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Good evening.

Following are this past week’s summaries of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

In 2352392 Ontario Inc. v. Msi, the Court held that a statement of claim constituted sufficient notice of rescission under ss 6(3) of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000. The Court stated that the purpose of notice under the Act is to avoid litigation, not to act as a pre-condition to litigation.

In Beniuk v. Leamington (Municipality), the plaintiffs alleged that heavy trucks using the road adjacent to their property caused vibrations that damaged their home. They unsuccessfully pursued a claim of injurious affection before the OMB, which was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. By the time that proceeding had been completed, more than two years had passed. They then sued the municipality, which successfully moved to have the claim dismissed as being statute-barred. The Court largely, but not completely, upheld the motion judge’s conclusions. The Court agreed with the motion judge that the Real Property Limitations Act (“RPLA”) does not apply to an action against a municipality in nuisance or negligence for damage relating to real property. Such an action is not one “to recover land” within the meaning of the RPLA. The Court also agreed that any claim for damages suffered more than two years before the claim was issued was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002. The fact that the plaintiffs had pursued a remedy at the OMB did not satisfy the “appropriate means” test so as to suspend the running of the limitation period while the OMB matter remained outstanding. However, the Court partially set aside the motion judge’s order to revive any portion of the claim for ongoing damage to the plaintiffs’ home that fell inside the two-year limitation period (since trucks continued to use the road and there was evidence of ongoing damage). . The Court also disagreed with the motion judge by leaving open the possibility that s. 44 of the Municipal Act creates a duty of care on the part of a municipality to keep roads in good repair owed not only to users of the road, but to adjacent landowners as well (the motion judge had found there was no duty to adjacent landowners).

In 3113736 Canada Ltd. v. Cozy Corner Bedding Inc., the respondent settled a class action against it for price fixing. The release forming part of the settlement released claims against the respondent, but also provided that certain claims against the respondent could potentially be revived if the appellant became insolvent, in the context of an insolvency proceeding. The day after the class action settlement, the respondent went under CCAA protection. The respondent sued on invoices for product sold owing to it by the appellant. The appellant, which was a class member bound by the terms of the class action settlement, raised the defence of equitable set-off in respect of over-payments it had allegedly made as a result of the price fixing in order to avoid or reduce any amount owing under the outstanding invoices. By way of summary judgment, the motion judge dismissed the set-off defence as having been released under the class action settlement, and granted the respondent judgment on the outstanding invoices. In allowing the appeal, the Court disagreed with the motion judge and determined that the defence of set-off was available. The matter was remitted to the lower court for a determination of the set-off defence on the merits.

On another note, please join me and Lea Nebel at our “Top Appeals of 2019” CLE program scheduled to take place at the OBA on Wednesday, April 15, 2020, commencing at 5:45 pm. In light of COVID-19, the program will be only available via webcast. If you are interested, please register as soon as possible so that we can get our registrations up to where they need to ensure that the program can proceed.

Finally, for anyone looking for timely and useful information regarding the ongoing crisis, please visit our firm’s COVID-19 Resource Centre. In addition please see the following links to a variety of COVID-19 resources offered by some key legal and governmental institutions:

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

3113736 Canada Ltd. v. Cozy Corner Bedding Inc., 2020 ONCA 235

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Debtor-Creditor, Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Defences, Equitable Set-Off, Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Settlements, Enforceability, Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, Competition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-34, s. 45(1)(a), (c), Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 29(3), Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Ltd. (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), Ventas Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Trust, 2007 ONCA 205, Creston Moly Corp. v. Sattva Capital Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Telford v. Holt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 193

Beniuk v. Leamington (Municipality), 2020 ONCA 238

Keywords: Torts, Real Property, Negligence, Nuisance, Municipal Liability, Duty of Care, Injurious Affection, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Discoverability, “Appropriate Means”, Rolling Causes of Action, Ongoing Damages, Summary Judgment, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, C. 24, Sched. B, ss. 4, 5, Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15 , s. 4, Harvey v. Talon International Inc., 2017 ONCA 267, Fennell v. Deol, 2016 ONCA 249, 407 ETR Concession Co. v. Day, 2016 ONCA 709, Municipal Act, 2002, S.O. 2001, C. 25, s. 44, Dick v. Vaughan (Township) (1917), 39 O.L.R. 187 (C.A.), Strang v. Township of Arran (1913), 28 O.L.R. 106 (C.A.), Cummings v. Dundas (Town) (1907), 13 O.L.R. 384 (Div. Ct.), leave to appeal refused: 1907 CarswellOnt 627 (C.A.)

2352392 Ontario Inc. v. Msi, 2020 ONCA 237

Keywords: Franchise Law, Contracts, Franchise Agreements, Rescission, Notice, Arthur Wishart Act, (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 3, ss 6(2) and 6(3), Ahmed v. Ontario, [2004] O.T.C. 923 (S.C.), 2130489 Ontario Inc. v. Philthy McNasty’s (Enterprises) Inc., 2012 ONCA 381, 779975 Ontario Ltd. v. Mmmuffins Canada Corp. (2009), 62 B.L.R. (4th) 137 (Ont. S.C.)., Mendoza v. Active Tire & Auto Inc., 2017 ONCA 471, 139 O.R. (3d) 230, Salah v. Timothy’s Coffees of the World Inc., 2010 ONCA 673, 4287975 Canada Inc. v. Imvescor Restaurants Inc. et al., 2009 ONCA 308
Criminal Decisions

R. v. W.M., 2020 ONCA 236

Keywords: Criminal law, Sexual Interference, Sexual Assault, Evidence, Similar Fact Evidence, R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, R. v. Morrissey (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 514, R. v. Lohrer, 2004 SCC 80, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 732, Whitehouse v. Reimer (1980), 116 D.L.R. (3d) 594 (Alta. C.A.), R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56

Ontario Review Board Decisions

H (Re), 2020 ONCA 233

Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Not Criminally Responsible, Mischief, Firearms Offences, Criminal Code, s. 672, Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 20


CIVIL DECISIONS

3113736 Canada Ltd. v. Cozy Corner Bedding Inc., 2020 ONCA 235

[Feldman, Brown and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Douglas LaFramboise, for the appellant
Varoujan Arman, for the respondent

Keywords:Contracts, Interpretation, Debtor-Creditor, Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Defences, Equitable Set-Off, Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Settlements, Enforceability, Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, Competition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-34, s. 45(1)(a), (c), Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 29(3), Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Ltd. (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), Ventas Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Trust, 2007 ONCA 205, Creston Moly Corp. v. Sattva Capital Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Telford v. Holt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 193

facts:

In 2010, Valle Foam was charged under the Competition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-34, with fixing prices of its foam products from 1999 to 2010. Along with other foam manufacturers, it was also sued for damages for price-fixing in a Canada-wide class proceeding. The class was made up of customers who, like Cozy Corner, purchased foam products between the years 1999 and 2012.

Valle Foam pled guilty to the charges and entered into an agreement to settle the class action, which included a release of claims against Valle Foam and other defendants (the “Class Action Release”). It broadly released all claims by class members against the class action defendants, but contained an exception for class membersto advance claims in any subsequent insolvency of the defendants. Valle Foam filed for insolvency protection under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36 (the “CCAA”) the day after it agreed to the class action settlement.

While under CCAA protection, Valle Foam commenced an action against Cozy Corner for unpaid invoices rendered in 2011 and 2012, after the price-fixing period identified by the Competition Bureau. Cozy Corner, who had also made purchases during the price-fixing period (as well as after in 2011-2012), defended the action and counterclaimed alleging that, due to the price-fixing scheme, it had overpaid Valle Foam in amounts that exceeded Valle Foam’s claim on the unpaid invoices. Cozy Corner conceded that the alleged over-charging was the only reason it did not make payment on the 2011-2012 invoices.

Valle Foam successfully moved for summary judgment for the amount of the invoices and a dismissal of the counterclaim. The motion judge found that the claims in the defence and counterclaim, which Cozy Corner sought to set-off against the respondent’s claim, fell within the definition of “Released Claims” in the settlement. Alternatively, he held that Cozy Corner had not led sufficient evidence of over-charging in the relevant period to meet its burden of showing a genuine issue requiring a trial.

issues:

(1) Was Cozy Corner bound by the Class Action Release?
(2) Did the Class Action Release include claims of equitable set-off?
(3) Was there sufficient evidence of over-charging to raise a genuine issue for trial?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

(1) Yes. Subsection 29(3) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, states that “[a] settlement of a class proceeding that is approved by the court binds all class members.” While the law is clear that adequate notice to class members must be provided, the lack of actual notice to any particular class member does not prevent the class (except for opt outs) from being bound where sufficient steps have been undertaken to provide adequate notice: Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Ltd. (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.). The Court found that the motion judge’s finding that sufficient steps to provide adequate notice had been undertaken was completely justified on the record and entitled to deference. The evidence led by Cozy Corner in fact suggested that notice of the class proceeding had been sent to it.

(2) No. The motion judge’s interpretation of the Class Action Release was subject to a deferential standard of review, absent extricable error: Creston Moly Corp. v. Sattva Capital Corp., 2014 SCC 53. However, the motion judge failed to interpret the Class Action Release as a whole and give meaning to all of its terms, which is a fundamental principle of contractual interpretation: Ventas Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Trust, 2007 ONCA 205. His reasons did not advert to or analyze the exception in the Class Action Release permitting claims in a subsequent insolvency proceeding to continue, which was an extricable legal error. Accordingly, his interpretation was not subject to deference.

In the Court’s view, the definition of Released Claims in the Class Action release was broad enough to capture a claim for equitable set-off. However, the exception in the Class Action Release preserved the right of class members like Cozy Corner to raise claims in insolvency proceedings to the same extent as the law applicable to that insolvency proceeding permits.
Section 21 of the CCAA preserves the ability of a creditor to raise set-off when sued by a company that is subject to CCAA protection. The CCAA governed Valle Foam’s insolvency proceeding and envisaged that Valle Foam, as a company subject to its protection, may sue to recover on debts owed to it, but that if it did, a defendant could raise equitable set-off. Accordingly, the Court did not view Cozy Corner’s assertion of equitable set-off as falling outside of the rights available to Cozy Corner.

(3) Yes. There was evidence in the record suggesting that the amount of the Competition Bureau’s assumption of overcharging was 20%. There was also evidence that Valle Foam’s CEO considered a potential “modest” amount for the over-charging to be found by the Competition Bureau of 5%, and these considerations were a factor in Valle Foam’s decision to declare insolvency. When applied to the amount of Cozy Corner’s prior purchases from Valle Foam (in excess of $3 million), there was some basis in the evidence that there had been an over-charge which yielded an amount that could substantially negate or reduce Valle Foam’s claim. Therefore, the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error in his assessment of the evidentiary record in concluding that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding the alleged over-charging.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment dismissing Cozy Corner’s claim was set aside, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.


Beniuk v. Leamington (Municipality), 2020 ONCA 238

[van Rensburg, Paciocco and Thorburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Raymond G. Colautti and Eric Florjancic, for the appellants
Tom Serafimovski and Samuel Atkin, for the respondent

Keywords:Torts, Real Property, Negligence, Nuisance, Municipal Liability, Duty of Care, Injurious Affection, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Discoverability, “Appropriate Means”, Rolling Causes of Action, Ongoing Damages, Summary Judgment, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, C. 24, Sched. B, ss. 4, 5, Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15 , s. 4, Harvey v. Talon International Inc., 2017 ONCA 267, Fennell v. Deol, 2016 ONCA 249, 407 ETR Concession Co. v. Day, 2016 ONCA 709, Municipal Act, 2002, S.O. 2001, C. 25, s. 44, Dick v. Vaughan (Township) (1917), 39 O.L.R. 187 (C.A.), Strang v. Township of Arran (1913), 28 O.L.R. 106 (C.A.), Cummings v. Dundas (Town) (1907), 13 O.L.R. 384 (Div. Ct.), leave to appeal refused: 1907 CarswellOnt 627 (C.A.)

facts:

The appellants owned a home in Leamington, Ontario which closely abuts Mersea Road East which, in 2006, experienced a significant increase in heavy truck traffic. The appellants complained to the municipality, which declined to reconstruct the road. The appellants retained an engineering firm whose report concluded that the structural damage to the home of the appellants was caused by vibrations transferred to the home from heavy truck traffic on Mersea Road East. The appellants thereafter commenced a proceeding before the then Ontario Municipal Board (the “OMB”) claiming injurious affection. The OMB determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the appellants’ claim. The appellants then commenced a civil action in the Superior Court claiming damages for nuisance and negligence. The Municipality successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the action was statute-barred and that the duty of care under s. 44 of the Municipal Act, 2002, S.O. 2001, C. 25 (“Municipal Act”) to keep roads in a reasonable state of repair is not owed to adjoining landowners.

issues:

(1) Does the ten-year limitation period under s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15 (“RPLA”) apply to the appellants’ civil action?
(2) Is the appellants’ civil action statute-barred under s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, C. 24, Sched. B (“Limitations Act”)?
(3) Is there any part of the appellants’ civil action that can continue?
(4) Did the motion judge err in rejecting the appellants’ claim under s. 44 of the Municipal Act on the basis that the duty of care is only owed to users of the road and not to adjoining landowners?

holding:

Appeal allowed in part.

reasoning:

(1) No. Subsection 2(1)(a) of the Limitations Act provides that the Limitations Act does not apply to proceedings to which the RPLA applies. Section 4 of the RPLA provides a ten-year limitation period for an action to recover land. There is no support in the jurisprudence that an action in nuisance or negligence for damages relating to real property, such as in the case at bar, is “an action to recover land” for the purposes of the RPLA. That land or real property is involved in an action does not mean that the RPLA applies: Harvey v. Talon International Inc., 2017 ONCA 267.

(2) Yes, except as discussed under issue (3) below. The basic two-year limitation period begins to run on the day the claim was discovered. The date of discovery is the earlier of the two dates under s. 5(1) – when (a) the person with the claim had knowledge of, or (b) a reasonable person with the abilities and in the circumstances of the person with the claim first ought to have had knowledge of, the matters referred to in ss. 5(1)(a)(i) to(iv). If either of these dates is more than two years before the claim was issued, the claim is statute-barred: Fennell v. Deol, 2016 ONCA 249. The appellants argued that the limitation period was tolled while they pursued the OMB proceedings, relying on s. 5(1)(a)(iv). They submitted that they did not know, and a reasonable person in their circumstances would not have known, that it was “legally appropriate” to start a civil claim in the Superior Court until after they received the OMB’s ruling with respect to jurisdiction.

The appellants relied on the decision in 407 ETR Concession Co. v. Day, 2016 ONCA 709 (“407 ETR”), in which the Court of Appeal concluded that a proceeding may not be appropriate under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) where the party with the claim is pursuing another resolution process that would eliminate the loss and thereby avoid needless litigation. The Court noted, however, that 407 ETR does not stand for a general principle that a limitation period will not begin to run whenever an alternative process that might resolve the matter has not yet run its course. The analysis about whether an action is appropriate will depend on the specific factual or statutory setting of each individual case. The fact that a plaintiff chooses to pursue an alternative process does not in itself suspend the running of the limitation period under s. 5(1)(a)(iv). In this case, there was no evidence to explain why the appellants chose to pursue the OMB route rather than commencing both an OMB proceeding and a civil action. Moreover, the appellants were put on notice that the OMB may not have jurisdiction to determine their claim upon receiving the municipality’s reply pleading which set out that the claim was not one for injurious affection.

(3) Yes. The appellants submitted that a fresh cause of action accrued each time vibrations from traffic caused damage to their property, and that, if this were true, they should be able to recover in respect of damage sustained within the two-year period before the issuance of the statement of claim (January 17, 2016–January 17, 2018). The specific issue that was put to the motion judge on this point was whether there was evidence of ongoing tortious conduct causing damage between January 17, 2016 and January 17, 2018. While the motion judge accepted that there was evidence of trucks continuing to drive on Mersea Road East, what was missing in his view was evidence of “damage sustained within the limitation period”. There was, however, evidence of continuing damage in the record before the motion judge. The engineer’s report, which was prepared for the appellants, suggested that they were sustaining additional damage on a regular basis at least until December 1, 2016. The issue of whether the Municipality engaged in wrongful conduct resulting in damage within two years before the statement of claim was issued was thus found to be a genuine issue requiring trial.

(4) Undecided. Section 44 of the Municipal Act provides for a statutory duty of a municipality with respect to road maintenance. Subsections 44(1) and 44(2) provide a cause of action against the municipality, while subsection 44(3) sets out three defences. The appellants relied on the plain wording of s. 44(2) to argue that the statutory duty under s. 44 was owed to them as adjoining landowners. Subsection 44(2) contemplates that “any person” who sustains damage because of a municipality’s failure to comply with subsection (1) can bring an action. The motion judge did not engage with the plain wording of s. 44(2) and instead relied on the Court’s decision in Fordham v. Dutton-Dunwich (Municipality), 2014 ONCA 891 (“Fordham”) to conclude that the statutory duty of care set out in s. 44(1) is not directed to injuries suffered by adjoining landowners. The Court found that the motion judge’s reliance on Fordham was misplaced because it was not a determination of whether the s. 44 duty was owed to persons other than the user of the road. To specify that the standard of care must be measured against the behaviour of a certain class of persons, as the Court did in Fordham, is not the same as saying that the duty of care is only owed to that class of persons.

The Court noted that there is diverging jurisprudence on the issue of who is owed the municipality’s duty of road maintenance. In Dick v. Vaughan (Township) (1917), 39 O.L.R. 187 (C.A.), the decision notes that the statutory duty of care was owed to the “travelling public and to no one else” and that it only applies to “what may be in a general way described as accident cases.” However, in other cases such as Strang v. Township of Arran (1913), 28 O.L.R. 106 (C.A.) and Cummings v. Dundas (Town) (1907), 13 O.L.R. 384 (Div. Ct.), leave to appeal refused: 1907 CarswellOnt 627 (C.A.), adjoining landowners were owed the duty to keep roads in a reasonable state of repair when access to their property was at issue.

The Court ultimately found that while there may well have been an issue as to whether the appellants could rely on s. 44 of the Municipal Act, the broader issue was whether the appellants had a claim in negligence against the respondent in respect of its construction of and subsequent conduct in relation to Mersea Road East. It was not clear to the Court whether their claim for negligence was limited to a claim for breach of the statutory duty to repair under s. 44, or whether it extended more broadly. The Court therefore concluded that the issue of whether the negligence claim is only under s. 44, and whether that section is available to the appellants, are matters that should be determined on a full record.


2352392 Ontario Inc. v. Msi, 2020 ONCA 237

[Feldman, Huscroft and Harvison Young JJA]

Counsel:

Jean-Marc Leclerc, for the appellants
Stephany Mandin and Steven H. Goldman, for the respondents 2352392 Ontario Inc. and Brent Shearer
Jennifer Dolman and Sarah McLeod, for the respondents The Works Gourmet Burger Bistro Inc., The Works Realty Corp., Fresh Brands Inc., Andrew O’Brien aka Thomas Andrew O’Brien, Sean Bell, and David Wilson

Keywords: Franchise Law, Contracts, Franchise Agreements, Rescission, Notice, Arthur Wishart Act, (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 3, ss 6(2) and 6(3), Ahmed v. Ontario, [2004] O.T.C. 923 (S.C.), 2130489 Ontario Inc. v. Philthy McNasty’s (Enterprises) Inc., 2012 ONCA 381, 779975 Ontario Ltd. v. Mmmuffins Canada Corp. (2009), 62 B.L.R. (4th) 137 (Ont. S.C.)., Mendoza v. Active Tire & Auto Inc., 2017 ONCA 471, 139 O.R. (3d) 230, Salah v. Timothy’s Coffees of the World Inc., 2010 ONCA 673, 4287975 Canada Inc. v. Imvescor Restaurants Inc. et al., 2009 ONCA 308

facts:

The franchisee issued a third party claim against the franchisor claiming damages and rescission of the franchise agreement for failure to deliver the required disclosure documents under the Arthur Wishart Act. The franchisor responded that the franchisee could not claim rescission under the Act because it had not delivered the required notice under s. 6 of the Act.

Subsequently, the lawyer who drafted the third party claim for the franchisee became involved in his personal capacity. New counsel for the franchisee issued a new statement of claim against the franchisor, taking the position that the third party claim in the bank action constituted the required notice under the Act. The franchisee then issued a statement of claim against his former lawyer, alleging that he was negligent in failing to comply with the requirements of the Act. In a motion within both actions, the franchisor and the franchisee each argued that the third party claim did not constitute notice under the Act. The motion judge accepted that position. The lawyer, VM, appealed.

issues:

(1) Is a notice of rescission of a franchise agreement sufficient if it is contained in a pleading, or, specifically in this case, a third party claim?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

(1) Yes. The relevant sections of the Act state that a franchisee can rescind the agreement no later than two years if the franchisor never provided disclosure documents, that said notice shall be in writing and personally delivered to the franchisor, and that the franchisor shall take certain actions within 60 days of receipt of rescission notice. The Court held that providing notice of rescission is meant to avoid litigation, not act as a precondition to litigation. The statement of claim did notify the franchisor and the franchisor was not prejudiced by the manner of receipt. The Act did not state that pleadings cannot be sufficient notice of rescission.


CRIMINAL DECISIONS

R. v. W.M., 2020 ONCA 236

[Strathy C.J.O., Miller and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

W. John McCulligh, for the appellant
Caitlin Sharawy, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal law, Sexual Interference, Sexual Assault, Evidence, Similar Fact Evidence, R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, R. v. Morrissey (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 514, R. v. Lohrer, 2004 SCC 80, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 732, Whitehouse v. Reimer (1980), 116 D.L.R. (3d) 594 (Alta. C.A.), R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56

ONTARIO REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS

H (Re), 2020 ONCA 233

[Strathy C.J.O., Miller and Trotter JJ.A.]

Counsel:

JH, in person
Dean F. Embry, appearing as amicus curiae
Eric W. Taylor, for the respondent, The Attorney General of Ontario
Julie Zamprogna Ballès, for the respondent, The Person in Charge of the Southwest Centre for Forensic Mental Health St. Joseph’s Health Care London

Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Not Criminally Responsible, Mischief, Firearms Offences, Criminal Code, s. 672, Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 20


The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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Photo of John Polyzogopoulos John Polyzogopoulos

John has been the editor of Blaneys Appeals since the inception of the blog in the Summer of 2014. He is a partner at the firm with almost two decades of experience handling a wide variety of litigation matters. John assists clients with…

John has been the editor of Blaneys Appeals since the inception of the blog in the Summer of 2014. He is a partner at the firm with almost two decades of experience handling a wide variety of litigation matters. John assists clients with matters ranging from appeals, to injunctions, to corporate, breach of contract, construction, environmental contamination, product liability, debtor-creditor, insolvency and other business litigation. He also handles professional discipline and professional negligence matters, as well as complex estates and matrimonial litigation. In addition, John represents amateur sports organizations in contentious matters, and advises them in matters of internal governance. John can be reached at 416-593-2953 or jpolyzogopoulos@blaney.com.