COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (April 8 – April 12)

By John Polyzogopoulos on April 13, 2024

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Good afternoon.
Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of April 8, 2024.

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In 660 Sunningdale GP Inc. v. First Source Mortgage Corporation, the Court overturned a motion judge’s decision that excused 660 Sunningdale from paying the balance of a Lender Fee after it decided not to proceed with the loan transaction under the Commitment Letter it had entered into with the lender, First Source. The motion judge ruled that the balance of the Lender Fee was an unenforceable penalty and also granted relief against forfeiture. The Court found that the Lender Fee was not a penalty, since it was earned as soon as the Commitment Letter was signed, and did not only become payable upon breach of the Commitment Letter by the borrower. In addition, the obligation to pay the Lender Fee was not a forfeiture of a contractual right from which relief could be granted. In wrongly applying these doctrines, the motion judge essentially applied the doctrine of unconscionability, which was unavailable in this case, as there was no inequality of bargaining power. 660 Sunningale was a large land developer, and could not be said not to be on a level playing field with the lender. This is a great decision for lenders, as it supports the enforceability of large lender fees payable when a sophisticated borrower backs out of a loan transaction.

In National Steel Car Limited v. Independent Electricity System Operator, the appellant contended that the Ontario government’s feed-in-tariff renewable electricity procurement program (FIT Program) was mainly designed to provide economic stimulus rather than serving a regulatory purpose. National Steel Car argued this program, which increased its electricity costs, amounted to unconstitutional taxation, in violation of the Constitution Act, 1867. The application judge determined that the FIT Program’s costs were valid regulatory charges, not covert taxes, aligning with Ontario’s legitimate goals of enhancing renewable energy and supporting economic, social, and environmental objectives. The Court found no error in the application judge’s conclusions.

Other topics covered this week included fraudulent conveyances, the abandonment of an appeal, the doctrines of res judicata and issues estoppel in the insurance coverage context, a failed closing of an agreement of purchase and sale of land where both buyer and seller mistakenly believed that the subject property was subject to a prescriptive easement, jurisdiction in an appeal from summary judgment on unpaid invoices in an action commenced under the Construction Act, the refusal of a court to hear a motion served the afternoon before a receivership hearing to approve a sales process, and the dismissal of a claim against a family lawyer for professional negligence and defamation.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Civil Decisions

6071376 Canada Inc. v. Khedmatgozar, 2024 ONCA 248

Keywords: Torts, Fraud, Conspiracy, Fraudulent Conveyances, Badges of Fraud, Civil Procedure, Applications, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 38.10(1), Agribrands Purina Canada Inc v Kasamekas, 2011 ONCA 460, FL Receivables Trust 2002-A v Cobrand Foods Ltd, 2007 ONCA 425, Koop v Smith (1915), 51 SCR 554, Montor Business Corporation v Goldfinger, 2016 ONCA 406, Re Fancy (1984), 46 OR (2d) 153 (H. Ct. J.)

Peakhill Capital Inc. v. 1000093910 Ontario Inc., 2024 ONCA 261

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Receiverships, Sales Process, Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Civil Procedure, Motions, Notice, Royal Bank of Canada v. Keller & Sons Farming Ltd., 2016 MCBA 46, Re Harmon International Industries Inc., 2020 SKCA 95, Marchant Realty Partners Inc. v. 2407553 Ontario Inc., 2021 ONCA 375, Ravelston Corporation Limited (Re), 2007 ONCA 135, Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp., 1991 CanLII 2727 (ONCA), CCM Master Qualified Fund v. blutip Power Technologies, 2012 ONSC 1750, Canrock Ventures LLC v. Ambercore Software Inc., 2011 ONCA 414

Aviva Insurance Company of Canada v. 8262900 Canada Inc. (CarePartners/Community Nursing Services Foundation), 2024 ONCA 258

Keywords: Contracts, Insurance, Coverage, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Abandonment, Reinstatement, Res Judicata, Issue Estoppel, Hermanns v Ingle (2002), 158 OAC 21 (Ont. C.A.), Re Rogers, [1955] O.J. No. 372, 1955 CanLII 399 (ON SC), Sherwood v Cinnabar Brown Holdings Ltd, 2021 BCCA 88, Philipos v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 79, Adam and Adam v Insurance Corporation of British Columbia et al (1985), 1985 CanLII 584 (BC CA), Akagi v Synergy Group (2000) Inc, 2014 ONCA 731

Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. v. Avison Young Real Estate Management Services LP, 2024 ONCA 251

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Construction, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Construction Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30, s 50(2), Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43, s 6(1)(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20, Villa Verde L.M. Masonry Ltd. v. Pier One Masonry Inc. (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 76 (C.A.), Great Northern Insulations Services Ltd. v. King Road Paving and Landscaping Inc., 2021 ONCA 367, Soo Mill and Lumber Company Ltd. v. Possebon et al., 2023 ONCA 215

660 Sunningdale GP Inc. v. First Source Mortgage Corporation, 2024 ONCA 252

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Penalty Clauses, Debtor-Creditor, Loan Agreements, Commitment Letters, Lender Fees, Defences, Unconscionability, Remedies, Rescission, Relief from Forfeiture, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 98, Peachtree II Associates – Dallas L.P. v. 857486 Ontario Ltd. (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 362 (C.A.), Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage & Motor Co. Ltd., [1915] A.C. 79 (H.L.), Marshallzehr Group Inc. v. Ideal (BC) Developments Inc., 2021 ONCA 229, Canadian General Electric Co. v. Canadian Rubber Co. (1915), 52 S.C.R. 349, Polaroid Canada Inc. v. Continent-Wide Enterprises Limited (2000), 7 B.L.R. (3d) 37 (Ont. C.A.), Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, 2020 SCC 16, Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Harding, [1973] AC 691, Redstone Enterprises Ltd. v. Simple Technology Inc., 2017 ONCA 282, Rahbar v. Parvizi, 2023 ONCA 522, Kozel v. The Personal Insurance Company, 2014 ONCA 130, 216927 Alberta Ltd. v. Fox Creek (Town), 1990 ABCA 29, Conner v. Bulla, 2010 BCCA 457, Liscumb v. Provenzano et al. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 129 (H.C.J.), Ross v. T. Eaton Co. (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 115 (C.A.), 120 Adelaide Leaseholds Inc. v. Oxford Properties Canada Ltd., [1993] O.J. No. 2801 (C.A.), 383421 Ontario Inc. v. Ole Miss Place Inc. (2003), 67 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), PDM Entertainment Inc. v. Three Pines Creations Inc., 2015 ONCA 488, Highway Properties Ltd. v. Kelly, Douglas and Co. Ltd., [1971] S.C.R. 562, Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226

Bell v. Amini, 2024 ONCA 260

Keywords: Torts, Professional Negligence, Lawyers, Defamation, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20.04(2), Bell v. Fishka, 2022 ONCA 683, Grant v. Torstar, 2009 SCC 61, Haskett v. Equifax Canada Inc. (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 577 (C.A.), Hyrniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7

Roalno Inc. v. Schaefer, 2024 ONCA 262

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Easements, Anticipatory Breach, Remedies, Declarations, Specific Performance, Abatements, Road Access Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.34, Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.5, s. 51, 1043 Bloor Inc v 1714104 Ontario Inc, 2013 ONCA 91, 3999581 Canada Inc v 1394734 Ontario Inc, 2007 ONCA 312, Whitmell v Ritchie (1994), 20 O.R. (3d) 424 (C.A.), Margettie v Snell, 2009 ONCA 838, Spirent Communications of Ottawa Limited v Quake Technologies (Canada) Inc, 2008 ONCA 92

National Steel Car Limited v. Independent Electricity System Operator,2024 ONCA 265

Keywords: Energy, Electricity, Price Regulation, Constitutional Law, Taxation, Division of Powers, Pith and Substance, Intra Vires, Civil Procedure, Applications, Evidence, Admissibility, Information and Belief, Expert Evidence, Impartiality, Constitution Act, 1867, Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009, S.O. 2009, c. 12, Electricity Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c.15, Sched. A, Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c.15, Sched. B, Energy Statute Law Amendment Act, 2016, S.O. 2016, c. 10, Taxpayer Protection Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 7, Sched. A, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 4.1.01, 39.01(5), National Steel Car Limited v. Independent Electricity System Operator, 2019 ONCA 929, Re: Exported Natuaral Gas Tax, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 1004, Allard Contractors Ltd. v. Coquitlam (District), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 371, Reference re Firearms Act, 1998 ABCA 305, R. v. Palmer, 2021 ONCA 348, Bruno v. Dacosta, 2020 ONCA 602, Farej v. Fellows, 2022 ONCA 254, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60, Van Mol (Guardian ad litem of) v. Ashmore, 1999 BCCA 6, Ontario Home Builders’ Association v. York Region Board of Education, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 929, Connaught Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 SCC 7, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 131, Westbank First Nation v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 134, Rogers Communications Inc. v. Châteauguay (City), 2016 SCC 23, Manitoba (A.G.) v. Metropolitan Stores, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110, White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co, 2015 SCC 23

Short Civil Decisions

Shaulov v. Law Society of Ontario, 2024 ONCA 263

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Orders, Final or Interlocutory

Bogue v. Law Society of Ontario, 2024 ONCA 264

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Discipline, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Motions, Panel Review, Vexatious Litigation, Rules of Civil Procedure, r 2.1.01, 2.1.02, 61.16(4)(a), Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss 6(1)(a), 7(5), Administration of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.6, ss 4.10(3)(4), Tran v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2023 ONSC 3207, R. v. Anderson, 2014 SCC 41

Foster v. Ontario (Children, Community & Social Services), 2024 ONCA 259

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Residential Tenancies, Privacy, Human Rights, Freedom of Information, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgement, Amicus Curiae, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 19, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31

Pencor Construction Inc. v. 1322295 Ontario Ltd., 2024 ONCA 273

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditors, Real Property, Mortgages, Defences, Unconscionability, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment

De Cerigo Properties Inc. v. Raffan, 2024 ONCA 272

Keywords: Costs

CIVIL DECISIONS

6071376 Canada Inc. v. Khedmatgozar, 2024 ONCA 248

[Pepall, Sossin and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G. J. Thorlakson and Maggie Sullivan, for the appellant

C. Cabana and I. Houle, for the respondents Mahmood Khedmatgozar, 3966305 Canada Inc. and Mary Beresford

A. Tomkins and R. Hassanzadeh, for the respondents Capital Dentistry Group Limited and Demetrius Dalios

facts:

The appellant, 6071376 Canada Inc. (“607”), was a judgment creditor of the respondent, Dr. M.K. It brought an application seeking a declaration that Dr. M.K had transferred shares in several dental practice corporations he co-owned to the respondent, Capital Dentistry Group Limited (“CDG”), in exchange for cash and shares in CDG, as a “result of a conspiracy by unlawful means amongst the [r]espondents”. The unlawful means was alleged to have been a fraudulent conveyance. 607 also sought other forms of relief against the respondents, including damages for the tort of unlawful conduct conspiracy. The application judge dismissed 607’s application, and 607 appealed. The appellant’s focus on the appeal was on the respondent CDG, not Dr. M.K, against whom it already obtained judgment in its original action.

issues:

Did the application judge err by finding that the transaction was not fraudulent and therefore not unlawful?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No.

607 argued that the application judge incorrectly applied the “badges of fraud” in evaluating the intent to defraud within the context of a transaction involving the purchase of dental practices. The argument was based on the application judge’s refusal to infer fraudulent intent from the transaction’s characteristics, which were initiated and structured by MCA, not by Dr. M.K or Dr. D.D. The application judge highlighted that the acquisition was proposed by MCA well before 607’s judgment against Dr. M.K and noted the transaction’s alignment with MCA’s historical dealings, including the combination of cash and shares at closing, suggesting no fraudulent intent. The Court concluded that the application judge’s conclusions were supported by evidence, indicating she properly assessed the situation.

Furthermore, the Court observed additional factors affirming the decision. There was no indication MCA was anything other than a legitimate buyer at arm’s length, and MCA was not directly involved in the application. Prior knowledge by 607’s counsel of Dr. M.K’s intent to sell his practices and the structured agreement to settle the judgment from the sale’s proceeds were noted, but did not alter the case’s outcome. Despite 607’s argument that the application judge should have converted the application to an action, the Court found no fault with the application judge’s handling, emphasizing that the request for conversion was never made by 607. The Court noted that decisions under r. 38.10(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to order that an application proceed to trial are discretionary in nature.

Peakhill Capital Inc. v. 1000093910 Ontario Inc., 2024 ONCA 261

[Harvison Young, Coroza and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G. M. Caplan and A. Simovonian, for the appellant

R. Swan, S. Zweig and A. Nelms, for the respondent, KSV Restructuring Inc.

K. Sherkin and M. Lightowler, for the third party/respondent, 2257004 Ontario Inc.

facts:

This case concerned a company in receivership, 1000093910 Ontario Inc., and its cross-motion to vary the receivership order and to enforce an agreement of purchase and sale of its primary asset, a piece of real estate, in Vaughan, Ontario, with a third party 2557004 Ontario Inc. (“255 Ontario”).

The motion judge exercised her discretion and declined to hear the cross-motion.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in refusing to hear the cross-motion?
Did the motion judge err in accepting the receiver’s proposal for a public auction of the property?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

The appellant did not establish that the motion judge erred in refusing to hear the cross-motion.

Both the receivership order and the Rules of Civil Procedure required the appellant to give seven days notice of its cross-motion. The appellant served its notice of cross-motion and supporting materials minutes before 4:00 p.m. on the eve of the hearing date set for the receiver’s motion. The receiver did not have any opportunity to respond to the cross-motion, nor did the court have time to read the materials. In addition, the hearing list that day was already full.

Additionally, the motion judge found that the cross-motion had little chance of success.

The motion judge did not err in granting the receiver’s motion to engage in the sales process it proposed.

Contrary to the allegations that the receiver’s motion was inconsistent with the principles in Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp., the receiver provided evidence that the proposed process was fair and transparent; that it promoted integrity and commercial efficacy; and that it would optimize the chances of securing the best price for the assets. The Soundair principles were therefore met.

Aviva Insurance Company of Canada v. 8262900 Canada Inc (CarePartners/Community Nursing Services Foundation), 2024 ONCA 258

[Pepall J.A. (Motions Judge)]

Counsel:

T. Gleason, for the moving party

G. D.E. Adair, K.C., for the respondent

facts:

Aviva Insurance Company of Canada sought to reverse its decision to abandon an appeal related to its dispute with 8262900 Canada Inc. (CarePartners) after a cyberattack led to a class action. The insurance dispute centered on whether Aviva was obligated to defend and indemnify CarePartners under its policy, following a funding agreement to cover defense costs on a 60/40 basis. However, the court had dismissed Aviva’s initial application, stating Aviva had not requested allocation of costs for different types of claims. Despite abandoning its appeal, Aviva attempted to reopen the case to argue about the allocation of indemnity costs, however, CarePartners argued that Aviva’s new claims were barred by res judicata and issue estoppel. CarePartners maintained that Aviva’s deliberate abandonment of the appeal meant it should fulfill the interim funding agreement’s obligations, while Aviva aimed to challenge the judge’s interpretation on the apportionment of costs without disputing its duty on bodily injury claims.

issues:

Should the Court grant the moving party’s motion for an order setting aside its notice of abandonment of appeal, an order granting leave to file a new factum on appeal, and, in the alternative, an order extending the time for serving and filing a notice of appeal?
Should the Court grant the respondent’s cross-motion for directions in respect of its cross-appeal against Aviva?

holding:

Motion dismissed. Cross-motion granted.

reasoning:

The Court was not persuaded that Aviva’s notice of abandonment was filed based on inadvertence, mistake, or misapprehension. Both Aviva’s counsel on the appeal and its claims analyst acknowledged in their cross-examinations that there was nothing accidental or inadvertent about the abandonment of the appeal. The appeal was abandoned because it was thought that the application judge’s bodily injury claim finding would not likely be overturned on appeal and in any event, the recovery would not be substantial.

The respondent’s counsel conceded that there was no prejudice to the respondent. He argued that there was no prejudice to either party because the parties would have to address the issues of res judicata and issue estoppel as part of the respondent’s cross-appeal and on Aviva’s new application. The Court was hard pressed to see how Aviva could succeed on an appeal as it related to the issue of apportionment. This was because the application judge expressly stated that Aviva had not asked him to allocate defence or indemnity costs between the personal injury claims and bodily injury claims in the underlying action. The Court found it difficult to see how the application judge could be criticized for not addressing an issue that was admittedly not before him. No such request was made by either party. Moreover, Aviva did not wish to challenge the application judge’s finding on bodily injury. That was the subject matter of its deliberate decision to abandon its appeal. Thus, the Court was not persuaded that the interests of justice favoured granting Aviva the relief requested.

2. Yes

The order requested was granted, save and except for the time limits which would be established by the Appeal Scheduling Unit.

Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. v. Avison Young Real Estate Management Services LP, 2024 ONCA 251

[Gillese and Copeland JJ.A. and Wilton-Siegel J. (ad hoc)]

Counsel:

M. Mazzuca and A. Wiebe, for the respondent/moving party

J. Kaufman and B. Adams, for the appellant/responding party

facts:

Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. (“Arcamm”) sued Avison Young Real Estate Management Services LP and 4342 Queen St. Niagara Holdings Inc. (“Queen”) in an action brought under the Construction Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30. Its statement of claim (the “Claim”) was filed, along with a certificate of action, as part of the process for registering a lien against title to the property municipally known as 4342 Queen Street, Niagara Falls, Ontario (the “Property”).

On June 8, 2021, a sudden electrical failure involving the high-voltage electrical system at the Property caused a complete power outage. The Property required power “24/7”. Within 24 hours of having been asked to restore power to the Property, Arcamm had sourced and installed temporary generators, and round-the-clock electrical power was restored to the Property. By November 1, 2021, Arcamm had permanently restored power to the Property. A final inspection that day established that its work was completed in compliance with the requisite codes and regulations. When Arcamm’s invoices for the work performed in relation to the Property remained unpaid, it successfully moved for summary judgment.

Arcamm sought an order quashing the Queen appeal from the summary judgment for want of jurisdiction. It submitted that the summary judgment was a final order captured by s. 71 of the Construction Act and, therefore, Queen’s appeal was to the Divisional Court, not to the Court. Section 71 provides that “an appeal lies to the Divisional Court from a judgment or an order on a motion to oppose confirmation of a report under this Act.”

issues:

Does the Court have jurisdiction to hear the appeal?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

Yes.

Firstly, the fact the Claim was styled as a proceeding under the Construction Act did not mean that the Construction Act automatically governed the appeal route. The jurisdiction of the Court was governed by the substance of the order made: Dal Bianco at para. 11, In Dal Bianco, the appeal of a Construction Act claim lay to the Court because the substance of the order under appeal related to proceedings authorized by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

In this case, the summary judgment was not made under the Construction Act. On the contrary, the motion judge refused to grant relief under that Act. Instead, the source of the motion judge’s jurisdiction was r. 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a rule promulgated pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act.

Further, the relief granted was based on a claim for damages in contract for unpaid invoices, a non-statutory cause of action. The grounds of appeal highlighted the significance of this point. Queen’s primary ground of appeal was its contention that the motion judge erred in failing to find a genuine issue requiring a trial, specifically by failing to consider the defence of contributory fault and whether Arcamm’s conduct caused or contributed to the same damages claimed in contract. Self-evidently, these issues were not matters governed by the Construction Act; they were specific to the application of the test under r. 20.

Second, the cases on which Arcamm relied upon were fundamentally different from the present case. All of those cases proceeded to trial on the construction lien track under the Construction Act. In this case, r. 20 was the source of the court’s jurisdiction below. The summary judgment was not made in reliance on the Construction Act.

660 Sunningdale GP Inc. v. First Source Mortgage Corporation, 2024 ONCA 252

[MacPherson, Miller and Paciocco JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. A. Taub and S. Mosonyi, for the appellants

M. A. Polvere and N. Kuehn, for the respondents

facts:

The respondent, 660 Sunningdale GP Inc. (“660 Sunningdale”), a developer, agreed in a commitment letter (the “Loan Agreement”) to pay a “Lender Fee” to the appellant, First Source Mortgage Corporation, on behalf of its syndicate partner, First Source Financial Management Inc. (collectively, “First Source”), as part of the consideration for a multimillion-dollar loan. The Lender Fee was deemed under the Loan Agreement to be earned upon the acceptance and execution of the commitment letter. The Loan Agreement provided that the Lender Fee was to be partially payable through a $100,000 payment made at the time the Loan Agreement was accepted and executed, with a remaining payment of $326,500 to follow.

660 Sunningdale paid the $100,000 upon executing the commitment letter but shortly after decided not to proceed with the loan, or to pay the balance of the Lender Fee. First Source registered a caution against the property, prompting 660 Sunningdale to issue a Notice of Action seeking a rescission of the Loan Agreement and an Order discharging the registered caution. The parties subsequently agreed to deposit the balance in trust and to commence litigation to resolve any payment obligations. First Source then counterclaimed.

The motion judge held that First Source was entitled to keep the $100,000 that had been paid, but 660 Sunningdale was entitled to the release of the balance from trust, plus interest, because: (1) the balance was payable under an unenforceable “penalty clause”, and (2) relief against forfeiture should be granted for the balance pursuant to s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act. The motion judge also appears to have concluded, possibly as an alternative basis for absolving 660 Sunningdale from having to pay the balance, that the balance of the Lender Fee was not earned because the loan had not been advanced.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in awarding summary judgment to 660 Sunningdale for the return of the balance of the Lender Fee, plus interest, to be paid from the funds held in trust?
Did the motion judge err in failing to dismiss 660 Sunningdale’s damages claim?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

Yes.

The Motion Judge Erred in Applying the Law of Unenforceable Penalty Clauses

The Court found that the motion judge erred in finding the balance of the Lender Fee to be an unenforceable penalty clause. Under the terms of the Loan Agreement, the balance of the Lender Fee was not a “stipulated remedy” for a breach of the contract. Rather, the balance was payable whether or not the contract was breached. In effect, the motion judge excused 660 Sunningdale from its obligations under a term of the Loan Agreement, using a body of law that governs the enforcement of penalties. But that body of law had no application.

The accepted definition of a “penalty” reinforces this point. By its very nature, a penalty clause purports to preordain the payment required if a breach occurs. Unless a term of a contract stipulates a purported remedy for a breach, it cannot be a penalty clause. Put otherwise, a penalty clause says, “if you breach the contract, look at the penalty you will have to pay.” That is not what the Lender Fee provisions say.

The Court noted that 660 Sunningdale argued that the motion judge did not err because she interpreted the Lender Fee as a stipulated remedy, and this court should defer to her interpretation. The Court disagreed. The construction that 660 Sunningdale advanced was not reflected in the motion judge’s decision. She did not address whether the Lender Fee was payable as a remedy for a breach, which is a necessary condition to it being characterized as a stipulated remedies clause. She focused only on whether the amount provided in the Lender Fee was extravagant and unconscionable in comparison to the amount First Source actually expended. By looking only at whether the amount of the balance of the Lender Fee was extravagant and unconscionable without first determining that the Lender Fee was a stipulated remedy clause, the motion judge effectively applied the independent doctrine of unconscionability rather than the doctrine of unenforceable penalty clauses.

Even if the motion judge’s decision could be read as 660 Sunningdale suggested it should be, there is no reasonable basis for that interpretation, given that the Loan Agreement provided no possible support for a finding that the Lender Fee was payable to remedy a breach. Similarly, the description of the deposit as “liquidated damages” in Article 4.17 could not support a reasonable finding, in the context of the Loan Agreement as a whole, that the Lender Fee was payable in order to remedy a breach of the Loan Agreement.

The Court, therefore, did not accept 660 Sunningdale’s submission that the motion judge interpreted the Lender Fee as a remedy for a breach. Had the motion judge interpreted the Lender Fee as a remedy for a breach, it would have been an unreasonable construction of the loan contract, amounting to a palpable and overriding error.

The Motion Judge Erred in Applying the Law of Relief of Forfeiture

The Court was also persuaded that the motion judge erred in excusing 660 Sunningdale from paying the balance of the Lender Fee based on the law of relief against forfeiture. Relief against forfeiture may be available to relieve a party of the consequences of its non-observance or breach of the terms of a contract or covenant. The balance of the Lender Fee was payable under the terms of the Loan Agreement regardless of any breach or non-observance of its terms. By granting relief against forfeiture to 660 Sunningdale from a contractual payment obligation that did not arise from any non-observance of the Loan Agreement on its part, the motion judge, in effect, applied the independent doctrine of unconscionability incorrectly in circumstances where there was no finding of inequality of bargaining power.

The paradigm circumstance in which relief against forfeiture is available is where the enforcement of a clause inserted to secure some aspect of the bargain would result in overcompensation for a breach of contract by the party seeking relief. In Canada, the application of the law of relief against forfeiture arising from breaches of contractual clauses inserted to secure performance can be observed, for example, in cases recognizing that relief against forfeiture can be granted to prevent the forfeiture of non-refundable deposits, the forfeiture of insurance coverage for imperfect compliance with policy terms, the forfeiture upon repudiation by the purchaser of installments or part or full payment of purchase monies that have been advanced, and forfeitures provided for in stipulated remedy clauses. This line of authority did not avail 660 Sunningdale relating to the balance of the Lender Fee.

The Court explained that the balance of the Lender Fee was not paid or payable, in form or in substance, as a deposit, or a part payment or installment, and it was not a stipulated remedy clause, precisely because it was not agreed to in order to secure performance of the bargain. Nor did this case involve any suggestion of “fraud, accident, mistake or surprise”, so it could not shelter under the alternative situation derived from English authority.

Narrow jurisdiction to grant relief against forfeiture has also been recognized where a party faces the loss of an option to renew a lease or extend a contractual right. The Court pointed out that this line of authority did not avail 660 Sunningdale, as this case did not involve either property rights or a failed attempt to exercise an option to renew.

In this case, the motion judge did not relieve 660 Sunningdale from any specified conduct that it engaged in that triggered its obligation to pay the balance of the Lender Fee. She, in effect, purported to relieve 660 Sunningdale not from the consequences of its conduct relating to the contract but rather from a contractual term that she found to be excessive and unconscionable in amount. It is not the role of relief against forfeiture to relieve parties from terms of a contract they agreed to, on the grounds of the improvidence of that term. That is the function of the independent doctrine of unconscionability. There was no suggestion in the motion judge’s decision that she considered whether there was an inequality of bargaining power between the parties to the Loan Agreement. Moreover, it was worth noting that 660 Sunningdale appeared to be a commercial developer capable of handling a largescale development, not a disadvantaged consumer.

The Balance of the Lender Fee was Not Contingent on the Loan Being Advanced

There were indications that the motion judge may have found, in the alternative, that 660 Sunningdale should receive the return of the balance of the Lender Fee because it was not earned, as the loan was not advanced. Those indications included the focus that she gave to a term of the Loan Agreement providing that the Lender Fee was payable out of the first advance, as well as her conclusion that the Court’s decision in Marshallzehr Group Inc. supported her decision.

The motion judge’s reliance on the Marshallzehr Group Inc. decision strongly suggested that she concluded that the Lender Fee in this case was similarly unearned, and not payable because the loan had not been advanced. If the motion judge did arrive at this conclusion, the Court held that she made a palpable and overriding error by arriving at an unreasonable interpretation of the contract and/or that she made an extricable legal error by failing to consider the whole of the Loan Agreement. The Loan Agreement before the motion judge was materially different than the loan agreement at issue in Marshallzehr Group Inc.

In its statement of claim, 660 Sunningdale sought $1 million in punitive damages and $50 million in damages against First Source for disrupting its business by causing 660 Sunningdale to terminate its loan commitment as a result of First Source’s unreasonable behaviour. First Source joined issue with that claim, denying that it committed any breaches of the Loan Agreement.

The motion judge decided that 660 Sunningdale had not established the breach, but she did not dismiss or address its damage claim. The Court held that she did not have to do so. 660 Sunningdale abandoned its damages claim in its summary judgment motion factum, stating that it was “foregoing any other damages and is simply requesting a release of the funds”. The damages claim therefore ended with its abandonment without the need for a dismissal of those claims.

Bell v. Amini, 2024 ONCA 260

[Pepall, George and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.B., acting in person

S. M. Sack and D. R. Miller, for the respondent

facts:

The respondent, a lawyer, had agreed to represent the appellant on a Motion to Change in a family law matter on a Legal Aid certificate. According to the respondent, the appellant had not followed the respondent’s recommended litigation strategy and instead adopted her own approach, which the respondent described as “unreasonable [and] unnecessarily hostile”.

On February 13, 2019, the appellant filed a complaint against the respondent with Legal Aid Ontario (“LAO”) and applied for a change of solicitor. The respondent responded to the complaint. LAO, after concluding that the appellant had conducted herself in an unreasonable manner, declined to approve further coverage. The appellant represented herself on the Motion to Change, which was ultimately unsuccessful.

On February 1, 2021, the appellant commenced an action against the respondent claiming that the respondent was negligent, had committed malpractice by withdrawing her services, and had defamed her in her communications with LAO.

issues:

Issue:

Did the motion judge err in concluding that there was no viable negligence claim?
Did the motion judge err in their determination regarding defamation?
Did the motion judge err in summarily dismissing the appellant’s action against the respondent?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

There were three problems with this submission. First, while there was a dispute about the timing of the allegation, the motion judge had found, and the appellant had conceded, that she had accused the respondent of colluding with opposing counsel, to her detriment. Second, the motion judge, the judge who heard the Motion to Change, and LAO, each concluded that the appellant had acted unreasonably in the proceedings. The Court has already found, when considering a motion related to the family law matter, that the appellant had “repeatedly litigated issues that have already been decided, engaged in abusive behaviour, and deliberately failed to comply with clear court orders”: Bell at para. 4. And third, when the respondent ended the solicitor-client relationship, the Motion to Change had not yet been scheduled, which afforded the appellant sufficient time to prepare.

The Court noted that there was no evidence in the record that could support a conclusion that the respondent’s conduct amounted to negligence.

The appellant had been advised, even before the retainer was terminated, that the respondent would have to provide LAO with updates. In any event, the respondent had no choice but to respond to the February 13, 2019 complaint.

Moreover, truth is a complete defence to a defamation claim: Grant at paras. 32-33; Haskett at para. 54. The motion judge had concluded that the respondent’s statements to LAO were truthful and accurate.

The motion judge referred to and applied the correct test for summary judgment as set out in Hyrniak.

The Court noted that after the motion judge considered the powers available to her under r. 20.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, she concluded that she could “make a just decision on the evidentiary record” before her. This evidence, per the motion judge, was sufficient to demonstrate that comments made by the appellant led to a breakdown of the solicitor-client relationship. As explained by Karakatsanis J. in Hyrniak, the exercise of powers available to motion judges on summary judgment applications attracts deference on appeal: Hyrniak, at paras. 81-84. The findings made by the trial judge were available to her on the record. The Court concluded that there was no basis on which to interfere with the motion judge’s decision.

Roalno Inc. v. Schaefer, 2024 ONCA 262

[Trotter, Thorburn and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Bieber, for the appellant/respondents by way of cross-appeal

R. W. Scriven, for the respondents Dale Schaefer and Maurice Freiburger

P. Loucks and T. Ivanina, for the respondents/cross-appellants Brian Freiburger and Kenneth Freiburger

facts:

The appeal arose out of a real estate transaction that failed after the parties both mistakenly came to believe that the property being sold and purchased was subject to a prescriptive easement. The would-be purchaser, the appellant Roalno Inc. (“Roalno”), owned and controlled by S.S, refused to close unless the vendors either reduced the sale price or took steps to have the supposed easement extinguished. When the vendors refused to do either of these things, Roalno refused to close. It then sued for specific performance with an abatement. The trial judge refused the relief on the basis that Roalno had breached the agreement of purchase and sale by refusing to close. Roalno appealed from this decision.

issues:

Did the trial judge err in her statement that “S.S should have closed and argued about the interpretation of the agreement later,” given that a purchaser seeking specific performance with an abatement is not required to close at the original purchase price to preserve the right to seek such remedy?
Did the trial judge err by finding that Roalno breached the contract when it refused to close on April 30, 2018?
Should an order be granted for Roalno’s request for a declaratory order that the road running over the F brothers’ northern properties was an “access road” under the Road Access Act in relation to the Vendors’ properties and an order be granted under the Act prohibiting the F brothers from obstructing the road?
Should the cross-appeal by the F brothers be allowed?

holding:

Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

The Court accepted that in situations where a purchaser of land was entitled to claim the remedy of specific performance with an abatement, because “there was a discrepancy between what the vendor had agreed to convey and what the vendor can convey,” the purchaser was not required to close at the original purchase price as a precondition for obtaining such remedy. However, the Court found that this principle did not assist Roalno. The Court was prepared to assume for the purpose of its analysis that S.S meant for the para. 28.2 “representation and warranty” in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) to be a condition, and that if there had in fact been an unregistered easement over the property, Roalno would have had the option of either terminating the contract or seeking specific performance with an abatement. However, everyone agreed that there never was any such easement.

In the Court’s view, Roalno could not rely on S.S’s legally erroneous belief that an easement by prescription might exist to justify its refusal to close at the agreed-on purchase price. The Court was also not persuaded that Roalno could retroactively justify its refusal to close by invoking the possibility of the respondents relying on the Road Access Act. S.S’s evidence was that he only learned about the existence of the Road Access Act months later, once litigation was underway. The Court was not persuaded that he could justify Roalno’s refusal to close based on a consideration that was not in his mind at the time.

2. No.

The Court accepted that the letter from the vendor’s lawyer (S.K) of April 25, 2018, could be understood as indicating the Vendors’ intention not to be bound by the APS because they mistakenly believed that they would be unable to fulfil one of its terms. However, S.K sent this letter in response to S.S’s earlier April 13, 2018 email and F.G’s April 23 and 24, 2018 letters, all of which made it equally clear that Roalno had no intention of fulfilling its own end of the bargain. The correspondence from S.S and F.G would have left a reasonable person in the Vendors’ position with no doubt that Roalno did not intend to complete the transaction according to the terms of the APS.

The Court found that S.K’s April 25, 2018 letter could not be properly characterized as an anticipatory breach of the APS by the Vendors. It was Roalno who anticipatorily breached the contract when S.S sent his April 13, 2018 email, reaffirmed by F.G’s letters ten days later. The Court was satisfied that when S.K sent his April 25, 2018 letter, he was communicating his clients’ decision that they would accept the repudiation, unless the parties agreed to amend the APS to remove para. 28.2. This led to the contract’s end, disentitling Roalno from being granted specific performance, either with or without an abatement. Moreover, as the innocent party in the breach, the Court found that the Vendors were entitled to keep Roalno’s $5,000 deposit.

3. The Court did not address this issue.

The Court found that its conclusion made it unnecessary to address Roalno’s request for a declaratory order that the road running over the F brothers’ northern properties was an “access road” under the Road Access Act in relation to the Vendors’ properties, and for an order under the Act prohibiting the F brothers from obstructing this road, since these requests were both contingent on Roalno being granted specific performance.

4. The Court did not address this issue.

The Court’s conclusion that Roalno’s appeal should be dismissed also made it unnecessary for the Court to address the F brothers’ cross-appeal, since the relief they sought was also contingent on Roalno’s appeal being allowed and it being awarded specific performance.

National Steel Car Limited v. Independent Electricity SystemOperator, 2024 ONCA 265

[Pepall, Harvison Young and Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. R. Morse, D. M. Trafford, and E. A. Cherniak, K.C., for the appellant, National Steel Car Limited

A. Mark and M. Ouanounou, for the respondent, Independent Electricity System Operator

P. Ryan and K. Leung, for the respondents, the Attorney General of Ontario and His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario

facts:

This appeal involved a constitutional challenge to electricity costs. In 2009, the Government of Ontario designed a feed-in-tariff renewable electricity procurement program (the “FIT Program”) pursuant to the Green Energy and Green Economy Act (the “Green Energy Act”). Under the FIT Program, suppliers of renewable energy were paid to “feed in” energy into Ontario’s electricity grid. As a result, the cost of electricity increased substantially for the appellant, National Steel Car Limited, a heavy user of electricity.

Before the application judge, it took the position that the FIT Program was principally undertaken and intended to create economic stimulus in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and to redress perceived economic harm suffered by Indigenous communities, rural communities, municipalities, and co-operatives due to the financial crisis. It argued that the FIT Program was designed to achieve a general economic purpose, not a regulatory purpose, and as such, the costs of the FIT Program, as paid through the Global Adjustment, were not valid regulatory charges. Rather, they were a colourable attempt to tax through regulation contrary to s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which required taxes to be authorized by the legislature. The application judge disagreed with the appellant and concluded that the costs of the FIT Program were valid regulatory charges.

issues:

Did the application judge err in finding that for the appellant to succeed in its colourability claim, it had to establish that the Government of Ontario had “lied”?
Did the application judge err by failing to provide reasons that permitted appellate review?
Did the application judge err in finding that the Stimulus Goals were a valid regulatory purpose?
Did the application judge err in finding that the appellant’s expert witnesses were biased?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

The appellant submitted that to succeed in its colourability argument, the application judge improperly required it to establish that Ontario had lied about the purposes of the FIT Program. Rather, the required analysis was whether the purpose of the legislation was, in pith and substance, to achieve a purpose other than that suggested by the legislation. According to the appellant, the alternate and invalid purpose was the pursuit of the Stimulus Goals. The “colourability” doctrine is invoked when a statute bears the formal trappings of a matter within jurisdiction, but in reality, is addressed to a matter outside jurisdiction. An ulterior motive was not a prerequisite to a finding of colourability, but in some cases, Parliament might try to invade an area of provincial jurisdiction by disguising the true nature of its legislation. The appellant raised the issue of falsehood and intent and the application judge responded to it. The Court found that the appellant made the strategic choice to frame its colourability argument in a way to challenge the veracity of the stated purposes of the regulation. The Court concluded that the application judge’s references were reflective of the appellant’s own argument.

2. No.

Evidentiary disputes between parties

i) The appellant contended that the application judge incorrectly supported the FIT Program’s regulatory objectives deeming them unsupported except for the last, which it labeled as mere economic stimulus. Despite these objections, the application judge ruled that the FIT Program’s component of the Global Adjustment was a valid regulatory charge linked to electricity regulation and could serve economic stimulus purposes. The Court found that the conclusion was well-supported by evidence, allowing for appellate review. The Court noted that the application judge conducted a thorough pith and substance analysis, finding that the economic stimulus was a secondary aspect of the program’s legitimate regulatory goals.

(a) Coal-Fired Generation

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding that eliminating coal-fired generation was a goal of the FIT Program, noting that replacement by gas-fired processes was already planned before its implementation. The respondents argued that actual energy production varies and does not always match capacity and emphasized that the FIT Program sought to integrate various energy sources, including nuclear and renewables, in a broad, evolving strategy. The Court upheld that the objective to phase out coal power was appropriately recognized as part of the FIT Program’s comprehensive energy goals.

(b) Air Quality and Healthcare Costs

The application judge found that improving air quality and reducing healthcare costs were among the purposes of the FIT Program, despite the appellant’s claim that no studies had shown such benefits would result from the program. Ample evidence supported the view that the FIT Program aimed to enhance environmental outcomes and public health. The FIT Directive aimed to increase the capacity of renewable energy supply to reduce emissions. The Court found that the absence of specific contemporaneous studies did not detract from the program’s regulatory intent to improve the environment, and such studies were not necessary to confirm the government’s policy goals or the program’s effectiveness in achieving environmental benefits.

(c) Planning

The application judge recognized planning for an impending energy supply shortage as a purpose of the FIT Program, countering the appellant’s claim that no imminent need justified the extensive renewable energy goals under the FIT Program based on 2008 testimony. The Ontario Government had revised the original Integrated Power System Plan to significantly boost renewable energy, reflecting a 2008 policy change aimed at addressing potential shortages due to retiring coal-fired and some nuclear generation. The Court upheld this policy adjustment, finding it reasonable within Ontario’s long-term energy strategy and aligning with the goal of adequacy, safety, reliability, and sustainability under the Electricity Act, 1998. The evidence supported the application judge’s endorsement of these new targets and the broader policy shift, validating the necessity for forward-looking, comprehensive energy planning.

(d) Fostering Renewable Energy

The appellant contended that the FIT Program’s high prices made it unnecessary for procuring renewable energy. The application judge upheld the FIT Program’s pricing, which was intended to cover costs plus a reasonable return, particularly to boost participation among Indigenous and community groups through “price adders.” Expert witnesses noted that prior programs had high administrative costs and failed to adequately support local and Indigenous involvement, prompting the need for better incentives under the FIT Program. The Court found that the FIT Program aimed to advance renewable energy generation in Ontario, fulfilling broader governmental regulatory, environmental, and social goals, and was not merely economic stimulus, as the extra costs were a minor part of the overall Global Adjustment.

(e) Indigenous and Community Participation

The FIT Directive aimed to encourage Indigenous and community participation in Ontario’s electrical system, a goal unchallenged by the appellant and upheld by the application judge. The application judge recognized the FIT Program as key to regulating electricity, potentially providing economic stimulus, since the Global Adjustment covered only actual costs and did not fund general revenues. Section 25.35(2) of the Electricity Act, 1998, and expert testimony, affirmed that electricity policies often pursued multiple objectives—economic, social, or environmental. The Court agreed with the application judge’s assessment, acknowledging the FIT Program’s regulatory and societal aims, and found his reasons sufficient for appellate review.

Admissibility of hearsay evidence

ii) The appellant argued that the application judge failed to address hearsay allegations concerning the FIT prices allowing generators to recover costs plus an 11 percent return as the target for a reasonable return. However, the Court found this rate appropriately supported by rule 39.01(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure (the admissibility of evidence of non-contentious facts on information and belief), FIPPA documents, and the appellant’s expert testimony. The application judge accepted the rate without further validation, categorizing charges limited to actual cost recovery within a regulatory scheme as regulatory charges, not taxes. Therefore, the Court determined no further inquiry was necessary from the application judge.

Onus to establish connection between the cost of the FIT Program and the regulation of electricity

iii) The appellant also submitted that the application judge’s reasons were insufficient because they failed to address the burden on the respondents to establish a connection between the cost of the FIT Program and the regulation of electricity. The Court agreed with the application judge that it did not matter who bore the onus of proof. If the onus was on the respondents, they succeeded; if the onus was on the appellant, it failed. The Court found no fault in the application judge’s decision. The application judge did not deem it necessary to discuss the onus because the respondents’ arguments prevailed, showing the charge was a valid regulatory charge.

3. No.

The appellant challenged the application judge’s findings that the goals of economic stimulus were legitimate regulatory objectives within the realm of energy procurement. The appellant contended that the judge erred by not considering these goals as extraneous to Ontario’s electricity system’s mandate for general or specific economic development. They argued that accepting such goals within regulatory policies allowed governments too broad a scope to enact economic policies under any regulatory guise, potentially contravening constitutional protections specified in s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. The crux of their argument was against the use of regulatory charges primarily aimed at economic stimulation as conflicting with constitutional norms.

(i) The pith and substance of the FIT Program was not the pursuit of the Stimulus Goals

The appellant argued that the primary purpose of the FIT Program was to pursue Stimulus Goals, relying on statements from former Minister Smitherman and Assistant Deputy Minister Lo, which were considered hearsay. However, these statements did not conclusively indicate that economic stimulus was the predominant purpose of the program. The application judge found that the Government was not strictly bound by the advice it received and that adopting a policy with some opposition did not necessarily mean its regulatory purpose was overtaken by stimulus aims. Moreover, checks for transmission and distribution availability were standard before awarding FIT contracts, contradicting claims that these contracts served solely as economic stimulus. The assertion that the FIT Program was a tax was also rejected by the Court, as was the reliability of the appellant’s expert evidence, which the application judge questioned for impartiality. The Court concluded that the appellant’s arguments about the FIT Program’s primary intent for economic stimulus were unsupported by meaningful evidence.

(ii) The FIT Program component of the Global Adjustment is a valid regulatory charge

The application judge found that the FIT Program was part of a clear regulatory scheme aimed at incentivizing renewable energy in Ontario, distinguishing it from a revenue-raising mechanism. Payments to electricity suppliers were related to their contributions to the electricity grid, with the Global Adjustment ensuring that costs to consumers reflected payments to generators, covering only actual costs without generating surplus revenue. The application judge also recognized that economic, social, and environmental considerations were valid in electricity regulation, countering the appellant’s argument that the program’s focus on economic stimulus was inappropriate. The Court found that the multifaceted role of electricity in Ontario’s economy underscored the legitimacy of integrating broader economic and social goals into electricity policy.

4. No.

The application judge admitted the evidence of the two experts by the appellant and decided to give it the weight it deserved in light of all the evidence. However, the application judge found the experts to be entrenched in bias. Specifically, he found that they failed at the fourth of the Mohan criteria in the threshold stage, which required, as per rule 4.1.01 of the Rules, the witness to be independent, objective, and impartial. The Court found that the application judge’s finding was open to him and was owed deference. Moreover, the application judge admitted their evidence and the Court saw no basis on which to interfere.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Shaulov v. Law Society of Ontario, 2024 ONCA 263

[MacPherson, Paciocco and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A.S., acting in person

S. Aylward and K. Bernofsky, for the respondents Law Society of Ontario, Performance Assessment Group Inc., John Braham and Michael Williams

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Orders, Final or Interlocutory

Bogue v. Law Society of Ontario, 2024 ONCA 264

[Brown J.A.]

Counsel:

G.B., acting in person

J. Elcombe, for the respondent Law Society of Ontario

L. Saad, for the respondent Colin Bogue

Foster v. Ontario (Children, Community & Social Services), 2024 ONCA 259

[Roberts, George and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G.F., acting in person

L. Brazil, for the respondent

Pencor Construction Inc. v. 1322295 Ontario Ltd., 2024 ONCA 273

[van Rensburg, Zarnett and George JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Richter, for the appellants

J. Butson, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditors, Real Property, Mortgages, Defences, Unconscionability, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment

De Cerigo Properties Inc. v. Raffan, 2024 ONCA 272

[Lauwers, Roberts and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Mazzuca and B. Masters, for the appellants

D. Berlach and N. Eklove, for the respondent

L. Melconian, for Karen Caradonna

Keywords: Costs

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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CIVIL DECISIONS

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SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

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John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email