What was in dispute is whether the respondent had the right to terminate the contracts as a result, without paying damages.
- Did the application judge err in concluding that the contracts could be terminated by the respondent if the appellants failed to achieve commercial operation by the Milestone Date?
- Did the application judge err in finding that the respondent was not estopped from terminating the contracts?
1. No. The application judge made no errors in interpreting the contract. His analysis was thorough and complete and there was little that could usefully be added.
The standard of review of the application judge’s contractual interpretation was correctness because the contracts at issue were standard form contracts and a decision interpreting them had precedential value.
The respondent was entitled to terminate the FIT Contracts pursuant to s. 9.2 as a result of the appellants’ failure to achieve commercial operation by the Milestone Date. The fatal flaw in the appellants’ interpretation of the contract lay in its failure to give effect to a key provision in the contract, s. 2.5, which contained a “time is of the essence” clause. Such a clause required strict compliance with the Milestone Date.
2. No. The respondent was not estopped from terminating the contract under s. 9.2. Neither estoppel by convention nor promissory estoppel applied in this case.
The application of the estoppel doctrine was a mixed question of fact and law that was reviewable on a standard of palpable and overriding error, subject to any extricable legal errors, which are reviewable on a correctness basis.
Estoppel by Convention
The reiterated an important concern. Although the doctrine of estoppel cannot vary the terms of a contract, it may operate to prevent a party from relying on the terms of the contract to the extent necessary to protect the reasonable reliance of the other party. Thus, the doctrine has the potential to undermine the certainty of contract and must be applied with care, especially in the context of commercial relationships between sophisticated parties represented by counsel.
Estoppel by convention is a relatively rare form of estoppel that may arise when both parties to a contract act based on a shared assumption concerning circumstances relevant to their contract. If it would be unfair to allow a party to resile from the assumption, the doctrine operates to provide a remedy for detrimental reliance on the assumption by the other party. In effect, the estoppel operates to circumscribe the factual context in which the contract exists, thus affecting the obligations that the contract contains. Estoppel by convention requires a manifest representation of a shared assumption, which may arise out of a statement or conduct but may also arise from silence. Regardless of how an assumption arises, it must be clear and it must be shared. There is no room for doubt about the nature of an assumption that gives rise to the estoppel. The parties must be of a like mind at the material time, and this will not be so if the nature of the assumption is in doubt. This requirement is reflected in the purpose of the doctrine. Estoppel exists to protect reasonable reliance: it must be reasonable to adopt a particular assumption and reasonable to act in reliance on it.
The appellants argued that two of the three elements of estoppel by convention were satisfied in this case and that the application judge found that only “the remaining element” was not. This submission put the cart before the horse. A shared assumption is not simply a remaining element; it is the thing that gives rise to the need for equitable relief. Without a shared assumption there can be no reliance and no detriment, and hence no need for equitable relief. In the absence of a shared assumption, the argument for estoppel by convention collapses.
A shared assumption giving rise to estoppel by convention may concern fact or law, and may be based on a mistake. But whatever the assumption concerns, it typically involves existing as opposed to future circumstances. The assumption asserted by the appellants in this case was unusual in that it included elements of both past practice as well as existing and future circumstances. Moreover, the assumption arose out of dealings not between the appellants and the respondent, but between the respondent and third parties. The appellants argued before the application judge that the parties assumed that the respondent would continue to follow its existing policy of not terminating FIT Contracts as a result of a supplier’s failure to meet the Milestone Date. The application judge found that this was not an assumption shared by the respondent. This was the judge’s call to make, and the Court saw no basis to interfere with it on appeal. The application judge’s conclusion was amply supported by the record.
Promissory estoppel typically involves a promise by one party not to rely on its strict contractual rights. Where such a promise has been made with an intention that the other party will rely on it, and that party relies on the promise to his or her detriment, the party who made the promise is estopped from acting inconsistently with it. As with a shared assumption, although the promise does not vary the terms of the contract, the party who made the promise may be precluded from resiling from it to the extent necessary to protect the position of the party who has relied on the promise to his or her detriment.
The classic case is Central London Property Trust v. High Trees House,  K.B. 130. In that case, in the context of a 99-year lease, a landlord agreed to accept reduced rent from a tenant for an indefinite period of time as a result of reduced demand during WWII. Lord Denning held that the landlord’s dispensation came to an end when full occupancy resumed but could also have been terminated at any time by notice. That is, the landlord could require the terms of the lease to govern future payments but was estopped from recovering past rent he had promised to discount.
In the absence of a shared assumption, was the respondent nevertheless estopped from relying on the strict terms of the FIT Contracts on the basis of promissory estoppel – that is, on the basis that the respondent promised that it would not enforce the contractual terms that permitted it to terminate the contracts? In the Court’s view, just as there was no shared assumption capable of supporting estoppel by convention, there was also no promise capable of supporting a claim of promissory estoppel.
The respondent’s past practice with other suppliers could not be taken to be a promise made to the appellants. Thus, the claim failed whether it was styled as estoppel by convention or promissory estoppel.
In summary, the appellants may well have assumed that time limits they contracted to meet did not really matter. But the respondent did not share that assumption, nor did it promise that it would not enforce those time limits. In these circumstances, the problem of detrimental reliance did not arise, as there was neither a shared assumption nor a promise on which the appellants could have relied on to their detriment. The application judge’s statement that the respondent’s break with its past practice “does seem unfair” was inappropriate. It is not the role of the judge to pronounce on the fairness of a contract or actions taken in accordance with it. In the absence of a finding that there was a shared assumption or a promise that was reasonably relied upon by the appellants, the question of fairness simply does not arise. The appellants chose to enter a contract with the respondent that made time of the essence. There was no basis for the Court not to give effect to their choice and the consequence it entailed: the respondent’s right to terminate the contracts under s. 9.2.
SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS
[Rouleau, van Rensburg and Roberts JJ.A.]
Gary S. Joseph and Stephen Kirby, for the appellant
Toni E. Wharton, for the respondent
Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Costs, Proportionality and Reasonableness, Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 391 (C.A.)
[Lauwers, Hourigan and Thorburn JJ.A.]
Linda Rothstein, Dan Rosenbluth, Ilana Zylberman Dembo, Sheila Gibb and Stephanie Romano, for the appellant
Avra Rosen and Kelly Eckert, for the respondent, AN
Bryan Smith, Lindsey Love-Forester and Cynthia Kuehl, for the respondents, MN, NN, Sonco Group Inc., The N 2011 Family Trust and The N Family Trust (2013)
Keywords: Family Law, Torts, Conspiracy, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Costs Below
[Huscroft, Zarnett and Coroza JJ.A.]
HTE, acting in person
Christopher Selby and Mark St. Cyr, for the respondents Neilas (799 College St) Inc. and Skypoint Hi-Rise Ltd.
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Settlements, Enforcement, Fresh Evidence
[Rouleau, van Rensburg and Roberts JJ.A.]
Kevin Sherkin, for the appellant
Doug Bourassa, for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Fraud, Criminal Interest Rate, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Costs, Full Indemnity, Proportionality and Reasonableness, Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 391 (C.A.)
[MacPherson, Pardu and Huscroft JJ.A.]
Donna Wowk, for the appellant
Bryan Smith, for the respondent
Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Costs
[Hoy A.C.J.O., van Rensburg and Roberts JJ.A.]
Shantona Chaudhury and Brodie Noga, for the appellants
Sarah J. Turney and Daniel T. Richer, for the respondents
Keywords: Real Property, Adverse Possession, Prescriptive Easements, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Costs
The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.