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Good evening.

Following are the summaries for this past week’s civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

In Holly v. Greco, the Court upheld the motion judge’s order striking the husband’s Answer for failure to comply with a support order, but varied the order to provide the husband the opportunity to participate at the trial. Congratulations to our own Jim Edney on the excellent result obtained for our client.

In Donovan v. Sherman Estate, the Court granted a stay of its May 9 order unsealing the Sherman estate court file pending the estate’s leave to appeal application to the Supreme Court.

Other topics covered this week included sale of goods, wrongful dismissal, family law (access by the birth mother to an adopted child) and municipal law (interpretation of a zoning bylaw relating to lot coverage).

Wishing everyone a nice weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email


Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Southside Construction Management Limited v. Ingersoll (Town), 2019 ONCA 459

Keywords: Municipal Law, Zoning By-Laws, Interpretation, Lot Coverage

1004335 Ontario Ltd. (A.D. Metro) v. DW Ditigal Wireless LP, 2019 ONCA 461

Keywords: Contracts, Sale of Goods, Implied Condition of Fitness for Purpose, Implied Condition of Merchantability, Damages, Remoteness, Mitigation, Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.1, s. 15, Skyway Equipment co. v. Guardian Insurance Co. of Canada (2005), 49 CLR (3d) 94 (Ont SCJ)

A.R. v. M.B., 2019 ONCA 462

Keywords: Family Law, Adoption, Access, Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, s. 21(1), Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. c.11, Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14

Holly v. Greco, 2019 ONCA 464

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Orders, Child Support, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Adjournments, Family Law Rules, Rule 1(8.4), Khimji v. Danani (2004), 69 O.R. (3d) 790 (C.A.), Mullin v. Sherlock, 2018 ONCA 1063

Donovan v. Sherman Estate, 2019 ONCA 465

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Orders, Stay Pending Appeal, Supreme Court Act, 1985, c. S-26, ss 65.1, Livent Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche, 2016 ONCA 395 (in Chambers), Baier v. Alberta, 2006 SCC 38 (in Chambers), Provincial Court Judges’ Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2018 BCCA 477 (in Chambers)

Theberge-Lindsay v. 3395022 Canada Inc. (Kutcher Dentistry Professional Corporation), 2019 ONCA 469

Keywords: Contracts, Employment Law, Contracts of Employment, Wrongful Dismissal, Damages, Payment in Lieu of Notice, Statutory Entitlement, Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41, Brake v. PJ-M2R Restaurant (2017), 135 O.R. (3d) 561 (C.A.)

Short Civil Decisions

Laureat A+ Ltd. c. Borg, 2019 ONCA 456

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leasess, Termination, Unjust Enrichment, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Standard of Review

Ostainvil v. Conseil des écoles publiques de l’Est de l’Ontario, 2019 ONCA 460

Keywords: Labour Law, Arbitration

Criminal Decisions

R. v. Bao, 2019 ONCA 458

Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession of Marijuana, Evidence, Identification, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s.5(3)(a), Criminal Code, s.686(1)(a)(i), R. v. Quercia (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 463 (C.A.), R. v. Malcolm (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 165 (C.A.), R. v. Miaponoose (1996), 30 O.R (3d) 419 (C.A.), R. v. Hibbert, 2002 SCC 39, R. v. Lewis, 2018 ONCA 351, R. v. Baltovich (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), R. v. Gough, 2013 ONCA 137, R. v. Pimentel (1995), 85 O.A.C. 395 (C.A.), R. v. Tat (1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (C.A.), R. v. Goran, 2008 ONA 195, 234 O.A.C. 283, Mezzo v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 802, R. v. Virgo, 2016 ONCA 792, R. v. Boast, 2019 ONCA 19, R. v. Jack, 2013 ONCA 80, R. v. Ellis, 2008 ONCA 77, R. v. MacIntosh (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.), R. v. Richards (2004), 70 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), R. v. Mey, 2011 ONCA 288, Rex. v. Goldhar; Rex v. Smokler (1941), 76 C.C.C. 270 (Ont. C.A.), Rex. v. Smierciak (1946), 87 C.C.C. 175 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Araya, 2015 SCC 11, R. v. Li, 2013 ONCA 81, R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, R. v. Prokofiew, 2010 ONCA 423, Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186

R. v. Cox, 2019 ONCA 466

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing, Dangerous Offenders, R v. Boutilier, [2017] 2 SCR 936

R. v. Murororunkwere, 2019 ONCA 463

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing, Standard of Review, R v. McKnight, 44 OR (3d) 263 (CA), R v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64

R. v. Payette-McLean, 2019 ONCA 471

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing

R. v. Lo Verde, 2019 ONCA 467

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Break and Enter, Forcible Entry, Defences, Intoxication, Criminal Code, s.72(1)

R. v. Morgan, 2019 ONCA 468

Keywords: Criminal Law, Receiving Financial Benefit from Sexual Services, Criminal Code, s. 286.2(1)

R. v. Gouldbourne, 2019 ONCA 472

Keywords: Criminal Law, Robbery, Use of an Imitation Firearm, Break and Enter, Sentencing, Criminal Code, s.85(4))

Ontario Review Board

Afifi (Re), 2019 ONCA 457

Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Criminal Law, Not Criminally Responsible, Conditional Discharges, Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, Criminal Code, Part XX.1


CIVIL DECISIONS

Southside Construction Management Limited v. Ingersoll (Town), 2019 ONCA 459

[Feldman, MacPherson and Simmons JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J.D. Goudy, for the appellant

K. Nenniger, for the respondent

FACTS:

Southside Construction Management Limited owns a 33-acre parcel of vacant land in Ingersoll, adjacent to Highway 401. It is designated a Highway Commercial Zone (“HC”) under s. 12 of the Zoning By-Law. In addition, a site-specific provision, s. 12.3.9, designates the land as Highway Commercial Zone 9 (“HC-9”). Under the general provisions applicable to the HC Zone, Southside’s land is subject to a lot coverage cap of 40% for buildings. However, s. 12.3.9.4, specifically applicable to the HC-9 zone, also imposes a cap on the “gross leasable commercial floor area” of a “community shopping centre”. Section 12.3.9.2.4 reads as follows:

The gross leasable commercial floor area for a community shopping centre containing permitted uses in the HC-9 Zone shall not be greater than 4,645 m2 (50,000 ft2).

“Community shopping centre” is not defined in the Zoning By-Law. However, “Shopping Centre” is defined in the definition section of the Zoning By-Law, s. 4:

In this By-law, unless the context requires otherwise: … “SHOPPING CENTRE”, means a building or group of buildings designed, developed, owned and managed as a unit containing six or more separated spaces for lease or occupancy by commercial uses or business or professional offices.

Southside argued that a “community shopping centre” must be a type of “shopping centre”, and therefore must consist of 6 or more separated spaces. It was on this basis that Southside made an application for a declaration concerning the interpretation of s. 12.3.9.2.4 that does not prohibit development for permitted uses greater than 4,645 m2. The application judge dismissed Southside’s application, and Southside appeals this decision.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the application judge err by rendering the definition of “shopping centre” in s. 4 of the Zoning By-Law surplusage?

(2) Did the application judge err by treating the policies in the Official Plan, rather than the terms of the Zoning By-Law, as the applicable law?

(3) In rejecting its interpretation of the Zoning By-Law, did the application judge render the term “community shopping centre” vague to the extent that s. 12.3.9.2.4 becomes void for uncertainty?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

(1) No. The Court noted that the application judge identified another provision of s. 12 of the Zoning By-Law that uses the exact term “shopping centre”, albeit without italics. Particularly when considered in light of the application judge’s other reasons, the Court saw no error in his conclusion that some meaning must be ascribed to the word “community” when associated with “shopping centre”.

(2) No. The application judge cited the applicable case law concerning the interrelationship between zoning by-laws and official plans and their interpretation. The Court stated that the application judge did no more than read the Zoning By-Law in its entire context and interpret it as required under the relevant authorities. Considered in context, it would have made no sense to read the by-law as imposing a relatively small size limit on a structure with six or more units but no size limit other than the 40% lot coverage cap on a structure with five or fewer units.

(3) No. There is no requirement that every term in a zoning by-law be precisely defined. Where words are not defined, they can be interpreted in accordance with their grammatical and ordinary meaning and the context in which they are used. Southside did not demonstrate how s. 12.3.9.2.4 meets the requirements of the void for vagueness test.


1004335 Ontario Ltd. (A.D. Metro) v. DW Digital Wireless LP, 2019 ONCA 461

[Feldman, MacPherson, Simmons JJ.A.]

Counsel:

C. Rootham and A. Ferguson, for the appellant

K. Patel and R. Torrance, for the respondent

FACTS:

The appellant 1004335 Ontario Ltd. c.o.b. A.D. Metro (“ADM”) supplied more than 17,000 touchscreens to the respondent DW Digital Wireless LP (“DW”), a designer and manufacturer of mobile display terminals (“MDTs”) used in taxis and buses. DW noticed a spike in customer complaints about MDTs. ADM and DW were unable to agree on the cause of the problem or an appropriate way of resolving it. Their relationship ended and DW moved its business to a new supplier. ADM commenced an action seeking payment for two outstanding invoices totalling $36,981. DW counterclaimed, seeking $704,068 for breach of contract.

The trial judge found that, based on s. 15 of the Sale of Goods Act, the touchscreens were sold under an implied condition of fitness for DW’s purpose of manufacturing as MDTs, because ADM was aware of that purpose. In addition, since the touchscreens were purchased by description, there was an implied condition of merchantability. Based on the parties’ pre-litigation efforts at finding the cause of the touchscreen issues and the expert evidence provided at trial, the trial judge found that some of the touchscreens were defective and, therefore, were sold in breach of both conditions.

The trial judge found that the lamination defect affected six “bad batches” of touchscreens which all turned out to have been supplied by one of ADM’s subcontractors, and that the poor lamination was caused by a design and/or manufacturing issue. The trial judge awarded replacement costs, including labour and shipping costs. She also agreed that DW’s decision to proactively replace all 6,000 touchscreens from the “bad batches” to preserve the relationship with two of DW’s major customers was reasonable in the circumstances. Damages were offset against the amounts DW owed ADM under the invoices, resulting in a total award of $355,193.49 to DW.

ISSUES:

(1) Was the trial judge incorrect to infer liability on the part of ADM
based on the timing of the defects?

(2) Did the trial judge err on the issue of damages?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

(1) No. The trial judge dedicated 121 paragraphs of her reasons to examining the evidence concerning the cause of the touchscreen failures and explaining her acceptance of the evidence of DW’s expert. The Court rejected ADM’s argument that the trial judge’s findings were undermined by her failure to explain how or why ADM’s subcontractor produced some “good” batches following the six “bad” batches. The fact that the problem may have gone away does not detract from the fact that there was a serious problem, and that its cause was as described by DW’s expert, whose opinion the trial judge was entitled to accept.

(2) No. ADM advanced four arguments on this point, all of which were rejected.

First, ADM argued that the trial judge erred in law by awarding damages for the cost of replacing certain touchscreens that were not defective, and failing to consider whether these damages were too remote to be compensable. This head of damages related to touchscreens provided to two of DW’s major European customers. DW’s decision to provide replacement touchscreens to these two major customers, who threatened contract cancellation and litigation, constituted reasonable mitigation of damages in the circumstances. The Court upheld the reasoning of the trial judge, saying that because the damages were reasonable, they were not too remote to be compensable.

Second, ADM argued that there should be no recovery for labour costs for repairing the touchscreens because all the repairs were done in-house by current DW employees. In an appropriate case, there is no reason not to compensate for the actual cost of repairs, even if they are performed by in-house employees and no overtime expense is incurred. The quantum of damages awarded by the trial judge was modest, and no error was found.

Third, ADM said that there was insufficient evidence to support DW’s claim for shipping costs. The trial judge accepted the evidence of DW’s principal witness on this issue, based on a sample shipping invoice. The Court held that she was entitled to do so and that she was careful in her scrutiny of DW’s claim.

Finally, ADM asserted that although DW suffered the damages claimed, it did not directly supply the screens and therefore was not the proper claimant on the counterclaim. DW was legally responsible to make good on the defective screens that it supplied and the Court found no error of law was committed with respect to standing.


A.R. v. M.B., 2019 ONCA 462

[Sharpe, Trotter and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.J. Cupello, for the appellant

D. Szandtner and P. Brunetta, for the respondents

FACTS:

The appellant brought an application under s. 21(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act (the “CLRA”) seeking access to her biological child, who had been adopted by the appellant’s mother and her husband (the respondents) in 2015.

The appellant’s child, A.B., was born in 2010. The appellant was subsequently hospitalized for mental health difficulties in 2012, and during this time the respondents took care of A.B. Social services became involved and A.B. was made a Crown Ward in 2013, however, the respondents continued to care for A.B. In 2015, the respondents adopted A.B., which the appellant consented to. After the adoption process was complete, the appellant moved to another city 350 kilometres away. During this time, the respondents permitted the appellant to visit A.B. once a month for supervised visits. There was also occasional contact between the appellant and A.B. by phone. The respondents stated, however, that the appellant did not seem very interested in visiting with A.B.

The appellant commenced an application for access under the CLRA in 2017, and has been denied access to A.B. ever since. However, the appellant’s standing was called into question at a case management conference. The appellant contended that she had standing under s. 21(1) of the CLRA, as she fell within the meaning of “any other person”. The application proceeded on the basis that access in these circumstances was exceptional, and so the appellant must fall within a recognized exception. The appellant argued that she fit within two exceptions to the rule that prevents a biological parent from having access to an adopted child:

(1) The biological parent establishes a relationship with the child after the adoption; and

(2) Assurances were given by the adoptive parents that there would be continued contact.

Further, the appellant argued that access would be in the best interests of A.B.

The application judge found that the appellant failed to meet the evidentiary threshold of demonstrating that she fit within either of the exceptions, and that permitting the application to proceed was not in the best interests of A.B. The application judge dismissed the application on the basis that the appellant lacked standing.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the application judge err in finding that the appellant did not fit within the two exceptions to the rule that prevents a biological parent from having access to an adopted child?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

No. The Court found that the application judge did not err in finding that the appellant does not fall within the two exceptions.

Regarding the first exception (the biological parent establishes a relationship with the child after the adoption), the Court stated that the reality was that the child was de facto adopted before the age of three. While she was not legally adopted until she was four and a half years old, she had already been in the care of the respondents for some time. She was now eight years old and has had minimal contact with her birth mother. Further, the evidence presented supported the application judge’s finding that the relationship between the appellant and A.B. was “minimal” at best.

Regarding the second exception, (assurances by the adoptive parents of continued contact), the appellant acknowledged that prior to consenting to the adoption, she had reached no agreement with the respondents as to what access, if any, she would have post-adoption. The evidence presented supported the application judge’s finding that there were no assurances of access or contact on a go-forward basis.

Further, the application judge did not err in finding that there was no evidence to establish that access would be in the best interests of A.B. While there was evidence that the appellant had taken steps to improve her own mental health and well-being, the evidence did not address the best interests of A.B. Overall, the court agreed with the application judge that the integrity and health of the adoptive family must take precedence over the interests of a birth parent seeking to maintain contact with the child.


Holly v. Greco, 2019 ONCA 464

[Feldman, MacPherson and Simmons JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Fordjour, for the appellants

James B.C. Edney, for the respondent

FACTS:

In June 2018, the appellant was ordered to pay interim child support of $12,365 per month for two children, retroactive to January 1, 2018, as well as $9,668 per month for September 1, 2017 to December 31, 2017. That order (the “June Order”) was made following a contested motion.

Following receipt of the June Order, the appellant paid a lump sum representing the past amounts but advised that he was only going to pay $2,365 per month until January 2019, when he would make up the difference with interest. The reason for this proposed renegotiation of the June Order was that he received his employment remuneration in a lump sum at the beginning of the year. Although the respondent objected, the appellant followed through on his intention for July, August and September. He neither appealed the June Order, nor did he seek to vary it.

As a result, counsel for the respondent brought a motion to strike the appellant’s pleadings for deliberate failure to comply with the June Order. Counsel agreed on a return date in October because the appellant’s counsel would be away for part of September. However, upon his return, the request for a further adjournment by the appellant’s counsel was denied because the motion judge believed that an adjournment would unfairly benefit the appellant by extending and facilitating his “ongoing calculated non-compliance”. In striking the appellant’s pleadings, the motion judge noted both the appellant’s high income ($984,687 in 2018 for support purposes), which refuted the claim he could not pay more than $2,365 per month, as well as the fact that the appellant neither appealed nor moved to vary the June Order, and instead “arrogated to himself the privilege of determining how much he would pay”.

The motion judge stated that the appellant gave no reason or submissions for not complying with the June Order. He therefore found the appellant’s conduct to be flagrant, wilful and a calculated disobedience of a court order, which deprived his children of child support. Concluding that the appellant’s conduct was egregious in this case, the motion judge found that the appropriate remedy was to strike out his Answer.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the motion judge err in striking out the appellant’s Answer?

HOLDING:

Appeal allowed in part.

REASONING:

(1) No. While the motion judge could have given the appellant further time, he did not view it as unfair not to do so in the circumstances where the appellant had taken matters into his own hands to deliberately not comply with a court order without seeking the sanction of the court to do so. The motion judge’s decision not to grant the adjournment was a discretionary one. Absent a clear error of law or misperception of facts, there was no basis for the Court to interfere with a judge’s decision whether to grant an adjournment.

While declining to interfere with the order striking the Answer, the Court applied Mullin v. Sherlock, 2018 ONCA 1063 and exercised its discretion under Rule 1(8.4) of the Family Law Rules to vary the participation rights of the appellant moving forward. By the time of the appeal, the appellant had paid the arrears and was complying with the June Order. So long as he continued to do so, he would be entitled to participate at the trial and to be provided with notice of any steps.


Donovan v. Sherman Estate, 2019 ONCA 465

[Van Rensburg J.A. (Motions Judge)]

Counsel:

C. Cseh and T. Youdan, for the moving party

K.D., appearing in person

FACTS:

In June 2018, the Trustees of the moving party estate received an ex parte order for the sealing of certain documents related to the administration of the estate. The respondent, a journalist, applied to the court to have the files unsealed. In August 2018, the Superior Court dismissed the application and ordered the entire court file to be sealed.

The sealing order was set aside by the Court on May 8, 2019. The files were to be made public within ten days of that decision. The moving party intends to file an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. However, the disposition of the leave application will undoubtedly take more than ten days. If the court file is unsealed, the application for leave to appeal, and the appeal itself would be rendered moot. The estate moved for a stay of the Court’s May 9 decision pending appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

(1) Should a temporary stay of the order to unseal the estate files be granted pending appeal to the Supreme Court?

HOLDING:

Motion granted.

REASONING:

(1) Yes. In Livent Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche, 2016 ONCA 395 (in Chambers),the Court laid out a three factor test to be applied on a motion for a stay pending appeal. The three factors are: (1) whether there is a serious question to be determined; (2) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and (3) whether the balance of convenience favours a stay.

Regarding factor (1), the court must perform a preliminary assessment of the merits of the proposed appeal and the merits of the proposed leave application. This stage of the test involves a low threshold. In assessing whether or not there was a serious issue to be tried, the Court referred to Baier v. Alberta, 2006 SCC 38 (in Chambers), which held that the extensive reasons of two levels of courts which arrive at different conclusions on the same issue, will create a serious issue to be tried. In the case at hand, the motion judge and the Court came to different conclusions as to whether there was proof that the safety of people named in the estate documents would be jeopardized if made public.

Assessing the merits of the leave application, the Court stressed that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in civil matters is usually only granted for matters of public or national importance. The Court determined that a serious issue exists in respect of the merits both of the proposed appeal and leave application.

Regarding factor (2), the Court applied Provincial Court Judges’ Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2018 BCCA 477 (in Chambers), a case with similar facts, and determined that the unsealing of the court file before the appeal could be heard constituted irreparable harm.

Finally, regarding factor (3), the Court concluded that the irreparable harm that may be suffered by the moving party if a stay was not granted would be far greater than the inconvenience that would be experienced by the respondent in waiting a few additional months for the information to be disclosed.

Accordingly, the Court stayed its May 9 order pending the disposition of the motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. If leave is granted, it will be at the Supreme Court’s discretion whether to extend the stay pending the outcome of the appeal.


Theberge-Lindsay v. 3395022 Canada Inc. (Kutcher Dentistry Professional Corporation), 2019 ONCA 469

[Lauwers, Pardu and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

C. Dockrill, for the appellant

R. Kornblum, for the respondent

FACTS:

The respondent began working in the appellant’s dental practice in 1993. Throughout her employment, the respondent was required to sign a series of employment agreements starting in 1999, all of which limited her entitlement for wrongful dismissal damages to the minimum required by the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (the “ESA“). The respondent tendered her resignation on March 28, 2015, effective July 7, 2005. During the notice period and prior to her effective day of resignation, the respondent advised the appellant of her intention to remain employed. On June 30, 2005, the respondent signed an employment agreement that limited the liability of 3395022 Canada Inc., should it terminate the plaintiff without cause, to notice or payment in lieu of notice in accordance with the ESA. In December 2012, the appellant terminated the respondent’s employment without cause. She was given one week’s salary as the ESA minimum, since she had signed her most recent employment agreement in 2011.

The trial judge held that none of the three employment contracts were enforceable, therefore the respondent was wrongfully dismissed and common law damages were assessed in lieu of reasonable notice at 15 months.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the trial judge err in failing to take proper account of the respondent’s resignation from her employment in 2005?

(2) Did the respondent have an obligation to mitigate her damages?

HOLDING:

Appeal allowed.

REASONING:

(1) Yes. The respondent’s unequivocal resignation and re-hiring in 2005 marked a break in the employment relationship, after which an entirely new contract was reached between her and the appellant. There was consideration for that new employment contract, that is, the respondent’s offer to again be employed by the appellant and his acceptance of her offer to again employ her. On this basis, the ESA minimum notice is the maximum amount to which the respondent is entitled, measured from 2005.

(2) The Court did not address the mitigation issue, as it does not apply when there is statutory entitlement.


SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Laureat A+ Ltd. c. Borg, 2019 ONCA 456

[Sharpe, van Rensburg, and Harvison Young]

Counsel:

K. Kilongozi, for the appellants

D. Cadieux, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leasess, Termination, Unjust Enrichment, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Standard of Review


Ostainvil v. Conseil des écoles publiques de l’Est de l’Ontario, 2019 ONCA 460

[Sharpe, van Rensburg, and Harvison Young]

Counsel:

M.E. Ostainvil, in person

P. Marshall and J. Rocque, for the respondents

Keywords: Labour Law, Arbitration


CRIMINAL DECISIONS

R. v. Bao, 2019 ONCA 458

[Watt, Trotter and Paciocco JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Caterina, for the appellant

B. Reitz, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession of Marijuana, Evidence, Identification, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s.5(3)(a), Criminal Code, s.686(1)(a)(i), R. v. Quercia (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 463 (C.A.), R. v. Malcolm (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 165 (C.A.), R. v. Miaponoose (1996), 30 O.R (3d) 419 (C.A.), R. v. Hibbert, 2002 SCC 39, R. v. Lewis, 2018 ONCA 351, R. v. Baltovich (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), R. v. Gough, 2013 ONCA 137, R. v. Pimentel (1995), 85 O.A.C. 395 (C.A.), R. v. Tat (1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (C.A.), R. v. Goran, 2008 ONA 195, 234 O.A.C. 283, Mezzo v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 802, R. v. Virgo, 2016 ONCA 792, R. v. Boast, 2019 ONCA 19, R. v. Jack, 2013 ONCA 80, R. v. Ellis, 2008 ONCA 77, R. v. MacIntosh (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.), R. v. Richards (2004), 70 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), R. v. Mey, 2011 ONCA 288, Rex. v. Goldhar; Rex v. Smokler (1941), 76 C.C.C. 270 (Ont. C.A.), Rex. v. Smierciak (1946), 87 C.C.C. 175 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Araya, 2015 SCC 11, R. v. Li, 2013 ONCA 81, R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, R. v. Prokofiew, 2010 ONCA 423, Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186


R. v. Cox, 2019 ONCA 466

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Hourigan and Paciocco JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P. Alexander, for the appellant

D. Krick, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing, Dangerous Offenders, R v. Boutilier, [2017] 2 SCR 936


R. v. Murororunkwere, 2019 ONCA 463

[Watt, Pardu and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N. Jamaldin, for the appellant

S. Wheildon, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing, Standard of Review, R v. McKnight, 44 OR (3d) 263 (CA), R v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64


R. v. Payette-McLean, 2019 ONCA 471

[Feldman, van Rensburg and Huscroft JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J.P.M. in person & A. Ohler, for the appellant

A. Baisu, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing


R. v. Lo Verde, 2019 ONCA 467

[Feldman, van Rensburg and Huscroft JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Lo Verde, in person

A. Ohler, duty counsel

M. Fawcett, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Break and Enter, Forcible Entry, Defences, Intoxication, Criminal Code, s.72(1)


R. v. Morgan, 2019 ONCA 468

[Feldman, van Rensburg and Huscroft JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Morgan, in person

M. Dineen, duty counsel

I. Paine, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Receiving Financial Benefit from Sexual Services, Criminal Code, s. 286.2(1)


R. v. Gouldbourne, 2019 ONCA 472

[Feldman, van Rensburg, Huscroft JJ.A.]

Counsel:

C. Gouldbourne, in person

A. Ohler, duty counsel

J. Smith Joy, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Robbery, Use of an Imitation Firearm, Break and Enter, Sentencing, Criminal Code, s.85(4)


ONTARIO REVIEW BOARD

Afifi (Re), 2019 ONCA 457

[Watt, Lauwers and Hourigan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Szigeti, for the appellant

D. Krick, for the respondent

Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Criminal Law, Not Criminally Responsible, Conditional Discharges, Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, Criminal Code, Part XX.1


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