In Kamil v. Alnoor, the Court refused to admit fresh evidence and quashed a husband’s appeal from an family law order after finding he remained in breach of court orders, including substantial child support arrears.

In Bocchini Estate v. Canada (Attorney General), the Court allowed an appeal, holding that under the 1886 Indian Act, dependent family members were automatically withdrawn from treaty when the head of their family withdrew. Accordingly, they and their descendants were not “Indians” within the meaning of the Indian Act and could not be registered as such. In dissent, George J.A. would have dismissed the appeal.

Law Society of Ontario v AA was a lengthy decision involving a successful appeal by the LSO from a Tribunal good character ruling for a licensing candidate with a history of child sexual abuse. The Court deemed the Tribunal’s decision unreasonable because it failed to grapple with the overarching public interest in maintaining public confidence in the profession and since it was internally inconsistent in finding AA of good character while imposing an unenforceable supervision condition for interactions with minors. It remitted the good character question to the Hearing Division for fresh assessment. On the motion by AA to anonymize the case, the Court rejected any presumption that prior confidentiality orders bind higher courts. Each court has the right to control its own record. The Court applied Sherman Estate afresh to conclude that anonymizing its record was necessary and proportionate to protect the privacy and dignity of AA’s daughter as a victim of her father’s abuse. The Court noted that while the order’s benefits presently outweighed its impact on court openness given AA’s status as an applicant for licencing who was not yet a lawyer, the balance may shift if AA becomes licensed. At that point, the public interest of clients making informed choices on retaining counsel will need to be taken into account. However, that will be a question for another day.

In Kakoutis v. Bank of Nova Scotia, the Court dismissed a motion to stay an eviction order pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and dismissed the respondent’s cross-motion under r. 37.16 to prohibit the appellant from bringing any further interlocutory motions. Judgment for possession of the mortgaged property had been granted to the bank over a decade ago, yet the appellant was still in the property all these years later, having not made any payments in the interim.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Kamil v. Alnoor, 2026 ONCA 53

Keywords: Family Law, Property, Matrimonial Home, Equalization of Net Family Property, Support, Parenting, Civil Procedure, Disclosure, Orders, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Uncontested Trials, Appeals, Fresh Evidence, Collateral Attack, Abuse of Process, Sigalas v. Sigalas Selas, 2025 ONCA 75, S.S. v. S.R.A., 2025 ONCA 724, Abu-Saud v. Abu-Saud, 2020 ONCA 824, Consentino v. Consentino, 2017 ONCA 593, Lamothe v. Ellis, 2022 ONCA 789

CASE Bocchini Estate v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 55

Keywords: Aboriginal Law, Treaty, Dependents, Statutory Interpretation, Judicial Review, Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, ss. 6(1)(a), 14.2, 14.3,  Manitoba Act, 1870, S.C. 1870, c. 3, s. 31, The Indian Act, 1876, S.C. 1876, c. 18, s. 3(3)(e), The Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c. 29, s.12(1)(a)(ii), An Act to amend “The Indian Act, 1876”, S.C. 1879, c. 34, s. 1, An Act further to amend “The Indian Act”, S.C. 1888, c. 22, s. 1., The Indian Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 43, ss. 13, 20, 39(a), 75, 78, 81, 83, An Act further to amend “The Indian Act, 1880”, S.C. 1884, c. 27, s. 4., Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 45(2), Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-2, Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11, Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada, 2013 SCC 14, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, R. v. Wilson, 2025 SCC 32, Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2013 FC 6, 357 D.L.R. (4th) 47, Opetchesaht Indian Band v. Canada, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 119, Canada v. South Yukon Forest Corporation, 2012 FCA 165, 431 N.R. 286, R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9, 481 D.L.R. (4th) 195, Pointe-Claire (City) v. Quebec (Labour Court), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1015, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, George v. Daily (1997), 115 Man. R. (2d) 27 (C.A.), Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, The Construction of Statutes, 7th Ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2022), § 8.03, 13.04[5], 23.04, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), Looking Forward, Looking Back, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), Debates of the House of Commons, 1st Sess, 4th Parl, Vol. VII, May 13, 1879, Debates of the House of Commons, 2nd Sess, 5th Parl, Vol. XVI, April 7, 1884, Debates of the House of Commons, 2nd Sess, 6th Parl, Vol. XXVI, April 26, 1888, “Classification of Gratuitous Transfers” (1941) 51 Yale L. J. 1

Law Society of Ontario v. AA, 2026 ONCA 47

Keywords: Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Licensing, Good Character, Public Interest, Civil Procedure, Standard of Review, Publication Bans, Anonymization Orders, Open Court Principle, Sherman Estate Test, Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, ss. 4.1, 4.1(a), 4.2, 4.2(3), 27(2) and (4), 49.26, 62(0.1)4.1, By-Law 4, s. 8(1), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990, accession by Canada 13 December 1991), art. 3(1), Law Society of Ontario, Rules of Practice and Procedure, rr. 1.1(a)-(b), Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, Armstrong v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2009 ONLSHP 29, Howard Steven Levenson v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2009 ONLSHP 98, Law Society of Ontario v. Colangelo, 2023 ONLSTA 16, 2024 ONSC 2446, aff’d 2025 ONCA 341, Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21, Pepa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 SCC 21, Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, Preyra, Re, 2000 CanLII 14383 (Ont. L.S.T.H.), Fortin v. Chrétien, 2001 SCC 45, Green v. Law Society of Manitoba, 2017 SCC 20, Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32, Song v. The Law Society of Alberta, 2025 ABKB 525, Trinity Western University v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33, A.G. Can. v. Law Society of B.C., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, Adams v. Law Society of Alberta, 2000 ABCA 240, Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC 52, Gaya v. Law Society of Ontario, 2022 ONLSTH 53, Mundulai v. Law Society of Ontario, 2024 ONSC 959 (Div. Ct.), motion for extension of time to file a motion for leave to appeal denied, 2025 ONCA 68, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Abbott, 2017 ONCA 525, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 355, Rad v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONLSTH 67, aff’d 2023 ONLSTA 26, Yeager v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONLSTH 42, Polanski v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2020 ONLSTH 115, aff’d 2021 ONLSTA 26, appeal quashed, 2022 ONSC 1428, leave to appeal to Ont. C.A. refused, M53298, Birkett v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONLSTA 14, Pachai v. Law Society of Ontario, 2021 ONLSTH 18, Nsamba v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONLSTH 62, John Blackburn v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2010 ONLSHP 112, Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, Komolafe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 431, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2024 SCC 4, Commission scolaire francophone des Territoires du Nord-Ouest v. Northwest Territories (Education, Culture and Employment), 2023 SCC 31, Sheps v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONLSTH 124, Universal Ostrich Farms Inc. v. Canada (Food Inspection Agency), 2025 FCA 147, leave to appeal refused, [2025] S.C.C.A. No. 344, Law Society of Ontario v. Splinter, 2021 ONLSTH 58, Law Society of Ontario v. Schulz, 2021 ONLSTH 178, Law Society of Ontario v. Lesieur, 2021 ONLSTH 144, Law Society of Ontario v. King, 2022 ONSLTH 30, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Aron, 2011 ONLSHP 31, Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 202, Law Society of Ontario v. AA, 2022 ONLSTH 9, 2024 ONLSTA 6, 2024 ONSC 3102, 2024 ONSC 5971, Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19, Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Manitoba, 2021 SCC 33, Eghtesad v. British Columbia (Director of Civil Forfeiture), 2024 BCCA 32, P1 v. XYZ School, 2022 ONCA 571, R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10, Lochner v. Ontario Civilian Police Commission, 2020 ONCA 720, G-L. v. OHIP (General Manager), 2014 ONSC 5392, leave to appeal to Ont. C.A. refused, M43614 (August 22, 2014), Nahas v. Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, 2021 ONSC 6940, R.A.R. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (2006), 275 D.L.R. (4th) 275 (Ont. C.A.), CBC v. Chief of Police, 2021 ONSC 6935, Laity v. The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2018 ONSC 4557, R. v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 432, R. v. Warsing, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 579, L.C.F. v. G.F., 2016 ONSC 6732, R.R. v. Newfoundland and Labrador, 2022 NLSC 46, A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46, H. (M.E.) v. Williams, 2012 ONCA 35, R. v. Hosannah, 2015 ONSC 380, R. v. Jha, 2015 ONSC 1064, Fedeli v. Brown, 2020 ONSC 994, R. v. T.W.W., 2024 SCC 19, R. v. Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10, R. v. Kirkpatrick, 2022 SCC 33, Ricard v. The University of Windsor, 2021 ONSC 5877, S.E.L. v. O.V.P., 2022 ONSC 1390, Canada (Transportation Safety Board) v. Carroll-Byrne, 2022 SCC 48, Airia Brands Inc. v. Air Canada, 2017 ONCA 792, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 476, Kirby v. Woods, 2025 ONCA 437, Mary F. Southin, Q.C., “What is ‘Good Character’” (1977), 35:2 Advocate 129, Mark Mancini, “The Purpose Error in the Modern Approach to Statutory Interpretation” (2022) 59 Alta. L. Rev. 919, Paul Daly, “The Scope and Meaning of Reasonableness Review After Vavilov” (2025) 63:1 Alta. L.R. 1, Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) (looseleaf updated June 2025, release 2), James Rossiter, Law of Publication Bans, Private Hearings and Sealing Orders (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2006) (loose-leaf updated May 2025, release 1), Law Society of Upper Canada, “Submission on the Federation of Law Societies of Canada’s National Suitability to Practise Standard Consultation Report, November 2013, Professional Regulation Committee Report to Convocation” (2013)

Kakoutis v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2026 ONCA 49

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Possession, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Frivolous and Vexatious, Abuse of Process, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 19(1)(c), Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 37.16, 61.16, Kakoutis v. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 2015 ONSC 513, Kakoutis v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2016 ONSC 2300,  RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, Hoang v. Mann Engineering Ltd., 2015 ONCA 838, Damallie v. Ping, 2017 ONCA 146, Bajouco v. Green, 2017 ONCA 493, Lum v. College of Physiotherapists of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 271, Susin v. Susin, 2018 ONCA 549

Short Civil Decisions

Narouz v. Fisgard Capital Corporation, 2026 ONCA 56

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time

Nunes v. Nunes, 2026 ONCA 54

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Gifts, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment

Farmer v. Farmer Estate, 2026 ONCA 50

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Estate Administration, Estate Trustees, Compensation, Costs

Munyal v. Baldwin, 2026 ONCA 52

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Civil Procedure, Settlements, Enforcement, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 49.09, R. v. Palmer, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, Capital Gains Income Streams Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Canada Inc. (2007) 87 O.R. (3d) 464 (Div. Ct.), Scherer v. Paletta, [1966] 2 O.R. 524 (C.A.)

Crescent Fesh Inc. v. Pivotal Fine Homes Ltd., 2026 ONCA 57

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Corporations, Shares, Civil Procedure, Appeals, New Issues on Appeal, Fresh Evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 14.05(3)(d) and (h)

Furney v. Robins Appleby LLP, 2026 ONCA 59

Keywords: Torts, Professional Negligence, Lawyers, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Limitation Periods, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B, ss. 4 and 5

Strutzenberger v. Strutzenberger, 2026 ONCA 61

Keywords: Family Law, Support, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Extension of Time, Strutzenberger v. Strutzenberger, 2025 ONCA 836

CIVIL DECISIONS

Kamil v. Alnoor, 2026 ONCA 53

[Roberts, Coroza and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

NK, acting in person

N. Samali, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Property, Matrimonial Home, Equalization of Net Family Property, Support, Parenting, Civil Procedure, Disclosure, Orders, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Uncontested Trials, Appeals, Fresh Evidence, Collateral Attack, Abuse of Process, Sigalas v. Sigalas Selas, 2025 ONCA 75, S.S. v. S.R.A., 2025 ONCA 724, Abu-Saud v. Abu-Saud, 2020 ONCA 824, Consentino v. Consentino, 2017 ONCA 593, Lamothe v. Ellis, 2022 ONCA 789

facts:

The parties were former spouses involved in ongoing family law proceedings. During the litigation, the husband repeatedly failed to comply with court orders, including orders requiring financial disclosure and payment of child support (both arrears and ongoing support). As a result of these breaches, the lower court judge struck the husband’s pleadings. Because his pleadings were struck, the matter proceeded to an uncontested trial on the remaining issues.

Before trial, the matrimonial home had been sold pursuant to earlier court orders made in the course of the litigation. At the uncontested trial, the judge made an order requiring the husband to pay the wife an equalization payment of $62,833.45. After the trial, the husband sought to challenge that equalization amount and attempted to introduce a 2022 appraisal of the matrimonial home that he said had not been put before the trial judge. At the time of the appeal, the husband remained in significant child support arrears and continued to be in breach of court orders. The wife moved to quash the appeal. The husband moved to introduce fresh evidence.

issues:

1. Should the appeal be quashed because the husband was in ongoing breach of court orders, including substantial child support arrears?
2. Should the husband be permitted to file fresh evidence on appeal?
3. Does the appeal from the equalization order raise any arguable error, particularly regarding the value attributed to the matrimonial home in NFP calculations?

holding:

Motion to quash granted. Fresh evidence motion dismissed.

reasoning:

1. Yes.

The Court decided to quash the appeal because the husband was in serious, ongoing breach of court orders, including substantial unpaid child support and prior disclosure obligations that had already resulted in his pleadings being struck. The Court stressed that an appellant cannot seek the court’s assistance while persistently ignoring its orders, as this undermines the administration of justice and amounts to an abuse of the appellate process, especially where the non-compliance is prolonged and unexplained.

2. No.

The Court refused to admit the proposed fresh evidence because it did not meet the test for admitting new evidence on appeal. The appraisal pre-dated the trial and could have been obtained and presented with reasonable diligence.I In any event, it could not have affected the result because the matrimonial home had already been sold before trial, making an earlier appraisal irrelevant to the equalization calculation.

3. No

The Court found that the appeal disclosed no arguable error in the trial judge’s equalization analysis. The husband’s argument focused on the value of the matrimonial home, but the home had already been sold pursuant to earlier court orders, and the trial judge properly relied on the available financial evidence at the uncontested trial after the husband’s pleadings were struck. His position amounted to a collateral attack on prior orders and an attempt to relitigate issues he had lost the ability to contest through his own non-compliance.

Bocchini Estate v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 55

[Huscroft, Coroza, and George JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Beggs and M. Torrie, for the appellant

L. Lung and M. Brar, for the respondent

Keywords: Aboriginal Law, Treaty, Dependents, Statutory Interpretation, Judicial Review, Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, ss. 6(1)(a), 14.2, 14.3,  Manitoba Act, 1870, S.C. 1870, c. 3, s. 31, The Indian Act, 1876, S.C. 1876, c. 18, s. 3(3)(e), The Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c. 29, s.12(1)(a)(ii), An Act to amend “The Indian Act, 1876”, S.C. 1879, c. 34, s. 1, An Act further to amend “The Indian Act”, S.C. 1888, c. 22, s. 1., The Indian Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 43, ss. 13, 20, 39(a), 75, 78, 81, 83, An Act further to amend “The Indian Act, 1880”, S.C. 1884, c. 27, s. 4., Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 45(2), Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-2, Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11, Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada, 2013 SCC 14, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, R. v. Wilson, 2025 SCC 32, Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2013 FC 6, 357 D.L.R. (4th) 47, Opetchesaht Indian Band v. Canada, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 119, Canada v. South Yukon Forest Corporation, 2012 FCA 165, 431 N.R. 286, R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9, 481 D.L.R. (4th) 195, Pointe-Claire (City) v. Quebec (Labour Court), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1015, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, George v. Daily (1997), 115 Man. R. (2d) 27 (C.A.), Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, The Construction of Statutes, 7th Ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2022), § 8.03, 13.04[5], 23.04, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), Looking Forward, Looking Back, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), Debates of the House of Commons, 1st Sess, 4th Parl, Vol. VII, May 13, 1879, Debates of the House of Commons, 2nd Sess, 5th Parl, Vol. XVI, April 7, 1884, Debates of the House of Commons, 2nd Sess, 6th Parl, Vol. XXVI, April 26, 1888, “Classification of Gratuitous Transfers” (1941) 51 Yale L. J. 1

facts:

This appeal concerned the respondents’ longstanding attempt to be added to the Indian Register on the basis that they were the direct descendants of an “Indian.” Its resolution required the interpretation of legislation from early in Canada’s history, when Manitoba was being settled and treaty status was the subject of election for many Métis.

This appeal was a second administrative appeal from the decision of the Registrar appointed under the Indian Act (the “Act”). The legislation, including the now repealed historical versions, were not challenged. The Registrar concluded that the decision of the head of a family, B.S. Sr., to withdraw from treaty resulted in the withdrawal of dependent family members like S.P.C. The Registrar relied on the Indian Act as it existed in 1888 despite the 1886 version of the Act applying at the time of withdrawal. His decision was overturned by the appeal judge, who concluded that it did not result in withdrawal of dependent family members and that the Registrar erred in finding that the withdrawal from treaty was in accordance with s. 13 of the Act from 1886.

issues:

1. Was S.P.C lawfully withdrawn from treaty?
2. If so, was the allotment or receipt of scrip illegal because either:
   1. P.C. was the victim of scrip fraud, or
   2. P.C. was under the age of 18 at the relevant time?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

1. Yes.  The Court was satisfied that Parliament intended minor children to be automatically withdrawn from treaty when the head of their family withdrew. It followed that when B.S. Sr., the respondent’s great-great-grandfather withdrew from treaty, S.P.C., the respondent’s grandfather, was legally withdrawn along with him. Thus, despite the Registrar’s mistaken reliance on the 1888 version of the Act, he reached the correct interpretation of s. 13 (the “withdrawal provision”).

The text of the withdrawal provision addressed the formalities of the withdrawal process but did not explicitly address the implications of an individual’s withdrawal for the rest of their family. The context and purpose of the withdrawal provision demonstrated that Parliament intended minor children to be withdrawn from treaty along with the heads of their families. A bargain similar to that which inhered in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act was reflected in the withdrawal provision. To conclude otherwise would have been inconsistent with the legislative context and would frustrate Parliament’s purpose in enacting the withdrawal provision.

The appeal judge’s reliance on the presumption against tautology was misplaced, when assuming that the 1888 amendment to the Act had to be interpreted as changing the law – that it was remedial rather than declaratory. The Court asserted that under the presumption against tautology courts should not generally render any portion of a statute meaningless or pointless or redundant. The presumption applies only within a statute – not between different versions of a statute. Amendment of an act does not imply a change in the law.

The appeal judge also erred in relying on a strictly textual or plain reading of the withdrawal provision in the 1886 Act. The fact that the withdrawal provision did not explicitly state that minor unmarried children were withdrawn along with the head of the household was not determinative of the analysis. The intention to extinguish treaty rights was clear once the legislation was considered in accordance with the modern approach to statutory interpretation. No genuine ambiguity remained that required resolution in accordance with presumptions of statutory interpretation.

2(a). No. The Court found the errors identified by the appeal judge were not palpable and overriding. The Court did not share the appeal judge’s view that the Registrar failed to grapple in a meaningful way with the possibility of fraud or disregarded the evidence that was put before him. It saw no support for the claim that the Registrar committed a palpable and overriding error in reaching his conclusion that it was insufficient to establish fraud. The Court also disagreed with the appeal judge and found that S.P.C.’s missing signature page and the fact that scrip notes were redeemed were not badges of fraud.

2(b). Yes. The Court proceeded on the basis that S.P.C. was not entitled to scrip until he reached the age of 18. The question was whether he received scrip after he turned 18 on October 3, 1887. In the absence of a finding of fraud or other evidence of inaccuracy, the scrip notes and receipt should have been taken at face value. In the Court’s view, the Registrar must have been able to rely on documentary evidence given how long ago the events at issue occurred.

The Registrar mistakenly found that S.P.C. was issued scrip on March 8, 1888, when the scrip notes bore the date February 9, 1888. It followed that S.P.C received scrip after his 18th birthday. The Registrar’s errors in miscalculating his age and misstating the date of issuance were not overriding, and the appeal judge ought not to have interfered on this basis. Finally, there was no evidence for the appeal judge’s finding that S.P.C. sold his scrip while he was still 17. The appeal judge should not have made any finding on a complete lack of evidence.

George J.A. (dissenting): No.

in dissent, George J.A. found that while distinguishing between Métis and Indians was a policy of the MacDonald government, the rest of Canada’s submissions, especially its reliance on the Manitoba Act, were unpersuasive and unsustainable. There was nothing in the Hansard evidence that specifically tethered the withdrawal provision in the Indian Act to the Manitoba Act. Further, any intention on the part of the government to provide an “unconditional right” to withdraw from treaty was plainly contradicted by the formalities requirements set out in the text of the withdrawal provision. The withdrawal provision, as it read in 1886, did not allow minors to be withdrawn by adults; rather, it contemplated withdrawal on an individual basis by those who, by complying with the formalities requirements, demonstrated the legal capacity to voluntarily relinquish benefits under treaty. Canada’s further suggestion that minors could individually withdraw from treaty on their own must have failed.

Law Society of Ontario v. AA, 2026 ONCA 47

[Sossin, Favreau and Wilson JJ.A]

Counsel:

A. Block, B. Kates and A. Luey, for the appellant/responding party

J. Melnick, for the respondent/moving party

M. Birdsell and S. Ahmed, for the intervener Justice for Children and Youth

J. Manoryk, for the intervener Toronto Star Newspapers Limited

M. Grace, for the intervener Law360 Canada

Keywords: Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Licensing, Good Character, Public Interest, Civil Procedure, Standard of Review, Publication Bans, Anonymization Orders, Open Court Principle, Sherman Estate Test, Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, ss. 4.1, 4.1(a), 4.2, 4.2(3), 27(2) and (4), 49.26, 62(0.1)4.1, By-Law 4, s. 8(1), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990, accession by Canada 13 December 1991), art. 3(1), Law Society of Ontario, Rules of Practice and Procedure, rr. 1.1(a)-(b), Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, Armstrong v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2009 ONLSHP 29, Howard Steven Levenson v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2009 ONLSHP 98, Law Society of Ontario v. Colangelo, 2023 ONLSTA 16, 2024 ONSC 2446, aff’d 2025 ONCA 341, Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21, Pepa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 SCC 21, Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, Preyra, Re, 2000 CanLII 14383 (Ont. L.S.T.H.), Fortin v. Chrétien, 2001 SCC 45, Green v. Law Society of Manitoba, 2017 SCC 20, Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32, Song v. The Law Society of Alberta, 2025 ABKB 525, Trinity Western University v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33, A.G. Can. v. Law Society of B.C., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, Adams v. Law Society of Alberta, 2000 ABCA 240, Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC 52, Gaya v. Law Society of Ontario, 2022 ONLSTH 53, Mundulai v. Law Society of Ontario, 2024 ONSC 959 (Div. Ct.), motion for extension of time to file a motion for leave to appeal denied, 2025 ONCA 68, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Abbott, 2017 ONCA 525, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 355, Rad v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONLSTH 67, aff’d 2023 ONLSTA 26, Yeager v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONLSTH 42, Polanski v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2020 ONLSTH 115, aff’d 2021 ONLSTA 26, appeal quashed, 2022 ONSC 1428, leave to appeal to Ont. C.A. refused, M53298, Birkett v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONLSTA 14, Pachai v. Law Society of Ontario, 2021 ONLSTH 18, Nsamba v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONLSTH 62, John Blackburn v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2010 ONLSHP 112, Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, Komolafe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 431, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2024 SCC 4, Commission scolaire francophone des Territoires du Nord-Ouest v. Northwest Territories (Education, Culture and Employment), 2023 SCC 31, Sheps v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONLSTH 124, Universal Ostrich Farms Inc. v. Canada (Food Inspection Agency), 2025 FCA 147, leave to appeal refused, [2025] S.C.C.A. No. 344, Law Society of Ontario v. Splinter, 2021 ONLSTH 58, Law Society of Ontario v. Schulz, 2021 ONLSTH 178, Law Society of Ontario v. Lesieur, 2021 ONLSTH 144, Law Society of Ontario v. King, 2022 ONSLTH 30, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Aron, 2011 ONLSHP 31, Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 202, Law Society of Ontario v. AA, 2022 ONLSTH 9, 2024 ONLSTA 6, 2024 ONSC 3102, 2024 ONSC 5971, Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19, Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Manitoba, 2021 SCC 33, Eghtesad v. British Columbia (Director of Civil Forfeiture), 2024 BCCA 32, P1 v. XYZ School, 2022 ONCA 571, R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10, Lochner v. Ontario Civilian Police Commission, 2020 ONCA 720, G-L. v. OHIP (General Manager), 2014 ONSC 5392, leave to appeal to Ont. C.A. refused, M43614 (August 22, 2014), Nahas v. Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, 2021 ONSC 6940, R.A.R. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (2006), 275 D.L.R. (4th) 275 (Ont. C.A.), CBC v. Chief of Police, 2021 ONSC 6935, Laity v. The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2018 ONSC 4557, R. v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 432, R. v. Warsing, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 579, L.C.F. v. G.F., 2016 ONSC 6732, R.R. v. Newfoundland and Labrador, 2022 NLSC 46, A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46, H. (M.E.) v. Williams, 2012 ONCA 35, R. v. Hosannah, 2015 ONSC 380, R. v. Jha, 2015 ONSC 1064, Fedeli v. Brown, 2020 ONSC 994, R. v. T.W.W., 2024 SCC 19, R. v. Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10, R. v. Kirkpatrick, 2022 SCC 33, Ricard v. The University of Windsor, 2021 ONSC 5877, S.E.L. v. O.V.P., 2022 ONSC 1390, Canada (Transportation Safety Board) v. Carroll-Byrne, 2022 SCC 48, Airia Brands Inc. v. Air Canada, 2017 ONCA 792, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 476, Kirby v. Woods, 2025 ONCA 437, Mary F. Southin, Q.C., “What is ‘Good Character’” (1977), 35:2 Advocate 129, Mark Mancini, “The Purpose Error in the Modern Approach to Statutory Interpretation” (2022) 59 Alta. L. Rev. 919, Paul Daly, “The Scope and Meaning of Reasonableness Review After Vavilov” (2025) 63:1 Alta. L.R. 1, Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) (looseleaf updated June 2025, release 2), James Rossiter, Law of Publication Bans, Private Hearings and Sealing Orders (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2006) (loose-leaf updated May 2025, release 1), Law Society of Upper Canada, “Submission on the Federation of Law Societies of Canada’s National Suitability to Practise Standard Consultation Report, November 2013, Professional Regulation Committee Report to Convocation” (2013)

facts:

In 2009, on three occasions across a two-month period, AA sexually abused three children, one being his own daughter, while living outside Canada with his family in a religious community. The abuse involved clothed sexual touching. After being confronted by a victim’s father, AA admitted the abuse to his then-spouse and local religious and child welfare authorities but was never criminally charged. When he and his family returned to Canada, AA was diagnosed with paedophilic disorder and assessed to be in remission. At the time of this appeal, none of AA’s children, including the victimized daughter, are aware of his child abuse.

For eight years, between 2009 and 2017, AA lied to his doctors, child protection authorities and the Law Society of Ontario (the “LSO”) about his history of abuse, minimizing and misrepresenting the nature and extent of his past actions. In 2012, when AA first applied to be licensed as a lawyer, he did not disclose his sexual abuse, and the LSO only learned of his past via an anonymous letter. During the LSO’s subsequent investigation AA was uncooperative, eventually withdrawing his application in 2017. When AA again applied for licensing in 2019, the LSO referred his application to their Tribunal Hearing Division for a hearing to determine whether AA was “of good character” within the meaning of s. 27(2) of the Law Society Act (the “Act”) and thus entitled to practice law. Before the hearing, a Hearing Division panelist granted AA’s requested publication ban, anonymizing and sealing the hearing record. At the hearing, AA was determined to be of good character, though the Hearing Division attached a condition to AA’s license, mandating that he be supervised in any interactions with “minor children.”

On appeal by the LSO, the Tribunal’s Appeal Division upheld the Hearing Division’s decision entirely. The LSO then sought judicial review by the Divisional Court, which again fully upheld the Appeal Division’s decision, and also issued an interim publication and anonymization order for its own record, later made permanent in its merits decision.

In April 2025, the LSO was granted leave to appeal, and the Court issued an unopposed order anonymizing its record to the date of the appeal hearing, later extended to the release of reasons. The instant decision addresses both the LSO’s merits appeal and a motion by AA requesting a publication ban and anonymization order for the Court’s record. As part of its appeal, the LSO argued that the Divisional Court’s anonymization and non-publication decision should be set aside. Justice for Children and Youth (“JFCY”) intervened on the appeal, while Toronto Star Newspapers Limited (“Toronto Star”) and Law 360 Canada (“Law360”) intervened on the motion.

issues:

The LSO’s Appeal: Whether the Divisional Court Erred in Upholding the Tribunal’s Good Character Decision

1. Did the Tribunal fail to appreciate the nature of AA’s misconduct?
2. Did the Tribunal assess good character myopically, without assessing the result against the statutory purpose animating the good character requirement?
3. Did the Tribunal err by upholding an ineffective, unenforceable licensing condition?

AA’s Motion: Whether AA’s Motion for an Anonymization and Non-Publication Order Should be Granted

1. Did a presumption of continuity exist for the Tribunal’s anonymization order, as affirmed by the Divisional Court, such that the Court should maintain the order barring a material change in circumstances?
2. Did the LSO waive its right to challenge the anonymization order before the Court, since it previously argued before the Appeal Division that it would not seek to vary the order unless the matter were remitted for a new hearing?
3. If the Court assesses the merits afresh, should the anonymization order be continued?

holding:

Appeal allowed. Motion granted.

reasoning:

The LSO’s Appeal: Whether the Divisional Court Erred in Upholding the Tribunal’s Good Character Decision

Although the Divisional Court correctly identified the relevant standard of review as reasonableness, it erred in applying this standard of review to the Appeal Division’s unreasonable decision (the “Tribunal decision”). Hence, the proper remedy was to remit the question of AA’s good character back to the Hearing Division for a fresh assessment in line with the Court’s reasons.

Before addressing the alleged errors, the Court laid out the five-part Armstrong test for good character, which considers 1) the misconduct’s nature and duration, 2) whether the applicant shows remorse, 3) rehabilitation efforts and their success, 4) behaviour since the misconduct, and 5) the passage of time following the misconduct. With respect to Vavilovian reasonableness review, to be reasonable the Tribunal’s decision had to be consistent with the Act’s text, context and purpose. The Hearing Division’s reading of the text of s. 27 was plausible and incorporated Armstrong appropriately. However, a reasonable good character assessment must be alive to the wider legal context, namely the jurisprudential emphasis on public trust and confidence in the legal profession as fundamental to self-regulation in the public interest. Public trust in the profession at large emerges from clients’ trust in individual lawyers. Turning to purpose, the Court affirmed the LSO’s submission that the central objectives underlying the good character requirement are the LSO’s interest in protecting the public, maintaining high ethical standards for legal professionals, cultivating public confidence in the profession and its self-regulation, and treating applicants fairly. The Tribunal’s own case law indicated that these objectives must be grappled with in a broader assessment of good character that includes but does not solely rely on the aggregated result of the Armstrong factors.  Though this framework was not unreasonable, as expressed below, the Tribunal’s decision regarding AA was unreasonable in light of the legal constraints bearing upon it.

1. 1. No. The Hearing Division appropriately recognized the serious impact of AA’s sexual assaults on the child victims. Nevertheless, it concluded on its record that AA had demonstrated sincere, concerted efforts since 2017 to address his historic sexual misconduct, having sought treatment and expressed remorse for both his abuse and his lack of candid disclosure thereafter. It would be improper for the Court to effectively reweigh the Hearing Division’s conclusions on each Armstrong factor, which were entitled to deference. The Tribunal’s decision was attentive to the underlying administrative reasons, and it acted reasonably in not interfering with them. Sentencing case law cited by the LSO to suggest that the Tribunal should have recognized the severity of AA’s conduct as a matter of law was inapplicable to this licensing decision.
2. Yes. The Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable since it failed to consider overarching public interest in its good character assessment. While the Hearing Division identified the importance of AA’s trustworthiness and the public’s trust in the profession, it neglected to grapple with these questions in light of its findings on the Armstrong factors. The Hearing Division simply concluded that AA was currently of good character without explaining how it had balanced each factor. Furthermore, its analysis did not reflect a consideration of whether granting AA a license would align with public trust in the legal profession. For example, the Hearing Division did not explain how, in its view, AA’s recent five years of honesty could overcome the eight-year period where he lied repeatedly about his prior criminal acts. Regarding JFCY and the LSO’s submissions on the best interests of the child principle, the Court held it was not necessary to apply this principle explicitly, since no specific child was at risk on the record. However, the Hearing Division’s failure to consider the serious nature of AA’s assaults on children in relation to public confidence in the profession was another gap in the analysis. Ultimately, the Hearing Division failed to assess AA’s good character in a manner consistent with s. 27’s text, context and purpose, such that the Court had no confidence in the outcome reached.
3. Yes. The licensing condition imposed by the Hearing Division independently served to make the decision unreasonable, because the condition, which suggested that AA could not be trusted alone with children, was internally inconsistent with the determination that AA met the good character threshold. Although the Hearing Division clearly had broad discretion to attach conditions to a lawyer license, such conditions must be reasonable. AA could not point to any non-distinguishable decision in which a demographic restriction was placed on an applicant’s license as part of a good character disposition. Moreover, while the Divisional Court held that the condition’s origin, arising from AA’s offered undertaking not to interact with minors unsupervised, promoted AA’s good character and public confidence in the profession, the Court disagreed. If AA himself thought that he could not be trusted alone with children, the Hearing Division’s failure to address this admission in its decision was unreasonable and troubling, as was its failure to impose any monitoring or enforcement mechanisms alongside the condition.

AA’s Motion: Whether AA’s Motion for an Anonymization and Non-Publication Order Should be Granted

AA requested anonymization of his name, his ex-spouse and children’s names, and any other identifying information, as well as a publication ban. He framed this order as merely a continuation of the Hearing Division’s original order that was subsequently upheld by the Tribunal and the Divisional Court. This motion to the Court was a first-instance decision with no standard of review. Although it did not accept all of AA’s submissions, the Court nonetheless granted the motion, conducting a fresh Sherman Estate analysis. The standard of review pertinent to the LSO’s appeal of the Divisional Court’s anonymization/non-publication order was less clear, but on either a correctness standard or a deferential standard, the Divisional Court erred in law by failing to engage in its own Sherman Estate analysis. However, the Court declined to interfere with the Divisional Court’s order to avoid defeating its own conclusion on anonymization.

1. No. The Court set out the tripartite Sherman Estate criteria to limit court openness through an anonymization order: 1) court openness would pose serious risk to an important public interest, 2) the order must be necessary to prevent this risk, and 3) the benefits of the order must outweigh its negative effects. Substantial authority confirmed that anonymization and non-publication orders (“confidentiality orders”) by lower courts and subordinate tribunals do not bind higher courts. Each order at each level is independent from and may differ from the others, with courts retaining supervisory jurisdiction over their records. Confidentiality orders remain intact even as a case progresses to higher adjudicative bodies, unless upon a material change in circumstances an interested party seeks to set aside or vary a particular order. Hence, the Tribunal’s confidentiality order remained intact, but no presumption of continuity required the Court to also impose a confidentiality order (though it ultimately did, upon its own application of Sherman Estate).
2. No. It was clear from the record that the LSO never waived its objection to AA’s motion for an anonymization and non-publication order before the Court. While the LSO did not oppose various interim confidentiality orders, counsel clearly stipulated at each stage that the LSO reserved its right to challenge AA’s motion at the motion hearing. Furthermore, it was doubtful that a party could ever waive application of the open court principle, which is a right of the public at large and not a particular litigant’s privilege.
3. Yes. On a fresh analysis, the Court granted a new anonymization and non-publication order. Assessing the first prong of the Sherman Estate test, the Court rejected AA’s arguments that the risk of harm to him personally, or general, speculative impacts on his children’s mental health from disclosing his name constituted serious risks to important public interests. AA and his ex-spouse’s decision not to tell their daughter that she was a victim of AA’s abuse could not dictate the Court’s analysis of whether to deviate from the open court principle. However, disclosure of AA’s daughter’s identity, given her positionality as a victim of sexual abuse, was a serious risk to her privacy and dignity. Many courts had held that preservation of an abuse survivor’s dignity was an important public interest. The Court further concluded that identifying AA could lead to identifying his daughter, such that a confidentiality order anonymizing all family member names was minimally impairing and necessary to prevent the aforementioned public interest risk. At this time, while AA was a licensing applicant and not a lawyer, the Court was satisfied that the order’s benefits outweighed its negative effects on the open court principle, as AA and his daughter’s identities were peripheral to the litigation. However, in line with submissions by the interveners, Toronto Star and Law360, the Court opined that the negative effect on the public interest would likely increase should AA be licensed as a lawyer, since anonymization would prevent potential clients from making informed decisions about whether to retain AA. Nevertheless, this was a future issue and not before the Court.

Kakoutis v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2026 ONCA 49

[Monahan J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

LK, acting in person

K. Hou, for the responding party (M56609)/moving party by way of cross-motion (M56635)

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Possession, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Frivolous and Vexatious, Abuse of Process, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 19(1)(c), Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 37.16, 61.16, Kakoutis v. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 2015 ONSC 513, Kakoutis v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2016 ONSC 2300,  RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, Hoang v. Mann Engineering Ltd., 2015 ONCA 838, Damallie v. Ping, 2017 ONCA 146, Bajouco v. Green, 2017 ONCA 493, Lum v. College of Physiotherapists of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 271, Susin v. Susin, 2018 ONCA 549

facts:

The appellants, LK and EK, were mortgagors of residential property at 102 Topham Crescent, Richmond Hill, Ontario (the “Property”) in favour of the respondent, The Bank of Nova Scotia, under a mortgage and line of credit granted in 2011.

On April 7, 2015, the respondent obtained summary judgment in the Superior Court of Justice (Toronto) for nonpayment, which, among other relief, ordered the appellants to deliver possession of the Property to the respondent. The appellants’ appeal to the Court was dismissed, and their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was subsequently dismissed.

While that litigation was ongoing, the appellants commenced a second action in Milton, advancing substantially the same arguments. On April 9, 2016, that action was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and their appeal to the Court was dismissed on December 5, 2016.

On May 20, 2025, an associate judge of the Superior Court granted the respondent leave to issue a writ of possession regarding the Property. On October 22, 2025, the Court quashed the appellants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction under s. 19(1)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act, and the appellants did not request a transfer to the Divisional Court or the Superior Court.

The Appellants filed what appeared to be another application for leave to appeal the December 4, 2015 judgment of the Court to the Supreme Court of Canada and sought a stay of any eviction order pending the determination of their leave application.

issues:

1. Should the appellant’s motion of stay be granted?
2. Should the respondent’s cross-motion to prohibit further motions be granted?

holding:

Motion and cross-motion dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court applied the tripartite test for a stay set out in RJR‑MacDonald and concluded that each factor weighed against relief. The appeal was “entirely devoid of merit” because the appellants sought to relitigate issues decided against them nearly a decade earlier and thus failed even the low threshold on the merits assessment. The appellants did not demonstrate irreparable harm; they had remained in possession for over a decade after being ordered to vacate, had made no payments since 2012, and provided no evidence to contradict the bank’s payment assertion or to connect the proposed eviction to any prejudice arising from Mr. K’s medical matters, which were unrelated to the proceeding. The balance of convenience and the interests of justice favoured the respondent, particularly given the appellants’ prior agreement to be bound by the Court’s decision after obtaining an earlier stay to permit their appeal to be heard, and the interim stay granted pending the motion had already been spent.
2. No. Although the appellants sought to relitigate adjudicated claims and had previously appealed to the wrong court, the record did not establish a multiplicity of frivolous or vexatious motions warranting relief under r. 37.16. The respondent had not characterized the proceeding as frivolous or vexatious before the associate judge or on appeal, and the appellants’ earlier stays of eviction had been granted and thus could not be deemed frivolous or vexatious. In the circumstances, and mindful that the appellants were self-represented, the Court declined to make a gatekeeping order, without prejudice to the respondent’s right to renew should circumstances change.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Narouz v. Fisgard Capital Corporation, 2026 ONCA 56

[Roberts, Favreau and Copeland JJ.A.]

Counsel:

W.N., acting in person

C. Shorey, for the respondent

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time

Nunes v. Nunes, 2026 ONCA 54

[Miller, Thorburn and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

K. Singh, for the appellants

N. Lewis, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Gifts, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment

Farmer v. Farmer Estate, 2026 ONCA 50

[Miller, Monahan and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Collings, for the appellant

N. Milton, for the respondent R.F.

No one appearing for the respondent P.F.

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Estate Administration, Estate Trustees, Compensation, Costs

Munyal v. Baldwin, 2026 ONCA 52

[Roberts, Coroza and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D.M., acting in person

R. Brown, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Civil Procedure, Settlements, Enforcement, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 49.09, R. v. Palmer, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, Capital Gains Income Streams Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Canada Inc. (2007) 87 O.R. (3d) 464 (Div. Ct.), Scherer v. Paletta, [1966] 2 O.R. 524 (C.A.)

Crescent Fesh Inc. v. Pivotal Fine Homes Ltd., 2026 ONCA 57

[Fairburn A.C.J.O., Huscroft and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

W. Rapoport, for the appellant

E. Dharsi, for the respondents]

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Corporations, Shares, Civil Procedure, Appeals, New Issues on Appeal, Fresh Evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 14.05(3)(d) and (h)

Furney v. Robins Appleby LLP, 2026 ONCA 59 

[Tulloch C.J.O., Roberts and George JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.F., acting in person

M. Kestenberg and A. Hershtal, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Professional Negligence, Lawyers, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Limitation Periods, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B, ss. 4 and 5

Strutzenberger v. Strutzenberger, 2026 ONCA 61

[Lauwers J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

P.S., acting in person

C. Stanek, appearing as amicus curiae, Pro Bono Ontario

P. Howie, for the responding party

Keywords: Family Law, Support, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Extension of Time, Strutzenberger v. Strutzenberger, 2025 ONCA 836

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.