The appeals in Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Ontario (Attorney General) and Canadian Union of Postal Workers v. Canada (Attorney General), were companion cases and obliged the Court to address, for the first time, the constitutionality of back-to-work legislation.

In Ontario Public Service Employees Union, the Court dismissed the appeal and held that the back to work legislation of Bill 178 ended a legal strike in a manner that limited OPSEU members’ section 2(d) Charter right to Freedom of Association. However, it also found that Ontario demonstrably justified the limit under section 1 of the Charter. The Court accepted the pressing objective of resuming classroom instruction to mitigate harm to students justified referring all outstanding issues to neutral interest arbitration as a proportionate and effective substitute for the right to strike.

In the companion case to Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Ontario (Attorney General), Canadian Union of Postal Workers v. Canada (Attorney General), the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge’s decision not to decide the appeal as moot, as the back to work legislation was spent. In the alternative, the Court found that while s. 2(d) Charter rights were limited, such limits were justified under s. 1.

Alyousef v. Alyousef was an appeal from a decision finding there had been an oral partnership agreement between the parties. The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, subject to further determination by the Court as to the correctness of the damages ordered by the trial judge, following further submissions to be made by the parties.

In Bahauddin v. New Lahore Tikka House Inc. (Lahore Tikka House), the Court upheld an order requiring a company to honour a garnishment, finding that a registered mortgage from the owner of property to its tenant evidenced a legitimate debt between the judgment debtor tenant and the garnishee landlord.

In Ontario (Education) v. Grassroots for Affordable Jewish Education Inc., the Court dismissed the appeal and left in place the Divisional Court’s order striking the application, holding that Adler v. Ontario governed and that there was no reasonable prospect of revisiting it under the Bedford/Carter framework. The Court concluded that the application for public funding of Jewish day schools was barred because section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the appellants’ evidence did not fundamentally shift the parameters of the debate established in Adler.

In Cameron Stephens Mortgage Capital Ltd. v. 2011836 Ontario Corp., the Court granted the Receiver’s motion and dismissed the Debtor’s motion, holding there was no appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

In Powell v. Ledroit Sabo Litigation, the Court allowed a motion to quash and transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court, holding that a final order confirming a solicitor client costs assessment requiring a single payment of $50,000 or less fell within the Divisional Court’s jurisdiction.

In Barbosa v. Avdeev, the Court dismissed a motion to stay an eviction and costs order of the Landlord and Tenant Board in a residential tenancy matter made on consent.  The Divisional Court refused to grant leave to appeal from that order. The Court confirmed that there is no appeal from a refusal by a lower court to grant leave to appeal, so there was no serious issue on the motion for leave to appeal.

In Seferovic v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., the Court dismissed an appeal and declared the appellant a vexatious litigant.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 75

Keywords:

Labour and Employment, Collective Bargaining, Right to Strike, Public Law, “Back to Work” Legislation, Constitutional Law, Charter Rights, Freedom of Association, Charter Damages, Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Labour Dispute Resolution Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 21, Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(d), 24(1), Colleges Collective Bargaining Act, 2008, S.O. 2008, c. 15, s. 17(2), Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A, Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1, Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 2, Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, Gordon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 625, Ontario English Catholic Teachers Association v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 101, Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 113 v. Ontario, 2024 ONCA 407, Canadian Union of Postal Workers v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 75, Québec inc. v. Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec, 2024 SCC 13, Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, Bracken v. Niagara Parks Police, 2018 ONCA 261, Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 1, Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., 2007 SCC 30, R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur, 2003 SCC 54, Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62, Workers v. Her Majesty in Right of Canada, 2016 ONSC 418, Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., 2004 SCC 66, RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460, British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. British Columbia, 2015 BCCA 184, Canadian Union of Postal Workers v. Canada, 2024 ONSC 3787, Canadian Union of Postal Workers v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 75, Gerard V. La Forest, “The Balancing of Interests under the Charter” (1992) 2 N.J.C.L. 133

Canadian Union of Postal Workers v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 75

Keywords: Labour and Employment, Collective Bargaining, Right to Strike, Public Law, “Back to Work” Legislation, Constitutional Law, Charter Rights, Freedom of Association, Freedom of Expression, Charter Damages, Civil Procedure, Mootness, Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52, Postal Services Resumption and Continuation Act, S.C. 2018, c. 25, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s. 1, s. 2(d), s. 2(b), s. 24, Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, s. 88.1, Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, [1989] S.C.J. No. 14, Saskatchewan (Environment) v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, 2025 SCC 4, Société des casinos du Québec inc. v. Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec, 2024 SCC 13, Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 74, Canadian Union of Postal Workers v. Her Majesty in Right of Canada, 2016 ONSC 418

Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2026 ONCA 78

Keywords: Contracts, Partnerships, Corporations, Income Tax, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Cross-Appeals, Extension of Time, Pre-judgment Interest, Damages, Costs, Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 161, Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, Ch. P.5, s. 2, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 128, 130(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 61.07(1), Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2017 ONSC 2106, Continental Bank Leasing Corp. v. Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 298, Cojocaru v. British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health Centre, 2013 SCC 30, Richardson v. Arsenov, 2022 ONCA 137

Bahauddin v. New Lahore Tikka House Inc., 2026 ONCA 80

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Judgments, Enforcement, Garnishment, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 60.08(16)(17) Turchiaro v. Liorti, [2004] O.J. No. 6289 (S.C.), Turchiaro v. Liorti, 2006 CanLII 8872 (Ont. C.A.), Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company v. Nicol, 2014 ONSC 4748, 20 Toronto Street Holdings Ltd. v. Coffee, Tea or Me Bakeries Inc. (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 360 (S.C.), International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, Local 200 v. S & S Glass and Aluminum (1993) Ltd. (2004), 185 O.A.C. 38 (C.A.), Benzacar v. Terk, 2023 ONCA 773, 6990371 Canada Inc. v. Benzacar, [2024] S.C.C.A. No. 17

Ontario (Education) v. Grassroots for Affordable Jewish Education Inc., 2026 ONCA 70

Keywords:In Ontario (Education) v. Grassroots for Affordable Jewish Education Inc., the Court dismissed the appeal and left in place the Divisional Court’s order striking the application, holding that Adler v. Ontario governed and that there was no reasonable prospect of revisiting it under the Bedford/Carter framework. The Court concluded that the application for public funding of Jewish day schools was barred because section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the appellants’ evidence did not fundamentally shift the parameters of the debate established in Adler.

Cameron Stephens Mortgage Capital Ltd. v. 2011836 Ontario Corp., 2026 ONCA 77

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Receiverships, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Automatic Right of Appeal, Leave to Appeal, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 193, 195, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 15.01(2), North House Foods Ltd.(Re), 2025 ONCA 563, HillmountCapital Inc. v. Pizale, 2021 ONCA 364, Romspen Investment Corporation v. Courtice Auto Wreckers Limited,2017 ONCA 301, 2403177 Ontario Inc. v. Bending Lake Iron Group Limited, 2016 ONCA 225,  Business Development Bank of Canada v. Pine Tree Resorts Inc., 2013 ONCA 282, York (Regional Municipality) v. Thornhill Green Co-operative Homes Inc., 2010 ONCA 393, Marchant Realty Partners Inc. v. 2407553 Ontario Inc., 2021 ONCA 375

Powell v. Ledroit Sabo Litigation, 2026 ONCA 68

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Assessment Appeals, Jurisdiction, Costs, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss.6(1), 19(1)(a), Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. s.15, 3, 6(5), 6(9), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 58, Nakano v. Cohen Highley LLP, 2025 ONSC 3147, Chavdarova v. The Staffing Exchange Inc., 2018 ONCA 744, Saleh v. Nebel, 2016 ONCA 948, Sandu v. Fairmont Hotels Inc., 2015 ONCA 611, Harte-Eichmanis v. Fernandes, 2012 ONCA 266, McGrath v. Woodrow (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 732 (C.A.), Newell v. Sax, 2019 ONCA 455, Evans, Sweeny Bordin LLP v. Zawadski, 2015 ONCA 756, Ares Law Professional Corporation v. Rock, 2017 ONCA 569, Adair Morse LLP v. Charron, 2023 ONCA 761, CIBC Mortgages Inc. (FirstLine Mortgages) v. Computershare Trust Co. of Canada, 2015 ONCA 846, Heegsma v. Hamilton (City), 2024 ONCA 865, Bales Beall LLP v. Fingrut, 2013 ONCA 266, Raphael Partners v. Lam (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), Charleston Partners v. Dickinson, [1996] O.J. No. 1552 (C.A.), Cao v. Monkhouse Law Professional Corp., 2021 ONSC 7894, Schwisberg v. Kennedy, [2006] O.J. No. 1224 (Div. Ct.), RZCD Law Firm LLP v. Williams, 2016 ONSC 2122, 1395804 Ontario Ltd. (Blacklock’s Reporter) v. Hameed, 2024 ONSC 2797, Speciale Law Professional Corporation v. Shrader Canada Limited, 2017 ONSC 3613, Singh v. Heft, 2022 ONCA 135

Barbosa v. Avdeev, 2026 ONCA 73

Keywords: Real Property, Residential Tenancies, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Eviction, Leave to Appeal, Stay Pending Appeal, Haudenosaunee Development Institute v. Metrolinx, 2023 ONCA 122, Hillmond Investments Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1996), 29 O.R. (3d) 612, Denison Mines Ltd. v. Ontario Hydro (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 181 (C.A.), Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Ontario (Animal Care Review Board), 2024 ONCA 89, Halton (Regional Municipality) v. F. Greco & Sons Limited (Greco Construction), 2021 ONCA 446

Seferovic v. 285 Spadina SPV, 2026 ONCA 84

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Abuse of Process, Vexatious Litigants, Orders, Non-Compliance, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 2.1, 2.1.01, 2.1.01(8), 25.11, 57.03(2), 59.06, Ontario Heritage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.18, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 140, 140(1), 2356802 Ontario Corp. v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc. (March 16, 2023), Toronto, CV-21-00662130-00CL, 21-00667377-00CL (Ont. S.C.), Seferovic v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2022 ONSC 2429, 2356802 Ontario Corp. v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2022 ONSC 2427, 2356802 Ontario Corp. v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2022 ONSC 7318, Seferovic et al. v. 285 Spadina, 2023 ONSC 5578, 2356802 Ontario Corp. v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2023 ONSC 6382, Seferovic v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2026 ONCA 32

Short Civil Decisions

Vault Capital Inc. v. Dacosta, 2026 ONCA 90

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Civil Procedure, Judgments, Enforcement, Writs of Possession, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Essar Steel Algoma Inc. (Re), 2016 ONCA 274, RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, Ducharme v. Hudson, 2021 ONCA 151

Denny’s Lube Centre (2016) Inc. v. 1121209 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 67

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Promissory Estoppel, Public Accounting Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 8., Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Grasshopper Solar Corporation v. Independent Electricity System Operator, 2020 ONCA 499, Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada, 2021 SCC 47, Chitty on Contracts, 36 ed., vol. 1

Murray v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2026 ONCA 81

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, New Issues on Appeal, Reply Factums, Leave, Prism Resources Inc. v. Detour Gold Corporation, 2022 ONCA 4, Boyer v. Callidus Capital Corporation, 2024 ONCA 761, Sternberg v. Cresford Capital Corporation, 2024 ONCA 283, Goberdhan v. Knights of Columbus, 2023 ONCA 269

Equifax Canada Co. v. Oh, 2026 ONCA 76

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 61.05(1) and r. 61.09(3)(b), Bell v. Amini, 2023 ONCA 344, Bell v. Amini, 2023 ONCA 344, Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260

Le v. Norris, 2026 ONCA 71

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory, Trials, Adjournments

Pelling Estate v. Pelling, 2026 ONCA 64

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Holographic Wills, Testamentary Intention, Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages

Pelling Estate v. Pelling, 2026 ONCA 62

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Wills, Validity, Real Property, Transfers/Deeds, Testamentary Effect, Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, s. 21.1

CIVIL DECISIONS

Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 74

[Pepall, Lauwers and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Wright, L. Johnson and B. Akhkend, for the appellants

S. Hanley, R. Fox and S. Kissick, for the respondent

F. Cesario and E. Vaughan, for the intervener College Employer Council

S. Barrett and C. Bauman, for the intervener Ontario Federation of Labour

Keywords: Labour and Employment, Collective Bargaining, Right to Strike, Public Law, “Back to Work” Legislation, Constitutional Law, Charter Rights, Freedom of Association, Charter Damages, Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Labour Dispute Resolution Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 21, Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(d), 24(1), Colleges Collective Bargaining Act, 2008, S.O. 2008, c. 15, s. 17(2), Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A, Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1, Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 2, Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, Gordon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 625, Ontario English Catholic Teachers Association v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 101, Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 113 v. Ontario, 2024 ONCA 407, Canadian Union of Postal Workers v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 75, Québec inc. v. Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec, 2024 SCC 13, Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, Bracken v. Niagara Parks Police, 2018 ONCA 261, Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 1, Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., 2007 SCC 30, R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur, 2003 SCC 54, Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62, Workers v. Her Majesty in Right of Canada, 2016 ONSC 418, Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., 2004 SCC 66, RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460, British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. British Columbia, 2015 BCCA 184, Canadian Union of Postal Workers v. Canada, 2024 ONSC 3787, Canadian Union of Postal Workers v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 75, Gerard V. La Forest, “The Balancing of Interests under the Charter” (1992) 2 N.J.C.L. 133

facts:

In the fall of 2017, Ontario enacted the Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Labour Dispute Resolution Act, 2017 (“Bill 178”) to end a five-week strike by full-time academic employees at Ontario’s 24 colleges. The Ontario Public Service Employees Union (“OPSEU”) served as the bargaining agent and negotiated with the College Employer Council. The parties began bargaining in July 2017 but were unable to resolve three central union proposals: (1) the creation of academic senates, (2) contractual guarantees of academic freedom, and (3) a reduction in the number of part‑time faculty. The parties were unable to reach an agreement on these proposals. After an unsuccessful conciliation process, the strike began on October 16, 2017, and student instruction in the colleges stopped.

Ontario took the view that the students’ academic term would be compromised if the strike lasted six weeks. OPSEU did not contend that this timeframe was unreasonable or propose an alternative. On November 6, 2017, each side tabled settlement offers. The Council declared its offer final and sought a statutory vote under the Colleges Collective Bargaining Act, 2008 (“CCBA”), which the membership rejected by 86%. On November 16, the Premier advised that the government would use “all tools at its disposal” if a settlement was not reached by 5:00 p.m. When no agreement materialized and the Council reported a deadlock, Ontario announced its intention to introduce back‑to‑work legislation.

Bill 178 received Royal Assent on November 19, 2017. The legislation ended the strike and required that all outstanding bargaining disputes be resolved through binding interest arbitration. On December 20, 2017, the arbitrator issued an award prescribing the terms for the new collective agreement for the period October 1, 2017 to September 30, 2021.

OPSEU sought a declaration under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 that Bill 178 was of no force and effect on the basis that Bill 178 infringed its members’ right to freely associate in striking under s. 2(d) of the Charter in a manner that was not justified under s. 1. OPSEU also sought damages under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Application Judge dismissed the application. OPSEU appealed.

issues:

1. By ending the strike, did Bill 178 limit the rights of OPSEU members under s. 2(d) of the Charter?
2. Did the Government Have a Pressing and Substantial Objective in Ending the Strike?
3. Was There Proportionality Between Bill 178’s Objective and the Means Chosen to Achieve It?
4. Did the Application Judge Err by not Applying the Test in RWDSU?
5. Did the Application Judge Err in Accepting Ontario’s Evidence of Harm?
6. Did the Application Judge Give Only Minimal Consideration to Bill 178’s Deleterious Effects on OPSEU Members?
7. Did the Application Judge Err in Finding that Interest Arbitration Under Bill 178 was an Adequate Substitute for OPSEU’s Right to Strike?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. By ending the strike, did Bill 178 limit the rights of OPSEU members under s. 2(d) of the Charter?

Yes. The Court held that “by ending a legal strike action, Bill 178 necessarily and substantially interfered with meaningful collective bargaining.” It did so because it “removed a ‘necessary component’ of the process—the ability to engage in a collective work stoppage—from OPSEU members’ hands.” The Court further found that “ending strike action for the duration of the collective bargaining process limited a protected activity under s. 2(d).” As a result, Bill 178’s passage limited the rights of OPSEU members under s. 2(d) of the Charter to freely associate in striking.

2. Section 1 Analysis: Did the Government Have a Pressing and Substantial Objective in Ending the Strike?

Yes. The Court affirmed the Application Judge’s identification of the legislative objective: “resuming classroom instruction … and the consequent mitigation of the harm inflicted on students by a lengthy strike.” It concluded that Ontario had established it had a pressing and substantial objective in legislating an end to the strike.

3. Was There Proportionality Between Bill 178’s Objective and the Means Chosen to Achieve It?

Yes. The second Oakes step is to determine whether there was proportionality between Bill 178’s objective of resuming college instruction and the means chosen to achieve it—ending the strike. This step engaged three inquiries: (1) rational connection, (2) minimal impairment, and (3) proportionate effects.

The Court agreed that the “back-to-work legislation” that ended the strike and referred all issues to binding arbitration was rationally connected to resuming instruction. It upheld the Application Judge’s conclusion that substituting “an impartial and effective dispute resolution process” in lieu of a strike and direct negotiations satisfied minimal impairment. It also endorsed the Application Judge’s balancing that the interference “was a measured, proportionate interference that was remediated by the appropriate arbitration put in its place,” such that the government did not engage in a disproportionate undermining of OPSEU members’ rights. The Court ultimately concluded that Ontario had established it had a pressing and substantial objective in legislating an end to the strike.

4. Did the Application Judge Err by not Applying the Test in RWDSU?

No. The Court held that there is no uniquely strong labour law test. It held that no appellate court has adopted the RWDSU test and that the Application Judge did not err in not applying it.

5. Did the Application Judge Err in Accepting Ontario’s Evidence of Harm?

No. The Court upheld the finding that it was “self-evident” that the adverse impact would be severe. It explained that the faculty strike paused the education of hundreds of thousands of students. It threatened their ability to complete the term and year. The Ministry of Training received approximately 700 pieces of correspondence from college students, family members, and members of the public describing financial, health, academic, employment, and accreditation impacts.  It confirmed that reliance on a “reasoned apprehension of harm” was proper and did not require scientific studies. The Application Judge’s deference to Ontario in making the assessment it did was entirely consistent with the authorities. Accordingly, the Court deferred to the Application Judge’s factual findings.

6. Did the Application Judge Give Only Minimal Consideration to Bill 178’s Deleterious Effects on OPSEU Members?

No. The Court rejected OPSEU’s prematurity argument. It noted that the application judge gave “the benefit of the doubt” to the government, as the policy-making authority, on timing. It declined to “micromanage Ontario’s response.” It emphasized deference to “reasonable policy choices” in labour relations. The Court further held that there were no air of reality and no evidentiary support for a chilling or narcotic effect from interest arbitration. It did not fault the Application Judge for not addressing this issue directly because the bargaining pattern provided no support for OPSEU’s contention.

7. Did the Application Judge Err in Finding that Interest Arbitration Under Bill 178 was an Adequate Substitute for OPSEU’s Right to Strike?

No. The Court held that the Application Judge did not err in finding that interest arbitration under Bill 178 was an adequate substitute for OPSEU members’ strike. Here, the application judge properly addressed the point within his s. 1 analysis. The Court reaffirmed that the government “exercised its responsibility to ensure a fair replacement process for collective bargaining by creating a neutral arbitral process where, as with direct labour negotiations, no outcomes were off the table.” It held that Bill 178 did not dictate any specific terms. It imposed a neutral form of arbitration. The Court further found that interest arbitration met the Supreme Court’s test of a meaningful alternative mechanism for resolving bargaining impasses.

Canadian Union of Postal Workers v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 75

[Pepall, Lauwers and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P. Cavalluzzo, A. Telford and B. Dosanjh, for the appellants

J. Bricker, M. Venney and M. Ambwani, for the respondent

S. Hanley, R. Fox and S. Kissick, for the intervener His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario as represented by the Attorney General of Ontario

C. Pigott and R. Counsell, for the intervener Canada Post Corporation

S. Barrett and C. Bauman, for the intervener Ontario Federation of Labour

Keywords: Labour and Employment, Collective Bargaining, Right to Strike, Public Law, “Back to Work” Legislation, Constitutional Law, Charter Rights, Freedom of Association, Freedom of Expression, Charter Damages, Civil Procedure, Mootness, Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52, Postal Services Resumption and Continuation Act, S.C. 2018, c. 25, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s. 1, s. 2(d), s. 2(b), s. 24, Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, s. 88.1, Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, [1989] S.C.J. No. 14, Saskatchewan (Environment) v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, 2025 SCC 4, Société des casinos du Québec inc. v. Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec, 2024 SCC 13, Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 74, Canadian Union of Postal Workers v. Her Majesty in Right of Canada, 2016 ONSC 418

facts:

In 2018, Canada enacted back-to-work legislation, the Postal Services Resumption and Continuation Act, (the “Act”), which ended five weeks of rotating strikes by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers. The union and the other appellants (collectively, “CUPW”) applied for a declaration that the Act limited CUPW members’ Charter rights in a manner that could not be demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter. Accordingly, they sought a declaration that the Act is of no force and effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act. CUPW also sought a declaration that Canada’s “conduct” preceding the Act was unconstitutional and claimed damages under s. 24 of the Charter.

The application judge dismissed the application as moot because the Act was “spent”. The Act’s limitation on strike activity had expired. The interest arbitration process created by the Act was completed, and, after the expiry of the collective agreements imposed under the arbitral award, the parties extended them for another two years and reached new negotiated collective agreements. The application judge declined to exercise his discretion to decide the moot application on the merits.

issues:

1. Did the application judge err in finding CUPW’s application to be moot and in finding that, as a matter of discretion, the criteria from Borowski v. Canada did not favour deciding the application on the merits?
2. Did the application judge err in alternatively finding that the Act limited CUPW members’ s. 2(d) Charter right to freedom of association relating to strike action and declining to find the other s. 2(d) and s. 2(b) limits alleged by CUPW?
3. Did the application judge err in finding that the Act’s limit of s. 2(d) of the Charter was justified under s. 1?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. Did the application judge err in finding CUPW’s application to be moot and in finding that, as a matter of discretion, the criteria from Borowski v. Canada did not favour deciding the application on the merits?

No. The Application judge did not err in finding CUPW’s application to be moot and in finding that, as a matter of discretion, the criteria from Borowski v. Canada did not favour deciding the application on the merits. The application judge dismissed the application as moot. CUPW made two overarching arguments on appeal. First, the Charter challenges were not moot, at least not all of them. Second, the challenges all met the Borowski criteria for hearing them despite any mootness.

CUPW argued there were three distinct Charter claims before the application judge. First, the constitutionality of back-to-work legislation. The Court found the application judge’s mootness determination turned on the fact that CUPW was not seeking a declaration with retroactive effect and did not seek to unwind the collective agreements reached through arbitration. The Court agreed with him, largely for the reasons he gave and saw no error in his application of the test for mootness. Second, the freedom of expression of CUPW members and union officials. The Court agreed with the application judge that the freedom of expression exercised by striking was fully subsumed in the strike action itself, which was properly analyzed under s. 2(d) and was therefore encompassed by his mootness determination. Third, it was not necessary to address whether the Prime Minister’s statement was implicitly captured by the application judge’s mootness analysis, because the s. 2(d) challenge based on this statement would have failed in any event.

The Court addressed the factors to be assessed in determining whether to hear a moot matter. The Court found that the collective bargaining issues raised by CUPW had not been especially evasive of review, as the numerous cases cited in OPSEU and in this appeal demonstrated. Further, the proposition that back-to-work legislation limits the right to strike contrary to s. 2(d) of the Charter had now been established. The Court agreed with the application judge’s view that a determination on the merits would have limited precedential value. Lastly, having regard to the limits of its adjudicative law-making function, the Court noted that if a court heard the moot case on the merits, it could not avoid “intruding into the role of the legislative branch” by deciding the matter in the abstract. To offer an opinion on the constitutionality of the government’s policy choice in these circumstances would trench inappropriately on the role of the legislature. The Court agreed with the motion judge’s discretionary decision not to hear CUPW’s constitutional challenges on the merits.

2. Did the application judge err in alternatively finding that the Act limited CUPW members’ s. 2(d) Charter right to freedom of association relating to strike action and declining to find the other s. 2(d) and s. 2(b) limits alleged by CUPW?

No. The application judge did not err in alternatively finding that the Act limited CUPW members’ s. 2(d) Charter right to freedom of association relating to strike action and declining to find the other s. 2(d) and s. 2(b) limits alleged by CUPW.

The Court reached this conclusion in the alternative and addressed it briefly, giving four reasons for concluding that the application judge did not err in his alternative analysis. First, for the reasons set out in OPSEU, the Court concluded that the Act, as back-to-work legislation, limited CUPW members’ s. 2(d) right to strike. Second, the Court found the Prime Minister’s statement did not limit CUPW members’ s. 2(d) rights. Third, CUPW argued that the Act indirectly prohibited picketing because the legislative extension of the previous collective agreements triggered the application of s. 88.1 of the Canada Labour Code, which prohibits mid-contract “strike” activity including picketing. Fourth, CUPW asserted that in requiring the union, its officers, and representatives to notify employees of their obligation to return to work, the Act limited their personal freedom of expression. CUPW’s argument did not distinguish between the personal expression of individuals and their responsibilities as union officers and representatives. The Court found this distinction to be critical. The Court found that the Act did not limit the personal expressive rights of CUPW members under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

3. Did the application judge err in finding that the Act’s limit of s. 2(d) of the Charter was justified under s. 1?

 No. The application judge did not err in finding that the Act’s limit of s. 2(d) of the Charter was justified under s. 1. The Court found the s. 1 Charter analysis carried out in OPSEU applied to this appeal, with modifications. The Court noted that the application judge inferentially adopted the findings of Firestone J. in CUPW 2016, that “the statute had the pressing and substantial objective of securing a ‘vital’ service to vulnerable and rural Canadians”, and that the “‘prohibition on the right to strike … is rationally connected to the … objective.’” The Court noted that the application judge did not err in finding the interest arbitration provision in the Act provided an appropriate substitute for the right to strike. The Court reaffirmed that the application judge did not err.

Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2026 ONCA 78

[Roberts, Trotter and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

O.S. Chaudhry, for the appellants

ARA, acting in person

Keywords: Contracts, Partnerships, Corporations, Income Tax, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Cross-Appeals, Extension of Time, Pre-judgment Interest, Damages, Costs, Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 161, Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, Ch. P.5, s. 2, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 128, 130(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 61.07(1), Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2017 ONSC 2106, Continental Bank Leasing Corp. v. Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 298, Cojocaru v. British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health Centre, 2013 SCC 30, Richardson v. Arsenov, 2022 ONCA 137

facts:

The trial judge found that two brothers, ARA and AA, had entered into an oral partnership agreement to deliver milk for a dairy distributor, The Milkman Inc. (“Milkman”), to be carried out through the appellant, 2390247 Ontario Inc. (“239”). Under the partnership agreement, the brothers each had an equal one-half interest in the business and thus agreed to manage 239 by consensus and equally share in its net profits and losses after tax. AA rolled his pre-existing business, 2296411 Ontario Inc. (“229”), into 239 pursuant to the terms of the partnership agreement.

In October 2013, the contract with the Milkman began. One month later, AA locked ARA out of their business premises and carried on the business without him through the numbered company appellants. The trial judge determined that the respondent was entitled to a 50% allocation of the net after tax profits and losses that 239 had earned between October 2013 and December 2017 (the “contract period”). As AA did not separate 229’s expenses from 239’s expenses, 229’s net income before tax was also included in the calculation.

Following the appellants’ written submissions, the trial judge released an endorsement in which he corrected errors in the damages calculation in his judgment. The appellants appealed the trial judge’s finding of an oral partnership agreement, the resulting damage award, and the calculation of prejudgment interest and costs. The respondent did not serve or file a notice of cross-appeal. However, in his factum, he challenged some of the trial judge’s findings regarding liability and damages on different grounds than those raised by the appellants and sought leave to raise them on the hearing of the appeal.

issues:

1. Did the trial judge err by ruling the parties agreed to enter into an oral partnership agreement to jointly operate a venture by consensus to provide milk delivery services to the Milkman?
2. Did the trial judge err by failing to conduct a credibility analysis and/or articulate how the court resolved credibility concerns?
3. Did the trial judge err by awarding prejudgment interest owed from the date the action commenced?
4. Did the trial judge appear to be biased in arriving at his decision?
5. Did the trial judge err in his award of costs?
6. Should the respondent be permitted to raise the grounds in the nature of a cross-appeal pleaded in his factum?
7. Did the trial judge err by amending his calculation of damages?

holding:

Appeal dismissed. Cross-appeal dismissed, subject to further consideration following additional submissions requested of the parties.

reasoning:

1 and 2. No. The Court concluded that the first two interrelated grounds of appeal could be considered together as they were a thinly veiled attempt to challenge the factual findings made by the trial judge based on his assessment of the witnesses and the record before him. The Court found no reversible error that would permit appellate intervention. The trial judge’s reasons revealed no misapplication of the governing principles for the formation of a partnership. The trial judge preferred the respondent’s evidence where it conflicted with the appellants’ evidence, and he was entitled to make that assessment.

3. No. The Court held that the trial judge’s determination that prejudgment interest would run from the date the action was commenced was fair and reasonable. The trial judge awarded damages informed by the partners’ equal allocation of profits and losses over the entirety of the contract period and not merely for one particular year. Accordingly, it would not be reasonable to calculate the prejudgment interest for each year of the contract period. Although s. 128 of the Courts of Justice Act provides that prejudgment interest runs from the date the cause of action arose, the trial judge chose the date the action was commenced, which mitigated the effect of allowing prejudgment interest on future profits.
4. No. The Court found no evidence of judicial bias in the record and concluded that the appellants had failed to meet the high threshold to displace the presumption of judicial integrity and impartiality.
5. No. The Court found no error in the trial judge’s exercise of his discretion. He was not persuaded that the respondent’s misstatements rose to the level of the kind of improper conduct that justified no award of costs.
6. Yes, in part. The Court only permitted the respondent to advance the third ground of his cross-appeal. The three grounds of the cross-appeal did not arise out of the issues raised by the appellants. As a result, the respondent was required to advance them by way of cross-appeal and therefore had to obtain an extension of time in which to assert a cross-appeal. The overarching consideration in granting an extension was whether the justice of the case warranted the extension. Informing that consideration were the following factors: 1) a timely intention to cross-appeal within the deadline prescribed by the rules; 2) the length of and explanation for the delay; 3) any prejudice by the delay to the appellants; 4) the merits of the cross-appeal.

The Court held that the respondent’s extension request faltered with respect to the first two proposed grounds on the factors of prejudice and lack of merit. The appellants did not have the opportunity to respond to the respondent’s cross-appeal in writing and there was no appeal record. As a result, some of the exhibits that the parties would need to argue the first two grounds of the cross-appeal were absent. However, the Court concluded that the third proposed ground was a discrete issue that could be adequately addressed on the appeal. The figures on which the damages calculation was based were canvassed in detail in the trial judge’s reasons and in the appeal record already filed.

7.No. The Court held that the trial judge did not err by amending his judgment in relation to the damages calculation. The errors were brought to his attention by the appellants, as part of written submissions invited from the parties by the trial judge with respect to the issues of the calculation of damages, prejudgment interest and costs. However, the Court concluded that the trial judge appeared to have repeated the same error about not accounting for income taxes paid and thus used net profit figures rather than net after tax profit figures. In order to properly determine the amount of damages payable to the respondent, the Court required further submissions from the parties on the issue.

Bahauddin v. New Lahore Tikka House Inc. (Lahore Tikka House), 2026 ONCA 80

[Lauwers, Miller and Sossin JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Simaan, for the appellant

S. Greaves and A. Nogalo, for the respondent

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Judgments, Enforcement, Garnishment, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 60.08(16)(17) Turchiaro v. Liorti, [2004] O.J. No. 6289 (S.C.), Turchiaro v. Liorti, 2006 CanLII 8872 (Ont. C.A.), Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company v. Nicol, 2014 ONSC 4748, 20 Toronto Street Holdings Ltd. v. Coffee, Tea or Me Bakeries Inc. (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 360 (S.C.), International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, Local 200 v. S & S Glass and Aluminum (1993) Ltd. (2004), 185 O.A.C. 38 (C.A.), Benzacar v. Terk, 2023 ONCA 773, 6990371 Canada Inc. v. Benzacar, [2024] S.C.C.A. No. 17

facts:

The motion judge ordered the appellant, 1436318 Ontario Ltd. (“143 Ltd.”), to pay the respondent, S.B., $154,257.05, being the amount owing on a consent judgment S.B. had obtained against the defendants, New Lahore Tikka House (“NLTH”) and 2294671 Ontario Incorporated (“229 Inc.”).

S.B. worked as a chef in the defendants’ restaurant, NLTH, for more than 20 years. He was dismissed without cause in 2016 and given eight weeks’ pay in lieu of notice. S.B. sued the defendants for wrongful dismissal. The parties settled and the defendants paid S.B. $25,000 and consented to a judgment requiring them to pay him a further $150,000, which they never paid. 143 Ltd. owned the NLTH property with G.A. as sole director and officer of 143 Ltd. She also owned and operated NLTH and 229 Inc. In 2015, 143 Ltd. mortgaged the property to the NLTH, the restaurant tenant, for $754,988.37, providing for monthly payments of $4,718.68.

On July 13, 2023, a Notice of Garnishment was issued directing 143 Ltd. to pay the Sheriff of the City of Toronto all debts owed to NLTH up to $154,257.05, reflecting the outstanding judgment plus post-judgment interest to that date. Despite being properly served, 143 Ltd. made no payments to the Sheriff. 143 Ltd. belatedly offered a garnishee’s statement, after S.B. brought a motion seeking to hold it liable for the amount in the Notice of Garnishment. In the garnishee’s statement, 143 Ltd. denied owing any money to NLTH.

The motion judge granted S.B.’s motion for an order that 143 Ltd. immediately pay the full amount contained in the Notice of Garnishment pursuant to r. 60.08(17) of the Rules. He found the mortgage was evidence of a legitimate debt owing from 143 Ltd. to NLTH and further that the equities favoured granting the relief sought.

issue:

Did the motion judge err in finding the mortgage was legitimate and represented a debt owed by 143 Ltd. to NLTH?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No. The Court saw no basis to intervene in the motion judge’s finding that G.A.’s evidence lacked credibility. The motion judge found contradictions between G.A.’s assertions and the documentary evidence, namely the registered mortgage and corporate profile report for another company. Comparing this case to Turchiaro, the Court believed 143 Ltd. had not established a palpable and overriding error that would justify setting aside the motion judge’s finding.

The Court briefly addressed the motion judge’s alternative conclusion that he would have exercised his equitable discretion to grant the relief under r. 60.08(16). S.B. sought relief under r. 60.08(17) which did not contain the same broad discretionary language as subrule (16). The court had no discretion to do other than as subrule (17) dictated.

The first inquiry under r. 60.08(17) was whether a garnishee’s statement had been served and filed, including whether the statement that was filed was to be treated as no statement because it was false. If the garnishee’s statement were true, and there was no valid debt, then S.B. would not be entitled to the relief provided by r. 60.08(17). Even if relief was sought based on r. 60.08(16), that subrule did not afford the motion judge independent equitable jurisdiction to make the order sought in the absence of a valid debt.

The cases cited in Nicol did not contemplate an equitable power to treat as valid a debt which does not in fact exist. Rather, those decisions recognized the court’s discretion to decline to enforce a garnishment where it would be inequitable, to hold a principal liable for a corporate garnishee’s failure to make payments, or to consider the realities of the relationship between related companies and hold a garnishee liable for making payments to an entity it knew to be the debtor operating under a different name than in the notice of garnishment.

Ontario (Education) v. Grassroots for Affordable Jewish Education Inc., 2026 ONCA 70

[Gillese, Pepall and Roberts JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Siskind, L. Greenspon and V. Pileggi, for the appellants

J. Hunter and M. Stevenson, for the respondent

Keywords: Constitutional Law, Education, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Stare Decisis, Appeals, Fresh Evidence, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(a) and 15(1), Constitution Act, 1867, s. 93(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21.01(1)(b), Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R 609, Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, R. v. Comeau, 2018 SCC 15

facts:

The appellants brought an Application seeking public funding for Jewish day schools from the Ontario government. Ontario moved to strike the application on the basis it was an attempt to relitigate the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Adler v. Ontario.

The appellants responded to the Motion by arguing there was a reasonable prospect the court would revisit Adler, based on the test set out in Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, and Carter v. Canada (Attorney General). The motion judge found the appellants had a reasonable prospect of satisfying the Bedford/Carter test and dismissed the Motion. Ontario successfully appealed to the Divisional Court, which allowed the appeal and dismissed the Application. The appellants appealed the Divisional Court decision.

issues:

1. Did the Divisional Court err in applying the wrong test for determining a motion to strike under r. 21?
2. Did the Divisional Court err in law in concluding that the Bedford/Carter test could not be met by considering the cumulative effect of a number of changes in facts and law?
3. Did the Divisional Court err in finding that s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, was a complete bar to the Application’s success, despite the changes brought by s. 93A, changes in international law, and the evolution of Charter rights since 1996?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. Did the Divisional Court err in applying the wrong test for determining a motion to strike under r. 21?

No.  The Divisional Court did not err in applying the test for determining a motion to strike under r. 21. The appellants submitted that the Divisional Court failed to properly apply the test for a motion to strike under r. 21.01(1)(b). They contended that instead of asking whether there was a reasonable prospect the Bedford/Carter test would be met on a full evidentiary record, the Divisional Court engaged in a substantive analysis of the arguments and asked whether the Application would succeed. The Court did not accept this submission.

The Court outlined that the Divisional Court expressly recognized that Ontario brought the Motion to strike under r. 21.01(1)(b) on the basis the Application had no reasonable prospect of success. The Court of Appeal noted the Divisional Court also expressly recognized that, on the Motion, the court had to determine whether there was a reasonable prospect the appellants could satisfy the Bedford/Carter test for revisiting binding precedent. The Court found that there was nothing in the Divisional Court reasons to indicate that, as the appellants alleged, the court then determined whether the appellants would succeed, rather than whether the evidence raised a reasonable prospect it would satisfy that test.

2. Did the Divisional Court err in law in concluding that the Bedford/Carter test could not be met by considering the cumulative effect of a number of changes in facts and law?

No. The Divisional Court did not err in law in concluding that the Bedford/Carter test could not be met by considering the cumulative effect of a number of changes in facts and law. The appellants submitted that the Divisional Court erred when it concluded there was no reasonable prospect that the Application could satisfy the Bedford/Carter test. They argued that the Application raised several new legal issues that were not raised in Adler and, thus, the Court was not bound by Adler in relation to those issues. They also argued that the reasons of the Divisional Court indicate that a single solitary issue must shift the parameters of the debate, rather than a consideration of the cumulative effect of numerous changes in facts and law.

The Court rejected the submission that the Application raised new legal issues that have a reasonable prospect of satisfying the first prong of the Bedford/Carter test. The Court saw nothing in the argument that the Divisional Court found that a solitary issue was needed to shift the parameters of the debate.

3. Did the Divisional Court err in finding that s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, was a complete bar to the Application’s success, despite the changes brought by s. 93A, changes in international law, and the evolution of Charter rights since 1996?

 No. The Court saw no error in the Divisional Court’s analysis of s. 93 of the Constitution Act.

Cameron Stephens Mortgage Capital Ltd. v. 2011836 Ontario Corp., 2026 ONCA 77

[Favreau J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

F. W., acting in person purportedly for the responding parties/moving parties by way of cross-motion, 2011836 Ontario Corp. and Jefferson Properties Limited Partnership

R. Shah, for the moving party/responding party by way of cross-motion, Albert Gelman Inc., in its capacity as receiver of 2011836 Ontario Corp. and Jefferson Properties Limited Partnership

W. Greenspoon, for the responding party, Cameron Stephens Mortgage Capital Ltd.

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Receiverships, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Automatic Right of Appeal, Leave to Appeal, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 193, 195, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 15.01(2), North House Foods Ltd.(Re), 2025 ONCA 563, HillmountCapital Inc. v. Pizale, 2021 ONCA 364, Romspen Investment Corporation v. Courtice Auto Wreckers Limited,2017 ONCA 301, 2403177 Ontario Inc. v. Bending Lake Iron Group Limited, 2016 ONCA 225,  Business Development Bank of Canada v. Pine Tree Resorts Inc., 2013 ONCA 282, York (Regional Municipality) v. Thornhill Green Co-operative Homes Inc., 2010 ONCA 393, Marchant Realty Partners Inc. v. 2407553 Ontario Inc., 2021 ONCA 375

facts:

The receivership of 2011836 Ontario Corp. and Jefferson Properties Limited Partnership (the “Debtors”) arose from the insolvency of a Richmond Hill residential development financed by Cameron Stephens Mortgage Capital Ltd. (“Cameron”). The Court appointed Albert Gelman Inc. as Receiver on December 21, 2023. The project comprised 96 residential units and was partially constructed at the time of appointment.

The Receiver proceeded under court supervision, including obtaining approval to stop construction and retain a new construction manager, and to disclaim certain pre‑receivership purchase-and-sale agreements for freehold homes. By late 2025, construction was nearly complete, and the Receiver was ready to commence sales.

On October 23, 2025, the Receiver moved before Kimmel J. for approval of its proposed sales process. F. W., purporting to represent the Debtors, brought a cross‑motion for a stay of individual sales pending a “court‑supervised bulk‑sale market test,” for the appointment of a sales monitor or inspector, and for a minimum price floor tied to pre‑receivership firm agreement prices.

On November 28, 2025, Kimmel J. granted the Receiver’s motion in part, approving the proposed sales process for units not yet under agreement, while adjourning a request to permit unit sales without further court approval pending a template approval and vesting order. She dismissed F. W.’s cross‑motion and adjourned his unrelated relief.

Following Kimmel J.’s decision, the Receiver moved before J. Dietrich J. (the “motion judge”) for approval of a template agreement of purchase and sale and for two approval and vesting orders in respect of two units. F. W. did not bring a cross‑motion but opposed the relief, raising many of the issues that the court had already decided. On December 19, 2025, the motion judge approved the Receiver’s template and granted the two approval and vesting orders.

F.W. advised the Receiver on December 29, 2025, that he intended to appeal, and served his notice of appeal on December 30, 2025. The Receiver then moved for a declaration that there was no appeal as of right under s. 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”), and, in the alternative, for an order lifting any automatic stay. F. W. moved for an extension of time and, subsequently, for leave to appeal if required.

Although there was no order authorizing F. W. to represent the Debtors under r. 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the motions proceeded on the merits due to urgency. The motions were heard on January 22, 2026, following a brief adjournment.

issues:

1. Is there a direct right of appeal from the motion judge’s orders?
2. Should leave to appeal be granted?

holding:

The F. W. and Debtor’s motions dismissed. The Receiver’s motion for an order declaring that the orders could only be appealed with leave of the court was granted.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court held that s. 193(c) BIA, which provided a direct appeal “if the property involved in the appeal exceeds in value ten thousand dollars.” This right to appeal has consistently been interpreted narrowly: North House Foods, at para. 28. This approach derives from the “broad nature” of the automatic stay imposed by s. 195(c) of the BIA to ensure consistency with “the needs of modern, ‘real-time’ insolvency litigation”: 2403177 Ontario Inc., at para. 53.

This Court identified three types of orders that do not fall within the scope: (1) those that were procedural, (2) did not bring into play the value of the debtor’s property, or (3) did not result in a loss, and further requiring that any loss of $10,000 or more be direct: North House Foods, at para. 28.

The Court stated that F. W.’s suggestion of a loss based on lower sales prices than pre‑receivership agreements was not sufficient, because to show a loss, he needed to demonstrate a “clear difference in value between the order under appeal and evidence in the record that a debtor could have obtained a higher value,” which he failed to do. There was no compelling evidence of higher obtainable prices, no evidence of alternative offers, and no evidence that the sales were improvident, rendering any alleged loss “entirely speculative”.

2. No. The Court applied the Pine Tree factors and was not satisfied that F. W.’s proposed appeal met any of them. F. W. did not raise issues “of general importance,” it lacked “merit,” and granting leave would “unduly hinder” the receivership.

On merit, the Court explained that F. W. sought to relitigate issues that had already been decided by the Court below multiple times. Most recently, Kimmel J. approved the Receiver’s proposed minimum pricing. F. W. did not seek to appeal that order. His proposed appeal, therefore, appeared to be a collateral attack on earlier court orders. Significant deference was owed to the motion judge and to a receiver’s business decisions where actions were within the “broad bounds of reasonableness” and “proceeded fairly.”

On prejudice and delay, the Court found that leave would trigger an automatic stay that could jeopardize the two approved sales and delay other potential sales, while interest accrued at approximately $400,000 per month, reducing recoveries over time.

Powell v. Ledroit Sabo Litigation, 2026 ONCA 68

[Roberts, Miller and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Turton, for the moving parties

O. Sabo, for the responding parties

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Assessment Appeals, Jurisdiction, Costs, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss.6(1), 19(1)(a), Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. s.15, 3, 6(5), 6(9), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 58, Nakano v. Cohen Highley LLP, 2025 ONSC 3147, Chavdarova v. The Staffing Exchange Inc., 2018 ONCA 744, Saleh v. Nebel, 2016 ONCA 948, Sandu v. Fairmont Hotels Inc., 2015 ONCA 611, Harte-Eichmanis v. Fernandes, 2012 ONCA 266, McGrath v. Woodrow (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 732 (C.A.), Newell v. Sax, 2019 ONCA 455, Evans, Sweeny Bordin LLP v. Zawadski, 2015 ONCA 756, Ares Law Professional Corporation v. Rock, 2017 ONCA 569, Adair Morse LLP v. Charron, 2023 ONCA 761, CIBC Mortgages Inc. (FirstLine Mortgages) v. Computershare Trust Co. of Canada, 2015 ONCA 846, Heegsma v. Hamilton (City), 2024 ONCA 865, Bales Beall LLP v. Fingrut, 2013 ONCA 266, Raphael Partners v. Lam (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), Charleston Partners v. Dickinson, [1996] O.J. No. 1552 (C.A.), Cao v. Monkhouse Law Professional Corp., 2021 ONSC 7894, Schwisberg v. Kennedy, [2006] O.J. No. 1224 (Div. Ct.), RZCD Law Firm LLP v. Williams, 2016 ONSC 2122, 1395804 Ontario Ltd. (Blacklock’s Reporter) v. Hameed, 2024 ONSC 2797, Speciale Law Professional Corporation v. Shrader Canada Limited, 2017 ONSC 3613, Singh v. Heft, 2022 ONCA 135

facts:

Per the request of the moving party clients, an assessment officer assessed the accounts of their former solicitors, the responding parties. The assessment officer reduced the responding parties’ accounts from $105,883.50 to $50,000. Prior to the assessment, the moving parties had paid $24,453.86. As a result of the assessment, the moving parties were required to pay a further $25,546.14 to the responding parties.

The responding parties moved to oppose confirmation of the report of the assessment officer before a judge of the Superior Court of Justice. The motion judge dismissed the responding parties’ motion and confirmed the assessment officer’s certificate of assessment. The responding parties appealed. The appeal concerned the determination of the correct appeal route from the Superior Court for a final order for a single payment in respect of a solicitor and client costs assessment. The moving parties sought to quash and transfer the responding parties’ appeal to the Divisional Court.

issue:

Did the responding parties’ appeal from the Superior Court’s final order confirming the solicitor client costs assessment lie to the Divisional Court?

holding:

Motion granted.

reasoning:

Yes. The Court concluded that the responding parties’ appeal fell within the Divisional Court’s monetary jurisdiction of $50,000. An appeal will lie to the Court of Appeal if the order under appeal is a final order of a judge of the Superior Court unless it is for a single payment of not more than $50,000 exclusive of costs. The final order of the Superior Court judge confirmed the correct amount of the solicitor’s account and what amounts remained payable. It was therefore the final order of the Superior Court that determined the amount of the single payment for the purpose of the appeal route. The final order of the Superior Court of Justice in issue was the order confirming the assessment certificate in the amount of $50,000. While the order under appeal did not expressly fix the amount, it confirmed that the $50,000 assessed under the assessment certificate was payable. Since the moving parties had already paid $24,453.86, they were required to pay the responding parties a further $25,546.14.

Barbosa v. Avdeev, 2026 ONCA 73

[Lauwers J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

A.B., acting in person

S. F. Toole, for the responding parties

E. Fellman, for the Landlord and Tenant Board

Keywords: Real Property, Residential Tenancies, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Eviction, Leave to Appeal, Stay Pending Appeal, Haudenosaunee Development Institute v. Metrolinx, 2023 ONCA 122, Hillmond Investments Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1996), 29 O.R. (3d) 612, Denison Mines Ltd. v. Ontario Hydro (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 181 (C.A.), Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Ontario (Animal Care Review Board), 2024 ONCA 89, Halton (Regional Municipality) v. F. Greco & Sons Limited (Greco Construction), 2021 ONCA 446

facts:

Mr. B sought to challenge an Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) order dated July 16, 2025, made on consent, which terminated the residential tenancy and required him to vacate his home by August 31, 2025. The LTB denied his request to review that consent order on August 15, 2025. The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal on December 19, 2025, and ordered Mr. B to pay costs of $3,142.

Mr. B filed a notice of motion for leave to appeal to the Court on December 29, 2025. The landlords pursued eviction, and the Sheriff fixed February 9, 2026, as the date by which Mr. B and any other occupant must vacate.

Mr. B brought a motion to stay the eviction and to stay enforcement of the Divisional Court’s costs award pending determination of his motion for leave to appeal that challenged the Divisional Court’s refusal to grant him leave.

He sought to challenge the landlords’ right to seek possession under the legislation. This dispute had led to the consent order he now wanted to set aside. The landlords swore that, as of November 17, 2025, Mr. B owed $20,352.42 in arrears and believed the leave motion was intended to delay vacant possession.

issues:

Should the eviction order and costs orders be stayed pending leave to appeal?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

No. The Court held that the proposed leave application did not raise a serious issue. As a general rule, there is no appeal from an intermediate court’s refusal of leave unless that Court mistakenly declined jurisdiction: Haudenosaunee Development Institute v. Metrolinx, at para. 8. Mr. B advanced no cogent argument that the Divisional Court committed such a jurisdictional error or disregarded essential statutory rights when it denied him leave to appeal.

The Court observed that Mr. B’s submissions attacked the merits of the LTB’s decision rather than identifying any error by the Divisional Court in refusing leave.

The Court further noted that it was not its role to second-guess the Divisional Court’s merits assessment on leave. Nor was the Divisional Court obliged to provide reasons for refusing leave: Halton (Regional Municipality) v. F. Greco & Sons Limited (Greco Construction), at para. 4. This undermined Mr. B’s procedural fairness arguments as a basis for establishing a jurisdictional error.

The balance of convenience also weighed against granting a stay. The landlords served the notice of termination with a termination date of January 31, 2025. Granting a stay would have prolonged the delay in the landlords’ repossession of the unit more than five months past the point at which Mr. B agreed to move out. Mr. B had ample time to make arrangements to live elsewhere. The balance of convenience favoured the landlords.

Seferovic v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2026 ONCA 84

[Roberts, Monahan, and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R.H., acting on his own behalf and also purporting to act on behalf of the appellants, R.F. and 285 Spadina SPV Inc.

S. A. Alexanian, for the respondent, 2356802 Ontario Corp.

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Abuse of Process, Vexatious Litigants, Orders, Non-Compliance, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 2.1, 2.1.01, 2.1.01(8), 25.11, 57.03(2), 59.06, Ontario Heritage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.18, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 140, 140(1), 2356802 Ontario Corp. v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc. (March 16, 2023), Toronto, CV-21-00662130-00CL, 21-00667377-00CL (Ont. S.C.), Seferovic v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2022 ONSC 2429, 2356802 Ontario Corp. v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2022 ONSC 2427, 2356802 Ontario Corp. v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2022 ONSC 7318, Seferovic et al. v. 285 Spadina, 2023 ONSC 5578, 2356802 Ontario Corp. v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2023 ONSC 6382, Seferovic v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2026 ONCA 32

facts:

This appeal arose from protracted litigation relating to a tenant’s proposed redevelopment of a leased heritage building into a concert hall. 2356802 Ontario Corp. (“235”) was the landlord while 285 Spadina was the corporate tenant, controlled by RH and his mother RF. The underlying litigation developed along two streams: (1) 235’s application against 285 Spadina and RH related to funds provided for work under the lease (the “lease application”), and (2) a parallel application commenced by investors in 285 Spadina seeking oppression relief (the “oppression application”).

RH initiated numerous proceedings in both streams of litigation and failed to comply with multiple orders, including costs awards to other litigants. On September 19, 2023, Osborne J. (as he then was) declared RH a vexatious litigant (the “vexatious litigant order”) pursuant to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act. RH’s attempted appeal was dismissed for delay. The vexatious litigant order prohibited RH from instituting any further proceedings except with leave of a Superior Court judge. RH subsequently unsuccessfully sought leave to bring various motions for a stay of proceedings. In his December 10, 2024 reasons, Black J. found that RH could not represent his mother RF or 285 Spadina. He expressed concerns that RH was using his allegedly incapable mother as a vehicle to evade the vexatious litigant order’s leave requirement.

On September 29, 2025, Cavanagh J. declined RH’s request for leave to bring yet another motion, and dismissed both the lease and oppression applications (the “September 29^th order”). RH then attempted to appeal the September 29^th order to the Court, disregarding the leave requirement. He also requested various further relief in another motion thereafter, which was dismissed entirely by Paciocco J.A., who found that the Registrar should not have accepted RH’s appeal of the September 29^th order absent leave. In the within proceeding, 235 requested that the Court dismiss RH’s appeal from the September 29^th order as a frivolous abuse of process.

issue:

Should RH’s appeal from the September 29, 2025 order dismissing the lease and oppression applications be dismissed as an abuse of process?

holding:

Motion granted and appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

Yes. The Court invoked the r. 2.1.01 process and dispensed with the need for further submissions. It observed that what began as applications against RH, his mother and their company had degenerated into vehicles for RH to engage in abusive, threatening behaviour against opposing litigants, judges and court staff. Across his more than 40 court appearances, numerous judges had remarked on RH’s abusive conduct, his failure to comply with court orders and the Rules, and his utter refusal to pay costs ordered against him. RH’s claim that he was disabled due to long-COVID was unsupported and had been dismissed by several judges. The Court held that RH’s years-long pattern of abusive conduct was intentional and had wasted considerable judicial time and resources. This behaviour was compounded by RH’s failure to obey the leave requirement inherent in his vexatious litigant status. Accordingly, the Court deemed the within appeal frivolous and ordered that RH must seek leave from a Superior Court judge before commencing any step in any proceeding in any court. No further correspondence from RH would be reviewed by Court staff, enter the record, or receive a response, unless RH proved he had obtained leave to commence or continue a proceeding.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Vault Capital Inc. v. Dacosta, 2026 ONCA 90

[Monahan J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

CSD, acting in person

CD, acting in person

D. Boswell and J. Reynar, appearing as amicus curiae, Pro Bono Ontario

M. Suria, for the responding party

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Civil Procedure, Judgments, Enforcement, Writs of Possession, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Essar Steel Algoma Inc. (Re), 2016 ONCA 274, RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, Ducharme v. Hudson, 2021 ONCA 151

Denny’s Lube Centre (2016) Inc. v. 1121209 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 67

[Fairburn A.C.J.O, Huscroft and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

T. Corsianos, for the appellant

A. Dobrogeanu, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Promissory Estoppel, Public Accounting Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 8., Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Grasshopper Solar Corporation v. Independent Electricity System Operator, 2020 ONCA 499, Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada, 2021 SCC 47, Chitty on Contracts, 36 ed., vol. 1

Murray v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2026 ONCA 81

[Lauwers J.A. (Motion Judge]

Counsel:

SCM, acting in person

H. Young, for the responding party

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, New Issues on Appeal, Reply Factums, Leave, Prism Resources Inc. v. Detour Gold Corporation, 2022 ONCA 4, Boyer v. Callidus Capital Corporation, 2024 ONCA 761, Sternberg v. Cresford Capital Corporation, 2024 ONCA 283, Goberdhan v. Knights of Columbus, 2023 ONCA 269

Equifax Canada Co. v. Oh, 2026 ONCA 76

[Lauwers J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

RO, acting in person

C. Stanek, appearing as amicus curiae, Pro Bono Ontario

J. Renihan, for the responding party

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 61.05(1) and r. 61.09(3)(b), Bell v. Amini, 2023 ONCA 344, Bell v. Amini, 2023 ONCA 344, Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260

Le v. Norris, 2026 ONCA 71

[Fairburn A.C.J.O, Huscroft and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

TBTL, acting in person

RN, acting in person

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory, Trials, Adjournments

Pelling Estate v. Pelling, 2026 ONCA 64

[Miller, Monahan and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A.V. Mayeski and A. E. Colquhoun, for the appellant

S. Clark for the respondent BMS, Estate Trustee of ENP, deceased

J. de Vries and R. Studin, for the respondent the Children’s Lawyer on behalf of minors BAP, AEP, TIP, and NMP

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Holographic Wills, Testamentary Intention, Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages

Pelling Estate v. Pelling, 2026 ONCA 62

[Miller, Monahan and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Frank, for the appellant RAP

A.V. Mayeski and A. E. Colquhoun, for the appellant RJP

S. Clark for the respondent BMS, Estate Trustee of ENP, deceased

J. de Vries and R. Studin, for the respondent the Children’s Lawyer on behalf of minors BAP, AEP, TIP, and NMP

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Wills, Validity, Real Property, Transfers/Deeds, Testamentary Effect, Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, s. 21.1

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