Jump To: Table of Contents | Civil Decisions | Short Civil Decisions | Criminal Decisions 

Good afternoon.

Following are last week’s summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

Topics covered last week included the proper notice of proceedings against the provincial Crown, the tort of battery, costs in an unsuccessful claim against a school board, the tort of conversion and setting aside default judgments in the context of an alleged breach of an agreement of purchase and sale of land.

Please join me and Lea Nebel at our “Top Appeals of 2019” CLE (registration is now open at the OBA’s website), dinner program to take place at the OBA on Thursday, February 27, 2020. Three decisions will be featured. The first is Darmar Farms v Sygenta, which deals with the potential new tort of “premature commercialization” and pure economic loss in product liability context. The second is The Guarantee Company of North America v Royal Bank of Canada regarding the priority of construction trust claims in bankruptcy. The third is Wright v Urbanek, which deals with the scope of the doctrines of abuse of process and collateral attack.

Wishing everyone a pleasant work week.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

B.D. v. D.O., 2020 ONCA 29

Keywords: Torts, Sexual Battery, PP v. DD, 2017 ONCA 180, F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53

Hajrizi v. Ottawa-Carleton District Schoolboard, 2020 ONCA 32

Keywords: Torts, Misfeasance in Public Office, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering, Negligence, Defamation, Conspiracy, Dependent’s Claims, Civil Procedure, Costs, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 61

Wangdah Material Toronto Ltd. v. 1691530 Ontario Ltd., 2020 ONCA 28

Keywords: Contracts, Breach, Torts, Conversion, Civil Procedure, Applications, Summary Trials, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38.10

Zeifman Partners Inc. v. A., 2020 ONCA 33

Keywords: Contracts, Breach, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase of Sale of Land, Civil Procedure, Default Judgments, Setting Aside, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 1.04(1), 19.01, Default Judgment, Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, 2014 ONCA 194

Pierce v. Belows, 2020 ONCA 41

Keywords: Contracts, Civil Procedure, Offers to Settle, Enforcement, Milios v. Zagas (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 218 (C.A.), Scherer v. Paletta, [1966] 2 O.R. 524 (C.A.)

Elliot v. Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, 2020 ONCA 36

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Misfeasance in Public Office, Crown Liability, Contracts, Insurance, Automobile Insurance, Duty of Good Faith, Statutory Accident Benefits, Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Proceedings Against the Crown, Notice, Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, ss. 7(1), Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, O Reg 34/10, Mattick Estate v. Ontario (Minister of Health) (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 221 (C.A.), Beardsley v. Ontario (2001), 57 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), Latta v. Ontario (2002), 62 O.R. (3d) 7 (C.A.)

Short Civil Decisions

Asfar v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 2020 ONCA 31

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Torts, Negligent Misrepresentation, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Breach of Trust, Conspiracy, Fraud, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B

Elbasiouni v. Brampton (City), 2020 ONCA 43

Keywords: Municipal Law, Appeals, Leave to Appeal, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 s. 6(1)(a), Building Code Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 23 ss. 25 and 26, Sault Dock Co. Ltd. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1973] 2 O.R. 479 (C.A.)

Criminal Decisions

R. v. C., 2020 ONCA 35

Keywords: Criminal Law, Impaired Driving, Refusing to Provide Breath Sample, Breach of Peace Bond, Arbitrary Detention

R. v. S.H., 2020 ONCA 34

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Criminal Code, s. 686(1)(b)(iii), s. 276, R. v. Arp, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339, R. v. Mahalingan, 2008 SCC 63, R v. D.C., 2019 ONCA 442, R. v. Bartholomew, 2019 ONCA 377, R. v. M.B., 2011 ONCA 76, R. v. L.L., 2009 ONCA 413

R. v. R.S., 2020 ONCA 39

Keywords: Criminal Law, Fresh Evidence, Criminal Code, s. 486.5

R. v. R., 2020 ONCA 38

Keywords: Criminal Law, Impaired Driving Causing Death, Sentencing, R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, R. v. Kummer, 2011 ONCA 39, R. v. Luskin, 2012 ONSC 1764, R. v. Muzzo, 2016 ONSC 2068, R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, R. v. Altiman, 2019 ONCA 511, R. v. M.(C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500

R. v. C., 2020 ONCA 40

Keywords: Criminal Law, Constitutional Law, Jury Selection, Peremptory Challenges, Bill C-75, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess., 42nd Parl., 2019, c. 25, ss. 269, 272, 406, Criminal Code, ss. 634, 640, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 11(d), 11(f), 7


CIVIL DECISIONS

B.D. v. D.O., 2020 ONCA 29

[Sharpe, Juriansz and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Vusumzi Msi and Pedram Najafi, for the appellant
No one appearing for the respondent

Keywords: Torts, Sexual Battery, PP v. DD, 2017 ONCA 180, F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53

facts:

The appellant and the respondent were co-workers. They commenced a sexual relationship. The respondent was married at the time. He testified that he wanted to end the physical aspect of their relationship, and conveyed this to the appellant. They decided to have sex again for the last time. The appellant testified that the two went to a wooded area during a lunch break and had sexual intercourse. The respondent told her to turn onto her stomach. The appellant testified that she then felt excruciating pain; she almost passed out. The appellant thought that the respondent attempted to penetrate her anus with his penis, and with his fingers or hand. The appellant brought an action against the respondent for sexual battery and negligence. The trial judge held that the appellant failed to establish either claim on a balance of probabilities and dismissed the action in its entirety.

issues:

(1) Did the trial judge err in not giving effect to the respondent’s admissions in his Statement of Defence?

(2) Did the trial judge err by failing to deal separately with the evidence as it related to negligence, focusing all of his attention on battery?

(3) Did the trial judge confound the issues of liability and causation of the appellant’s injuries?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No. The court dealt with all issues summarily, stating that the trial judge carefully evaluated all of the evidence. He was simply not satisfied that the standard of proof had been met. He identified problems with the appellant’s evidence and noted that it was roundly contradicted by the respondent’s account. While the trial judge’s finding, at para. 48, that the appellant “did not know what happened” during the alleged sexual battery may be at odds with a brief portion of her testimony in which she described the incident, the court concluded that this finding was one of many factors he considered in his credibility assessment of the appellant.


Hajrizi v. Ottawa-Carleton District Schoolboard, 2020 ONCA 32

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Doherty J.A. and Marrocco A.C.J. (ad hoc)]

Counsel:

William N. Fuhgeh, for the appellants
Craig O’Brien, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Misfeasance in Public Office, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering, Negligence, Defamation, Conspiracy, Dependent’s Claims, Civil Procedure, Costs, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 61

facts:

In the tenth grade, RH was charged with uttering threats, arrested, and on the same day, released. She transferred to another school. RH and her parents commenced an action against the respondents for, among other things, misfeasance in public office, intentional infliction of mental suffering, negligence, defamation, and conspiracy. RH sought damages of $3.7 million from the School Board, and each of her parents sought damages under s. 61 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (the “FLA”), in the amount of $200,000.

The trial judge dismissed RH and her parents’ claims and awarded costs, on a substantial indemnity scale, in the amount of $201,155.36 against the parents, on a joint and several basis. He also ordered that RH was liable to the School Board for $100,000 of the costs ordered. RH and her parents appealed the dismissal of their action and sought leave to appeal the costs ordered.

issues:

(1) Did the trial judge err in dismissing the action against the School Board and MH?

(2) Should leave to appeal be granted for the trial judge’s order awarding costs against the appellants?

holding:

Appeal dismissed. Motion for leave to appeal costs dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No. The appellants did not identify anything that, in the Court’s view, made the trial unfair. The trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence. He simply did not accept RH’s version of events. Further, there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s credibility findings. The reasons why the trial judge found that key aspects of RH’s testimony were not credible were clear, and all the causes of action advanced depended on the acceptance of RH’s testimony.

(2) No. The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in ordering costs against RH’s parents who only made derivative claims under s. 61 of the FLA. In the Court’s view, the trial judge reasonably inferred that the parents played a pivotal role in initiating and prosecuting the litigation. The trial judge considered the quantum of the costs sought by the respondents, reduced them somewhat, and concluded that the reduced amount was proportional in relation to the complexity of the case and the amount involved. On a substantial indemnity scale, the costs were entirely reasonable.


Wangdah Material Toronto Ltd. v. 1691530 Ontario Ltd., 2020 ONCA 28

[Gillese, Rouleau and Fairburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

QC, acting in person
Robert Wood, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Breach, Torts, Conversion, Civil Procedure, Applications, Summary Trials, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38.10

facts:

The parties were involved in purchasing and exporting vehicles. The appellants purchased two vehicles with the respondent’s money but refused to deliver those vehicles for export, sold them to a third party and kept the proceeds. The respondent refused to do further business with the appellant. At the time that the respondent severed the relationship, the appellants had paid deposits on 63 vehicles which had not yet been delivered to the respondent.

The respondent brought an application seeking compensation for the conversion of the two vehicles sold by the appellants. The appellants commenced a counter-application alleging breach of contract and seeking to set off against the amounts claimed for conversion damages. The trial judge found that there was no overarching contract governing a continuing business relationship between the parties, but rather, a series of individual contracts. In the absence of a contract, he held that there was no obligation on the respondent to take any of the vehicles on which the appellants had placed deposits.

issues:

(1) Did the trial judge make a palpable and overriding error?

(2) Did the trial judge inappropriately hinder the respondent’s cross-examination?

(3) Was there a reasonable apprehension of bias?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No. The appellants demonstrated no basis upon which to interfere with the trial judge’s factual findings and contractual interpretation. An appeal is not a second trial. There was evidence supporting each one of the trial judge’s factual conclusions and the Court deferred to them.

(2) No. The appellants also claimed that the respondent falsified the agreements which formed the basis of the conversion claim. They argued that the trial judge inappropriately stopped him from exploring that matter during the cross-examination of the respondent. The Court saw no error on the part of the trial judge. The documents in question were irrelevant to the issues to be decided at trial.

(3) No. The Court saw nothing to support this suggestion. To the contrary, the record revealed that the trial judge presided over the matter in a patient and fair way, one that ensured meaningful access to justice for a self-represented litigant.


Zeifman Partners Inc. v. A., 2020 ONCA 33

[Juriansz, Trotter and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Brian Diamond, for the appellant
Margaret R. Sims and Stephanie De Caria, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Breach, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase of Sale of Land, Civil Procedure, Default Judgments, Setting Aside, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 1.04(1), 19.01, Default Judgment, Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, 2014 ONCA 194

facts:

In November 2013, the appellant entered into an agreement to purchase a residential property. The appellant was granted an option to extend closing by up to eight weeks, the property was sold on an “as is, where is” basis, and the total deposit would be returned to the appellant if the transaction did not close unless due to the appellant’s default. A month prior to closing, the appellant learned of extensive water damage and arranged for a home inspection. A week prior to closing, the appellant’s lawyer shared the inspector’s report with the respondent seller who promptly advised that the cause of the water damage had been repaired and the affected drywall and been repaired and repainted. The lawyer also advised that an environmental engineer had inspected and confirmed there were no mould issues. The appellant exercised his right to extend closing.

One day prior to the extended closing date, the appellant’s lawyer sought a further extension to allow the parties to obtain a comprehensive report and properly assess the extent of the water damage to the property. The respondent’s lawyer brought a motion authorizing it to retain the deposits and treat the agreement as defaulted upon by the appellant. In the interim period, an order was made directing that any interested party may be given access for the purpose of inspecting it. Another directed the respondent to engage a mould detection and remediation expert to test the property. The respondent’s mould inspector identified mould growth throughout the house which it remediated at a cost of $26,781. Later, the respondent sold the property to another purchaser for a reduced price.

The respondent commenced an action against the appellant seeking over $6 million in damages. The action did not proceed smoothly on account of a number of defaults by the appellant resulting in several orders being made against him. The appellant’s third lawyer of record was then removed after missing a court imposed deadline at the behest of the Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company (“LawPro”). The appellant was accordingly directed to retain new counsel within 30 days or serve a notice of intention to act in person. The appellant did neither and on a motion by the respondent, the appellant’s statement of defence was struck out. The respondent’s further default judgment motion was granted and judgment for damages in the amount of $5.3 million and costs along with a forfeiture of $1.3 million in deposits was awarded. The appellant retained new counsel and served materials for a motion to set aside the default judgment which was ultimately dismissed.

issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err in her consideration of the history of the proceeding?

(2) Did the motion judge ignore facts relevant to the appellant’s default?

(3) Did the motion judge err in finding no arguable defence on the merits?

(4) Should the appellant be relieved from default?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

(1) Yes. The motion judge correctly identified the factors that a court must take into account in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment as set out in Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, 2014 ONCA 194:

  1. whether the motion was brought promptly after the defendant learned of the default judgment;
  2. whether there is a plausible excuse or explanation for the defendant’s default in complying with the Rules;
  3. whether the facts establish that the defendant has an arguable defence on the merits;
  4. the potential prejudice to the moving party should the motion be dismissed, and the potential prejudice to the respondent should the motion be allowed; and
  5. the effect of any order the court might make on the overall integrity of the administration of justice.

It was an error in principle to consider the entire history of the proceeding under the first two factors of the Mountain View analysis. The history has nothing to do with the first factor. The second factor requires only an examination of the default which led to the default judgment, which in this case was the failure to appoint new counsel within 30 days.

(2) Yes. The motion judge improperly ignored the fact that the appellant’s loss of counsel that led to his default was not a result of anything the appellant did but rather, was the inaction of the lawyer which led to the involvement of LawPro. She also improperly ignored that the appellant was living in Israel at the time which would cause difficulty, given the distance and time difference. Further, the appellant had contacted three lawyers, only one of whom eventually came to his assistance.

(3) Yes. The motion judge applied too high a standard in her analysis of whether there was an air of reality to the appellant’s defence. She quoted outdated and inapplicable jurisprudence. While it is not the role of the motion judge to make findings of fact and assess whether the defence will succeed, she chose to do exactly this. There was no evidence in the record to sustain some of the conclusions she drew. There was credible evidence on the record which directly contradicted another conclusion she drew. She further failed to consider the appellant’s submissions on the quantum of damages and whether they could constitute an arguable defence on the merits.

(4) Yes. The motion judge’s conclusions were tainted by reviewable error, the appellant moved promptly to set aside the default judgment, the default itself occurred because of the involvement of LawPro while the appellant was living in Israel, the appellant has an arguable defence on the merits, the prejudice to the appellant was significant while that to the respondent, a receiver appointed by the first mortgagee was not, and many of the appellant’s breaches of court orders were explainable and had otherwise been corrected.

In the result, the default judgment and noting in default were set aside, the statement of defence was restored, and the parties were ordered to immediately proceed to obtain a new trial date at the earliest opportunity.


Pierce v. Belows, 2020 ONCA 41

[Simmons, Lauwers and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Lauren Tomasich, Elie Farkas and Sean Lawler, for the appellant
Jordan Goldblatt, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Civil Procedure, Offers to Settle, Enforcement, Milios v. Zagas (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 218 (C.A.), Scherer v. Paletta, [1966] 2 O.R. 524 (C.A.)

facts:

The appellant was granted summary judgment in relation to a loan. The appellant’s former counsel and the respondent’s counsel exchanged emails concerning settlement. The appellant acknowledged, based on the emails, an objective observer would conclude that this matter had settled on terms that included the appellant waiving his right of appeal from the order on the summary judgment motion and forgiving the loan plus interest in exchange for a waiver of costs. Nonetheless, the appellant argued his unchallenged evidence established he never intended to make a binding offer to settle.

issue:

(1) Should the settlement agreement made by the appellant’s former counsel and respondent’s counsel be enforced?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

(1) Yes, the settlement should be enforced. Relying on Milios v. Zagas (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 218 (C.A.), the appellant argued his unchallenged evidence established he never intended to make a binding offer to settle and that several factors supported the court exercising its discretion not to enforce the settlement, including: the short time that elapsed between the settlement and his former counsel’s repudiation of the settlement; the absence of prejudice to the respondent if the settlement was not enforced; the relative prejudice to the appellant in losing his right of appeal; and that no third parties would be affected.

The Court distinguished the Milios decision and rejected the appellant’s argument. Milios was a rule 49 case and involved a mistake, not a limitation of authority. Unlike Milios, the present case was not a rule 49 case. Rather, the appellant asserted he did not authorize his former counsel to make an offer to settle. Unlike Milios, this was not an assertion of a mistake. It was an assertion that counsel’s authority was limited and did not extend to making an offer to settle. Although the court retains discretion not to enforce a settlement, the facts of this case did not compel that result. The appellant’s former counsel was retained, had authority to–and was instructed to–engage in settlement negotiations without limitation.


Elliot v. Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, 2020 ONCA 36

[Pardu, Brown and Huscroft JJ.A.]

Counsel:

L Glenn Frelick and Dona Salmon, for the appellant
Ron Bohm and David Lee, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Misfeasance in Public Office, Crown Liability, Contracts, Insurance, Automobile Insurance, Duty of Good Faith, Statutory Accident Benefits, Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Proceedings Against the Crown, Notice, Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, ss. 7(1), Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, O Reg 34/10, Mattick Estate v. Ontario (Minister of Health) (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 221 (C.A.), Beardsley v. Ontario (2001), 57 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), Latta v. Ontario (2002), 62 O.R. (3d) 7 (C.A.)

facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the motion judge finding that a letter dated July 13, 2018 (“Notice Letter”), satisfied the notice requirement contained in ss. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27 (“PACA”), for 15 class actions commenced in late 2018 and early 2019 against the appellant, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario (the “Appellant”), PH, BM, and 15 Ontario automobile insurers. PH was the Superintendent of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (“FSCO”). BM is his successor.

Subsection 7(1) of PACA provides, in relevant part, that “no action for a claim shall be commenced against the Crown unless the claimant had, at least sixty days before the commencement of the action, served on the Crown a notice of the claim containing sufficient particulars to identify the occasion out of which the claim arose.”

Prior to the commencement of the class actions, the Notice Letter was served. It stated that pursuant to ss. 7(1) of the PACA, JM, the representative plaintiff in one of the 15 class actions, intended to commence an action against the Appellant and the other defendants in respect of the class members, who were described as a broad class of persons impacted by the alleged wrongful conduct. The Notice Letter concluded with the sentence: “This shall be your good and sufficient notice of the intention to commence proceedings as against Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario” (emphasis added).

Although the class actions each named a different Ontario automobile insurer as a defendant and named different individuals as the representative plaintiffs, all 15 actions named the Appellant as a defendant and were commenced more than 60 days after service of the Notice Letter. The class actions also raised a common allegation against the Appellant. Specifically, it was alleged that FSCO failed to enforce its guidelines concerning the Harmonized Sales Tax (“HST”) against all automobile insurers in Ontario in respect of the payment of benefits set out in the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule made under the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8. The actions further asserted that each of the Ontario automobile insurers consistently breached those guidelines, and that FSCO was aware of that wrongful conduct, but took no steps to stop it.

The Appellant accepted that the Notice Letter satisfied ss. 7(1) in respect of JM’s class action. However, the Appellant moved to strike out the statements of claim in the remaining 14 actions (the “Other Actions”) because they named different representative plaintiffs. The Appellant was prepared to treat the statements of claim in the Other Actions as notices under ss. 7(1), but argued that the representative plaintiffs in the Other Actions would have to issue new statements of claim.

In dismissing the Appellant’s motions, the motion judge held that the Notice Letter satisfied the notice requirement under ss. 7(1) as was interpreted by the Court of Appeal in Mattick Estate v. Ontario (Minister of Health) (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 221 (C.A.) (“Mattick Estate”). The Appellant appealed, arguing the word “claimant”, as used in ss. 7(1), refers only to the plaintiff in one action.

issue:

(1) Did the motion judge err in interpreting or applying ss. 7(1) of PACA?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No. The Court found no error in the motion judge’s analysis. In making its determination, the Court held that the decision of Mattick Estate remains the leading authority on the interpretation of ss. 7(1). As was considered by the Court in Mattick Estate, the legislative purpose of the notice requirement under ss. 7(1) is to allow the Crown to gather sufficient information to permit it to resolve the complaint in advance of any litigation, and failing that, to allow the Crown to properly prepare a defence to the litigation which may result. The legislative purpose will thus be satisfied when the notice contains particulars that sufficiently identify the occasion in question. However, the notice need not express that the complainant intends to take legal action against the Crown, as such a requirement would be inconsistent with the legislative purpose. The Court noted that while it did not expressly consider the meaning of the word “claimant” under ss. 7(1) in Mattick Estate, in the result it found that the impugned letter complied with the section notwithstanding that it did not threaten litigation or refer to a potential claim that included other plaintiffs.

Based on the foregoing, the Court held that the motion judge correctly applied the principles set out in Mattick Estate. The Court also held that the language used in the Notice Letter was broad enough to bring each of the 15 class actions within its scope. In this regard, the Court noted that the Notice Letter made a complaint against FSCO on behalf of a broad class of persons. It also alleged that FSCO failed to enforce its HST guidelines against all automobile insurers in Ontario, not just some, and that class action litigation was intended in respect of those failures. Accordingly, the Court was not satisfied that the Crown’s ability to gather sufficient information was prejudiced, particularly given that the complaint against the Crown asserted in the Notice Letter was the same as those pleaded in the 15 actions.


SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Asfar v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 2020 ONCA 31

[Strathy C.J.O., MacPherson and Jamal JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Niki Kanavas, for the appellants
Stephen H. Shantz and Aida Gregorian, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Torts, Negligent Misrepresentation, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Breach of Trust, Conspiracy, Fraud, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B

Elbasiouni v. Brampton (City), 2020 ONCA 43

[Feldman, Brown and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. E., acting in person
Charles A. Painter, for the responding party

Keywords: Municipal Law, Appeals, Leave to Appeal, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 s. 6(1)(a), Building Code Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 23 ss. 25 and 26, Sault Dock Co. Ltd. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1973] 2 O.R. 479 (C.A.)


CRIMINAL DECISIONS

R. v. C., 2020 ONCA 35

[Benotto, Paciocco and Thorburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. C., acting in person
Andrew Hotke, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Impaired Driving, Refusing to Provide Breath Sample, Breach of Peace Bond, Arbitrary Detention

R. v. S.H., 2020 ONCA 34

[Roberts, Paciocco and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Adam Weisberg and Michelle Psutka, for the appellant
Kathleen Doherty, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Criminal Code, s. 686(1)(b)(iii), s. 276, R. v. Arp, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339, R. v. Mahalingan, 2008 SCC 63, R v. D.C., 2019 ONCA 442, R. v. Bartholomew, 2019 ONCA 377, R. v. M.B., 2011 ONCA 76, R. v. L.L., 2009 ONCA 413

R. v. R.S., 2020 ONCA 39

[Watt, Tulloch and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Najma Jamaldin, for the appellants
Rick Visca, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Fresh Evidence, Criminal Code, s. 486.5

R. v. R., 2020 ONCA 38

[Hoy A.C.J.O., Lauwers and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Owen Wigderson, for the appellant
Michael S. Dunn, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Impaired Driving Causing Death, Sentencing, R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, R. v. Kummer, 2011 ONCA 39, R. v. Luskin, 2012 ONSC 1764, R. v. Muzzo, 2016 ONSC 2068, R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, R. v. Altiman, 2019 ONCA 511, R. v. M.(C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500

R. v. C., 2020 ONCA 40

[Doherty, Watt and Tulloch JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Dirk Derstine, Tania Bariteau and Laura Remigio, for the appellant
Andreea Baiasu and Rebecca Law, for the respondent
Jeffrey G. Johnston, for the intervener Attorney General of Canada
Jonathan Rudin and Emily Hill, for the intervener Aboriginal Legal Services
Nathan Gorham and Mindy Caterina, for the intervener Criminal Lawyers’ Association

Keywords: Criminal Law, Constitutional Law, Jury Selection, Peremptory Challenges, Bill C-75, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess., 42nd Parl., 2019, c. 25, ss. 269, 272, 406, Criminal Code, ss. 634, 640, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 11(d), 11(f), 7


The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

Print:
EmailTweetLikeLinkedIn
Photo of John Polyzogopoulos John Polyzogopoulos

John has been the editor of Blaneys Appeals since the inception of the blog in the Summer of 2014. He is a partner at the firm with almost two decades of experience handling a wide variety of litigation matters. John assists clients with…

John has been the editor of Blaneys Appeals since the inception of the blog in the Summer of 2014. He is a partner at the firm with almost two decades of experience handling a wide variety of litigation matters. John assists clients with matters ranging from appeals, to injunctions, to corporate, breach of contract, construction, environmental contamination, product liability, debtor-creditor, insolvency and other business litigation. He also handles professional discipline and professional negligence matters, as well as complex estates and matrimonial litigation. In addition, John represents amateur sports organizations in contentious matters, and advises them in matters of internal governance. John can be reached at 416-593-2953 or jpolyzogopoulos@blaney.com.