Jump To: Table of Contents | Civil Decisions | Short Civil Decisions

Good afternoon.

Following are this week’s summaries of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of December 19, 2022.

Continue Reading

In Chen v. Brookfield Residential (Ontario) Limited, the appellant purported to deliver a Notice of Rescission to the respondent under the Condominium Act, 1998, in an attempt to rescind its agreement for purchase of a condominium on the ground that certain amenities were not completed at closing, and that this constituted a “material change” within the meaning of s. 74 of Act. The Court held that the Act precluded amenities from the purchaser’s right to rescind and thus, this change did not constitute a material change. In making this finding, the Court further noted that the Notice of Rescission was delivered in bad faith, since it was clear that the intention of the appellant was to evade the purchase agreement rather than addressing a material change.

In Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), the appellant representative plaintiff in a class action against the respondent Government of Canada agency, Health and Welfare Canada (“HWC”), appealed the trial judge’s decision dismissing its action. The appellant had alleged that the government had failed to properly regulate and control the entry of medical implant devices that were made by materials that posed dangers to the public.  The trial judge had found that the evidence was that HWC had never issued Notice of Compliances for the devices at issue and ultimately found that there was no duty of care owed by the government to the class and that even if there had been a prima facie duty of care, it would have been negated by residual policy considerations.  The Court found that the trial judge had carefully considered the evidence and the conclusions drawn were supported by the record.  The Court saw no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s decision.

Other topics covered included a discussion of when costs are payable out of an estate in an unsuccessful challenge to a will, and partial summary judgment in the construction context.

Merry Christmas and Happy Hanukah to all who are celebrating.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email
Ines Ferreira
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Chen v. Brookfield Residential (Ontario) Limited , 2022 ONCA 887

Keywords: Contracts, Anticipatory Breach, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Condominiums, Remedies, Rescission, Condominium Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 19, ss. 72, 74, Harvey v. Talon International Inc., 2017 ONCA 267, Lin v. Brookfield Homes (Ontario Limited), 2019 ONCA 706, Jung v. Talon International, 2019 ONCA 644, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27

Di Nunzio v. Di Nunzio , 2022 ONCA 889

Keywords: Family Law, Wills and Estates, Wills, Validity, Suspicious Circumstances, Testamentary Capacity, Civil Procedure, Costs, Payment out of Estate, Public Policy Considerations, Vout v. Hay, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 876, McDougald Estate v. Gooderham (2005), 255 D.L.R. (4th) 435 (Ont. C.A.)

Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), 2022 ONCA 892

Keywords:Torts, Negligence, Product Liability, Liability of Public Authorities, Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Certification, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Costs, Public Interest, Class Proceedings Fund, Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-27, Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 31, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 57.01, 61.03.1(18), Medical Devices Regulations, S.O.R./98-282, Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 ONCA 479, Drady v. Canada (Health), 2008 ONCA 659, Attis v. Canada (Health), 2008 ONCA 660, Bryars Estate v. Toronto General Hospital (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 460

Learmont Roofing Ltd. v. Learmont Construction Ltd., 2022 ONCA 894

Keywords: Contracts, Construction, Trust Claims, Civil Procedure, Partial Summary Judgment, Construction Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30, Butera v. Chown, Cairns LLP, 2017 ONCA 783, Cook v. Joyce, 2017 ONCA 49, Baywood Homes Partnership v. Haditaghi, 2014 ONCA 450, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7

Short Civil Decisions

Rampal v. Aujla Derry Investments Inc., 2022 ONCA 884

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreement of Purchase and Sale of Land, Beneficial Ownership, Mutual Releases, Reasonable Notice, Repudiation

Acquaviva v. Holmes, 2022 ONCA 891

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, No Genuine Issue Requiring Trial, Bossé v Mastercraft Group Inc., 123 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (Ont. C.A.)

Savanta v. Hilditch, 2022 ONCA 890

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Ambiguity, Share Purchase Agreements, Forum Selection Clauses, Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Sleep Number Corporation v. Maher Sign Products Inc., 2020 ONCA 95, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53

Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Ryanview Farms, 2022 ONCA 898

Keywords: Cost Endorsement

Chiappino & Associates Limited v. 6891799 Canada Inc., 2022 ONCA 893

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Leases, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Adjournments

North Elgin Centre Inc. v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Limited, 2022 ONCA 896

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Offers to Settle, Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 49, 57.01, Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.)

CIVIL DECISIONS

Chen v. Brookfield Residential (Ontario) Limited, 2022 ONCA 887

[Paciocco, Harvison Young and Thorburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

T. Corsianos, for the appellant

N.G. Wilson and R. Khemraj, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Anticipatory Breach, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Condominiums, Remedies, Rescission, Condominium Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 19, ss. 72, 74, Harvey v. Talon International Inc., 2017 ONCA 267, Lin v. Brookfield Homes (Ontario Limited), 2019 ONCA 706, Jung v. Talon International, 2019 ONCA 644, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27

facts:

On January 19, 2017, the appellant entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (“APS”) with the respondent, Brookfield Residential, for a detached condominium with joint ownership of the common elements. The APS stipulated that non-completion of the common elements before the occupancy date would not be deemed a failure to complete the unit. The closing date was set for December 11, 2017, and by that point, the market conditions had changed and the value of the home had declined significantly.

On November 24, 2017, the appellant, CJC, notified the respondent that he wanted either a mutual release from the transaction or a postponement because of his inability to close the deal due to low appraisal value. After the respondent offered a brief extension, the appellant advised that he wanted a “cancellation of the deal”. On December 7, 2017, the appellant provided a purported Notice of Rescission pursuant to section 74(6) of the Condominium Act (the “Act”), claiming that the “amenities” had not been completed as set out in the disclosure statement. The “amenities” referred to were the parkette and entry/exit gates. The appellant represented that this non-completion constituted a material change which justified rescission. The respondent subsequently terminated the APS for anticipatory breach.

The appellant sought a return of his deposit and damages. The respondent counterclaimed for damages. The amenities were completed in September 2018, and the respondent re-sold the property in October 2018 at a lower price than the price agreed to in the APS. The appellant then withdrew his claim, and the respondent moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim. The motion judge granted summary judgment against the appellant.

issues:
  1. Did the motion judge err in holding that the Notice of Rescission was invalid?
  2. Did the motion judge err in holding that the appellant anticipatorily breached the APS, which allowed the respondent to terminate the APS?
  3. Should the Court grant leave to amend the appellant’s pleadings to claim damages for breach of contract resulting from the respondent’s sale of the property to a third party?
holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No

Pursuant to subsection 74(6) of the Act, purchasers are authorized to rescind an APS if there has been a “material change”. As noted by the motion judge, the alleged “material change” identified in the appellant’s Notice of Rescission was the respondent’s failure to complete the entrance and exit gates and the parkette before closing.

The Court held that the appellant’s Notice of Rescission was invalid on its face because the material change identified did not meet the statutory definition. Section 74(2) defines a “material change” as a change that a reasonable purchaser “would have regarded collectively as sufficiently important to the decision to purchase … that it is likely that the purchaser would not have entered into an agreement … or would have exercised the right to rescind such an agreement … if the disclosure statement had contained the change or series of changes, but does not include, … (d) a change in the schedule of the proposed commencement and completion dates for the amenities of which construction had not been completed.”  The Court concluded that the motion judge was correct in determining that the alleged material changes were statutorily precluded as amenities under subsection 74(6)(d).

(2) No

Prior to delivering his Notice of Rescission, the appellant explicitly communicated to the respondent that he did not intend to perform the contract. The Court noted that the appellant’s intention was clear, irrespective of the status of the amenities. The Court held that this constituted an anticipatory breach. Further, the Court stated that the Notice of Rescission was not a bona fide attempt to address a material change. Rather, it was a strategy to evade the APS. The appellant argued that the Act does not require that the Notice of Rescission be brought in good faith. The Court disagreed stating that this would lead to absurd results by enabling purchasers to strategically use the rescission mechanism to side-step their otherwise valid contractual agreement, pressure vendors to negotiate releases, or unjustifiably extend closing timelines.

(3) No

The Court held that it was not in the interest of justice to allow the claim to be amended to plead a new cause of action. Once the appellant repudiated the agreement and the respondent accepted the appellant’s anticipatory breach and terminated the contract, the respondent was obliged to mitigate its damages by reselling the property. Moreover, the Court noted that the appellant’s conduct made it clear that he had no intention of completing the sale.


Di Nunzio v. Di Nunzio, 2022 ONCA 889

[Gillese, Tulloch and Roberts JJ.A.]

Counsel:

B. D. Arkin, for the appellant

M. S. Deverett, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Wills and Estates, Wills, Validity, Suspicious Circumstances, Testamentary Capacity, Civil Procedure, Costs, Payment out of Estate, Public Policy Considerations, Vout v. Hay, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 876, McDougald Estate v. Gooderham (2005), 255 D.L.R. (4th) 435 (Ont. C.A.)

facts:

The parties are siblings. Their mother, Mrs. D, died from cancer at the age of 80 on July 20, 2018. On March 1, 2017, she made a will naming her one daughter, T.D., as the sole trustee and beneficiary, and expressly disinherited her other children, R.D. and L.D. On October 23, 2018, the court issued to T.D., as executrix, a certificate of appointment with will attached.

On October 29, 2018, L.D. started the application that was dismissed by the application judge. The thrust of her application and her appeal is that the will was invalid and of no force and effect based on lack of capacity, suspicious circumstances, and undue influence.

issues:
  1. Did the application judge err in ruling that that the will was valid and Mrs. D had testamentary capacity?
  2. Did the application judge err in finding that there were no public policy considerations that warranted payment of the appellant’s costs from the estate?
holding:

Appeal dismissed. The appeal of the costs order was allowed.

reasoning:

(1) No

The Court held that the application judge’s findings were amply supported on the record and that there was no basis to intervene. The Court held that the application judge correctly applied the applicable legal principles in Vout v. Hay, and thoroughly considered the evidence in relation to each of L.D.’s arguments. The Court noted that the application judge had given compelling reasons for accepting the evidence put forward by T.D., including evidence from independent witnesses, that amply supported the application judge’s findings that Mrs. D had the requisite testamentary capacity, notwithstanding her illness and the effects of her treatment and medication, and was not under any influence, but only guided by her own alert good judgment when she made her March 1, 2017 will which was not surrounded by suspicious circumstances.

The Court further stated the application judge explained why he found L.D.’s evidence insufficient to support her allegations. He described the history of L.D.’s relationship with her mother, which included her mother’s prior intent to exclude L.D. from her will. These facts provided the context within which Mrs. D decided to exclude L.D. from her 2017 will.

The Court noted that the application judge found L.D.’s relationship with her mother “had been tumultuous and difficult for a very long time” and was not close because of L.D.’s long history of alcohol and drug abuse which had continued into her adult years. Mrs. D had sought to disinherit L.D. when she made her 2015 will because L.D. had taken, and not replaced, money from her mother’s bank account while Mrs. D was undergoing chemotherapy. This was not an isolated incident. However, T.D., R.D. and Mrs. D’s lawyer persuaded her at that time to leave her estate to all three of her children although she removed L.D. as trustee and executrix. The application judge concluded that in making her 2017 will, Mrs. D carried out her “firm and clear” testamentary intention to exclude L.D. and R.D because of her rational concerns, supported by the record, that L.D. would run through the money.

(2) Yes

In McDougald Estate v. Gooderham (2005), the Court explained that the traditional approach in estate litigation that the costs of all parties are ordered payable out of the estate has been displaced by the modern approach of fixing costs in accordance with civil costs rules, unless the court finds that there are public policy considerations. Public policy considerations include where the dispute arises from an ambiguity or omission in the testator’s will or other conduct of the testator, or there are reasonable grounds upon which to question the will’s validity.

The application judge rejected L.D.’s request for costs to be paid by the estate, stating that, as established by McDougald Estate, costs in estate litigation follow the event in the absence of one or more applicable policy considerations, none of which the application judge found to apply in this case. The Court held that because the application judge did not provide reasons for why no policy considerations applied, the Court did not owe deference to that conclusion.  As a result, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs order and stated that the Court stands in the place of the application judge to consider the question of costs of the application afresh.

The Court noted that the public policy considerations outlined in McDougald were engaged based on the application judge’s findings on the issues of Mrs. D’s testamentary capacity and validity of the will. Accordingly, the Court held that there was no basis to order that L.D.’s costs were to be paid from the estate.

The Court found that the grounds raised by L.D. did not rise to the level of public policy considerations that warranted payment of her costs from the estate. However, the grounds that L.D. raised on the application were not frivolous and did raise triable issues warranting court scrutiny. As the application judge noted, “at first glance, [Mrs. D’s] decision to leave all of her estate to T.D., excluding both L.D. and R.D., could be considered as a suspicious circumstance”. The Court exercised its discretion and set aside the costs order against L.D. As a result, L.D. would bear her own costs of the application, while T.D.’s costs were payable from the estate.


Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), 2022 ONCA 892

[Pepall, van Rensburg and Benotto JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Legge, for the appellant

S. Gaudet, R. Flaim and A. Law, for the respondent

P-E. Veel, for the Law Foundation of Ontario

J. Newland, for the respondent, Ontario Health Insurance Plan

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Product Liability, Liability of Public Authorities, Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Certification, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Costs, Public Interest, Class Proceedings Fund, Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-27, Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 31, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 57.01, 61.03.1(18), Medical Devices Regulations, S.O.R./98-282, Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 ONCA 479, Drady v. Canada (Health), 2008 ONCA 659, Attis v. Canada (Health), 2008 ONCA 660, Bryars Estate v. Toronto General Hospital (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 460

facts:

The appellant was the representative plaintiff in a class action against the respondent, Health and Welfare Canada (“HWC”) regarding its alleged duty of care to members of the class to regulate and control the entry of medical devices into Canada, and to warn of any dangers posed by those devices. The class action concerned certain temporomandibular joint (“TMJ”) implant devices made of a material known as Proplast manufactured by Vitek Inc (“Vitek”).

A manufacturer of a new device was prohibited from selling or advertising a device in Canada unless it received a Notice of Compliance (“NOC”) from HWC. On March 17, 1987, Vitek applied for NOCs for a variety of devices. After complying with a request for more information, HWC refused NOCs for TMJ implants on September 2, 1988, but did issue NOCs to Vitek for Preform Facial Implants and Facial Block and Sheeting on July 11, 1988. As a result of a clerical error made by HWC, four Vitek devices were shown in HWC’s internal database as having been issued NOCs when in fact no NOCs had been issued for those devices. The representative plaintiff was not implanted with a device that had not received a NOC. However, it was unclear if this was true of other class members.

In March 1990, Vitek issued a safety alert to physicians with respect to certain Vitek implants (TMJ interpositional) but this did not include Block or Sheeting. On learning of this safety alert, HWC sent an Information on Potential Recall to the Medical Devices Unit of HWC on May 17, 1990. HWC also contacted all physicians and dentists it knew to have used the product and sent an advisory letter and package of relevant material on October 26, 1994. HWC completed an action plan designed to prevent possible harm from use and distribution of the product by 1995. HWC only identified 162 implants which may have been used in Canada.

The class action was certified in 2007. However, the Attorney General (“AG”) moved for decertification on the ground that the recent decision in Drady v. Canada (Health), 2008 ONCA 659 and Attis v. Canada (Health), 2008 ONCA 660 determined that there was no private law duty of care on the part of the regulator in these circumstances. On the stated case, the five-judge panel of the Court determined that there was a potential duty of care because the combination of misrepresentations and the failure to correct the record in the face of the risk to specific patients could create proximity.

The trial judge held that there was no duty of care imposed by legislation, nor were there any direct communications between the plaintiff and HWC. Furthermore, even if there were a prima facie duty of care, the trial judge determined that it would have been negated by residual policy considerations.

issues:
  1. Did the trial judge make a palpable and overriding error in finding that the government had not approved the Vitek type of Proplast TMJ prostheses?
  2. Did the trial judge err in his assessment of the evidence relating to Proplast Block and Sheeting for which NOCs had been issued?
  3. Does the Court of Appeal have jurisdiction to hear the cross-appeal on the costs order at trial?
  4. Did the trial judge err in his costs award?
holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No

The appellant originally took the position that HWC had not issued NOCs for the Vitek Proplast TMJ prostheses devices. However, she changed her position in closing submissions at trial, asserting that HWC had issued NOCs and had approved the devices, and that this was negligent. However, the Court noted that there was considerable evidence to support the trial judge’s finding that the devices in issue never received NOCs, including: (1) oral testimony, (2) the Information Letter showing that the NOCs for four Vitek devices reflected clerical errors, (3) the letter explaining why NOCs would not be granted, and (4) the fact that no NOCs for the devices had ever been found by anyone. Therefore, the Court found that there was no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s conclusion that HWC had not issued NOCs or approved the Vitek devices in issue.

(2) No

The trial judge found that: (1) there was no evidence that any member of the class was implanted with Block or Sheeting as a TMJ implant at any time after Vitek received a NOC, and (2) there was no evidence that anyone had been misled by the product monograph. Furthermore, the product monograph explicitly reserved the ultimate discretion to physicians on how and when to use the product. The Court held that the trial judge did not err in these findings.

(3) Yes

The Ontario Health Insurance Plan (“OHIP”) argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the AG’s cross-appeal on costs because the appeal is properly to the Divisional Court. The Court disagreed and noted that the appellant’s appeal encompassed OHIP’s subrogated claim, and accordingly, the AG’s request for leave fell within Rule 61.03.1(18) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The AG was not required to bring a separate leave application against OHIP.

(4) No

The AG sought costs of the proceedings on a partial indemnity scale amounting to $6,306,388.79. Instead, the trial judge awarded $385,000, which represented costs of two senior counsel working 10 hours a day for the 55-day trial. The AG argued that: (1) the trial judge erred in finding that this was a matter of public interest, (2) the trial judge erred in considering how the costs award would impact the Class Proceeding Fund (the “Fund”), and (3) the award was plainly wrong given the amount.

First, the Court noted that the concept of public interest should be construed liberally. Cases addressing liability for government regulation of consumer devices may be determined to be in the public interest, and the trial judge’s determination on this was entitled to deference. Second, the Court stated that it was clear from the trial judge’s reasons that sufficient weight was put on access to justice and the impact of a costs award on the Fund. Lastly, the Court found that the trial judge had written detailed reasons on the costs award and clearly considered the factors outlined in Rule 57.01 and section 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992. The Court concluded that absent any error in principle or an award that is clearly wrong, the costs award is entitled to deference, as the trial judge is best positioned to decide what is fair and reasonable. The Court held that there was no reason to interfere with the award.


Learmont Roofing Ltd. v. Learmont Construction Ltd., 2022 ONCA 894

[Gillese, Tulloch and Roberts JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Adilman, for the appellants

D. J. MacKeigan, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Construction, Trust Claims, Civil Procedure, Partial Summary Judgment, Construction Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30, Butera v. Chown, Cairns LLP, 2017 ONCA 783, Cook v. Joyce, 2017 ONCA 49, Baywood Homes Partnership v. Haditaghi, 2014 ONCA 450, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7

facts:

In August 2018, the appellant, Learmont Construction Ltd. (“LC”), was awarded a Canadian Construction Documents Committee (“CCDC”) stipulated price contract for a commercial roof replacement project (“the project”). Mr. P signed the contract on behalf of LC.

LC then entered into a subcontracting agreement with the respondent, Learmont Roofing Ltd. (“LR”), in which LR agreed to perform all the work for the project. Specifically, the subcontract stipulated that LC would receive 5 per cent of the gross amount on every invoice, and LR would receive the remaining 95 per cent.

LC received progress payments from the owner of the property on which the project was being carried out. The amount in each invoice was certified by a third-party engineer. After receiving each payment, LC was to pay 95 per cent of the total invoice price to LR. Interest on overdue payments to LR would accrue at the rate of 9 per cent per annum.

By January 2019, the work under the contract was completed. Based on five invoices, the owner paid LC in full. There was no indication that the owner was in any way dissatisfied with the work done.

LC passed 95 per cent of the monies received on the first, second, third, and fifth invoices, by cheque, to LR. When LR tried to certify the cheque for the fourth invoice, it discovered that the cheque had been cancelled by Mr. B – the controlling shareholder of LC. When asked about the cancellation, Mr. B explained that LC did not have the funds to pay for the cheque at the time.

LR commenced an action to recover the amount owed to it pursuant to the fourth invoice. LR brought a motion for partial summary judgment, which was subsequently granted by the motion judge, as she found no genuine issues requiring a trial.

The motion judge held that Mr. B’s “speculative allegation” regarding the contract price being spiked to benefit the lead engineer was not a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The motion judge found that LR was entitled to the monies held in trust by LC, and that LC’s principal, Mr. B, was liable for the breach of the appellants’ trust obligations under the Constructions Act, as he failed to remit the amount owed to LR. The motion judge found that the funds were diverted by Mr. B for his personal benefit, or on behalf of 2653389 Ontario Inc. to protect its investment in LC. Accordingly, Mr. B and 2653389 Ontario Inc. were held jointly and severally liable for the amount owing to LR.

issues:
  1. Did the motion judge err in finding no genuine issue for trial on LR’s trust claim?
  2. Did the motion judge err in granting partial summary judgment?
holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No

The Court, relying on Butera v Chown, Carins LLP, reiterated that partial summary judgment is a “rare procedure that is reserved for an issue or issues that may be readily bifurcated from those in the main action and that may be dealt with expeditiously and in a cost-effective manner”. The Court clarified that the more important credibility disputes are to determining key issues, the harder it would be to fairly adjudicate those issues solely on a partial summary judgment basis.

The Court found that the motion judge demonstrated a proper appreciation of the legal principles governing partial summary judgments and saw no error in the motion judge’s decision to grant partial summary judgment.

(2) No

The Court found that the motion judge, in reviewing the evidentiary record, concluded that it did not give rise to any issues of credibility. The Court held that there was no palpable and overriding error justifying appellate interference with the motion judge’s findings.

The motion judge properly considered and rejected the risk of inconsistent factual findings. The “myriad of counterclaims” against the respondent, including allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, and conversion, did not “prevent the plaintiff from moving forward to recover the outstanding amount owing to it on invoice #4” through a partial summary judgment motion.


SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Rampal v. Aujla Derry Investments Inc., 2022 ONCA 884

[Paciocco, Harvison Young and Thorburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P. Di Monte, for the appellant

J. Smith, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreement of Purchase and Sale of Land, Beneficial Ownership, Mutual Releases, Reasonable Notice, Repudiation

Acquaviva v. Holmes, 2022 ONCA 891

[Pepall, van Rensburg and Benotto JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Saverino, for the appellant

B. Fromstein and K. Kerwin, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, No Genuine Issue Requiring Trial, Bossé v Mastercraft Group Inc., 123 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (Ont. C.A.)

Savanta v. Hilditch, 2022 ONCA 890

[Pepall, van Rensburg and Benotto JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D.D. Langley, for the appellants

E. Savas, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Ambiguity, Share Purchase Agreements, Forum Selection Clauses, Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Sleep Number Corporation v. Maher Sign Products Inc., 2020 ONCA 95, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53

Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Ryanview Farms, 2022 ONCA 898

[Doherty, Tulloch and Thorburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.A. Cook, for the appellants

B. Waterman, for the respondent

Keywords: Cost Endorsement

Chiappino & Associates Limited v. 6891799 Canada Inc., 2022 ONCA 893

[Lauwers, Huscroft and Miller JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Z. Rehman, for the appellants

T. Watson, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Leases, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Adjournments

North Elgin Centre Inc. v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Limited, 2022 ONCA 896

[Brown J.A. (Motions Judge)]

Counsel:

A. Parley, M. Robbins, and S. Blakeley, for the moving party/appellant, McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Limited

J.E. Streisfield, for the moving party on the cross-motion/respondent, North Elgin Centre Inc.

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Offers to Settle, Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 49, 57.01, Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.)


The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

Print:
Email this postTweet this postLike this postShare this post on LinkedIn
Photo of John Polyzogopoulos John Polyzogopoulos

John has been the editor of Blaneys Appeals since the inception of the blog in the Summer of 2014. He is a partner at the firm with over two decades of experience handling a wide variety of litigation matters. John assists clients with…

John has been the editor of Blaneys Appeals since the inception of the blog in the Summer of 2014. He is a partner at the firm with over two decades of experience handling a wide variety of litigation matters. John assists clients with matters ranging from appeals, to injunctions, to corporate, partnership, breach of contract, construction, environmental contamination, product liability, debtor-creditor, insolvency and other business litigation. He also handles complex estates and matrimonial litigation involving disputes over property and businesses, as well as professional discipline and professional negligence matters for various types of professionals. In addition, John represents amateur sports organizations in contentious matters, and also advises them in matters of internal governance. John can be reached at 416-593-2953 or jpolyzogopoulos@blaney.com.