COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (May 11-May 15)

By John Polyzogopoulos on May 16, 2026

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Good afternoon.
Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of May 11, 2026.

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In Green Rise Foods Inc. v. N.V. Hagelunie, the appellant’s greenhouse tomato crop was destroyed by excessive carbon monoxide emissions caused a malfunctioning boiler that went undetected due to a malfunctioning carbon monoxide monitor. The respondent insurer denied the appellant’s claim under a standard form greenhouse insurance policy, relying on a machinery breakdown exception and an exhaust gas exclusion. After the policyholder moved for summary judgment declaring coverage, the motion judge granted boomerang summary judgment in favor of the insurer and dismissed the action. He found that the exhaust gas exclusion was a complete answer to the claim and, alternatively, that the machinery breakdown exception applied. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by focusing solely on the immediate cause of the loss (carbon monoxide poisoning) rather than determining the effective cause or causes of the loss within the context of a series of potentially causal events. The Court further found that the motion judge failed to address the onus of proof regarding the machinery breakdown exception and did not make the requisite factual findings as to the causes of the boiler and monitor malfunctions. The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment was set aside, and the entire action was remitted for trial on the genuine issues identified.

In Chanderpaul v. Caesars Convention Centre Ltd., the Court held that while the corporate veil may be pierced whenever those in control expressly direct a wrongful act — regardless of whether that conduct falls within their role as directing mind — the evidentiary threshold for doing so remains high. Evidence of systemic abuse of the corporate form rather than isolated or ambiguous misconduct is required.

In Derenzis v Ontario, the Court reaffirmed that non-party production orders under r. 30.10 are exceptional remedies requiring documents to be logically probative of a material issue and genuinely necessary for a fair hearing. The Court held that internal Licence Appeal Tribunal records concerning individual tribunal proceedings were not relevant to the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge alleging systemic bias on the part of LAT and lack of adjudicative independence in its handling of statutory accident benefit claims. The Court also confirmed that deliberative secrecy in the administrative law context is broad and protects internal adjudicative and administrative communications to the same extent as judicial deliberations.

In Sheridan Retail Inc. v. Roy, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of Sheridan Retail Inc.’s $300,000 lawsuit against P.R. as a SLAPP. P.R. had publicly opposed SRI’s Sheridan mall redevelopment project and complained to the City about safety, environmental and regulatory concerns. The Court agreed that the action arose from P.R’s expression on matters of public interest and that the alleged trespasses onto the property to document alleged infractions were inextricably linked to his efforts to substantiate those complaints. It also held that SRI failed to show substantial merit or sufficient harm, particularly because its alleged economic losses and trespass-related damages were not adequately particularized. The Court affirmed the dismissal and the $25,000 damages awarded to P.R., but reduced the full-indemnity costs award from about $156,000 to $75,000, as full indemnity costs awards on such motions should generally not exceed $50,000.

In Libfeld v. Libfeld, the Court granted motions to quash appeals from an order authorizing the court-appointed Sales Officer to enter into agreements partitioning jointly held real estate development lands as part of a court-ordered wind-up and sale of a family business, the Conservatory Group. The Court held that the order was interlocutory and made under the Business Corporations Act and therefore was appealable only to the Divisional Court with leave.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Civil Decisions

Green Rise Foods Inc. v. N.V. Hagelunie, 2026 ONCA 334

Keywords: Contracts, Insurance, Coverage, Exceptions, Exclusions, Civil Procedure, Boomerang Summary Judgment, Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.01(1), Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. of Canada v. Sherwin‑Williams Co. of Canada Ltd., [1951] 3 D.L.R. 1 (J.C.P.C.), Canada Rice Mills Ltd. v. Union Marine & General Insurance. Co., [1941] 1 D.L.R. 1 (J.C.P.C.), Ledcor Construction Ltd. v. Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co., 2016 SCC 37, Derksen v. 539938 Ontario Ltd., 2001 SCC 72, Emond v. Trillium Mutual Insurance Co., 2026 SCC 3, Progressive Homes Ltd. v. Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada, 2010 SCC 33, ING Insurance Company of Canada v. Miracle (Mohawk Imperial Sales and Mohawk Liquidate), 2011 ONCA 321, Sam’s Auto Wrecking Co. Ltd. (Wentworth Metal) v. Lombard General Insurance Company of Canada, 2013 ONCA 186, Chernet v. RBC General Insurance Company, 2017 ONCA 337, 942325 Ontario Inc. in Caneast Foods Limited v. Lombard General Insurance Company of Canada, 2008 ONCA 368, Chao v. Chao, 2017 ONCA 701, Shea v. Halifax Insurance Co., [1958] O.R. 458 (C.A.), Graham v. Toronto (City), 2022 ONCA 149, O’Byrne v. Farmers’ Mutual Insurance Company (Lindsay), 2014 ONCA 543, Zurich Insurance Co. v. 686234 Ontario Ltd. (2002), 62 O.R. (3d) 447 (C.A.), 942325 Ontario Inc. v. Commonwealth Insurance Co. (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 399 (C.A.), Sher-Bett Construction (Manitoba) Inc. v. The Co-Operators General Insurance Company, 2021 MBCA 10, Co-operative Fire & Cas Co. v. Saindon, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 735, Milashenko v. Co-operative Fire and Casualty Co. (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 89 (Sask. C.A.), Honeywell International Inc. v. XL Insurance Company Ltd., 2024 BCCA 375, Leyland Shipping Company v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society, [1918] A.C. 350 (H.L. (Eng.)), Munro, Brice & Co. v. War Risks Association, [1918] 2 K.B. 78 (Eng.), Luciani v. British America Ass’ce Co., [1931] 1 D.L.R. 166 (Ont. S.C.(A.D.)

Chanderpaul v. Caesars Convention Centre Ltd., 2026 ONCA 332

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Negligence, Sufficiency of Pleadings, Motion to Strike, Commercial Host Liability, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Directors’ Liability, Duty of Care, Limitation Period, Failure to Insure, Genuine Issue Requiring Trial, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 21.01, 20.04, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Liquor License Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L-19, Di Filippo v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2024 ONCA 33, R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, Attis v. Canada (Health), 2008 ONCA 660, R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, FNF Enterprises Inc. v. Wag and Train, 2023 ONCA 92, Ceballos v. DCL International Inc., 2018 ONCA 49, Hartman v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONCA 270, Abbasbayli v. Fiera Foods Company, 2021 ONCA 95, Transamerica Life Insurance Co. of Canada v. Canada Life Assurance Co. (1996), 28 O.R. (3d) 423 (Gen. Div.), Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2018 ONCA 472, 642947 Ontario Ltd. v. Fleisher et al. (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Zhelka et al., [1967] 2. O.R. 565 (Ont. H.C.), Shoppers Drug Mart Inc. v. 6470360 Canada Inc. (Energyshop Consulting Inc./Powerhouse Energy Management Inc.), 2014 ONCA 85, 1061590 Ontario Ltd. v. Ontario Jockey Club (1995), 21 O.R. (3d) 547 (C.A.)

Libfeld v. Libfeld, 2026 ONCA 343

Keywords: Corporations, Wind-Up, Oppression, Partnerships, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Orders, Final or Interlocutory, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43., ss. 6(1)(b), Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, ss. 207, 255, Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.5., ss. 35(1)(f), Libfeld v. Libfeld, 2021 ONSC 4670, Libfeld v. Libfeld, 2023 ONCA 442, Hendrickson v. Kallio, [1932] O.R. 675 (C.A.), Prescott & Russell (United Counties) v. David S. Laflamme Construction Inc., 2018 ONCA 495, Paulpillai Estate v. Yusuf, 2020 ONCA 655, Gefen v. Gefen, 2021 ONSC 6497, Kauffman v. Fazari, 2020 ONSC 7358, Rickwood et al. v. The Town of Aylmer et al., [1955] O.R. 470 (C.A.), Duffy v. Duffy, 2025 ONCA 507, Smerchanski v. Lewis (1980), 30 O.R. (2d) 370 (C.A.), Royal Trust Corporation v. Fisherman (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 794 (C.A.), P1 v. XYZ School, 2021 ONCA 901, 86708 Ontario Inc. v. Gerstein, 2016 ONCA 905, Ontario Securities Commission v. McLaughlin, 2009 ONCA 280, Buccilli v. Pillitteri, 2016 ONCA 775, Gustafson v. Johnson, 2017 ONCA 581

Derenzis v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 344

Keywords: Administrative Law, Instititutional Bias, Constitutional Law, Charter Claims, Contracts, Insurance, Coverage, Statutory Accident Benefits, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Non-Party Production, Relevance, Materiality, Privilege, Deliberative Secrecy, Fresh Evidence, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8., ss. 267.5 and 280, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7 and 15, Constitution Act, 1867, s. 96, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 30.10, Derenzis v. Gore Mutual Insurance Co., 2025 ONSC 2732, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ballard Estate, [1995] O.J. No. 1854, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Stavro (1995), 26 O.R. (3d) 39 (C.A.), Vachon v. Titley, 2013 ONSC 5227, R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, Frenette v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 647, Actava TV, Inc. v. Matvil Corp., 2021 ONCA 105, Morse Shoe (Canada) Ltd. v. Zellers Inc. (1997), 100 O.A.C. 116 (C.A.), Reichmann v. Vered, [1998] O.J. No. 3751 (C.A.), Lowe v. Motolanez (1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 408 (C.A.), Philip Services Corp. v Deloitte & Touche, 2015 ONCA 60, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Medcap Real Estate Holdings Inc. (Re), 2022 ONCA 318, R. v. Candir, 2009 ONCA 915, Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 3, R. v. Sharma, 2022 SCC 39, Ontario (Energy Board) v. Ontario Power Generation, 2015 SCC 44, Ellis-Don Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), 2001 SCC 4, Tremblay v. Quebec (Commission des affaires sociales), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 952, Bokhari v. Top Medical Transportation Services, 2025 ONSC 1208, Cherubini Metal Works Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2007 NSCA 37, MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796, I.K.K. v. M.P., 2018 ONSC 2473, British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Malik, 2011 SCC 18

Sheridan Retail Inc. v. Roy, 2026 ONCA 347

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Intentional Interference with Economic Relations, Inducing Breach of Contract, Trespass, Civil Procedure, Anti-SLAPP, Costs, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43 s. 137.1, Building Code Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 23, Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, Hansman v. Neufeld, 2023 SCC 14, Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22, Volpe v. Wong-Tam, 2023 ONCA 680, Benchwood Builders, Inc. v. Prescott, 2025 ONCA 171, Sokoloff v. Tru-Path Occupational Therapy Services Ltd., 2020 ONCA 730, Grist v. TruGrp Inc., 2021 ONCA 309, Yates v. Iron Horse Corporation, 2026 ONCA 38, United Soils Management Ltd. v. Mohammed, 2019 ONCA 128, 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2018 ONCA 685, Levant v. DeMelle, 2022 ONCA 79, Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 257, The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. West Face Capital Inc., 2023 ONCA 533, UM Financial Inc. v. Butler, 2025 ONCA 844, Park Lawn Corporation v. Kahu Capital Partners Ltd., 2023 ONCA 129, Marcellin v. London (Police Services Board), 2024 ONCA 468, 2110120 Ontario Inc. v. Buttar, 2023 ONCA 539, Burjoski v. Waterloo Region District School Board, 2024 ONCA 811, Hamer v. Jane Doe, 2024 ONCA 721, Galati v. Toews, 2025 ONCA 568, Subway Franchise Systems of Canada, Inc. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2021 ONCA 25, 40 Days for Life v. Dietrich, 2024 ONCA 599, R. v. Edwards, 2024 ONCA 135, Hudson’s Bay Co. v. White, [1997] O.J. No. 307 (Gen. Div.), Deluca v. Paul Guiho Trucking & Construction Ltd. (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 267 (Ont. C.A.), Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Ari, 2025 BCCA 131

Short Civil Decisions

Royal Bank of Canada v. Sacred Heart Seniors Health and Recreation Center Inc., 2026 ONCA 348

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Guarantees, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Canada Small Business Financing Regulations, SOR/99-141, Canada Small Business Financing Program Guidelines, s. 7.3

Watt v. Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, 2026 ONCA 355

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Physicians, Civil Procedure, Leave to Appeal, Abuse of Process, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 106, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.1, Watt v. Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, 2024 ONSC 5980

CIVIL DECISIONS

Green Rise Foods Inc. v. N.V. Hagelunie, 2026 ONCA 334

[Tulloch C.J.O., Roberts and George JJ.A.]

Counsel:

K. Marlowe, K.C., for the appellant

L. Lorimer and R. Cooper, for the respondent

facts:

The appellant grows tomatoes in a large greenhouse operation which it purchased on February 1, 2021. Boilers are used in the greenhouse operation: 1) to provide heat for the greenhouses; and 2) to generate carbon dioxide, which is vented into the greenhouses to accelerate photosynthesis and promote growth of the tomato crop. By burning natural gas, boilers produce “flue gas” consisting of the carbon dioxide required for distribution into the greenhouses, as well as carbon monoxide. Carbon monoxide is produced by incomplete combustion when there is not enough oxygen to react with all the carbon in the fuel.

The system supplies carbon dioxide-enriched flue gas to the greenhouses for crop growth. When the boilers are functioning safely and efficiently, the flue gas contains only safe levels of carbon monoxide. Since 2016, the inspection, maintenance and repair of the boilers had been carried out by a third-party company, Powerhouse Boiler & Combustion Ltd. (“Powerhouse”). The motion judge found that days prior to the purchase of the greenhouse operation, Powerhouse carried out an inspection of the boilers and determined they were efficiently and safely functioning. There is no evidence that Powerhouse examined the monitor that detects carbon monoxide levels at that time.

On February 23, 2021, the appellant began observing signs of damage to its tomato plant crop. Investigation into the cause of the damage ensued. It was not until March 17, 2021, that the appellant discovered excessive amounts of carbon monoxide were being emitted by an improperly functioning boiler and that the monitor was not working and had failed to detect the high levels of carbon monoxide flowing into the greenhouses through the carbon dioxide flue-gas distribution system. In consequence, the appellant suffered a loss of 23 acres of its tomato plants.

On March 19, 2021, the appellant made a claim for the loss of its tomato plants under its insurance Policy. On March 22, 2021, a crop expert hired by the respondent insurer attended the greenhouse operation and concluded that the appellant’s loss was caused by excessive levels of toxic gases, including carbon monoxide. He recommended that the entire crop be removed. He did not inspect the malfunctioning boiler or monitor. In its letter dated March 24, 2021, the respondent informed the appellant that the crop damage was not covered under the Policy. It based its denial of the appellant’s claim on its crop expert’s opinion that the crop damage was likely incurred due to incomplete combustion of the boiler causing emissions of different toxic exhaust gases, including carbon monoxide.

The appellant commenced an action for damages for breach of contract arising from the respondent’s failure to indemnify it under the Policy for its claimed loss. The appellant brought a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that it was entitled to coverage for its claimed loss and that the respondent was liable to indemnify it under the Policy. The motion judge dismissed the appellant’s motion and granted boomerang summary judgment in favour of the insurer. He found that the language of the Policy, including the language of the exhaust gas exclusion and machinery breakdown exception, was unambiguous. He concluded that the Policy exclusion for exhaust applied; alternatively, if he was in error, he applied the machinery breakdown exception in the initial grant of coverage.

In concluding that the exhaust gas exclusion applied, the motion judge rejected, on two grounds, the appellant’s argument that the discharge of carbon monoxide into the greenhouse was also “pollution” as defined under the Policy.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge fail to carry out the requisite legal analysis of the standard form policy that applies in the context of a loss caused by a series of events?

2. If so, should partial summary judgment be granted to the appellant or are there genuine issues requiring a trial?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

1. Yes. The motion judge failed to carry out the requisite legal analysis of the standard form policy that applies in the context of a loss caused by a series of events. The Court outlined that the motion judge’s analytical error arose in his causation analysis. The motion judge found that the loss resulted from a series of events: the malfunctioning boiler that went undetected by the malfunctioning monitor that resulted in the excessive emissions of carbon monoxide that entered into the greenhouses through the flue-gas distribution system and, ultimately, the loss of the tomato plants. The Court outlined that he ignored his factual finding of a series of potentially causal events and erroneously focused on the most immediate-in-time cause of the loss, namely, the carbon monoxide poisoning of the tomato plants, rather than determining what in substance was the effective cause or causes of the loss. The Court stated that this approach represented an error in principle.

In light of the motion judge’s finding of a series of potentially causal events, he should have ascertained whether the claimed loss was caused by one effective cause in the chain of causation culminating in the loss, or by the operation of concurrent causes. The Court outlined that this required him to analyze the malfunctions of the boiler and the monitor, as well as the reasons for these malfunctions, to determine whether any of these events, by themselves or in combination with the carbon monoxide poisoning, were the effective cause or causes of the claimed loss. The Court then outlined that the effective cause or causes of the loss will determine coverage.

The Court outlined that it would not be appropriate for the Court of Appeal to determine the effective cause or causes of the loss and whether the loss was caused by one effective cause in a chain of causation or by concurrent causes operating together.

2. Yes. The Court found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial. These were not issues that the Court could determine on the appeal. The trial judge will have to consider whether the machinery breakdown exclusion had any application. It was common ground that “machinery breakdown on crop” and “to moving work equipment” did not apply here because neither of those situations relates to the malfunctioning boiler or monitor. Whether “machinery breakdown due to standstill or maintenance” applies is a question of fact for the trial judge. The parties did not address on appeal the issue of which party bore the onus to prove that the machinery breakdown exception applied or did not apply to foreclose the initial grant of coverage. The Court was of the view that this was a material issue that must be decided if the boiler or monitor is determined to be an effective cause of the loss. As it was not squarely addressed by the parties or the motion judge, it was also a genuine issue requiring a trial. Findings about what factually caused the boiler and the monitor to fail will be required for the determination of whether the machinery breakdown exception applied. Therefore, the factual causes of the boiler and monitor malfunction were also genuine issues requiring a trial.

The causation analysis had to be considered afresh. Accordingly, if it is determined that this is a case of multi-causal loss, it will be necessary for the trial judge to interpret the Policy language anew with a view to determining whether the exhaust gas exclusion clause applies to bar all coverage. The Court stated that if the respondent intended for all coverage to be ousted if a loss was caused by an excluded peril, namely exhaust gas, despite the fact that the loss is also caused by another covered peril, the respondent needed to clearly specify this in the Policy. The trial judge will have to determine whether the respondent did so. This was also a genuine issue requiring a trial.

Chanderpaul v. Caesars Convention Centre Ltd., 2026 ONCA 332

[Huscroft, Coroza and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Ismail, for the appellant/respondent by way of cross-appeal

M. M.A. Stroh and A. Yu, for the respondents/appellants by way of cross-appeal

facts:

The appellant, MC, sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident in April 2013 while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by AR. AR had consumed alcohol earlier that evening at Throne Entertainment Venue (“Throne”), a nightclub operated by Caesars Convention Centre Ltd. (“Caesars”), and later pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit. AR was underage at the time and had used false identification to purchase alcohol at the nightclub.

MC commenced proceedings against the drivers involved in the collision and later added Caesars as a defendant on the basis that it had overserved AR prior to the accident. The claim alleged that Caesars negligently operated Throne by permitting excessive alcohol consumption and failing to comply with obligations under the Liquor Licence Act.

Although Caesars operated as a nightclub serving alcohol, it was insured only as a banquet hall that did not provide food or liquor services. As a result, the insurer denied coverage and refused to defend or indemnify Caesars in the litigation. After Caesars was noted in default in 2015, the corporation was dissolved, and its assets were sold.

The individual respondents, RK and KK, were the directors and shareholders of Caesars. They were also directors and shareholders of RKS Investments Ltd. (“RKS”), the corporation that owned the property from which Throne operated. MC sued RK, KK and RKS seeking damages, disgorgement, punitive damages, and relief based on allegations that the respondents had used the corporate structure improperly and had rendered Caesars incapable of satisfying any judgment. MC alleged that RK and KK negligently operated the nightclub, encouraged overservice and underage drinking, failed to maintain proper insurance coverage for nightclub operations, and improperly dissolved Caesars after it had been noted in default in order to render it judgment-proof. MC further alleged that the respondents wrongfully maximized profits while operating the nightclub without adequate safeguards or insurance coverage.

The respondents brought a motion for summary judgment under r. 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and, alternatively, sought to strike portions of the pleadings under r. 21. The motion judge permitted the claim against Caesars for overservice to proceed but dismissed the claims against RK, KK and RKS, concluding that the appellant had failed to establish a basis to pierce the corporate veil and that the claim relating to a failure to obtain insurance was statute-barred. MC appealed, and the respondents cross-appealed the refusal to dismiss the overservice claim against Caesars.

issues:

Appeal

1. Did the motion judge err in concluding that the appellant’s pleadings were insufficient and in declining to grant leave to amend?

2. Did the motion judge err in concluding that the corporate veil could not be pierced to hold RK, KK and RKS liable for Caesars’ alleged wrongdoing?

3. Did the motion judge err in concluding that the claim against RK and KK personally for negligently failing to obtain proper insurance for Caesars was statute-barred?

4. Did the motion judge err in concluding that RK and KK did not owe the appellant a duty of care to ensure Caesars was adequately insured?

Cross-Appeal

5. Did the motion judge err in concluding that the claim against Caesars for overservice raised a genuine issue requiring trial?

6. Did the motion judge err in finding that the claims against RK, KK and RKS were not statute-barred?

holding:

Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court held that the motion judge committed no reversible error in addressing the sufficiency of the pleadings under r. 21 or in declining to grant leave to amend.

The appellant argued that the respondents delayed too long in bringing their r. 21 motion and that, once pleading deficiencies were identified, she ought to have been permitted to amend rather than face dismissal. The Court rejected both submissions. There was no procedural unfairness, as the appellant had clear notice that relief was sought under both r. 20 and r. 21 and had a full opportunity to respond to each. The Court also found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that delay in bringing the r. 21 motion was a live issue below that could bar the respondents from relying on the rule.

On the substance of the pleadings, the Court confirmed that a motion judge is entitled to consider piercing the corporate veil on a r. 21 motion, and accepted that the pleadings lacked the necessary specificity to support such a claim, referring broadly to “the defendants” rather than alleging individual misconduct. Critically, the motion judge did not stop there — she went on to conduct a full r. 20 summary judgment analysis and found that, even assuming the pleadings were sufficient, the evidentiary record disclosed no genuine issue requiring trial. The failure-to-insure claim was addressed similarly: already found to be statute-barred, the r. 21 analysis was merely alternative reasoning.

The Court reaffirmed that leave to amend is discretionary and entitled to appellate deference, and need not be granted where it is plain and obvious a claim cannot succeed. Because the corporate veil claims failed on the evidentiary record and the failure-to-insure claim was statute-barred, amendment could cure neither deficiency, and no basis for appellate interference was established.

2. No. The Court held that while the motion judge erred in her legal analysis of the corporate veil test, she nonetheless reached the correct conclusion that the evidentiary record was insufficient to pierce it.

The applicable test, drawn from Transamerica, requires two elements: (1) that the corporation is completely dominated and controlled; and (2) that it is being used as a shield for fraudulent or improper conduct. The Court identified two errors in the motion judge’s application of this test. First, the motion judge appeared to suggest that wrongful conduct must exist at the time of incorporation — the Court clarified that the test is not so limited and that post-incorporation conduct is plainly sufficient. Second, and more significantly, the motion judge imposed an additional requirement that the improper conduct must have been taken outside the directing mind’s role or for a purpose unrelated to the corporation’s operation. The Court held this was an error, affirming from Shoppers Drug Mart and Fleisher that the corporate veil can be pierced whenever those in control expressly direct a wrongful act, regardless of whether that conduct falls within their ordinary corporate role.

Despite these errors, the Court declined to interfere with the outcome. The threshold for piercing the corporate veil is high — corporate separateness is the rule, and only exceptional cases warrant departing from it. The appellant’s evidence, consisting of two advertisements, photographs of patrons holding alcohol, server sales records from a single night, and a forensic accountant’s opinion that revenues could not be accurately determined, fell well short of establishing systemic wrongdoing or abuse of the corporate form. By the time of the motion, the appellant was expected to lead her best evidence, but she had not done so, and was not entitled to rely on the prospect that more favourable facts might emerge at trial.

3. No. The Court held that there was no basis to interfere with the motion judge’s conclusion that the claim was commenced outside the applicable limitation period.

The motion judge found that the appellant knew, or ought to have known, about the alleged inadequate insurance coverage no later than December 2015, when she pleaded in a prior statement of claim that the respondents had deliberately failed to carry adequate insurance and had rendered Caesars judgment-proof. Despite this knowledge, the appellant did not advance a direct negligence claim against RK and KK personally for failing to obtain proper insurance until the consolidated claim was issued in December 2020, well beyond the two-year limitation period.

The Court rejected the appellant’s submission that the motion judge applied an unduly technical approach to discoverability. Even on the timeline most favourable to the appellant, the claim was still brought too late. As a result, the motion judge correctly concluded that the claim was statute-barred.

4. Not addressed. The Court expressly declined to address whether the motion judge erred in finding that RK and KK did not owe the appellant a duty of care to ensure Caesars was adequately insured. Having already concluded that the claim was statute-barred, the Court held it was unnecessary to revisit the motion judge’s alternative ruling on this point.

5. No. The Court deferred to the motion judge’s conclusion that the overservice claim disclosed a genuine issue requiring trial.

The respondents argued that the appellant’s toxicology evidence was inadmissible hearsay because the expert relied in part on another toxicology report prepared during related criminal proceedings. The motion judge rejected that argument, finding that the reliance went to weight rather than admissibility. Even if the report carried limited weight, it remained uncontradicted because the respondents filed no competing expert evidence.

The respondents also argued that the appellant failed to “lead trump” because she did not compel AR to testify on the motion. The Court agreed with the motion judge that the appellant had made significant efforts to obtain his evidence, including serving a summons and retaining a private investigator, and should not be faulted for his non-participation. In any event, there was evidence that AR consumed alcohol at Caesars and later pleaded guilty to driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level. While that evidence might not ultimately succeed at trial, it was sufficient to establish a genuine issue requiring trial regarding overservice.

6. Not addressed. The Court did not address this issue because it arose only if the appellant’s appeal succeeded. Since the appeal was dismissed, it was unnecessary to determine the respondents’ alternative limitations argument on the cross-appeal.

Libfeld v. Libfeld, 2026 ONCA 343

[Thorburn, Favreau and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

H. Chaiton and D. Marr, for the moving party (M56773 and M56798), court-appointed Sales Officer, Ernst & Young Inc.

E. Bisceglia, S. Turajlich and B. Frino, for the moving parties (M56696 and M56697), Durban Properties Inc. and Sentinel Land Corporation

P.H. Griffin and E. S. Lederman, for the responding parties (M56696, M56697, M56773, M56798), Mark Libfeld, 1331081 Ontario Inc., 2091170 Ontario Inc. and Vitanna Construction Ltd.

M. Barrack, J. Sirivar, L. Kelley, S. Livingstone and J. Schabas, for the responding parties (M56696, M56697, M56773, M56798), C.L. and 1331078 Ontario Inc.

D. Chernos, A. Zur and J. D’Silva, for the responding parties (M56696, M56697, M56773, M56798), S. L. and 1331088 Ontario Inc.

G. Luftspring and A. Sanche, for the responding parties (M56696, M56697, M56773, M56798), J. L. and 1331091 Ontario Inc.

facts:

These appeals involved a dispute among four brothers: M.L., C.L., S.L., and J.L. Each brother, through his own holding company, owned 25% of a complex real estate business known as The Conservatory Group (“Conservatory”). The Conservatory primarily focused on residential land development and homebuilding. The business included more than 520 separate entities, including corporations, joint ventures, partnerships, trusts and co-tenancies.

Two of Conservatory’s most valuable assets were the Richview and Raki Projects, both large residential developments. Conservatory held a 40% stake in these projects through Arpegio Homes Inc. and Hayward Estate Homes Inc. Each brother owned 25% of Arpegio and Hayward through his own holding company. DG Group owned the other 60% of both projects.

Trial Judgment & Sale Process Order

A six-week trial was held before McEwen J. to wind up the Conservatory, following a breakdown in the brothers’ relationship. In reasons for judgment dated June 30, 2021, the trial judge characterized the brothers’ relationship as one of “extreme dysfunction” and held that, given the level of animosity among them, “their interests must be separated quickly and cleanly with minimal input from them”. He further held that the “only viable remedy” was for the Conservatory to be wound up and sold under the supervision of the court-appointed Sales Officer. In his judgment dated October 25, 2021 (the “Judgment”), the trial judge ordered that Conservatory and all its constituent entities be wound up and sold. In ordering the Sale Process, the trial judge cited s. 207 of the Business Corporations Act (the “OBCA”), and s. 35(1)(f) of the Partnerships Act. The Judgment further provided that the Sales Officer could apply to the Superior Court from time to time for advice and directions, including with respect to the expansion or discharge of its powers and duties.

On March 16, 2023, McEwen J. approved the Sale Process described by the Sales Officer in its first report (the “Sale Process Order”), authorizing and directing the Sales Officer to take any steps needed to carry out the Sale Process and maximize the value of Conservatory’s assets. S.L. and J.L. tried to appeal the Sale Process Order, but the Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Sale Process Order was interlocutory and could be appealed only with leave to the Divisional Court.

Given the Projects’ ownership structure, the Projects could only be marketed as the Conservatory’s minority interests, which was unlikely to maximize value. The Sales Officer, on behalf of the Conservatory, began discussions with the majority owner of the Projects, DG Group, regarding a process to partition the lots and separate their respective interests. After several years of negotiations, they agreed to convert the developable land into saleable lots pursuant to a joint proposal (the “First Proposal”), which sought to sell the assets as interests in land rather than as minority interests in a limited partnership and co-tenancy. On October 1, 2025, the Sales Officer and DG Group reached an agreement in principle, the terms of which were finalized in a series of formal agreements (the “Raki First Agreements”).

DG Group brought a motion to the Superior Court seeking approval of the Raki First Agreements and requiring the parties to take all necessary steps to implement the First Proposal. The motion received support from the Sales Officer, S.L., and J.L. Despite this, M.L. and C.L. objected on the grounds that the First Proposal amended the terms of existing agreements and that the Sales Officer lacked authority to impose new agreements on the brothers’ holding companies.

Order Under Appeal

On November 24, 2025, Conway J. granted the motion and issued the Raki Order. The motion judge held that the Judgment and the Sale Process Order gave her jurisdiction to issue the order, as the mechanism was “integrally related to the [Sale Process] so that [Conservatory] can obtain the lots to market and sell in that process”. She further held that the Judgment and the Sale Process Order were broadly worded and empowered the Sales Officer to implement the First Proposal. Should the existing powers prove insufficient, Conway J. expanded the powers of the Sales Officer pursuant to s. 207(2) of the OBCA.

On December 1 and 8, 2025, C.L., M.L. and their holding corporations appealed the Raki Order. DG Group and the Sales Officer brought motions to quash the appeals on the grounds that the Raki Order was interlocutory and therefore appealable only to the Divisional Court with leave. S.L. and J.L. supported the motions to quash.

issues:

Did the Court have jurisdiction to hear the appeals from the Raki Order? Or was the order interlocutory or made under the OBCA, making it appealable only to the Divisional Court with leave?

holding:

Motion granted.

reasoning:

No. The Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeals from the Raki Order. The Raki Order was interlocutory and, in any event, was made under the OBCA, such that the appeals lay only to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Raki Order Is Interlocutory

The Court began by recalling the well-established definition of an interlocutory order set out in Hendrickson v. Kallio, at p. 678. It further noted that, in determining whether an order is final or interlocutory, “one must examine the terms of the order, the motion judge’s reasons for the order, the nature of the proceedings giving rise to the order, and other contextual factors that may inform the nature of the order”: Prescott & Russell (United Counties) v. David S. Laflamme Construction Inc., at para. 7.

The Court also cited Gefen v. Gefen, at para. 23, where the Divisional Court held that sale process orders were interlocutory because they did not “finally dispose of the issues in the estate proceeding” and, because the sale was “subject to the approval and supervision of the court, with the distribution of the proceeds to be determined at a later date,” the orders did not “affect the substantive rights of the parties to the litigation.”

The Court rejected the responding parties’ argument that the Raki Order was final because it imposed new commercial agreements and would not be revisited. It distinguished their reliance on Smerchanski v. Lewis (1980), noting that in Royal Trust Corporation v. Fisherman (2001), para. 16, the Court clarified that Smerchanski “was not intended to mean that all orders directed to a non-party must be final, and the principle expressed therein should not be further expanded in that way.” The Court also distinguished P1 v. XYZ School, where a sealing order was characterized as final due to its effects on a third party’s right to freedom of the press. Here, by contrast, DG Group participated throughout the proceedings and made submissions before McEwen J. in the proceedings leading to the Sale Process Order.

In short, the Raki Order was “not a final order, but rather a step in implementing the wind-up and sale of Conservatory ordered in the Judgment,” and its effect was “to solve the issue of how to include the land interests in both Projects in a court-ordered sale.”

The Raki Order Was Made Under the OBCA

Although it was not necessary to address the alternative argument given the finding that the Raki Order was interlocutory, the Court found no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that she made the Raki Order pursuant to the OBCA. Section 255 of the OBCA provides that “[a]n appeal lies to the Divisional Court from any order made by the court under this Act,” and this provision should be interpreted broadly. The Court applied the principle from Ontario Securities Commission v. McLaughlin, at para. 16, that if the power exercised by the motion judge is “sufficiently close” to a legislative source under the OBCA, the order must be treated as made under the OBCA and will only be appealable to the Divisional Court.

The Court found that the Raki Order was “entirely rooted in the OBCA.” The motion judge’s jurisdiction to make the order was rooted in the Judgment, which was made pursuant to s. 207(2) of the OBCA and s. 35(1)(f) of the Partnerships Act. As the motion judge found, the Judgment and the Sale Process Order “are broadly worded and already empower the Sales Officer to implement the Raki First Proposal,” and the Judgment “preserves the jurisdiction of [the Superior Court] under s. 207(2) [of the OBCA] to make further orders as it sees fit to carry out the wind-up of [Conservatory].”

Derenzis v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 344

[Roberts, Coroza and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Keenan and V. Crystal, for the appellant

J. Campisi and A. Ismail, for the respondents LD and JDS

S. Kissick and P. Ryan, for the respondent His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario

A. R. Camporese for the respondents Gore Mutual Insurance Company, HS, JF, SB, JB, KJ by his Litigation Administrator CRJ

No one appearing for the remaining respondents

facts:

LD sustained injuries in a 2015 motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits from her insurer, Gore Mutual Insurance Company (“Gore”). Disputes arose regarding her entitlement to benefits, leading LD to commence two proceedings before the Licence Appeal Tribunal (“LAT”). Both applications were dismissed, and the LAT’s decisions were later upheld by the Divisional Court.

Separately, LD and JD commenced a Superior Court action against numerous defendants, including Gore, Ontario, investigators, and others involved in the handling of LD’s accident benefits claim. In the action, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Ontario’s statutory accident benefits regime under the Insurance Act, alleging, among other things, that s. 280(3), which grants the LAT exclusive jurisdiction over statutory accident benefits disputes, violated s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867. They also alleged that the LAT lacked adjudicative independence, was systemically biased against them and their law firm, and infringed ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

To support these allegations, the plaintiffs brought a motion under r. 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking production from Tribunals Ontario, a non-party, of approximately 400 internal LAT records relating to LD’s tribunal proceedings. The requested records included draft decisions, internal notes, and email communications among adjudicators, counsel and staff. Tribunals Ontario opposed production, arguing that the records were not relevant or necessary to a fair hearing and were protected by deliberative secrecy and solicitor-client privilege.

The motion judge ordered substantial production of the records, concluding that they were relevant and necessary to the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge and that portions of deliberative secrecy should be displaced. Tribunals Ontario appealed.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in concluding that the requested LAT records were relevant to a material issue and necessary for a fair hearing under r. 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure?

2. Did the motion judge err in her treatment of deliberative secrecy and solicitor-client privilege in ordering production of the LAT records?

3. Should the appellant’s fresh evidence motion relating to the Divisional Court decision be granted?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

1. Yes. The Court held that the motion judge committed legal errors in her interpretation and application of r. 30.10 by failing to properly assess materiality, probative value, fairness and the exceptional nature of non-party production orders.

The Court emphasized that r. 30.10 imposes a restrictive test requiring the moving party to establish that the records are both logically probative of a material issue and necessary for a fair hearing. The motion judge erred by effectively treating relevance alone as sufficient and by suggesting that the records’ lack of probative value or admissibility did not matter. Under r. 30.10, however, the documents must have a reasonable possibility of being logically probative of a material issue in the litigation. If documents are not probative, production should not be ordered.

The Court further held that the motion judge mischaracterized the alleged lack of adjudicative independence as a “material issue” in the constitutional challenge. While the pleadings alleged systemic bias and lack of independence at the LAT, proving those allegations would not advance the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims under either s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 or ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter. Adjudicative independence was not relevant to the constitutional allocation of jurisdiction under s. 96, nor did the pleadings establish how alleged bias against the plaintiffs or their law firm constituted discrimination based on disability under s. 15. Accordingly, the requested internal LAT records relating to LD’s individual proceedings were not logically probative of a material issue in the action.

The Court also held that the motion judge erred in finding the records necessary for a fair hearing. Her reasoning—that Charter claims cannot proceed in a factual vacuum—set the threshold too low and would effectively make non-party production available in any constitutional case. The Court stressed that orders under r. 30.10 are exceptional and must be approached restrictively, balancing the moving party’s need for the documents against the burden and expense imposed on the non-party. The motion judge failed to account for the exceptional scope of the production request, which sought hundreds of internal tribunal records from an administrative body presumptively entitled to independence and confidentiality.

In addition, the Court rejected the motion judge’s conclusion that Tribunals Ontario was not a “typical” non-party because its interests aligned with Ontario’s. Tribunals Ontario operated independently and at arm’s length from the government, and it was not a necessary party to the litigation. The constitutional issues could be fully litigated by the actual parties without compelling broad production from the Tribunal itself.

Having found these legal errors, the Court reviewed the matter afresh and concluded that the records were neither probative of a material issue nor necessary for a fair hearing. Even after reviewing the records themselves, the Court found they largely consisted of routine administrative and adjudicative communications that did not support the plaintiffs’ allegations of systemic bias, lawlessness, or lack of adjudicative independence. The r. 30.10 motion was therefore dismissed.

2. Yes. Although the Court found it unnecessary to finally determine privilege because the production motion itself failed, it held that the motion judge erred in law by unduly narrowing the scope of deliberative secrecy in the administrative law context.

The motion judge had concluded that deliberative secrecy in administrative tribunals applies only to matters lying at the “heart” of adjudicative decision-making. The Court rejected that approach, holding that the governing authorities establish that deliberative secrecy applies in the administrative context to the same extent that it applies to courts. Secrecy remains the rule and extends not only to adjudicators’ actual deliberations, but also to internal communications and administrative processes connected to adjudication.

Accordingly, the motion judge erred by treating the protection too narrowly and by concluding that portions of the internal tribunal communications fell outside deliberative secrecy merely because they involved administrative or procedural matters.

3. No. The Court dismissed the fresh evidence motion.

The appellant sought to rely on a Divisional Court decision released after the motion judge’s ruling as evidence supporting its position on deliberative secrecy. The Court held that there was no basis to admit the decision as evidence rather than simply treating it as legal authority. In any event, the Court found the decision unnecessary to resolve the appeal because the production order could be set aside based on the legal errors already identified in the motion judge’s r. 30.10 analysis

Sheridan Retail Inc. v. Roy, 2026 ONCA 347

[Simmons, Paciocco and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

L. Johnston and G. Mutlu, for the appellant

K. Pulfer and M. Robson, for the respondent

facts:

SRI is a single-purpose corporation and a subsidiary of Dunpar Developments Inc., a large property developer. SRI was incorporated to redevelop the Sheridan Mall, an indoor mall in the Sherwood Forest neighborhood of Mississauga (the “mall”). This project included renovation of the existing storefronts and a proposal to build two 15-storey condominiums. The respondent, P.R., was an engineering student who lived in the neighborhood and was active in the Sherwood Forest Residents Association as a “Development Liaison”. The appeal arose from a successful motion by P.R. to have a lawsuit brought against him by the appellant, Sheridan Retail Inc. (“SRI”), dismissed as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (a “SLAPP”), pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (the “CJA”).

P.R. was highly critical of SRI’s plans to redevelop an aging mall in his neighbourhood and voiced these concerns at various public meetings. He also complained to the City of Mississauga that SRI was pursuing the project in an unsafe and legally non-compliant manner. To substantiate these claims, he entered onto SRI property and took photographs of the allegedly deficient work. In response, SRI sued P.R. for $300,000, alleging defamation, intentional interference with economic relations and inducing breach of contract (the “economic torts”), as well as trespass. P.R. countered by bringing his anti-SLAPP motion. This led to SRI abandoning its defamation claim and focusing its submissions before the motion judge on P.R’s alleged trespasses, which it cast as the “crux” of the action.

The motion judge granted the anti-SLAPP motion. She found that P.R’s expression on matters of public interest to be inextricably linked to his alleged trespasses. She also held that SRI’s action lacked substantial merit and that any minimal harm SRI suffered due to P.R’s expression was vastly outweighed by the public’s interest in protecting that expression. On appeal, SRI alleged various errors at each stage of the motion judge’s analysis. It also claimed she erred in awarding P.R. damages and full indemnity costs.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in finding that the proceeding arose “from an expression” made by P.R. “that relates to a matter of public interest”?

2. Did the motion judge err in deciding that SRI failed to satisfy the “Merits-Based Hurdle”?

3. Did the motion judge commit palpable and overriding errors when weighing the competing interests engaged by the “Public Interest Hurdle”?

4. Did the motion judge err by awarding damages?

5. Should leave to appeal the costs award be granted, and if so, did the motion judge act in a procedurally unfair manner in deciding to award full indemnity costs?

holding:

Appeal allowed in part.

reasoning:

1. No. SRI argued that the motion judge erred in resolving both threshold issues by characterizing the proceeding as arising from expression and failing to recognize that the trespass action was a private dispute. Specifically, SRI submitted that the motion judge erred by misapprehending SRI’s position as conceding that the opposing party was engaged in public expression with respect to its claims of trespass, and in concluding that SRI had sought leave to “prune” its claim to only plead trespass and that it had abandoned its economic torts claims. The Court did not give effect to this ground of appeal.

2. No. The Court did not address SRI’s claim that if one cause of action has substantial merit and the moving party lacks any valid defence to it, the “Merits-Based Hurdle” is satisfied for the proceeding as a whole. The Court outlined that the motion judge found that none of its causes of action satisfied the substantial merit standard. If those findings stood up, the proceeding failed the “Merits-Based Hurdle”, both on SRI’s conception of its application and on an examination of the merits of the underlying proceeding as a whole.

The Court took no issue with the legal proposition that SRI relied upon, but did not accept that the motion judge failed to consider it. The motion judge recognized that areas of the mall were entered “for the primary purpose of collecting information to substantiate his safety concerns and complaints to the city.” What she found, in substance, was that the trespass cause of action did not have substantial merit because SRI failed to provide a foundation showing that the alleged acts of trespass produced real damage, and were therefore incapable, in the circumstances of this case, of overriding the right to expression that SRI was trying to suppress. The motion judge was entitled to come to this conclusion, which was entitled to deference. The motion judge did not err in finding that SRI failed to show reasonable grounds that its trespass claim had substantial merit. There was therefore no error in the motion judge’s finding that SRI had not cleared the “Merits-Based Hurdle”.

3. No. The Court addressed SRI’s challenges to the motion judge’s decision on the “Public Interest Hurdle” for completeness, even though itw as not necessary to deny the appeal from the decision to dismiss SRI’s action.

The motion judge was entitled to find that the public interest in protecting the appellant’s expression was high and outweighed any harm to SRI, given the important social issues engaged, regardless of whether the appellant may have technically trespassed in service of this expression. The Court saw no basis for questioning that assessment. Moreover, SRI had not demonstrated any palpable and overriding errors in the motion judge’s evaluation of the harm it suffered as a result of P.R’s expression.

4. No. The motion judge did not ground her damages award in the mere fact, inherent in all successful anti-SLAPP motions, that the proceeding sought to suppress expression. She properly applied the test for awarding damages by finding that SRI used the lawsuit, with its extravagant damages claim and the massive opinion it secured, to intimidate, and that SRI conducted itself in what she clearly considered to be a bullying fashion to stop his public participation. These findings satisfied both the “bad faith” and “improper purpose” prerequisites.

The Court also considered each of the challenges SRI made to the reasonableness of the motion judge’s factual findings and the Court was unpersuaded that they demonstrated palpable errors, let alone overriding ones.

5. Yes. The motion judge’s decision to award full indemnity costs award without inviting submissions before making that determination was procedurally unfair. The Court granted leave to appeal the costs award. The Court then granted full indemnity costs, but reduced them from the $156,394.57 awarded to $75,000, relying on Park Lawn Corporation, in which the Court had held that full indemnity costs should generally not exceed $50,000 on anti-SLAPP motions.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Royal Bank of Canada v. Sacred Heart Seniors Health and Recreation Center Inc., 2026 ONCA 348

[Miller, Trotter and Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

I.P., acting in person

N.P.S., acting in person for the appellant Sacred Heart Seniors Health and Recreation Center Inc.

J. Satin and A. Shchukin, for the respondent

Watt v. Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, 2026 ONCA 355

[Roberts, Monahan and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A.W., acting in person

D.P. Jacobs, S.G. Bosnick and K. Baptiste, for the responding party

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email