In Nexus Solutions Inc. v. Krougly, the Court upheld the trial judge’s finding that the respondent’s competing software was not developed “in the course of” his employment under s. 13(3) of the Copyright Act, as his actual responsibilities were limited to the development of his employer’s existing software. The Court affirmed that the proper test under s. 13(3) turns on what the employer actually assigned to the employee, not what it theoretically could have directed the employee to do. In this case, the employee developed the competing software on his own time, while fulfilling his employment duties. Accordingly, it could not be said that the employer had paid for the development of the software such that it could claim ownership of it.

The Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Christian Heritage Party of Canada v. Hamilton (City) concerned the City of Hamilton’s rejection of a political advertisement submitted by the Christian Heritage Party of Canada for city-owned transit shelters. The advertisement was rejected by the City on the grounds that it posed a tangible risk to its statutory objective of providing a safe and welcoming transit system. The CHP sought judicial review, arguing that the city breached procedural fairness, acted unreasonably and exhibited bias. The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the City’s decision was both fair and reasonable. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the City provided CHP with adequate opportunity to participate, properly balanced freedom of expression against the City’s duty to provide a safe transit system, and engaged in a robust proportionality analysis consistent with the Doré/Loyola framework.

In Murray-Leung v. Dyck, the Court upheld a finding that the respondents had established a prescriptive easement over a driveway encroaching onto the appellants’ property based on continuous, open, and unchallenged use without permission prior to the 1997 conversion to the Land Titles Act system.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Christian Heritage Party of Canada v. Hamilton (City), 2026 ONCA 195

Keywords: Election Law, Constitutional Law, Human Rights, Advertising and Media, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(b), Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Doré/Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12,  Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32, Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students — British Columbia Component, 2009 SCC 31, Moreau-Bérubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), 2002 SCC 11, Commission scolaire francophone des Territoires du Nord-Ouest v. Northwest Territories (Education, Culture and Employment), 2023 SCC 31, York Region District School Board v. Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario, 2024 SCC 22, Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12,  Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21, Toth v. Canada (Mental Health and Addictions), 2025 FCA 119, Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 257, Bracken v. Fort Erie (Town), 2017 ONCA 668, Lauzon v. Ontario (Justices of the Peace Review Council), 2023 ONCA 425, Association for Reformed Political Action Canada v. Hamilton (City of), 2023 ONSC 6443, CHP v. City of Hamilton, 2018 ONSC 3690

Nexus Solutions Inc. v. Krougly, 2026 ONCA 199

Keywords: Copyright, Intellectual Property, Statutory Interpretation, Employment, Software Development, Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 13(1) and (3), Penhallurick v. MD5 Ltd., [2021] EWHC 293 (IPEC), Corso v. Nebs Business Products Limited, 2009 CanLII 11215 (Ont. S.C.), Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, R. v. Alex, 2017 SCC 37, Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34, Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30, Wiebe v. Saskatchewan Institute of Applied Science and Technology, 2007 SKQB 60, Canadian Intellectual Property Law (2025), 2022 CanLIIDocs 4489

Murray-Leung v. Dyck, 2026 ONCA 204

Keywords: Real Property, Adverse Possession, Prescriptive Easements, Encroachments, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Burden of Proof, Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.5, Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, s. 31, Hunsinger v. Carter, 2018 ONCA 656

Short Civil Decisions

CTCMPAO v. Yan, 2026 ONCA 200

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigants, Abuse of Process, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140

Highbury Narrows Ltd. v. LAF Canada Company, 2026 ONCA 194

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Civil Procedure, Costs, Highway Properties Ltd. v. Kelly, Douglas & Co. Ltd., [1971] S.C.R. 562, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53

Kotsopoulos v. Toronto (City), 2026 ONCA 206

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Slip and Fall, Highways, Public Authorities, Municipalities, Liability, Civil Procedure, Partial Summary Judgment, Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, 49.10(1), 57.01(1), K.K. v. K.W.G., 2008 ONCA 489, Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.)

Vassell Estate v. Vassell, 2026 ONCA 203

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Costs, Courts of Justice Act, s. 7(5), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 63.01 Saffih v. Sbih, 2024 ONCA 710, Enbridge Gas Distribution v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Net Connect Installation Inc. v. Mobile Zone Inc., 2017 ONCA 766, Bayford v. Boese, 2021 ONCA 533

CIVIL DECISIONS

Christian Heritage Party of Canada v. Hamilton (City), 2026 ONCA 195

[Sossin, Copeland and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G. Milousis and J. Bieman, for the appellants

C. Boggs and S. Zacharias, for the respondent

J. Sikkema and J. Persaud, for the intervener, Association for Reformed Political Action Canada

E. Phillips, M. Dill and K. Chen, for the intervener, Egale Canada

Keywords: Election Law, Constitutional Law, Human Rights, Advertising and Media, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(b), Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Doré/Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12,  Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32, Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students — British Columbia Component, 2009 SCC 31, Moreau-Bérubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), 2002 SCC 11, Commission scolaire francophone des Territoires du Nord-Ouest v. Northwest Territories (Education, Culture and Employment), 2023 SCC 31, York Region District School Board v. Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario, 2024 SCC 22, Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12,  Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21, Toth v. Canada (Mental Health and Addictions), 2025 FCA 119, Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 257, Bracken v. Fort Erie (Town), 2017 ONCA 668, Lauzon v. Ontario (Justices of the Peace Review Council), 2023 ONCA 425, Association for Reformed Political Action Canada v. Hamilton (City of), 2023 ONSC 6443, CHP v. City of Hamilton, 2018 ONSC 3690]

facts:

On January 28, 2023, the Christian Heritage Party (the “CHP”) wrote to OUTFRONT Media (“OutFront”), the City’s advertising agent, to place an advertisement (the “Advertisement” or the “Ad”) in City-owned transit shelters. The Ad depicted a woman with the captions “Woman:” above and “An Adult Female” below. The Ad included a link to CHP’s website, which laid out its platform. Under the heading “gender issues”, the platform stated that there are “two biological genders: male and female” that “cannot be changed by surgery or chemicals”. It also noted that “[c]hildren must be protected from the LGBTQ ‘gender agenda’ which ignores biological reality.”

The City had a Policy for Commercial Advertising and Sponsorship (the “Advertising Policy”) that governed commercial advertising on City-owned or City-controlled assets and public property. The Advertising Policy required proposed advertisements to comply with applicable laws, bylaws and City policies. It also required that advertisements not “adversely affect public safety”.

In a letter dated July 6, 2023, the City denied CHP’s application for advertising (the “Decision Letter”). The City began by setting out its interpretation of the Advertisement, noting that it “implicitly suggests that only those who are biologically born female can be considered women”, thereby excluding trans women. This interpretation was reinforced by CHP’s platform regarding gender issues. Thus, in the City’s view, the Advertisement posed a tangible risk to the City’s statutory objective of providing a safe and welcoming transit system.

CHP sought judicial review on the following grounds: (1) the decision was made in a procedurally unfair manner; (2) the decision was unreasonable under Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov and the framework from Doré v. Barreau du Québec; and (3) the City exhibited bias. The Divisional Court rejected each of these grounds in turn.

issues:

1. Did the Divisional Court err in the description of the decision on review by dismissing OutFront’s involvement?
2. Did the Divisional Court err in misapplying the Baker factors in determining that there was no breach of procedural fairness?
3. Did the Divisional Court err in improperly applying the Doré/Loyola framework by balancing CHP’s Charter rights with third-party interests (i.e. those of the transgender and gender non-conforming community); and ignoring the CHP’s other Charter-protected rights of freedom of religion and equality?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. Did the Divisional Court err in the description of the decision on review by dismissing OutFront’s involvement?

No. The Court noted that the Divisional Court did not treat the initial communication from OutFront as a “decision” for purposes of the judicial review.

According to the appellants, the Divisional Court erred in law and made palpable and overriding errors of fact by dismissing as irrelevant OutFront’s involvement. The appellants relied on the majority’s statement in Vavilov that, “[t]he review of an administrative decision can be divorced neither from the institutional context in which the decision was made nor from the history of the proceedings”. The City argued that CHP’s initial interaction with OutFront was not relevant to CHP’s judicial review application. The City was not even aware of CHP’s communication with OutFront at the time the decision was made. The Divisional Court did not err by focusing on the Decision Letter from the City as the decision under review.

2. Did the Divisional Court err in misapplying the Baker factors in determining that there was no breach of procedural fairness?

No. The appellants argued they were denied fairness by the City. They contended that the Divisional Court repeatedly erred in law and mixed law and fact when conducting its procedural fairness analysis and applying the Baker framework. The City argued that it provided an opportunity to CHP to participate through its forthright communications with CHP’s counsel, which identified the issues that the City was considering. The City also provided answers to the questions posed by CHP’s counsel in correspondence. As well, according to the City, CHP had multiple opportunities to put forward any submissions or evidence that it wished, and a specific invitation to do so was not required.

The Court saw no error in the Divisional Court’s Baker analysis, noting that the decision to accept or deny a proposed advertisement for transit shelters was administrative in nature. The Court outlined that in reviewing the record as a whole in light of the Baker analysis, the City provided an adequate opportunity for CHP to be heard. It also provided CHP with a clear sense of the issues under consideration, their origins and implications, and therefore a good understanding of the case to be met. Accordingly, the Court concluded the City did not breach its duty of fairness.

3. Did the Divisional Court err in improperly applying the Doré/Loyola framework by balancing CHP’s Charter rights with third-party interests (i.e. those of the transgender and gender non-conforming community); and ignoring the CHP’s other Charter-protected rights of freedom of religion and equality?

No.

The appellants argued that the Divisional Court erred in assessing the reasonableness of the City’s decision in light of the appellants’ Charter rights and values. The Court outlined that its role is to step into the shoes of the reviewing court and determine if the underlying decision was reasonable. The appellants argued that the City was unduly fixated on the transgender and LGBTQ third party communities. The Court rejected that submission. The Court outlined that the City did not arbitrarily choose to focus on transgender or LGBTQ communities at the expense of other residents of the City. Rather, the City relied on empirical and qualitative evidence about and from these communities, who they identified as being the groups most vulnerable to harms arising from the Advertisement. The issue of whether the proposed Advertisement would violate the Ontario Human Rights Code, or otherwise would be found unlawful, was not determinative in the Doré/Loyola context.

While the appellants objected to how the City engaged in its proportionality reasoning, the Court noted that it was clear that the City undertook the robust proportionality exercise envisioned in Lauzon. The Court underlined that with respect to the substance of the City’s proportionality analysis, as set out above, deference was owed. The question, ultimately, was whether the City acted reasonably. The Court concluded that the City’s decision to reject the Advertisement was reasonable and resulted from a proper application of the Doré/Loyola analysis.

Nexus Solutions Inc. v. Krougly, 2026 ONCA 199

[Miller, Zarnett and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.B. Lerner, B. Kolenda and N. Naglie, for the appellant
W. Fawcett, for the respondents

Keywords: Copyright, Intellectual Property, Statutory Interpretation, Employment, Software Development, Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 13(1) and (3), Penhallurick v. MD5 Ltd., [2021] EWHC 293 (IPEC), Corso v. Nebs Business Products Limited, 2009 CanLII 11215 (Ont. S.C.), Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, R. v. Alex, 2017 SCC 37, Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34, Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30, Wiebe v. Saskatchewan Institute of Applied Science and Technology, 2007 SKQB 60, Canadian Intellectual Property Law (2025), 2022 CanLIIDocs 4489

facts:

At issue was the scope of s. 13(3) of the Copyright Act (the “Act”), which provided that an employer is the first owner of the copyright in a work created by an employee “in the course of” their employment.

In phase one of a bifurcated trial, the trial judge found that the “Limedas” software created by the respondent (“Krougly”), was not developed in the course of his employment with the appellant (“Nexus”). This was despite secretly developing it while he was employed by Nexus and the software competed with Nexus’s continuous emissions monitoring system (“CEMS”) software called CEMView. He therefore dismissed Nexus’s s. 13(3) copyright claim.

issues:

1. Did the trial judge err by holding that it was a “critical determination” in interpreting s. 13(3) that Krougly had not been specifically directed by Nexus to develop Limedas since, by definition, Nexus could not have directed Krougly to develop software of which it was unaware?
2. Did the trial judge err by taking into account an irrelevant factor in interpreting s. 13(3), namely, whether Nexus had bargained for or otherwise expended resources in the development of Limedas?
3. In the alternative, assuming that the direction given by Nexus to Krougly was relevant to the s. 13(3) inquiry, did the trial judge err by finding that Krougly had not been sufficiently directed to create Limedas.

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The fact that an employer could require an employee to carry out a task was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for that task to fall within the employee’s course of employment. Whether or not the task fell within the employee’s course of employment depended on whether the employer had actually assigned responsibility to the employee to carry out the task or perform the function in question. The employer did not have to specifically direct the employee to produce a particular work for that work to have been made in the course of employment. What was necessary, however, was that the employee’s actual responsibilities included making the work.
Not only did Nexus’s interpretation of “in the course of … employment” ignore the actual responsibilities of the employee, but it also ran counter to the purpose of s. 13(3). The trial judge correctly pointed out that the relevant test under s. 13(3) was not what Nexus could have instructed Krougly to do but, rather, what Nexus actually asked him to do. The trial judge found as a fact that Krougly’s responsibilities were limited to the development of CEMView and that the creation of a different CEMS, like Limedas, was therefore outside the scope of his employment responsibilities.
Nor did the trial judge require that Nexus must have provided a “specific direction” to develop the kind of software that Limedas relied on before Krougly could be found to be acting within the scope of his employment in creating it. As the trial judge pointed out, Krougly “had not been instructed to produce that work, specifically … or impliedly”. In fact, Krougly had been expressly told that his responsibilities were limited to the ongoing development of Nexus’s existing CEMView software, that he should not undertake any unauthorized software development and, if he did, he would not be paid for it. The cases relied upon by Nexus were consistent with the trial judge’s analysis.

2. No. Nexus misconstrued the larger point the trial judge was trying to make, which was that Nexus did not expend resources to support the development of Limedas. Because Krougly did not receive any increase in compensation when he began developing Limedas, and he undertook this work almost entirely on his own time and using his own equipment while still working full-time in his existing role with Nexus, Nexus did not fund the creation of Limedas by paying Krougly’s salary or otherwise. Read in context, this is all the trial judge was attempting to convey in his “bargain for” comment.
Nor did the trial judge “require” Nexus to have expended new or specific resources or have bargained for the software associated with Limedas as a precondition to succeeding in its copyright claim. The trial judge merely took this factor into account, along with several other relevant considerations, in determining that the development of Limedas fell outside of Krougly’s responsibilities as an employee.

3. No. The emails and communications that Nexus relied on indicated, at best, that at some point in the future Nexus intended to develop a next generation product incorporating upgraded “OPC UA” communications protocol. But Nexus did not identify any evidence suggesting that a decision to move forward with OPC UA had actually been made, much less that Krougly was assigned the task of implementing it. The absence of a firm commitment to OPC UA was confirmed by the fact that as of the date of trial, 13 years after Krougly resigned from Nexus, OPC UA had still not been integrated into CEMView. There was ample evidence supporting the trial judge’s finding that Krougly’s role at Nexus was limited to the development of CEMView, and that he had not been directed to develop a new software product incorporating OPC UA.

Murray-Leung v. Dyck, 2026 ONCA 204

[Sossin, Gomery and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

W. Fawcett, for the appellants
M. Jarrett and T.D. Marshall, for the respondents

Keywords: Real Property, Adverse Possession, Prescriptive Easements, Encroachments, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Burden of Proof, Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.5, Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, s. 31, Hunsinger v. Carter, 2018 ONCA 656

facts:

The two properties at issue, 56 Garner and 58 Garner, were originally a single lot which was severed by the owner in 1953 and converted to the Land Titles Act system in 1997. The respondents purchased 58 Garner Road in 1996. The appellants purchased 56 Garner in 2017. The only access to 58 Garner was by way of a gravel driveway (the “Driveway”), a strip of which was located on the 56 Garner property. At the end of the Driveway there was a gravel parking and lawn area that encroached on 56 Garner.

In 2020, the appellants attempted to build a fence on the Driveway, 6-8 inches off the property line. The respondents objected, believing that the fence would impede or obstruct vehicular and service truck access to their property. The appellants moved ahead with renovating their home, using the Driveway for access. They also placed a number of large objects along the property which the respondents said obstructed their access to the Driveway. The respondents brought an application which sought either adverse possession or a prescriptive easement in relation to the portions of the Driveway encroaching on the appellants’ property.

The application judge found that the respondents had not established adverse possession but had successfully established a prescriptive easement. Since the properties were converted to the Land Titles Act in 1997, claims could only be based on use before that date. The application judge was satisfied that since at least 1977, the Driveway had encroached onto 56 Garner, the previous owners of 58 Garner had used the Driveway for vehicular travel in a continuous, uninterrupted, open, peaceful manner, without permission, and that the use of the disputed land was necessary to service the property. The appellants were ordered to stop interfering with the easement.

issues:

1. Did the application judge misapprehended key evidence on whether the Driveway remained “essentially” unchanged over the period in question?

2. Did the application judge reverse the onus in finding that the respondents had not demonstrated that service vehicles could not access the respondents’ property through the Driveway without encroaching on the appellants’ property?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court held that there was no basis to disturb the application judge’s findings which relied in part on the aerial photographs to conclude that the Driveway remained in essentially the same location over the material time-period. While the appellants attempted to show that the Driveway’s position in relation to the appellants’ property clearly did shift in different photographs over time, there was no expert testimony on these photographs, nor was there information on the scale or perspective of the aerial photographs. The application judge also relied on evidence from J with respect to accessing the Driveway to empty the septic tank at what was now the respondents’ property, and M whose evidence was that the Driveway also was used by various service trucks to access the property. The Court found that these factual findings were entitled to deference.

2. No. The Court rejected the argument that the application judge shifted the burden to the appellants to establish key elements of the prescriptive easement. Once a prescriptive easement claimant proved facts that supported the inference of acquiescence in 20 years of use, the evidentiary burden passed to the respondent to lead evidence to rebut the inference by proving the use was by permission. The application judge found the appellants had led no evidence in that regard. After explaining the evidence in support of the prescriptive easement that the application judge accepted, she stated that the appellants had not demonstrated that it was possible to get service trucks down the length of the respondents’ driveway without encroaching on the disputed land. That statement did not reverse the onus on establishing the prescriptive easement, which the application judge expressly confirmed fell on the respondents. Rather, the application judge confirmed that the appellants had failed to counter the respondents’ evidence, which she accepted.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

CTCMPAO v. Yan, 2026 ONCA 200

[Huscroft, Zarnett and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N.X.Y.Y, acting in person
H. Ngan, for the respondent/responding party CTCMPAO
A. Windsor, for the respondent M.B.

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigants, Abuse of Process, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140

Highbury Narrows Ltd. v. LAF Canada Company, 2026 ONCA 194

[Sossin, Gomery and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Diacur, for the appellant
J. Haylock and J. Wang, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Civil Procedure, Costs, Highway Properties Ltd. v. Kelly, Douglas & Co. Ltd., [1971] S.C.R. 562, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53

Kotsopoulos v. Toronto (City), 2026 ONCA 206

[Sossin, Copeland and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Wolfe and A. Enwright, for the appellants/respondents by way of cross-appeal
S. Zacharias and N. Marotta, for the respondent/appellant by way of cross-appeal

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Slip and Fall, Highways, Public Authorities, Municipalities, Liability, Civil Procedure, Partial Summary Judgment, Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, 49.10(1), 57.01(1), K.K. v. K.W.G., 2008 ONCA 489, Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.)

Vassell Estate v. Vassell, 2026 ONCA 203

[van Rensburg, Miller and Coroza JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N. V., acting in person
L. Wianecki and A. Yiu, for the responding party
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Costs, Courts of Justice Act, s. 7(5), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 63.01 Saffih v. Sbih, 2024 ONCA 710, Enbridge Gas Distribution v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Net Connect Installation Inc. v. Mobile Zone Inc., 2017 ONCA 766, Bayford v. Boese, 2021 ONCA 533

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.