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Good afternoon.

Please find below our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for the week of November 16, 2020.

Sokoloff v Tru-Path Occupational Therapy Services Ltd was another anti-SLAPP decision, perhaps the first by the Court since the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pointes Protection..

Skof v. Bordeleau considered the jurisdiction of the Superior Court in a claim by a former police officer against his former employer, and whether that jurisdiction was ousted by the collective bargaining agreement or by the Police Services Act (no in both cases).

Other topics covered this week included family law and stay pending appeal in a mortgage enforcement case.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

2257573 Ontario Inc. v. Furney, 2020 ONCA 742

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Stay Pending Appeal, Serious Issue to be Tried, Irreparable Harm, Balance of Convenience, Mortgages, Interest, Order for Possession, Power of Sale, Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 63.01(1), Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C.46, s 347, RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, Wilfert v McCallum, 2017 ONCA 895, Starkman v Home Trust Company, 2015 ONCA 436, Circuit World Corporation v Lesperance (1997), 33 OR (3d) 674 (Ont CA), Centurion Farms Ltd v Citifinancial Canada Inc, 2013 ONCA 79, Manufacturers Life Co v Granada Investments Ltd (2001), 150 OAC 253 (Ont CA), Oak Orchard Developments Ltd v Iseman, [1987] OJ No 361 (Ont HC), Joseph E Roach, The Canadian Law of Mortgages, 3rd ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2018)

Skof v. Bordeleau, 2020 ONCA 729

Keywords: Labour Law, Collective Agreements, Regulated Professions, Police, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, Jurisdiction, Judicial Review, Remedies, Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, Damages, Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15, s. 89, Judicial Review Procedure Act, s. 8, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 21.01(3)(a), TeleZone Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 ONCA 892, aff’d 2010 SCC 62, Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929, Piko v. Hudson’s Bay Co. (1998), 167 D.L.R. (4th) 479 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 23, Regina Police Assn. Inc. v. Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioners, 2000 SCC 14

Sokoloff v Tru-Path Occupational Therapy Services Ltd, 2020 ONCA 0730

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Civil Procedure, Anti-SLAPP, Public Interest, Costs, Courts of Justice Act, ss. 137.1, 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v Pointes Protection Association, 2018 ONCA 0685, aff’d 2020 SCC 22, Grant v Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, Platnick v. Bent, 2018 ONCA 0687, aff’d 2020 SCC 23, Hamilton v Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, Veneruzzo v Storey, 2018 ONCA 0688

Short Civil Decisions

Elguindy v. Elguindy, 2020 ONCA 739

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Costs, Leave to Appeal, Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c. C.43, s. 133(b), Brad-Jay Investments Limited v. Village Developments Limited, 218 O.A.C. 315 (C.A.)

Haley v Stepan Canada Inc., 2020 ONCA 0737

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Genuine Issue Requiring Trial, Evidence, Onus of Proof, Burden of Proof, Expert Evidence

J.D.M. v T.L.L.M., 2020 ONCA 734

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Contempt Evidence, Standard of Proof

CIVIL DECISIONS

2257573 Ontario Inc. v. Furney, 2020 ONCA 742

[Jamal J.A. (Motions Judge)]

Counsel:

R.K. Watson, for the moving parties

H.W. Reininger, for the responding party

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Stay Pending Appeal, Serious Issue to be Tried, Irreparable Harm, Balance of Convenience, Mortgages, Interest, Order for Possession, Power of Sale, Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 63.01(1), Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C.46, s 347, RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, Wilfert v McCallum, 2017 ONCA 895, Starkman v Home Trust Company, 2015 ONCA 436, Circuit World Corporation v Lesperance (1997), 33 OR (3d) 674 (Ont CA), Centurion Farms Ltd v Citifinancial Canada Inc, 2013 ONCA 79, Manufacturers Life Co v Granada Investments Ltd (2001), 150 OAC 253 (Ont CA), Oak Orchard Developments Ltd v Iseman, [1987] OJ No 361 (Ont HC), Joseph E Roach, The Canadian Law of Mortgages, 3rd ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2018)

facts:

The appellants, experienced real estate investors, owned three properties in Niagara-on-the-Lake. In 2017, the appellants encountered financial difficulties and were introduced to the respondent, a mortgage lender, through an acquaintance investor to obtain short-term financing. This acquaintance owned property in Woodstock. The appellants negotiated several high-interest, short-term loans from the respondent — totalling almost $900,000 — secured by mortgages on the appellants’ and acquaintance’s properties. The appellants were represented by counsel on these transactions. Unable to obtain longer term financing, the appellants accumulated interest, other charges, and penalties on the mortgage loans with the respondent. The appellants defaulted on their loans and have not paid anything towards the mortgages to date.

In late 2017, the respondent sued the appellants for defaulting under the mortgage agreements. The respondent then moved for summary judgment, seeking orders for possession of all properties and repayment of the principal advanced, interest, and other penalties, fees and charges under the agreements. In response, the appellants claimed the respondent had breached an alleged oral agreement, under which the respondent agreed to discharge three executions against the properties. They also claimed the respondent failed to provide timely and accurate mortgage discharge statements and that, once the penalties, fees, and charges were included in the calculation of the effective annual interest rate, the mortgage loans involved a criminal rate of interest contrary to s. 347 of the Criminal Code. Finally, the appellants counterclaimed against the respondent, alleging that they suffered damages when the respondent unreasonably refused to discharge the executions against the Properties.

By order of October 14, 2020, the motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of the respondent for the amounts owing under the mortgage loans, and orders of possession on one property owned by the appellants and the property owned by their acquaintance. These properties were sold under power of sale. The appellants’ claim that the respondent orally agreed to discharge three executions against the properties as part of refinancing arrangements was rejected. The motion judge accepted that by including the penalties, fees and other charges within the calculation of the effective annual interest rate it would exceed the criminal rate of interest under s. 347 of the Criminal Code. However, the respondent was only seeking repayment of the principal and interest under the mortgage loans at this point. The appellants moved to stay the orders for possession pending appeal of the order for summary judgment.

issues:

Have the appellants satisfied the three-part RJR-Macdonald test for granting a stay pending appeal?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

No. To obtain a stay of a judgment pending appeal, a moving party must meet the three-part RJR-Macdonald test for an interlocutory injunction:

(1) Is there a serious question to be determined on the appeal?
(2) Will the moving party suffer irreparable harm if the stay is denied?
(3) Which party does the balance of convenience favour if the stay is granted?

The Court emphasized that “these three criteria are not watertight compartments” and that the interests of justice must remain paramount.

Serious question to be determined

The threshold to meet this prong of the test is low, and turns on whether the issue on appeal is frivolous or vexatious. The appellants alleged the motion judge erred in law and fact in determining the total amount due under the mortgage loans. They did not dispute that the mortgage loans were in default and have been for several years. Even if the appellants succeeded on appeal in reducing the interest payable, their mortgage loans will still be in default, which triggers the respondent’s right to possession. There is thus no serious question on the appeal about the respondent’s right to possession of the properties.

Despite this, the appellants argued that that they were now ready, willing, and able to satisfy their monetary obligations, but their proposal would have required the respondent to subordinate or relinquish its mortgages on the properties. The respondent did not accept this. The existence of a proposal did not alter the conclusion that there was no serious question to be determined regarding the respondent’s right to possession.

Irreparable Harm

Irreparable harm is “harm which either cannot be quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured, usually because one party cannot collect damages from the other.” The appellants argued they would suffer irreparable harm if the stay was denied.

First, they argued that the respondent would have engaged in improvident sale of the properties, destroying the appellants’ equity and jeopardizing their ability to repay the respondent and third-party judgment creditors. The Court pointed out that in any sale, the mortgagee has a legal obligation to take reasonable precautions to obtain the true market value of the properties as of the date of sale. The appellants provided no evidence to support that the respondent would breach that legal obligation.

Second, the appellants argued that they would have no effective remedy against the respondent if they succeed on the appeal or counterclaims, because the respondent is a numbered company whose assets and financial condition are unknown. They feared the respondent’s assets might be depleted before the final determination of the appeal or counterclaims. Again, however, no evidence was provided to justify this fear.

Third, the appellants claimed that denying the stay would cause them to lose their right to redeem the mortgages and repurchase the properties. The Court rejected this argument. At the time of the hearing of the motion, the appellants had not sought to exercise their right to redeem the mortgages, nor did they provide any evidence to suggest that doing so in the foreseeable future was a realistic possibility.

Balance of Convenience

The Court did not accept the appellants’ submission that the balance of convenience favoured granting a stay. This factor overwhelmingly favoured the respondent. If the stay was denied, the appellants would lose their right to redeem the mortgages, but there was no realistic prospect of doing so in the foreseeable future. By contrast, the respondent loaned money to the appellants in exchange for mortgage security it sought to realize upon, after an extended period of default, and after the motion judge already ruled in its favour. In these circumstances, the respondent would have suffered greater harm if its right to possession was delayed any further.


Skof v. Bordeleau, 2020 ONCA 729

[Huscroft, Nordheimer and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P. Champ, for the appellant

R.F. Caza and M.P. Dupont, for the respondents

Keywords: Labour Law, Collective Agreements, Regulated Professions, Police, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, Jurisdiction, Judicial Review, Remedies, Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, Damages, Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15, s. 89, Judicial Review Procedure Act, s. 8, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 21.01(3)(a), TeleZone Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 ONCA 892, aff’d 2010 SCC 62, Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929, Piko v. Hudson’s Bay Co. (1998), 167 D.L.R. (4th) 479 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 23, Regina Police Assn. Inc. v. Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioners, 2000 SCC 14

facts:

The appellant is a police officer with the Ottawa Police Service, and also serves as President of the Ottawa Police Association (“OPA”). In 2019, the Ontario Provincial Police charged the appellant with certain offences under the Criminal Code. In response, the individual respondent, who is the chief of the Ottawa Police Service, suspended the appellant pursuant to s. 89 of the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15 (“PSA”).

The appellant then began an action against the respondents claiming, inter alia, declaratory relief, injunctive relief and damages. The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that the Superior Court of Justice did not have jurisdiction to decide the claim, and asserted that the issues should be properly determined under the applicable collective agreement. The respondents also submitted in the alternative, if the collective agreement was not applicable to the dispute, the appellant should have sought relief under either the PSA, or by way of an application for judicial review.

The motion judge agreed with the respondents that the Superior Court of Justice did not have jurisdiction to decide the matter, and dismissed the action under Rule 21.01(3)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

issues:

(1) What is the proper test under Rule 21.01(3)(a)?
(2) Does the Superior Court of Justice have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appellant’s action?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

(1) What is the proper test under r. 21.01(3)(a)?

The Court only addressed this issue as a brief introduction into its more substantive analysis. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the Superior Court of Justice is a court of inherent jurisdiction. As such, it has jurisdiction over every conceivable claim with two narrow exceptions. First, if the claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. Second, if the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Justice has been expressly excluded by legislation or by an arbitral agreement (TeleZone Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 ONCA 892, aff’d 2010 SCC 62).

The Court went on to note that some authorities have engaged in a debate on whether it is appropriate to use the “plain and obvious” test under Rule 21.01(3)(a). Instead of furthering that debate, the Court instead concluded that in order to find that the Superior Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction over a claim, it must be “clear and unequivocal” that the jurisdiction has been ousted, as per the TeleZone decision. The Court declined to provide any further analysis on this issue, and concluded its commentary by noting that the motion judge did not appear to approach the motion with the “clear and unequivocal” test in mind.

(2) Does the Superior Court of Justice have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appellant’s motion?

Yes. As mentioned above, the respondents proposed three alternative modes of deciding the appellant’s action to the exclusion of the Superior Court of Justice’s jurisdiction: (i) the collective agreement, (ii) the Police Services Act, or (iii) by way of an application for judicial review. The Court addressed each of these proposed alternatives individually, and found that none precluded the appellant from bringing an action in the Superior Court of Justice.

(i) Collective Agreement
On this proposed alternative, the Court noted the motion judge’s critical error in finding that the appellant continued to be an employee of the Ottawa Police Service during his term as President of the OPA, and therefore remained subject to the collective agreement. While the appellant continued to be an employee of the Ottawa Police Service in the technical sense, the materials filed in the record clearly demonstrated that once the appellant was elected as President of the OPA, he was no longer subject to the collective agreement. Both the collective agreement itself, as well as a Memorandum of Agreement signed by the OPA and Ottawa Police Service, contained express provisions providing for this exception.

The respondents made an additional effort to avoid this result by arguing that the “essential character” of the claim is one covered by the collective agreement. The Court responded to this argument by invoking principles of case law from Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929 and Piko v. Hudson’s Bay Co. (1998), 167 D.L.R. (4th) 479 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 23. These cases stand for the proposition that notwithstanding the “exclusive jurisdictions” of arbitrators, a court of inherent jurisdiction retains residual discretionary powers to grant remedies not possessed by a statutory tribunal or arbitrator.

As a final point, the case of Regina Police Assn. Inc. v. Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioners, 2000 SCC 14, made it clear that a dispute raised by an employee does not necessarily bring such dispute within the scope of a collective agreement. The context of the dispute determines jurisdiction, not the identity of the parties.

(ii) Police Services Act
The motion judge found that the appellant “may fall under Part V of the PSA” but did not identify specifically how that fact provided any remedy to the appellant. The Court noted that there is no provision in the PSA that permits an officer to challenge a suspension ordered by a Chief of Police under s. 89. Further, there is no provision in the PSA that would authorize the Ontario Civilian Police Commission to grant relief under Part V of the PSA, contrary to the submission of the respondents.

As a result of the inapplicability of the collective agreement, in conjunction with the lack of any specific remedies provided by the PSA, the Court concluded that the only remedy for an officer in this instance is to seek relief through the court process.

(iii) Judicial Review
The conclusion that the only available avenue for relief is the court process raises the subsequent question of the proper forum for seeking relief from the court. Notwithstanding the lack of a definitive answer that the appellant’s dispute in fact constitutes a claim for judicial review, the Court concluded that there is nothing in the Judicial Review Procedure Act (“JRPA”) that precludes a party from seeking relief by way of an action. In fact, the JRPA specifically considers that possibility in s. 8, which provides that a judge from the Superior Court of Justice can deal with such actions summarily, or refer the action to Divisional Court to be treated as an application for judicial review.

Also critical to note is the differing range of remedies available in applications for judicial review, as opposed to actions in the Superior Court of Justice. In the former, unlike the latter, damages are not available. Therefore, given that there is no authority precluding the appellant’s action, and given that the appellant is seeking damages as a remedy, it is not “clear and unequivocal” why the Superior Court of Justice does not have the jurisdiction to address this dispute.


Sokoloff v Tru-Path Occupational Therapy Services Ltd, 2020 ONCA 0730

[Huscroft, Zarnett and Coroza JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Chaudhury and C. Senese, for the appellants

J.C. Lisus, A. Winton and V.A. Calina, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Civil Procedure, Anti-SLAPP, Public Interest, Costs, Courts of Justice Act, ss. 137.1, 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v Pointes Protection Association, 2018 ONCA 0685, aff’d 2020 SCC 22, Grant v Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, Platnick v. Bent, 2018 ONCA 0687, aff’d 2020 SCC 23, Hamilton v Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, Veneruzzo v Storey, 2018 ONCA 0688

facts:

The respondent in this appeal is the plaintiff to the main action and operates a law firm. As part of their business, the respondents would refer clients who needed occupational therapy services to the appellants. As part of this arrangement, the respondents would hold back settlement funds to ensure the appellants were paid all their fees not covered by clients’ insurers. Eventually, the respondents began to have issues with some of the fees and charges being made by the appellants and the business relationship deteriorated and was eventually terminated.

The appellant believed the respondent still owed them significant amounts of money under their arrangement. As part of their effort to get the respondent to pay the fees, the appellant took to protest outside the respondents’ offices, displaying signs with various messages relating to the fees and the conduct of the respondents. The respondents brought a defamation action against the appellants claiming damages arising from the appellant’s protests.

The appellant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the defamation suit. The motion judge dismissed the motion, holding that the appellant’s expression on the signs did not relate to a matter of public interest and so was not covered by s.137.1. Further, even it was a matter of public interest, the respondents’ interests were sufficiently impaired such that the action should move to trial to determine the suit on its merits. The motion judge awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis against the appellant, despite the default position in s. 137.1(8) that a successful responding party under a s. 137(1) motion is not entitled to costs.

The appellant appeals the motion judge’s decision to dismiss their motion and also seeks leave to appeal the costs award.

issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err in finding that the appellant’s expression did not concern a matter of public interest?

(2) Should leave to appeal costs be granted?

holding:

Appeal dismissed. Motion for leave to appeal costs dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No. Section 137.1 motions are designed to prevent ‘SLAPP’ or Strategic Legislation Against Public Participation. SLAPP is litigation, or threats of litigation that are used to prevent a person from commenting on a matter of public interest. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized several indicia of SLAPP, including: (1) “a history of the plaintiff using litigation or the threat of litigation to silence critics”; (2) “a financial or power imbalance that strongly favours the plaintiff”; (3) “a punitive or retributory purpose animating the plaintiff’s bringing of the claim”; and (4) “minimal or nominal damages suffered by the plaintiff”.

The statutory scheme of s. 137.1 is that under s. 137.1(3), a judge shall, subject to ss. (4) dismiss a proceeding against a person if the person can satisfy the judge that the impugned expression relates to a matter of public interest. Section 137.1 (4) provides that a judge shall not dismiss the proceeding if there is substantial merit to the proceedings, the moving party has no valid defence and the harm suffered or to be suffered by the responding party is sufficiently serious that the public interest favours allowing the proceeding rather than preventing it. In this sense, s. 137.1 acts as a screening provision for SLAPP proceedings.

The first step in an inquiry under s. 137.1 is to determine what the impugned expression was about, or what it pertained to (Pointes Protection) The motion judge found that while the public certainly has an interest in the conduct of lawyers and law firms, this was merely a case of how a lawyer chose to conduct their business and was a matter of contractual dispute. The motion judge drew particular attention to the methods used by the appellant in advancing this dispute, namely protesting, and also to the fact the appellant testified he was not concerned with the public interest, just with getting the money he felt he was owed. The appellant submitted that these two considerations do not properly form the test under s. 137.1 and thus the motion judge erred in considering them.

The Supreme Court of Canada has made clear that no qualitative evaluation of the expressions is to be made at this stage of the inquiry. The Supreme Court stated in Pointes Protection that “…it is not legally relevant whether the expression is desirable or deleterious, valuable or vexatious, or whether it helps or hampers the public interest”. The issue at this stage is the subject matter. If the subject matter is identified as public in nature, than a balancing act and qualitative assessment occur later in the analysis.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant’s submissions that the motion judge’s consideration of the nature of expression and the appellant’s motivations in making them were irrelevant to the determination of the subject matter. This was an error. However, the Court of Appeal then went on to consider whether despite the error, the motion judge still appropriately classified the subject matter of the appellant’s expression as not public in nature.

The Court of Appeal found that the record before the motion judge amply supported that this was a private dispute. While the analysis under s. 137.1(3) should be both broad and purposive as well as generous and expansive, there is no one test to determine public interest and the expression is to be assessed as a whole and the question is whether “some segment of the community would have a genuine interest in receiving information on the subject” (Pointes Protection). The dispute in this case arose between two parties trying to determine what fees were owed between them and the appellant was trying to pressure the respondent into paying. The fact that the respondents were members of a regulated profession does not change the character of a private dispute over a contract.

The appellant submitted that because the respondent gave an undertaking to protect the amounts owed, the public interest was engaged in ensuring lawyers are held to their undertakings. The court dismissed this argument because the test under s. 137.1(3) is that the expression must relate to the public interest, not merely mention something that is of public interest. While the public undoubtedly has an interest in ensuring lawyers adhere to their undertakings, that was not what the expression related to. It related to a private dispute and only mentioned undertakings.

As the Court of Appeal found the motion judge correctly characterized the expression as not relating to the public interest, the protections of s. 137.1 were not engaged and analysis of the stages of the inquiry were not necessary. The appeal was dismissed.

(2) No. Under s. 137.1(8), the responding party to a s. 137.1 motion is not entitled to costs if successful, unless the judge determines that such an award is appropriate in the circumstances. Initially, the motion judge awarded costs to the respondent without reference to this section. Once alerted of the error, the motion judge invited parties to make submissions on costs. After reviewing the submissions, the motion judge awarded partial indemnity costs against the appellant, but reduced the amount from what the responding party requested to be more in line with what costs were incurred by the applicant.

The motion judge acknowledged that s. 137.1(8) had strong policy reasons behind it, namely ensuring that s. 137.1 motions are accessible and that litigation, or the threat thereof, is not used by powerful parties to silence the criticism or expression of other persons, that policy did not apply here. The parties in this dispute were both sophisticated parties and were both members of regulated professions. The appellants were trying to get their bills paid and chose to use allegedly defamatory language and use the ‘court of public opinion’ to win their dispute. This type of conduct is not what s. 137.1(8) is designed to protect.

Decisions as to cost awards are owed substantial deference and should not be granted unless there are strong grounds on which the appellate court could find an error in principle or that the cost award was plainly wrong. While the Court of Appeal acknowledged the motion judge’s analysis had certain flaws in the timeline of events, they were not sufficiently serious so as to justify appellate intervention. Leave to appeal costs was refused.


SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Elguindy v. Elguindy, 2020 ONCA 739

[Fairburn A.C.J.O., Roberts and Coroza JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. E., acting in person

M. J. Bates, for the responding party

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Costs, Leave to Appeal, Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c. C.43, s. 133(b), Brad-Jay Investments Limited v. Village Developments Limited, 218 O.A.C. 315 (C.A.)

Haley v Stepan Canada Inc., 2020 ONCA 0737

[Fairburn A.C.J.O., Pepall and Roberts JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Moras, for the appellant

A. Potasky, for the respondents

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Genuine Issue Requiring Trial, Evidence, Onus of Proof, Burden of Proof, Expert Evidence

J.D.M. v T.L.L.M., 2020 ONCA 734

[Fairburn A.C.J.O., Pepall and Roberts JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.H. Tweyman, for the appellant

J.L. Daboll, for the respondent

K. Bingham, for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Contempt Evidence, Standard of Proof

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Photo of John Polyzogopoulos John Polyzogopoulos

John has been the editor of Blaneys Appeals since the inception of the blog in the Summer of 2014. He is a partner at the firm with almost two decades of experience handling a wide variety of litigation matters. John assists clients with…

John has been the editor of Blaneys Appeals since the inception of the blog in the Summer of 2014. He is a partner at the firm with almost two decades of experience handling a wide variety of litigation matters. John assists clients with matters ranging from appeals, to injunctions, to corporate, breach of contract, construction, environmental contamination, product liability, debtor-creditor, insolvency and other business litigation. He also handles professional discipline and professional negligence matters, as well as complex estates and matrimonial litigation. In addition, John represents amateur sports organizations in contentious matters, and advises them in matters of internal governance. John can be reached at 416-593-2953 or jpolyzogopoulos@blaney.com.