In One York Street Inc. v. 2360083 Ontario Limited, the Court allowed the appeal and restored the motion judge’s order requiring production of the respondents’ solicitor-client communications. The respondents had put their understanding of certain terms of a lease extension in issue, and had pleaded that they did not have the benefit of legal advice when agreeing to them. However, they did have legal advice and notwithstanding that they amended their defence to remove the allegation that they did not have legal advice, the motion judge ordered their solicitor-client communications on the lease terms produced. The Divisional Court set that order aside, applying a correctness standard and finding that once the allegation of no legal advice was withdrawn, the motion judge had erred in finding that privilege had been deemed waived. The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Divisional Court’s order, restoring that of the motion judge. The Court determined that the Divisional Court had erred in applying a correctness standard of review to the motion judge’s finding of deemed waiver of privilege, which involved mixed fact and law and was reviewable only for palpable and overriding error. The Court found that the motion judge correctly concluded that the respondents had put their understanding of their legal rights under the lease in issue even with the withdrawal of the allegation that they did not have legal advice, thereby waiving privilege.

In Schickedanz v. Schickedanz, the appellant challenged the trial judge’s decision invalidating a handwritten codicil executed by her mother, which would have left her the home farm, rather than dividing it equally among her and her four brothers as provided in the original will. The Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the codicil was made in suspicious circumstances relating to the mother’s knowledge and approval of its contents and her testamentary capacity.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

One York Street Inc. v. 2360083 Ontario Limited, 2026 ONCA 176

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Breach, Misrepresentations, Civil Procedure, Amending Pleadings, Evidence, Admissibility, Relevance, Solicitor-Client Privilege, Deemed Waiver, Appeals, Standard of Review, Correctness, Palpable and Overriding Error, Creative Career Systems Inc. v. Ontario, 2012 ONSC 649, Solosky v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821, Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455, Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 SCC 39, Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Cameron, 2019 NSCA 38, S. &. K. Processors Ltd. v. Campbell Ave. Herring Producers Ltd. (1983), 45 B.C.L.R. 218 (S.C.), R. v. Dosanjh, 2022 ONCA 689, Rogers v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 62 B.C.L.R. 387 (C.A.), R. v. Campbell, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565, Soprema Inc. v. Wolrige Mahon LLP, 2016 BCCA 471, Laliberté v. Monteith, 2021 ONSC 4133, Magnotta Winery Corporation v. Ontario (The Alcohol and Gaming Commission), 2020 ONSC 561, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, R. v. Delchev, 2015 ONCA 381, Roynat Capital Inc. v. Repeatseat Ltd., 2015 ONSC 1108, Thomson v. University of Alberta, 2013 ABCA 391, The Blood Tribe v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 ABCA 112, R. v. Matthews, 2022 ABCA 115, Girouard v. Canadian Judicial Council, 2019 FCA 252, Do Process LP v. Infokey Software Inc., 2015 BCCA 52, Araya v. Nevsun Resources Ltd., 2019 BCCA 205, Matthew Gourlay et al., Modern Criminal Evidence, ed by Brian H. Greenspan & Vincenzo Rondinelli (Toronto: Emond, 2022), David M. Paciocco, Palma Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 8th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020), John T. McNaughton, Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 8 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), §2327, Sidney N. Lederman, Michelle K. Fuerst & Hamish C. Stewart, Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant: The Law of Evidence in Canada, 6th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2022), Civil Evidence Handbook, release no. 1 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2026)

Schickedanz v. Schickedanz, 2026 ONCA 191

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Holograph Will, Codicil, Testamentary Capacity, Suspicious Circumstances, Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, s. 6, Canada Permanent Trust v. Bowman, [1962] S.C.R. 711, Vout v. Hay, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 876, Stekar v. Wilcox, 2017 ONCA 1010, Forde v. Dockery, 2024 ONSC 5878, Sikora Estate (Re), 2015 ABQB 374, Garwood et al. v. Garwood et al., 2017 MBCA 67, McGrath v. Joy, 2022 ONCA 119, Quaggiotto v. Quaggiotto, 2019 ONCA 107, Orfus Estate v. The Samuel and Bessie Orfus Family Foundation, 2013 ONCA 225, Leonard v. Zychowicz, 2022 ONCA 212, Waxman v. Waxman (2004), 186 O.A.C. 201 (C.A.), Johnson v. Huchkewich, 2010 ONSC 6002, Canada Forgings Inc. v. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 2024 ONCA 677

Short Civil Decisions

Bellefeuille v. Tamarack Developments Corporation (Tamarack Homes), 2026 ONCA 170

Keywords: Contracts, Construction, Tarion Warranties, Civil Procedure, Orders, Administrative Dismissals for Delay, Setting Aside, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 48.14, Reid v. Dow Corning Corp. (2001), 11 C.P.C. (5th) 80 (Ont. S.C.), Scaini v. Prochnicki, 2007 ONCA 63, Barbiero v. Pollack, 2024 ONCA 904, Prescott v. Barbon, 2018 ONCA 504, Arumugasamy v. Subaschandiran, 2026 ONCA 102, Hryniak v. Mauldin,2014 SCC 7

Wei v. Ye-Hang Canada (EH-C) Technology & Services Inc., 2026 ONCA 180

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Contra Proferentem Doctrine, Debtor-Creditor, Defences, Non Est Factum Defence, Corporations, Remedies, Piercing Corporate Veil, Torts, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 137.1

Amex Bank of Canada v. DaCosta, 2026 ONCA 181

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Civil Procedure, Default Judgments, Setting Aside, Service, Substituted Service, Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, 2014 ONCA 194

Johnson v. Johnson, 2026 ONCA 189

Keywords: Family Law, Child Support, Parenting, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Dismissal for Delay, Case Management, Evidence, Transcripts, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 61.09, 61.05, 61.13, Van de Perre v. Edwards, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014, Girao v. Cunningham, 2017 ONCA 811, Khorramrooz v. Baradar, 2026 ONCA 24, McDowell v. Barker, [2011] O.J. No. 5035 (C.A.)

RCG Islington 401 Limited Partnership v. Toronto (City), 2026 ONCA 168

Keywords: Municipal Law, Land-Use Planning, Building Permits, Development Charges, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Limitation Periods, O. Reg. 73/20, s. 1, 2, §. 415-5, 415-7 of City of Toronto, By-law 515-2018, (27 April 2018)

Peng v. Chen Estate, 2026 ONCA 174

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Appeals, Security for Costs, Appeals, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 7(5), Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 61.06, 56.01, Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2017 ONCA 827, Correct Building Corporation v. Lehman, 2022 ONCA 723

Caruso v. Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONCA 177

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Paralegals, Discipline, Civil procedure, Appeals, Interveners, Friends of the Court, , Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s.91, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 13.03, Caruso v. The Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 6744, Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 164 (Ont. C.A.), Jones v. Tsige (2011), 106 O.R. (3d) 721 (C.A.)

CIVIL DECISIONS

One York Street Inc. v. 2360083 Ontario Limited, 2026 ONCA 176

[Huscroft, Copeland and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Lerner and J. Lepore, for the appellant

M. Karabus and L. Sabourin, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Breach, Misrepresentations, Civil Procedure, Amending Pleadings, Evidence, Admissibility, Relevance, Solicitor-Client Privilege, Deemed Waiver, Appeals, Standard of Review, Correctness, Palpable and Overriding Error, Creative Career Systems Inc. v. Ontario, 2012 ONSC 649, Solosky v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821, Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455, Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 SCC 39, Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Cameron, 2019 NSCA 38, S. &. K. Processors Ltd. v. Campbell Ave. Herring Producers Ltd. (1983), 45 B.C.L.R. 218 (S.C.), R. v. Dosanjh, 2022 ONCA 689, Rogers v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 62 B.C.L.R. 387 (C.A.), R. v. Campbell, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565, Soprema Inc. v. Wolrige Mahon LLP, 2016 BCCA 471, Laliberté v. Monteith, 2021 ONSC 4133, Magnotta Winery Corporation v. Ontario (The Alcohol and Gaming Commission), 2020 ONSC 561, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, R. v. Delchev, 2015 ONCA 381, Roynat Capital Inc. v. Repeatseat Ltd., 2015 ONSC 1108, Thomson v. University of Alberta, 2013 ABCA 391, The Blood Tribe v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 ABCA 112, R. v. Matthews, 2022 ABCA 115, Girouard v. Canadian Judicial Council, 2019 FCA 252, Do Process LP v. Infokey Software Inc., 2015 BCCA 52, Araya v. Nevsun Resources Ltd., 2019 BCCA 205, Matthew Gourlay et al., Modern Criminal Evidence, ed by Brian H. Greenspan & Vincenzo Rondinelli (Toronto: Emond, 2022), David M. Paciocco, Palma Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 8th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020), John T. McNaughton, Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 8 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), §2327, Sidney N. Lederman, Michelle K. Fuerst & Hamish C. Stewart, Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant: The Law of Evidence in Canada, 6th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2022), Civil Evidence Handbook, release no. 1 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2026)

facts:

The appellant was a commercial landlord. In 2017, the respondents 2360083 Ontario Limited (“236”) and LCIL Ltd., entered into a lease with the appellant for premises in a shopping centre. The lease was for a term of three years and included four options to renew the lease, for a total of 17 additional years, bringing the total term to 20 years. The day after the lease was signed, the respondents entered into a lease extension agreement that extended the lease term to 20 years.

In 2019, issues arose with the respondents’ payment of rent under the lease. In 2021, the appellant commenced a claim in which they alleged that the respondents breached the lease by failing to pay rent and, ultimately, abandoned the leased premises. In the respondents’ statement of defence and counterclaim, they alleged that they executed the lease and the extension in reliance on misrepresentations by the appellant. The original statement of defence and counterclaim also specifically pleaded that the respondents “did not understand the ramifications” of the lease extension and that they signed it “without legal advice”. It was subsequently admitted by the respondents that at the time they signed the lease and the extension, they received legal advice from FR LLP (“FR”). During examinations for discovery, the respondents asserted solicitor-client privilege over the FR file in relation to the negotiation and execution of the lease and the extension.

In 2023, the appellant served a motion seeking, among other relief, production of the FR file. In response to the motion, the respondents filed a motion to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim to remove the portions that explicitly pleaded that they did not understand the terms of the lease or the extension and did not receive legal advice at the time of signing the lease extension. The amending motion was granted prior to the production/privilege motion being heard.

The motion judge found that privilege was deemed waived and ordered production of the FR file. The Divisional Court allowed the respondents’ appeal from the motion judge’s order. The Divisional Court concluded that the respondents effectively removed their reliance on lack of legal advice through the 2023 amendments to the statement of defence and counterclaim. Accordingly, the Divisional Court quashed the order for production. The appellant appealed the decision.

issues:

1. Did the Divisional Court err in applying a correctness standard of review to the motion judge’s analysis of deemed waiver of privilege?
2. Did the motion judge err in finding a deemed waiver of privilege?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

1. Yes.

The Court found that the Divisional Court erred in applying a correctness standard of review to the motion judge’s analysis of deemed waiver of privilege. A question of whether a deemed waiver of privilege had occurred was an issue of mixed fact and law. Whether the motion judge applied the correct legal standard or test for deemed waiver of privilege was reviewable on a correctness standard. If a motion judge applied the correct legal standard, their findings of fact were entitled to deference. The Court found that the motion judge applied the correct legal framework to her analysis of the deemed waiver issue. The findings of fact and ultimate conclusion of whether a deemed waiver had occurred were reviewable on the palpable and overriding error standard. The Court saw no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge’s finding that the circumstances supported the conclusion that there was a deemed waiver of privilege by the respondents of the legal advice they received in relation to entering into the lease. The Court found that the motion judge was particularly well-placed to make the case-specific factual findings required for the deemed waiver analysis. The motion judge was also the case management judge. Her ongoing supervision of the case placed her in an advantageous position to engage in the case-specific assessment of whether there was a deemed waiver of privilege by the respondents

2. No.

The Court found that the motion judge did not err in finding a deemed waiver of privilege. The motion judge’s analysis correctly focused on the question of whether the respondents had placed reliance in their statement of defence and counterclaim, and in their conduct of the litigation, on their state of mind with respect to their legal position by pleading that they relied on representations by the appellant not contained in the lease as “guarantees.” In light of the position taken by the respondents in their pleading, and the fact that they had received legal advice at the time they entered into the lease, they had placed in issue the legal advice they received.

The motion judge considered both versions of the statement of defence and counterclaim in her analysis. While the 2023 amendments to the statement of defence and counterclaim removed express reliance on not receiving legal advice and the express assertion that the respondents did not understand the terms of the lease extension, the remaining pleadings still placed reliance on the respondents’ understanding of their legal position. Having made these assertions, and in circumstances where it was undisputed that the respondents had received legal advice from their own counsel at the time they entered into the lease and the extension, allowing the respondents to maintain privilege over the legal advice they received would have been inconsistent with the position they had taken in the litigation and would have been unfair to the appellant.

Schickedanz v. Schickedanz, 2026 ONCA 191

[van Rensburg, Paciocco and Thorburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Turner and K. Morris, for the appellant

D. Lobl, A. Chen and N. Fainman-Adelman, for the respondents

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Holograph Will, Codicil, Testamentary Capacity, Suspicious Circumstances, Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, s. 6, Canada Permanent Trust v. Bowman, [1962] S.C.R. 711, Vout v. Hay, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 876, Stekar v. Wilcox, 2017 ONCA 1010, Forde v. Dockery, 2024 ONSC 5878, Sikora Estate (Re), 2015 ABQB 374, Garwood et al. v. Garwood et al., 2017 MBCA 67, McGrath v. Joy, 2022 ONCA 119, Quaggiotto v. Quaggiotto, 2019 ONCA 107, Orfus Estate v. The Samuel and Bessie Orfus Family Foundation, 2013 ONCA 225, Leonard v. Zychowicz, 2022 ONCA 212, Waxman v. Waxman (2004), 186 O.A.C. 201 (C.A.), Johnson v. Huchkewich, 2010 ONSC 6002, Canada Forgings Inc. v. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 2024 ONCA 677

facts:

On May 9, 2016, E.S. who died on December 12, 2019, executed a codicil in her own handwriting, purportedly leaving the most valuable asset from her estate, the “home farm”, to her daughter, the appellant C.S. If valid, the purported codicil revoked terms of her 2007 will, which had been prepared with the assistance of a lawyer, E.H. That will, like an earlier will E.S. executed with the assistance of a lawyer, would have resulted in an equal division of the equity in the home farm between C.S. and her brothers.

The four brothers and respondents, W.S., G.S., M.S and A.S. disputed the purported codicil, and C.S. initiated an application to prove it. The trial judge found the purported codicil to have been made in circumstances of suspicion relating to E.S.’s knowledge and approval of its contents, and her capacity to execute it. Those findings placed the burden on C.S. of proving on the balance of probabilities that E.S. knew and approved of the terms of the purported codicil and had the testamentary capacity needed to create a valid testamentary disposition. The trial judge concluded that C.S. failed to discharge her burden on either of the issues and found the purported codicil to be invalid.                      

issues:

1. Did the trial judge err in assessing suspicious circumstances?
2. Did the trial judge err by applying the incorrect standard in determining whether Charlotte discharged her burden on the “knowledge and approval requirement”?
3. Did the trial judge err by placing undue reliance on Elma’s family doctor’s notes and by disregarding his testimony?
4. Did the trial judge err by providing insufficient reasons for his decision?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1.No

The Court found no contradiction related to the trial judge’s conclusion that it was suspicious that the purported codicil stated the bequest of the home farm to C.S. was “always the wish” of her husband, when neither of his earlier wills reflected this wish. Even though her husband had expressed this wish, her husband did not act upon it when his wills were prepared, casting doubt on the accuracy of the claim.

The Court held the trial judge’s inconsistency in whether C.S. or E.S. drove to the municipal office in Markham was not an overriding error. This was because the evidence of C.S.’s instrumental role in procuring the purported codicil had multiple components that would have led to the same conclusion, whether C.S. drove or not.

Moreover, the circumstances of suspicion the trial judge identified relating to whether E.S. fully understood the purported codicil went well beyond C.S.’s immediate role in its execution. All the factors, along with evidence of C.S.’s belief she was entitled to the home farm; her expression of relief after the purported codicil was executed that “it was done”; the lack of involvement by others in the execution of the purported codicil; and E.S.’s statement to A.S. the next day that “she did something yesterday” that she was “unsure about”, provided an ample foundation for the circumstances of the finding of suspicion.

2. No.

The Court was not persuaded that the trial judge required evidence that E.S. knew the precise value of the home farm. It was evident that the trial judge’s concern was that the evidence failed to show that E.S. knew that the value of the home farm had appreciated to the point where it constituted the bulk of her estate, or that giving it to C.S. would result in an unequal division of her assets, contrary to her expressed wish to treat her children equally. The trial judge was entitled to find that C.S. failed to establish that E.S. fully understood what was in the purported codicil.

3. No.

The Court rejected the argument that the trial judge ignored the family doctor’s testimony by focusing on his clinical notes when describing E.S.’s health challenges. The trial judge was entitled to use the words contained in the notes in explaining his decision and did not distort the family doctor’s evidence by doing so. Nor was there any basis for finding that the trial judge relied on the notes alone as opinion evidence. In his testimony, the doctor was questioned about the opinions that his clinical notes contained, and as indicated, he did not recant them. His testimony effectively incorporated the material opinions expressed in his notes.

The Court also rejected the related submission that the trial judge erred by relying, without the benefit of expert evidence, on irrelevant physical maladies that E.S. suffered from, and on her anxiety. The evidence provided the trial judge with an ample basis, without the need for expert evidence, for concluding that E.S. had a host of maladies that affected both her physical and mental wellbeing and that were relevant to her testamentary capacity at the time of execution.

Finally, they were not persuaded that E.S.’s cognitive impairment was too mild to undermine her capacity. The material issue before the trial was whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, created circumstances of suspicion relating to E.S.’s capacity and, if so, whether C.S. could affirmatively establish capacity. The evidence was enough as a whole to give rise to circumstances of suspicion, shift the onus to C.S, and to support a finding that she had failed to meet her onus.

4. No.

The Court was persuaded that it was entirely possible to understand the basis for the trial judge’s decision. The trial judge’s reasons were not only extensive but clear. The Court did not accept the argument that the trial judge’s reasons were insufficient because he failed to distinguish between his recitation of submissions and the findings he made. His factual conclusions were clear from the decision. They also rejected the suggestion that the trial judge erred by not making explicit credibility findings. This was not a credibility case requiring close attention to material evidentiary controversies. The central circumstances were not in dispute and the findings the trial judge made in those areas where controversy existed were clear.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Bellefeuille v. Tamarack Developments Corporation (Tamarack Homes), 2026 ONCA 170

[Lauwers, Huscroft and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Milosevic, for the appellants

J. Therrien, for the respondent Tamarack Developments Corporation a.k.a. Tamarack Homes

A. Severson, the respondent City of Ottawa

M. Shillington, for the respondent Tarion Warranty Corporation

Keywords: Contracts, Construction, Tarion Warranties, Civil Procedure, Orders, Administrative Dismissals for Delay, Setting Aside, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 48.14, Reid v. Dow Corning Corp. (2001), 11 C.P.C. (5th) 80 (Ont. S.C.), Scaini v. Prochnicki, 2007 ONCA 63, Barbiero v. Pollack, 2024 ONCA 904, Prescott v. Barbon, 2018 ONCA 504, Arumugasamy v. Subaschandiran, 2026 ONCA 102, Hryniak v. Mauldin,2014 SCC 7

Wei v. Ye-Hang Canada (EH-C) Technology & Services Inc., 2026 ONCA 180

[van Rensburg, Miller and Coroza JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Gideon, for the appellants

C. Zhang, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Contra Proferentem Doctrine, Debtor-Creditor, Defences, Non Est Factum Defence, Corporations, Remedies, Piercing Corporate Veil, Torts, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 137.1

Amex Bank of Canada v. DaCosta, 2026 ONCA 181

[Huscroft, Zarnett and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. A. Prosia and M. Laforet, for the appellant

M. Asad, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Civil Procedure, Default Judgments, Setting Aside, Service, Substituted Service, Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, 2014 ONCA 194

Johnson v. Johnson, 2026 ONCA 189

[Madsen J.A. (Case Management Judge)]

Counsel:

BWJ, acting in person

S. Hines, appearing as agent for EJ

G. Latner, appearing as amicus curiae

Keywords: Family Law, Child Support, Parenting, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Dismissal for Delay, Case Management, Evidence, Transcripts, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 61.09, 61.05, 61.13, Van de Perre v. Edwards, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014, Girao v. Cunningham, 2017 ONCA 811, Khorramrooz v. Baradar, 2026 ONCA 24, McDowell v. Barker, [2011] O.J. No. 5035 (C.A.)

RCG Islington 401 Limited Partnership v. Toronto (City), 2026 ONCA 168

[Lauwers, Huscroft and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

C. Stanek, P. Gross and G. Reeder, for the appellant

C. Davies, for the respondent

Keywords: Municipal Law, Land-Use Planning, Building Permits, Development Charges, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Limitation Periods, O. Reg. 73/20, s. 1, 2, §. 415-5, 415-7 of City of Toronto, By-law 515-2018, (27 April 2018)

Peng v. Chen Estate, 2026 ONCA 174

[van Rensburg, Miller and Coroza JJ.A.]

Counsel:

XP, acting in person

S. Eisen and J. Valencia, for the responding party, MHT

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Appeals, Security for Costs, Appeals, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 7(5), Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 61.06, 56.01, Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2017 ONCA 827, Correct Building Corporation v. Lehman, 2022 ONCA 723

Caruso v. Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONCA 177

[Wilson J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

AC, acting in person

N. R. Hasan and S. Aylward, for the respondent

JC, for the proposed intervener, acting in person

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Paralegals, Discipline, Civil procedure, Appeals, Interveners, Friends of the Court, , Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s.91, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 13.03, Caruso v. The Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 6744, Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 164 (Ont. C.A.), Jones v. Tsige (2011), 106 O.R. (3d) 721 (C.A.)

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.