In Tiny Township Association of Responsible STR Owners v. Tiny (Township), the Court dismissed an appeal from an application judge’s decision regarding the validity of a By-Law that regulated short-term rentals. The Court upheld the application judge’s finding that the STR By-law was intra vires of the Township’s licensing power and appropriately considered the economic, social and environmental well-being of community. 

In B.M. v. Ontario, the Court granted intervener status to four of the six applicants. The appellants seek to certify a class action against Ontario and Canada on behalf of all indigenous children off-reserve who have been apprehended by a children’s aid society or have encountered other barriers to essential social services from 1992 to the present. 

In MacEwen v. Daljit, the Court allowed an appeal from an order setting aside the parties’ domestic contract under s. 56(4)(b) of the Family Law Act. The hearing judge had found that the Wife engaged in trickery and dishonestly changed certain paragraphs, but the Court held that this finding could not stand. The Husband had not alleged any such misconduct against the Wife and she was not on notice of such allegations. Furthermore, there were no personal vulnerabilities or inequality of bargaining power that justified setting aside the contract. The domestic contract was therefore restored. 

In Starra v. Starra, the Court dismissed the appeal from an order varying and ultimately terminating spousal support following the respondent’s retirement. The Court held that the motion judge was entitled to conclude that the compensatory component of support would be satisfied within a two-year transition period, having considered the parties’ long-term marriage, the appellant’s health issues, the evidence of family violence, the respondent’s retirement, and the parties’ similar net worth. The Court also upheld the refusal to award retroactive support, finding no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that the respondent had no ongoing disclosure obligations, the appellant had legal advice throughout the relevant period, and a retroactive award would cause significant hardship to the respondent.

The Court dismissed an appeal from a summary judgment that dismissed a realtor’s claim to a commission arising from a failed commercial real estate transaction. The Court found that the motion judge made no reviewable error in interpreting the contractual documents, holding that the “TBD” designation in the Buyer Representation Agreement failed to establish a binding commission obligation on the buyer, that the buyer was not a party to the separate Commission Agreement between the seller and the brokerage, and that the Revised Co-op Agreement identified only the seller as responsible for commission payment. Applying a deferential standard of review per Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., the appeal was dismissed. 

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Tiny Township Association of Responsible STR Owners v. Tiny (Township), 2026 ONCA 408

Keywords: Municipal Law, Land Use Planning, Licencing, By-Laws, Jurisdiction, Short Term Rentals, Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, s. ss. 8(3), 11, 151(1), 151(5), 273(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, Auer v. Auer, 2024 SCC 36, Clublink Corporation ULC v. Oakville (Town), 2019 ONCA 827, Katz Group Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Health and Long‑Term Care), 2013 SCC 64, 2211266 Ontario Inc. (Gentlemen’s Club) v. Brantford (City), 2013 ONCA 300, Toronto Livery Association v. Toronto (City), 2009 ONCA 535, 232169 Ontario Inc. (Farouz Sheesha Café) v. Toronto (City), 2017 ONCA 484, 2386240 Ontario Inc. v. Mississauga (City), 2019 ONCA 413, York (Regional Municipality) v. Tsui, 2017 ONCA 230, Sarnia (City) v. River City Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Sarnia, 2015 ONCA 732, Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), CAMPP Windsor Essex Residents Association v. Windsor (City), 2020 ONSC 4612

B.M. v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 422

Keywords: Public Law, First Nations, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Family Law, Crown Wardship, Charter Claims, Justiciability, Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Certification, Interveners, Amicus Curiae, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 15, Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 13.02, 13.03(2), BM v. Ontario, 2025 ONSC 4575, Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd. (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 164 (C.A.), Canadian Federation of Students v. Ontario (Colleges and Universities), 2020 ONCA 842, Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 669, G.G. v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 164, Animal Justice v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 941, Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 29, Bhajan v. Ontario (Children’s Lawyer), 2010 ONCA 560, Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 619, First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 CHRT 2 

MacEwen v. Daljit, 2026 ONCA 398

Keywords: Family Law, Domestic Contracts, Separation Agreements, Setting Aside, Civil Procedure, Pleadings, Procedural Fairness, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, ss.56(4)(b), Rodaro v. Royal Bank of Canada (2002), 59 OR (3d) 74 (CA), Grand Financial Management Inc. v. Solemio Transportation Inc., 2016 ONCA 175, Frick v. Frick, 2016 ONCA 799, Browne v. Dunn (1893), 6 R 67 (HL), R v. Quansah, 2015 ONCA 237, Hayward v. Hayward, 2021 ONCA 175, Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, Marketology Media Inc. v. D.G.A. North American Inc., 2024 ONCA 799, Labatt Brewing Co. v. NHL Enterprises Canada L.P., 2011 ONCA 511, Anderson v Anderson, 2023 SCC 13, Davies v. Jane, 2025 ONCA 752, Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, Rick v. Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10, Faiello v. Faiello, 2019 ONCA 710, LeVan v. LeVan, 2008 ONCA 388, Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, [2004] 1 SCR 550, Virc v. Blair, 2014 ONCA 392, Dougherty v. Dougherty, 2008 ONCA 302, Maka v. Maka, 2015 ONSC 3480, El Rassi-Wight . Arnold, 2024 ONCA 2, Stupka v. Stupka, 2012 ONSC 1133, aff’d 2013 ONCA 365, Stevens v Stevens, 2012 ONSC 706, Ward v. Ward, 2011 ONCA 178, Tozer v. Tassone, 2019 ONCA 285, 25 RFL (8th) 159, Raaymakers v. Green (2006), 25 RFL (6th) 54 (Ont CA), Singh v. Khalill, 2024 ONCA 909, Smith v. Smith, 2017 ONCA 759, Butty v. Butty, 2009 ONCA 852

Starra v. Starra, 2026 ONCA 405 

Keywords: Family Law, Spousal Support, Compensatory Support, Non-Compensatory Support, Variation, Material Change of Circumstances, Divorce Act, SC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), Schulstad v. Schulstad, 2017 ONCA 95, Hickey v. Hickey, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, Boston v. Boston, 2001 SCC 43, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2016)

Qureshi v. Zeema Investments Incorporated, 2026 ONCA 413 

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Buyer Representation Agreements, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Standard of Review, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53

Short Civil Decisions

Louie v. Han, 2026 ONCA 404

Keywords: Real Property, Resulting Trusts, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, Louie v. Han, 2026 ONCA 25  

Birtzu v. McCron, 2026 ONCA 406 

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Civil Procedure, Judgments, Enforcement, Writs of Seizure and Sale, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 1.03(1), 60.07, Birtzu v. McCron, 2019 ONCA 777, 148 O.R. (3d) 603

Royce Presidential Investments Inc. v. Valour Group Inc., 2026 ONCA 409

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, Appeals, Reasons for Decision, Royce Presidential Investments Inc. v. Valour Group Inc., 2025 ONCA 903

Thomson v. Fleming, 2026 ONCA 418 

Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Travel, Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Arbitration, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, r. 32.1(2)

Contardi v. Contardi, 2026 ONCA 420 

Keywords: Family Law, Support, Disclosure, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, E.L.R. v. D.M.S., 2025 ONCA 802, Issasi v. Rosenzweig, 2011 ONCA 112, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131

Alyousef  v. Alyousef, 2026 ONCA 416 

Keywords: Damages, Civil Procedure, Costs

R (H.C.) v. Ontario Special Education Tribunal, 2026 ONCA 419

Keywords: Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Education, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Reconsideration, Vexatious Litigation, Abuse of Process, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Mootness, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2.1.01, Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, leave to appeal ref’d [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 488, Meridian Credit Union Limited v. Baig, 2016 ONCA 942, McGrath v. Joy, 2023 ONCA 46

CIVIL DECISIONS

Tiny Township Association of Responsible STR Owners v. Tiny (Township), 2026 ONCA 408

[Gomery, Madsen and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

H. Lie, for the appellant 

M. Hodgson and E. Wargel, for the respondent

Keywords: Municipal Law, Land Use Planning, Licencing, By-Laws, Jurisdiction, Short Term Rentals, Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, s. ss. 8(3), 11, 151(1), 151(5), 273(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, Auer v. Auer, 2024 SCC 36, Clublink Corporation ULC v. Oakville (Town), 2019 ONCA 827, Katz Group Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Health and Long‑Term Care), 2013 SCC 64, 2211266 Ontario Inc. (Gentlemen’s Club) v. Brantford (City), 2013 ONCA 300, Toronto Livery Association v. Toronto (City), 2009 ONCA 535, 232169 Ontario Inc. (Farouz Sheesha Café) v. Toronto (City), 2017 ONCA 484, 2386240 Ontario Inc. v. Mississauga (City), 2019 ONCA 413, York (Regional Municipality) v. Tsui, 2017 ONCA 230, Sarnia (City) v. River City Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Sarnia, 2015 ONCA 732, Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), CAMPP Windsor Essex Residents Association v. Windsor (City), 2020 ONSC 4612

facts: 

In 2015, the Township’s Council initiated a review of potential short-term rental (STR) regulations, prompted by concerns expressed by community members about the unruly and noisy behaviour of STR renters. Over the next seven years, the Council took a series of steps to obtain community feedback on STRs and to determine how to balance policy goals, including ensuring a supply of affordable housing, mitigating community disruptions related to STRs, and increasing municipal revenue through licensing and regulation. During this process, it received input from STR owners as well as other Township residents. In 2022, the Corporation of the Township of Tiny passed By-Law 22-017, regulating the operation of short-term rental accommodations (STRs) in the Township. The STR By-Law requires STR owners to apply for and obtain an annual licence, restricts how STRs can be used, regulates the duration of rental periods, and caps the total number of days each year that an STR can be rented. The STR By-Law was unpopular with some STR owners, and as a result, the Tiny Township Association of Responsible STR Owners was formed. In 2023, the Association brought an application to quash the STR By-Law pursuant to s. 273(1) of the Municipal Act. The Association and individual applicants argued that the STR By-Law was enacted in bad faith, that it was a disguised zoning by law, and that it amounted to an illegal attempt to regulate STRs out of existence. The application judge rejected these submissions and dismissed the application.

issues:

1. Is the STR By-Law ultra vires the Township’s business licensing power on the basis that:

a. it applies to non-commercial activity;
b. it effectively prohibits, rather than regulates, the operation of STRs; and
c. it fails to balance existing property rights?

2. Is the licensing cap ultra vires the Township’s authority respecting economic, social and environmental well-being?
3. Did the application judge err in awarding costs without recognizing that the Township had already been indemnified for its litigation costs through the annual licensing fee imposed on STR owners?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court found that the STR By-Law was a valid exercise of both the Township’s general licensing power and its power to licence businesses.

a) A municipality may enact a licensing scheme for a purpose other than licensing businesses. Section 8(3) of the Municipal Act states that a by-law may “provide for a system of licences respecting the matter”. There is no qualification restricting this power to licensing businesses, and the specific licensing powers in s. 151(1) do not limit or derogate from the more general authority conferred by s. 11. In fact, s. 151(5) confirms that a licensing scheme may be enacted for a purpose other than the regulation of a business. The Township has the power under the Municipal Act to implement a licensing scheme with respect to STRs, whether or not STRs meet the definition of businesses, and the Township did so to further valid statutory purposes. This was a complete answer to the Association’s position that the licensing scheme as a whole is invalid.

b) Nothing in the Municipal Act prevents a municipality from imposing temporal restrictions on business activities, so long as the restriction is based on a valid exercise of a municipal power under the Act. Section 151(1)(f) gives the Township the broad power to “license, regulate or govern real and personal property used for the business and the persons carrying it on or engaged in it.”

c) The Court found that the Township made extensive efforts to balance the competing interests of all community stakeholders, including STR owners. This is borne out by the lengthy consultation, research and review process it undertook over many years. The application judge acknowledged that the STR By-Law changed how the applicants could rent out their property and restricted the income they could earn from their property but noted that its enactment was “based on a detailed investigation of the issues with community participation and feedback”. In particular, he found that the licence cap was “a compromise between those community members who sought a complete ban on STRs and those who sought no restrictions.”

2. No. If a municipality is empowered under the Municipal Act to pass by-laws for a particular purpose, and the record shows that this purpose motivated the by-law’s provisions, the absence of a reference to that purpose in the text of the by-law does not undermine its validity. The records showed that the Township was concerned about the impact of unchecked STRs on competition in the area and the availability of affordable housing for the community.

3. No. The Court found that there was no basis to set aside the application judge’s cost awards. In setting costs, the court should determine the amount that is fair and reasonable for a litigant to pay in a particular proceeding. Indemnification of the winning party is a recognized justification for awarding costs. It was open to the application judge to find that the public interest element did not immunize the Association and its members who had participated in the litigation from cost consequences.

B.M. v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 422

[Favreau]

Counsel:

D. Sterns and A. Abdulla, for the appellants 

H. Evans, S. Pottle, S. Nestico-Semianiw and W. Malik, for the respondent His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario 

S. Pavic, S. Rajguru and V. Sharypkina, for the respondent Attorney General of Canada 

L. Farr and K. Langevin, for the proposed intervener Anishinabek Nation c.o.b. as Union of Ontario Indians Inc. 

S. Choudhry, for the proposed intervener British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 

K. Johnstone, M. Wente and J. Rogers, for the proposed intervener Chiefs of Ontario 

H. Ahmad, for the proposed intervener Hiawatha First Nation 

J. Falconer and E. McMurray, for the proposed intervener Nishnawbe Aski Nation 

A. Wheeler and K. Tsang, for the proposed intervener Nigig Nibi Ki-win Gamik

Keywords: Public Law, First Nations, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Family Law, Crown Wardship, Charter Claims, Justiciability, Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Certification, Interveners, Amicus Curiae, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 15, Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 13.02, 13.03(2), BM v. Ontario, 2025 ONSC 4575, Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd. (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 164 (C.A.), Canadian Federation of Students v. Ontario (Colleges and Universities), 2020 ONCA 842, Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 669, G.G. v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 164, Animal Justice v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 941, Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 29, Bhajan v. Ontario (Children’s Lawyer), 2010 ONCA 560, Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 619, First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 CHRT 2 

facts:

The Appellants, B.M. and C.A., sought to bring a class action proceeding on behalf of all indigenous children off-reserve who were apprehended by a children’s aid society in Ontario and indigenous children who have encountered barriers in obtaining essential social services from 1992 to the present. In their claim, the Appellants alleged that Canada and Ontario’s policies and practices have breached the class’ rights pursuant to sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Appellants also pleaded that the Respondents, Ontario and Canada, breached their fiduciary duties and were negligent. However, the motion judge dismissed the Appellant’s motion to certify the claim, finding that the claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

On appeal, there were six proposed interveners: The Anishinabek Nation c.o.b. as Union of Ontario Indians Inc.; The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (“BCCLA”); The Chiefs of Ontario; Hiawatha First Nation; Nishnawbe Aski Nation; and Nigig Nibi Ki-win Gamik (“Nigig Gamik”). They sought to intervene as friends of the court pursuant to rules 13.02 and 13.03(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Appellants did not oppose any of the interveners’ motions. The Respondents took no position on BCCLA’s and the Chiefs of Ontario’s motions for leave to intervene, but opposed the other motions.

issues:

Should the proposed interveners’ motions for leave to intervene be granted on the ground that they are likely to make useful contributions to resolving the motion to certify?

holding:

Motions of the Anishinabek Nation, the BCCLA, the Chiefs of Ontario and Nishnawbe Aski Nation granted. Motions of Hiawatha First Nation and Nigig Gamik dismissed.

reasoning:

Yes for four of the interveners. No for the other two. The Court granted the motions for leave to intervene for all interveners except Hiawatha First Nation and Nigig Nibi Ki-win Gamik.

The Court evaluated each intervener’s motion individually on the basis that granting leave in constitutional cases is more relaxed. As a result, the Court considered whether the interveners had a real, substantial and identifiable interest in the matter, whether they had a distinct perspective or whether they had special expertise. However, the Court acknowledged that the scope of the proposed interventions would be limited to the extent that they were duplicative with the submissions of the parties.

The Court granted part of the Anishinabek Nation’s motion for leave to intervene in part, holding that its intervention should be limited to the issue of the role of First Nation (Band) representatives. The Court found that its proposed draft factum included an additional legislative and jurisprudential perspective that would be useful to the Appellants’ appeal. However, the Court directed the Anishinabek Nation to revise its factum to no more than ten pages and to amend it so as to not expand the evidentiary record.  

The Court also granted the BCCLA’s motion, finding that the BCCLA’s proposed issue of the extent of the government’s residual Charter liability for unconstitutional conduct by public sector entities will provide a unique perspective on appeal.  

The Court granted the Chiefs of Ontario’s motion, holding that although some of their proposed submissions overlap with those of the Appellants, they would bring a nuanced perspective regarding the justiciability of Charter claims that challenge complex government policy decisions involving the design, management, control and funding of social programs. Although the motion to intervene was granted, the Court expressed concerns regarding the length of the of the factum and ultimately directed the Chiefs of Ontario to file a revised factum of no more than 15 pages, with the substance remaining the same.

The Court granted the Nishnawbe Aski Nation’s motion. The Court concluded that its proposed submissions concerning the motion judge’s section 15 Charter analysis and reliance on the Caring Society decision would be of assistance during the appeal and provided a nuanced perspective, despite overlapping with the Appellant’s submissions. The Court rejected the Respondent’s argument that the Nishnawbe Aski Nation’s draft factum improperly expanded the evidentiary record, holding that it did not rely on the affidavit evidence in support of its submissions but only referred to certain parts of the filed affidavit in support of the intervention to provide background information. The Nishnawbe Aski Nation’s references were not material to the issues on appeal and therefore did not expand the evidentiary record.  

The Court dismissed the Hiawatha First Nation’s motion. It held that although Hiawatha First Nation’s proposal to consider the differences between indigenous and western modes of parenting during the section 15 Charter analysis would be relevant to the merits of the claim if the action were to be certified, it did not bring light to the issues raised by the Appellants at the certification stage. Additionally, the Court held that the motion must be denied because Hiawatha First Nation’s reliance on academic articles would improperly expand the evidentiary record. 

Finally, the court dismissed Nigig Gamik’s motion, concluding that its proposed submissions on whether the motion judge erred in finding that the claim did not disclose a cause of action by relying on United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, sui generis fiduciary duties and ad hoc fiduciary duties unduly expanded the scope of issues on appeal.

MacEwen v. Daljit, 2026 ONCA 398

[Trotter, Zarnett and Madsen J.A.]

Counsel:

J.J. Sommer, for the appellant 

A. Feldstein and R.S. Mungol, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Domestic Contracts, Separation Agreements, Setting Aside, Civil Procedure, Pleadings, Procedural Fairness, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, ss.56(4)(b), Rodaro v. Royal Bank of Canada (2002), 59 OR (3d) 74 (CA), Grand Financial Management Inc. v. Solemio Transportation Inc., 2016 ONCA 175, Frick v. Frick, 2016 ONCA 799, Browne v. Dunn (1893), 6 R 67 (HL), R v. Quansah, 2015 ONCA 237, Hayward v. Hayward, 2021 ONCA 175, Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, Marketology Media Inc. v. D.G.A. North American Inc., 2024 ONCA 799, Labatt Brewing Co. v. NHL Enterprises Canada L.P., 2011 ONCA 511, Anderson v. Anderson, 2023 SCC 13, Davies v. Jane, 2025 ONCA 752, Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, Rick v. Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10, Faiello v. Faiello, 2019 ONCA 710, LeVan v. LeVan, 2008 ONCA 388, Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, [2004] 1 SCR 550, Virc v. Blair, 2014 ONCA 392, Dougherty v. Dougherty, 2008 ONCA 302, Maka v. Maka, 2015 ONSC 3480, El Rassi-Wight . Arnold, 2024 ONCA 2, Stupka v. Stupka, 2012 ONSC 1133, aff’d 2013 ONCA 365, Stevens v. Stevens, 2012 ONSC 706, Ward v. Ward, 2011 ONCA 178, Tozer v. Tassone, 2019 ONCA 285, 25 RFL (8th) 159, Raaymakers v. Green (2006), 25 RFL (6th) 54 (Ont CA), Singh v. Khalill, 2024 ONCA 909, Smith v. Smith, 2017 ONCA 759, Butty v. Butty, 2009 ONCA 852

facts:

The appellant, who was the Wife of the respondent, appealed from an order setting aside a separation agreement under s.56(4)(b) of the Family Law Act (FLA), and the related cost order. The parties separated on August 1, 2015, after a 12-year marriage. In May 2016, the parties retained a divorce Consultant to help them negotiate an agreement. The Consultant was not legally trained and repeatedly recommended that the parties seek legal advice. The Consultant sent both parties a draft agreement and Net Family Property (NFP) statement, and the parties to continued to negotiate and make further changes to the terms.

On May 24, 2016, the Wife sent the revised documents to the Consultant who released them to the parties and gave instructions on how to execute them. The Husband took the documents to a real estate lawyer but did not obtain legal advice from a family law lawyer despite recommendations to do so. On May 26, 2016, the Wife met with the family law lawyer with whom the parties had previously consulted to execute the documents, now signed by the Husband. The lawyer, now acting only for the Wife, suggested clarifications and revisions to the draft agreement, primarily in relation to support. Handwritten changes were made, and the Wife then signed this version of the agreement and the NFP statement. The parties later discussed the signed agreement with handwritten revisions, initialed the handwritten changes, and fully executed the Final Agreement.

In November 2018, the Wife filed the Final Agreement with the Family Responsibility Office for enforcement and shortly after for an uncontested divorce. In the Husband’s answer filed in December 2018, more than 2 years after signing the Final Agreement and selling the matrimonial home, the Husband challenged the Final Agreement’s validity and sought to have it set aside. He asserted that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Final Agreement were “concerning”; he was under duress upon execution, he did not have legal advice, there was no financial disclosure, and the Final Agreement was poorly drafted and illogical.

At the focus hearing, the hearing judge found that the Wife engaged in trickery and had dishonestly changed certain paragraphs in the Final Agreement. Section 56(4)(b) of the FLA provides that the court may set aside a domestic contract or a provision in it, “if a party did not understand the nature or consequences of the domestic contract”. On that basis, he concluded that the Husband did not understand the nature and consequences of the impugned paragraphs in the Final Agreement and exercised his discretion to set it aside.

issues:

Did the hearing judge err in setting aside the Final Agreement under s.56(4)(b)?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

Yes. The hearing judge’s finding of dishonesty and trickery arose from a procedurally unfair process that could not stand. The Wife was not on notice of any allegation of fraud, trickery or deception, and the Husband’s counsel did not put to her that she had altered the Final Agreement without the Husband’s knowledge. The finding of dishonesty and trickery could not stand because it was not anchored in the pleadings, evidence, positions or submissions of the parties.

The Court further found that there was no other basis to set aside the Agreement under S.56(4)(b). The hearing judge had identified no personal vulnerabilities, no inequality in bargaining power, and had noted the Husband’s sophistication. He also found that the Husband was repeatedly told to obtain independent legal advice and chose not to do so. There was therefore no basis to find that the Husband did not understand the nature or consequences of the Final Agreement. For these reasons, the order of the hearing judge was set aside, with all terms of the Final Agreement continuing with full force and effect.

Starra v. Starra, 2026 ONCA 405

[Rouleau, Thorburn and Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel: 

G. S. Joseph and T. Guo, for the appellant

Y. Guilbault and V. Bégin, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Spousal Support, Compensatory Support, Non-Compensatory Support, Variation, Material Change of Circumstances, Divorce Act, SC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), Schulstad v. Schulstad, 2017 ONCA 95, Hickey v. Hickey, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, Boston v. Boston, 2001 SCC 43, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2016)

facts:

The parties divorced after a 25-year marriage. During the marriage, the appellant stayed home and supported the respondent’s career. It was uncontested that the appellant had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) associated with family violence during the marriage and as a result has been unable to work since the separation.

The respondent paid monthly spousal support in the amount of $15,000 and an unqualified payment of $100,000 per a consent order. After 11 years, the appellant brought a motion to change to increase support due to her increased expenses. In response, the respondent sought to terminate spousal support as he intended to retire.

The appellant argued that her health continued to deteriorate resulting in higher medical and other necessary expenses. These circumstances, the appellant submitted, justified retroactively awarding her spousal support in the high range. She explained that the delay in bringing her motion to change was caused by the respondent’s refusal to provide ongoing disclosure of his income and her physical and mental health concerns.

The motion judge concluded that, the appellant had met the threshold to establish a material change in circumstances, though the increase was partly due to the appellant’s medical treatment choices. The motion judge was not prepared to find that the respondent was the sole cause of the PTSD.

The motion judge also found that the respondent’s retirement and corresponding decrease in income constituted a material change in circumstances. The motion judge concluded that a review of spousal support and the corresponding obligation to maintain a one-million dollar life insurance policy was warranted.

The motion judge recognized that the appellant had been entitled to both compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support. The motion judge noted that the respondent had paid over $2.1 million in spousal support since separation and that the parties were then 63 and 62 years old. The motion judge determined that the parties’ net worth was similar at the time of the motion.

The motion judge concluded the appellant should continue to be entitled to compensatory support for a two-year transitional period until September 30, 2026. By then, support should terminate as the objectives of spousal support will have been met.

Regarding the appellant’s claim for a retroactive adjustment to spousal support, the motion judge noted that the final order did not provide for annual adjustments, nor did it require for financial disclosure by the parties. The motion judge was therefore not prepared to give effect to the appellant’s submission that the respondent was blameworthy for not providing financial disclosure after the final order was issued.

Finally, the motion judge dismissed the appellant’s request for retroactive spousal support and rejected the appellant’s claim that her ailments justified her failure to bring an earlier motion to vary the amount of support. The appellant sought legal advice annually and there is evidence that the appellant waited to bring the application until the respondent began arranging his affairs to retire. The motion judge determined that a retroactive award would create significant hardship for the respondent.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in determining that by September 30, 2026, the compensatory component of the support order would have been satisfied?
2. Did the motion judge err in failing to grant the appellant’s application for a retroactive increase in the amount of spousal support?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The motion judge was clearly aware of and understood the appellant’s health issues and the impact on her ability to work.

The appellant argued that it was an error for the motion judge to order the termination of spousal support by September 2026 given the length of the marriage, the appellant’s medical conditions and the strength of her ongoing compensatory claim. The appellant’s compensatory claim was directly related to the economic consequences of it having been a long-term marriage and of the violence she had suffered in the marriage.

The motion judge recognized and considered the link between the appellant’s PTSD and the domestic violence issues raised in this case. However, she was not prepared to find that the respondent was the sole cause of the appellant’s PTSD, as there was medical evidence of other causes. The motion judge further concluded that the increase in medical costs was partly due to the appellant’s treatment choices.

The standard of review for support orders involves significant deference. This is informed both by the discretion involved in making support orders and the importance of finality in family law litigation. An appeal court should only intervene where there is a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error of law. An appeal court is not entitled to overturn a support order simply because it would have made a different decision or balanced the factors differently.

The motion judge carefully considered the parties’ full circumstances, including that the parties’ net worth was similar. The motion judge considered Boston v. Boston, where, under a compensatory spousal support order, a pension is equalized by way of a lump-sum payment and the recipient has an obligation to use the assets equalized between the parties in an income-producing way for use upon the payor’s retirement.

2. No. The motion judge was fully aware of the needs and circumstances of the appellant and weighed these against the hardship a retroactive award may occasion on the respondent.

The appellant submitted that the motion judge erred in her application of the law respecting the award of retroactive spousal support. Specifically, the appellant argued that she was entitled to spousal support on both a compensatory and non-compensatory basis and that delay in bringing her application, standing alone, was not a sufficient reason to deny retroactive support. The appellant maintained that her health problems and the toll of the domestic abuse she suffered explained the delay. Finally, the appellant submitted that the court must not reward the respondent for having improperly withheld financial disclosure.

The motion judge referenced the relevant jurisprudence and found that the respondent had no ongoing disclosure obligations and that throughout the relevant period the appellant had the benefit of legal advice. The motion judge was fully aware of the needs and circumstances of the appellant and weighed these against the hardship a retroactive award may occasion on the respondent. In the result, she was not persuaded that a retroactive adjustment to the amount of spousal support was appropriate.

Qureshi v. Zeema Investments Incorporated, 2026 ONCA 413

[van Rensburg, Miller and Sossin JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Klein, for the appellants

S. Siddiqui and J. Rosenstein, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Buyer Representation Agreements, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Standard of Review, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53

facts:

The respondent, Mr. Q, sought to purchase a commercial property as an investment and approached the appellant, Mr. H, a realtor affiliated with Re/Max Realty Services Inc. (“Re/Max”), for assistance.  Mr. H suggested that Mr. Q make an offer on a property owned by Zeema Investments Inc. (“Zeema”) that was not listed for sale.  On October 29, 2019, Mr. Q signed several documents including a Buyer Representation Agreement (the “BRA”), which provided that the brokerage was entitled to a commission of “TBD” (to be determined) and that the buyer would pay the commission even if the transaction was not completed owing to the buyer’s default or neglect. 

On November 5, 2019, Zeema executed a separate agreement with Re/Max (the “Commission Agreement”) to pay a commission of $650,000 (inclusive of HST). Mr. Q was not a party to this agreement. A Revised Co-op Agreement was subsequently signed providing that Re/Max would represent Mr. Q only and would be paid its commission “by the seller, as per the terms of the commission agreement dated November 5, 2019.”

An agreement of purchase and sale was executed on November 20, 2019, with Mr. Q paying deposits totaling $750,000. Mr. Q subsequently chose not to proceed with the purchase, and Re/Max invoiced him $650,000 for a commission under the BRA, which he refused to pay. 

On a motion for summary judgment brought by Re/Max and Mr. H, the motion judge found no contractual obligation on Mr. Q to pay the commission, holding that the “TBD” designation in the BRA failed to specify a commission amount or a mechanism for determining one, and that the Revised Co-op Agreement identified only the seller as the payor. Accordingly, the motion judge dismissed the motion.

issues:

1. Whether the motion judge erred by finding that summary judgment was appropriate, given the factual dispute over whether Mr. Q had signed the Commission Agreement.
2. Whether the motion judge erred in his interpretation of the contractual documents, specifically whether “TBD” in the BRA meant that the obligation to pay a commission would be determined by a future event, namely the Commission Agreement.

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The appellants could not argue on appeal that summary judgment was not appropriate because the appeal arose from the appellants’ own summary judgment motion. It was therefore not open to the appellants to now argue that a trial was required to resolve the factual dispute over whether Mr. Q had signed the Commission Agreement.

2. No. The Court was not persuaded by the appellants’ argument that the motion judge should have read the BRA, the Commission Agreement, and the Revised Co-op Agreement together to conclude that Mr. Q had agreed to pay the commission in the event the transaction did not close. Although it may have been Mr. H’s subjective understanding that Mr. Q would pay Re/Max the commission agreed between Re/Max and Zeema if the transaction did not close, the motion judge’s interpretation of the contract was open to him. The contractual interpretation required in the case was highly fact-specific, requiring a highly deferential standard of review as established in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp. The parties did not arrive at an agreement for Mr. Q to pay the commission in the event he failed to complete the purchase, and it was not enough on appeal for the appellants to argue that it was open to the motion judge to have inferred an additional term into the BRA or Revised Co-op Agreement. There was no extricable question of law, and deference was required.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Louie v. Han, 2026 ONCA 404

[Huscroft, Dawe, and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

L.L. acting in person

J. Sanderson and J. Allingham, for the respondent/responding party

Keywords: Real Property, Resulting Trusts, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, Louie v. Han, 2026 ONCA 25  

Birtzu v. McCron, 2026 ONCA 406

[Gomery, J.A]

Counsel:

S. Hector, for the moving party

C. Stanec, appearing as amicus curiae

J.B. acting in person

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Civil Procedure, Judgments, Enforcement, Writs of Seizure and Sale, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 1.03(1), 60.07, Birtzu v. McCron, 2019 ONCA 777, 148 O.R. (3d) 603

Royce Presidential Investments Inc. v Valour Group Inc., 2026 ONCA 409

[Rouleau, Lauwers, Miller]

Counsel:

G. Harper and C. Shokar, for the appellants

M. Day, for the respondent

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, Appeals, Reasons for Decision, Royce Presidential Investments Inc. v. Valour Group Inc., 2025 ONCA 903

Thomson v. Fleming, 2026 ONCA 418

[Thorburn, Madsen, Rahman]

Counsel:

S.P. Philbert, for the appellant

J.F., acting in person

Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Travel, Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Arbitration, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, r. 32.1(2)

Contardi v. Contardi, 2026 ONCA 420

[Roberts]

Counsel:

A.Taerk and M.Emmanuel, for the appellant/moving party

D. Gurizzan and S. Del Rizzo, for the respondent/responding party

Keywords: Family Law, Support, Disclosure, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, E.L.R. v. D.M.S., 2025 ONCA 802, Issasi v. Rosenzweig, 2011 ONCA 112, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131

Alyousef v. Alyousef, 2026 ONCA 416 

[Roberts, Trotter, Dawe]

Counsel:

O.S. Chaudhry, for the appellants

A.A, acting in person

Keywords: Damages, Civil Procedure, Costs

R (H.C.) v. Ontario Special Education Tribunal, 2026 ONCA 419

[Huscroft, Monahan, Dawe]

Counsel:

H.C., acting in person

O. Filetti, for the responding party Ontario Special Education Tribunal

O. Filetti and V. Crystal, for the responding party Ontario Special Education Tribunal

N. Simmons and A. Smith, for the responding party Toronto District School Board

Keywords: Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Education, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Reconsideration, Vexatious Litigation, Abuse of Process, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Mootness, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2.1.01, Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, leave to appeal ref’d [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 488, Meridian Credit Union Limited v. Baig, 2016 ONCA 942, McGrath v. Joy, 2023 ONCA 46