Topics covered this week included property of a bankrupt (beneficial interest in trust property), testamentary capacity and extensions of time to perfect appeals.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Richards (Re), 2022 ONCA 216

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Property of the Bankrupt, Trusts, Interpretation, Anti-Deprivation Rule, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 38, s. 67(1)(c), Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Chandos Construction Ltd. v. Deloitte Restructuring Inc., 2020 SCC 25

Hategan v. Frederiksen, 2022 ONCA 217

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Injurious Falsehood, Wrongful Appropriation of Personality, Civil Conspiracy, Negligence, Unlawful Interference with Economic Interests, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Summary Judgment, Injunctions, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61.09(1)(a), r. 61.13 (2.1), Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.12, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, Issasi v. Rosenzweig, 2011 ONCA 112, Lysko v. Braley (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 721 (CA), Wiseau Studio, LLC et al. v. Harper et al., 2020 ONSC 2504, A.I. Enterprises Ltd. v. Bram Enterprises Ltd., 2014 SCC 12, Cojocaru v. British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health Centre, 2013 SCC 30, Zhong v. Wu, 2019 ONSC 7088, Rainy River (Town) v. Olsen, 2017 ONCA 605, 6 C.P.C. (8th) 1, Bobel v. Humecka, 2021 ONCA 757

Leonard v. Zychowicz, 2022 ONCA 212

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Capacity, Undue Influence, Suspicious Circumstances, Civil Procedure, Costs, Scott v. Cousins (2001), 37 E.T.R. (2d) 113 (Ont. S.C.), Vout v. Hay, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 876, Banks v. Goodfellow (1870), L.R. 5 Q.B. 549, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Wilton v. Koestlmaier, 2019 BCCA 262, McGrath v. Joy, 2022 ONCA 119, Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9

Oliveira v. Oliveira, 2022 ONCA 218

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Extension of Time, Contempt, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 7, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3.02(1), Hillmount Capital Inc. v. Pizale, 2021 ONCA 364, 2363523 Ontario Inc. v. Nowack, 2018 ONCA 286, Duca Community Credit Union Ltd. v. Giovannoli (2001), 142 O.A.C. 146 (C.A.), Denomme v. McArthur, 2013 ONCA 694, 36 R.F.L. (7th) 273, Leighton v. Best, 2014 ONCA 667, Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Corkery, 2009 ONCA 85, 2363523 Ontario Inc. v. Nowack, 2016 ONCA 951

Short Civil Decisions

Currie v. Nylene Canada Inc., 2022 ONCA 209

Keywords: Employment Law, Wrongful Dismissal, Reasonable Notice, Break in Service, Pension, Bardal v. The Globe and Mail Ltd. (1960), 24 D.L.R. (2d) 140 (Ont. H.C.), Lowndes v. Summit Ford Sales Ltd. (2006), 206 O.A.C. 55 (C.A), Dawe v. The Equitable Life Insurance Company of Canada, 2019 ONCA 512

1750738 Ontario Inc. c. 1750714 Ontario Inc., 2022 ONCA 215

Keywords: Contracts, Oral Agreements, Essential Terms, Specific Performance, Civil Procedure, Costs, Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c. C.43, ss. 131(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 57.01(1), TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. v. Potter Station Power Ltd. Partnership , (2002), 20 CPC (5th) 382 (SCJ), City Front Developments Inc. c. Toronto District School Board (2007), 285 DLR (4th)), Loretto v. Little (costs), 2010 ONSC 5993, Boucher c. Accountants Council of the Province of Ontario (2004), 71 OR (3d) 291

Daly v. NYX Tannery Ltd., 2022 ONCA 213

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Amending Pleadings, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory, Costs, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 34, ss.19(1)(c), 19(1.2)(a), 133(b)

Caja Paraguyaya De Jubilaciones Y Pensiones Del Personal De Itaipu Binacional v. Obregon, 2022 ONCA 225

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Injunctions, Non-Dissipation Orders, Contempt, Caja Paraguaya de Jubilaciones Y Pensiones Del Personal De Itaipu Binacional v. Garcia, 2018 ONSC 5379

11534599 Canada Corp. v. Hume, 2022 ONCA 224

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Appeals

CIVIL DECISIONS

Richards (Re), 2022 ONCA 216

[van Rensburg, Nordheimer and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

Counsel:

I. J. Klaiman, for the appellant, M. P. R.

C. Francis, for the respondent, Royal Bank of Canada

Keywords:Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Property of the Bankrupt, Trusts, Interpretation, Anti-Deprivation Rule, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 38, s. 67(1)(c), Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Chandos Construction Ltd. v. Deloitte Restructuring Inc., 2020 SCC 25

facts:

The appellant appealed from the order of the bankruptcy judge that involved the interpretation of a trust of which he was the beneficiary (the “Trust”).

The appellant was an undischarged bankrupt. Royal Bank of Canada (“RBC”) had an outstanding judgment against him for $987,613 plus costs and interest. On September 16, 2019, RBC filed a bankruptcy application against the appellant, which was issued the same day.

The appellant was the beneficiary of a property (the “Property”) pursuant to a Trust that was settled by his father in 2001. The Trust was set up to hold the Property during the lives of the appellant’s parents, with a life interest permitting them to live in the Property. The appellant’s father, George, died in 2010. His mother, Patricia, continued to live in the Property. She died in July 2020. According to the terms of the Trust, the date of death of the second of the appellant’s parents is called the “Time of Division”.

At the Time of Division, the trustees were required to distribute the Trust Fund (including the Property and any Chattels) to the appellant, if he was then alive.
Prior to Patricia’s death, the trustees of the Trust sold the Property. The proceeds of sale ($1,172,120.90) were being held in trust.

In October 2020, RBC obtained an order under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”), taking an assignment of rights of the appellant’s Trustee in Bankruptcy to make a claim against the sale proceeds of the Property. The Bankruptcy Trustee had not wanted to pursue the claim due to lack of funding. RBC now stands in the shoes of the Bankruptcy Trustee with respect to the sale proceeds of the Property.

RBC brought a motion to recover the sale proceeds up to the amount owing to RBC. It sought a declaration that the appellant was the beneficiary of the Trust and had an interest in the Property under the terms of the Trust. RBC argued that the sale proceeds constituted property of the bankrupt, pursuant to the broad definition in s. 67(1)(c) of the BIA, which vested in his Bankruptcy Trustee and formed part of his bankrupt estate.
The appellant responded that his interest in the Property was suspended while he was a bankrupt, pursuant to the provisions of s. 4.2 of the Trust.

issues:

(1) Did the appellant’s interest in the Property not vest in his Bankruptcy Trustee until such time as he was discharged from bankruptcy, as a result of s. 4.2 of the Trust?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No.

The bankruptcy judge rejected that contention, as did the Court. She found that the mandatory distribution provision contained in s. 5.2.2 of the Trust overrode s. 4.2. In particular, the bankruptcy judge held that the provisions of the Trust (Part IV), which contained s. 4.2, applied to the Property during the lifetimes of the appellant’s parents, but the provisions of the Trust (Part V) that contained s. 5.2.2 applied to the Property after the death of his parents. The bankruptcy judge noted that the mandatory division of the Property contained in Part V was not made subject to s. 4.2, nor did it otherwise reference that provision. She further found that, had the intent been as the appellant contended, she would have expected there to have been express language in the mandatory distribution provision to that effect.

As a result, the bankruptcy judge concluded that the Property vested in the appellant at the Time of Division. The Property thus constituted property of the appellant and vested in his Trustee in Bankruptcy. Since the Trustee in Bankruptcy had transferred its rights in the appellant’s Property to RBC, RBC was entitled to receive the proceeds of sale up to the amount that the appellant owed to RBC.

The appellant failed to demonstrate any error in the bankruptcy judge’s decision. Her decision involved an interpretation of the Trust document and was entitled to deference on review: Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp. The Court agreed with her interpretation. It was consistent with the plain wording of the relevant section and was also consistent with the stated purpose of the Trust.

The Court also observed that, if the interpretation of the Trust was as contended by the appellant, it would offend the public policy that underlies the BIA by allowing persons to place assets out of the reach of their creditors. As Rowe J. said in Chandos Construction Ltd. v. Deloitte Restructuring Inc., “the anti-deprivation rule renders void contractual provisions that, upon insolvency, remove value that would otherwise have been available to an insolvent person’s creditors from their reach.”

Hategan v. Frederiksen, 2022 ONCA 217

[Pardu J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

J. Kary, for the appellant

A. Wood and L. Cadieux-Shaw, for the respondent E. M. F.

M. Freiman, for the respondent B. F.

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Injurious Falsehood, Wrongful Appropriation of Personality, Civil Conspiracy, Negligence, Unlawful Interference with Economic Interests, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Summary Judgment, Injunctions, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61.09(1)(a), r. 61.13 (2.1), Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.12, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, Issasi v. Rosenzweig, 2011 ONCA 112, Lysko v. Braley (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 721 (CA), Wiseau Studio, LLC et al. v. Harper et al., 2020 ONSC 2504, A.I. Enterprises Ltd. v. Bram Enterprises Ltd., 2014 SCC 12, Cojocaru v. British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health Centre, 2013 SCC 30, Zhong v. Wu, 2019 ONSC 7088, Rainy River (Town) v. Olsen, 2017 ONCA 605, 6 C.P.C. (8th) 1, Bobel v. Humecka, 2021 ONCA 757

facts:

The appellant, E. R. H., and the respondent, E. M. F., are both former active members of Heritage Front, an extremist neo-Nazi group. They left the group, and began speaking publicly against extremism and hate groups. The appellant believes that the respondent’s  public persona amounts to an appropriation of the appellant’s own identity as an anti-hate speaker, and that the respondent’s appearance and her religious and sexual identity have been assumed to steal the appellant’s “life and accomplishments”. The appellant relied upon a public statement on September 19, 2017, on a television show, The Agenda, made by the respondent, B. F., for the foundation of her action against him. The appellant sued both respondents for damages for the torts of wrongful appropriation of personality, civil conspiracy, injurious falsehood, negligence and unlawful interference with economic interests.

On February 3, 2021, the motion judge dismissed the appellant’s claims on a summary judgment motion, awarded judgment for damages for defamation against her, and granted a permanent injunction against her. The terms of the injunction restrained the appellant from making or publishing any statement referring to the respondent E. M. F., and required her to remove all online statements she had made about E. M. F., release all domain names she had created using E. M. F.’s name, and refrain from using any online identifier containing that name.

The appellant served a Notice of Appeal on March 3, 2021. On July 21, 2021, the Registrar dismissed the appeal for delay because it had not been perfected.

The appellant ultimately brought a motion to set aside the administrative dismissal returnable January 11, 2022, some 13 months after the judgment appealed from.

The appellant moved for an order setting aside the Registrar’s dismissal of her appeal and asked for extra time to perfect the appeal. The respondents asked that the motion be dismissed, submitting that the appeal had no merit, and that the appellant did not adequately explain the delay.

issues:

(1) Have the respondents been prejudiced by the appellant’s delay, such that a motion to extend the time to perfect the appeal and set aside the dismissal should be denied?

(2) Did the motion judge err in concluding this was an appropriate case for summary judgment?

(3) Did the motion judge err in granting a permanent injunction against the appellant from defamation of E. M. F.?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) Yes.
Further time should not be allowed to perfect the appeal. The appellant failed to pursue the appeal with reasonable timeliness and there was little merit to the appeal (discussed below). It would be prejudicial to the respondents to incur further costs to resist an appeal with so little merit.
The relevant factors on a motion to extend the time to perfect an appeal and to set aside a Registrar’s dismissal are:

1. whether the appellant formed an intention to appeal within the relevant period;
2. the length of the delay and explanation for the delay;
3. any prejudice to the respondent;
4. the merits of the appeal; and
5. whether the “justice of the case” requires it.

While the appellant manifested an intention to appeal within 30 days of the judgment in issue, she did not pursue the appeal with reasonable diligence. The initial notice from the Registrar should have prompted her to act with a sense of urgency, knowing that there was a risk her appeal would be dismissed for delay.

If the appellant proposed to place fresh evidence before the panel, that should have been articulated in an affidavit accompanying a motion to admit fresh evidence. Cross-examination on any such affidavit would almost certainly be required and would lead to further delay even if she delivered an affidavit promptly. The issues on the appeal were largely defined by the reasons for judgment, and there was no reasonable excuse for failure to deliver a factum identifying the issues that would be argued on appeal.

The context of a summary judgment motion is intended to avoid a trial when one is not required and promote proportionate, economical and speedy access to justice. It was now 13 months after the judgment, and steps to appeal were not taken.

(2) No.

The motion judge did not err in concluding that this was an appropriate case for summary judgment. All of the appellant’s asserted causes of action rested on her allegation that the respondents made false statements. Counsel was unable to point to any evidence of such false statements, and this was a sufficient basis to dismiss her claims. The motion judge’s observations that the appellant’s claims were based on speculation were well founded.

Defamation

The appellant argued that although not pleaded or argued, the motion judge should have treated this as an action for defamation. As a question of law, B. F.’s remarks were not on their face capable of a defamatory meaning. Similarly, a claim in defamation against E. M. F. could not survive the absence of any evidence of defamatory statements.

Appropriation of Personality

The claim for injurious falsehood failed in the absence of any evidence of false statements by either respondent and in the absence of evidence of malice on their part. E. M. F.’s truthful statements about her own life experiences and her own choices about sexual and religious practices could not amount to an invasion of the appellant’s right to exploit her own personality. There was no evidence that E. M. F. used the appellant’s name or likeness by way of commercial exploitation.

Civil Conspiracy
The claim for civil conspiracy failed in the absence of any evidence of an agreement.

Unlawful Interference with Economic Relations
The tort of unlawful interference with economic relations is established where a plaintiff suffers economic loss resulting from a defendant’s unlawful act against a third party, intended to target the plaintiff. Here, there was no unlawful act nor a third party identified.

Negligence
The appellant did not articulate in her pleadings or argument any standard of care, any breach of that standard or damages due to negligence. There was no basis to posit a novel duty of care to support a claim in negligence.

(3) No.

The evidence that the appellant made defamatory statements about E. M. F. was overwhelming. The motion judge described the breadth of circulation, the degree of repetition and the seriousness of the harm inflicted. The defamatory statements met all three elements of defamation. First, the defamatory statements were published. Secondly, E. M. F. was clearly the target of the defamatory statements. Last, there was no question that the defamatory statements would tend to lower E. M. F.’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person.

The onus was on the appellant to establish any defence to the defamation. Given the gaps in the appellant’s evidence, the motion judge did not err in rejecting the defences of justification and fair comment. The thrust of the appellant’s campaign was that E. M. F. was dishonestly stealing the appellant’s identity, and that was not established.

The appellant also acted with the evident malice to the detriment of the respondents. The mode, style, tenor, tone, language, broad dissemination over multiple platforms, and content of the defamatory communication indicated of malice. The evidence proffered by the appellant did nothing to dispel that impression.

Given the appellant’s history of disregarding the interim order and the intentions she expressed, there was good reason to believe that absent an injunction she would continue her abusive campaign. Further, there was good reason to believe that any judgment for damages was unlikely to be recoverable. Accordingly, the injunction was not overly broad. The appellant was not restrained from speaking about the many matters that are important to her, provided she does not refer to E. M. F. This was a modest limitation on her freedom of speech, in the circumstances.

Leonard v. Zychowicz, 2022 ONCA 212

[Strathy C.J.O., Roberts and Sossin JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.A. Munro, for the appellant

A.L. Keesmaat and S.A. Bilato, for the respondent

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Capacity, Undue Influence, Suspicious Circumstances, Civil Procedure, Costs, Scott v. Cousins (2001), 37 E.T.R. (2d) 113 (Ont. S.C.), Vout v. Hay, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 876, Banks v. Goodfellow (1870), L.R. 5 Q.B. 549, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Wilton v. Koestlmaier, 2019 BCCA 262, McGrath v. Joy, 2022 ONCA 119, Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9

facts:

The appeal involved a dispute between two cousins concerning the will of their late aunt (the “Testatrix”) who died on April 4, 2011. The central issue on the application was whether the Testatrix had testamentary capacity when she executed a will on October 23, 2007 (the “Will”). The Will named the respondent as estate trustee and sole beneficiary. The appellant had been named as the estate trustee and sole beneficiary in an earlier will, made in 2002 (the “earlier Will”).

The appellant brought an application to declare the Will invalid and to require the respondent to surrender her appointment as estate trustee. She asserted that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, that the Testatrix lacked testamentary capacity as well as knowledge and approval of the Will’s contents, and that the Testatrix had been subjected to undue influence around the time she signed the Will.

The application judge dismissed the application. He found that the Will had been executed with the requisite formalities and concluded that it could be presumed that the Testatrix knew and approved of its contents. He also found that there were no suspicious circumstances raised during the preparation of the Will, nor was there evidence of undue influence. However, he was prepared to accept that there was some evidence raised by the appellant of suspicious circumstances concerning the capacity of the Testatrix, so as to put an onus on the respondent to prove testamentary capacity. After considering the evidence on capacity, the application judge found that the respondent had discharged her onus and the Will was valid.

issues:

(1) Did the application judge err in relying on the presumption of capacity to make a determination of capacity in the absence of material evidence?

(2) Should the Court grant leave to the appellant to appeal the costs award?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No.

A judge’s findings of fact based on the acceptance of expert evidence and their preference of the evidence of one expert over another is entitled to deference and should not be disturbed in the absence of a palpable and overriding error in the assessment of the evidence. The appellant demonstrated no such error.

Furthermore, the application judge’s findings of fact in relation to testamentary capacity were the product of his assessment of all of the evidence. In addition to expert evidence, there was ample evidence before the application judge to support the Testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the absence of undue influence. The evidence fully supported the application judge’s conclusions on the issue of testamentary capacity. The appellant identified no palpable and overriding error in his assessment of the evidence.

(2) No.

A court should set aside a costs award on appeal only if the judge has made an error or if the costs award is plainly wrong. The application judge did not err in requiring the appellant to pay costs, particularly having regard to his conclusion that there were no reasonable grounds upon which to question the execution of the Will or the capacity of the Testatrix. Furthermore, while it is certainly preferable to keep dockets, even where the client will not be billed until the completion of the matter, the fact that respondent’s counsel had not issued accounts, and had no dockets, was not an automatic bar to the recovery of costs. The application judge must do the best they can in such circumstances and this application judge did so.

Oliveira v. Oliveira, 2022 ONCA 218

[Rouleau, Hoy and van Rensburg JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. O., acting in person

Y. Kodsy and M. D. Wright, for the responding parties

Keywords:Civil Procedure, Appeals, Extension of Time, Contempt, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 7, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3.02(1), Hillmount Capital Inc. v. Pizale, 2021 ONCA 364, 2363523 Ontario Inc. v. Nowack, 2018 ONCA 286, Duca Community Credit Union Ltd. v. Giovannoli (2001), 142 O.A.C. 146 (C.A.), Denomme v. McArthur, 2013 ONCA 694, 36 R.F.L. (7th) 273, Leighton v. Best, 2014 ONCA 667, Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Corkery, 2009 ONCA 85, 2363523 Ontario Inc. v. Nowack, 2016 ONCA 951

facts:

The appellant did not perfect his appeal within the required time. The day after the perfection deadline, he brought a motion before a single judge of the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “chambers judge”), seeking an extension of time to perfect his appeal and other relief. The chambers judge (1) refused to grant an extension of time to perfect the appeal; (2) refused to stay the appellant’s sentencing for contempt; and (3) ordered sealed a document that was included in the appellant’s motion materials in violation of the deemed undertaking rule.

An order dated February 26, 2021 (the “Contempt Order”), was made finding the appellant in contempt of two earlier orders of the SCJ motion judge. On January 14, 2022, he was sentenced by the SCJ motion judge to an 89-day period of incarceration to be served intermittently. An order was made on March 1, 2022, extending the time to appeal and staying the order pending appeal, directing case management of that appeal, and directing the panel motion and appeal.

The appellant appealed the chambers judge’s order, the contempt order, and the order dated April 29, 2021 sentencing him to a period of incarceration. He asserted that the chambers judge erred in refusing to extend the time for his appeal and in ordering a document contained in his materials (which he refiled in his materials on the review motion) to be sealed.

issues:

(1) Should the orders of the chambers judge be overturned?

holding:

Appeal allowed in part.

reasoning:

(1) Yes.

The chambers judge erred in principle in refusing an extension of time to appeal the Contempt Order on the basis that the appeal lacked merit. The appellant was granted an extension of time to appeal the Contempt Order, and certain other orders related to the contempt proceedings.
A panel may interfere with the order under review under s. 7(2) of the Courts of Justice Act if the motion judge failed to identify the applicable principles, erred in principle, or reached an unreasonable result.

In a motion to extend time to appeal, the overriding issue is whether it is in the interests of justice in the particular circumstances to extend time. Factors the court may consider include whether the appeal has so little merit that the court could reasonably deny the important right of appeal, whether the appellant intended to appeal during the appeal period, the length of and explanation for the delay, and prejudice to the opposing party.

While the Contempt Order was made in open court on February 26, 2021, the SCJ motion judge did not provide any written reasons or endorsement. A civil contempt order is a serious matter. Without seeing the reasons for the Contempt Order, it is impossible to assess, even in a preliminary way, the merits of the proposed appeal. Moreover, a lack of reasons itself can be a ground of appeal. The chambers judge erred in dismissing the motion for an extension of time primarily on the basis that the appeal lacked merit, and by failing to consider all the circumstances.
While it is no doubt true that there was a delay, the appellant’s confusion was at least partly explained by the fact that the decision was made orally, there were no written reasons, and the respondents had not taken out a formal order.

There was no error in the decision to order sealed a document that was subject to the implied undertaking rule, and the same order was made in respect of said document, filed in the review motion.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Currie v. Nylene Canada Inc., 2022 ONCA 209

[Pepall, Brown and Thorburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

C. Richard and T. Ujjainwalla, for the appellant

M. Layton and K. Krupat, for the respondent

Keywords: Employment Law, Wrongful Dismissal, Reasonable Notice, Break in Service, Pension, Bardal v. The Globe and Mail Ltd. (1960), 24 D.L.R. (2d) 140 (Ont. H.C.), Lowndes v. Summit Ford Sales Ltd. (2006), 206 O.A.C. 55 (C.A), Dawe v. The Equitable Life Insurance Company of Canada, 2019 ONCA 512

1750738 Ontario Inc. c. 1750714 Ontario Inc., 2022 ONCA 215

[van Rensburg, Benotto and Thorburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. G. Saikaley, G. Poliquin, and M-P. Dupont, for the appellants

S. C. Reitano, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Oral Agreements, Essential Terms, Specific Performance, Civil Procedure, Costs, Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c. C.=43, ss. 131(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 57.01(1), TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. v. Potter Station Power Ltd. Partnership , (2002), 20 CPC (5th) 382 (SCJ), City Front Developments Inc. c. Toronto District School Board (2007), 285 DLR (4th)), Loretto v. Little (costs), 2010 ONSC 5993, Boucher c. Accountants Council of the Province of Ontario (2004), 71 OR (3d) 291

Daly v. NYX Tannery Ltd., 2022 ONCA 213

[van Rensburg, Nordheimer and Harvison Young JJ.A]

Counsel:

G. Grenier, for the moving party

J. Daly, acting in person

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Amending Pleadings, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory, Costs, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 34, ss.19(1)(c), 19(1.2)(a), 133(b)

Caja Paraguyaya De Jubilaciones Y Pensiones Del Personal De Itaipu Binacional v. Obregon , 2022 ONCA 225

[van Rensburg, Nordheimer and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Anisman, for the appellant, A.D.

J. D. Vellis and J. King, for the respondents

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Injunctions, Non-Dissipation Orders, Contempt, Caja Paraguaya de Jubilaciones Y Pensiones Del Personal De Itaipu Binacional v. Garcia, 2018 ONSC 5379

11534599 Canada Corp. v. Hume, 2022 ONCA 224

van Rensburg, Nordheimer and Harvison Young JJ.A.

Counsel:

P. Robson, for the moving party

E. S. Peritz, for the responding parties

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Appeals

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.