COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (SEPTEMBER 14 – SEPTEMBER 18)

By John Polyzogopoulos on September 18, 2026

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Good afternoon.
Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of September 14, 2026.

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In Knauff v. Ontario (Human Rights Tribunal), the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the moving party’s application for leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that had refused to judicially review the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario’s ruling that ethical veganism did not constitute a “creed” under the Human Rights Code. The case was rendered moot after the moving party and his employer, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry, entered into Minutes of Settlement resolving his discrimination claim, and the Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the matter despite the mootness. The significance of this decision is that the Court constituted a five-member panel and took the opportunity to reconsider and update the longstanding Sault Dock framework governing leave to appeal from the Divisional Court. The Court confirmed that the key consideration remains whether the proposed appeal raises an arguable question of law or mixed law and fact that is of sufficient public importance, while eliminating the prior distinction between appeals from the Divisional Court’s original versus appellate jurisdiction. Applying this updated framework, the Court concluded that the moving party’s challenge amounted to a straightforward application of mootness principles and did not raise an arguable question of public importance and dismissed the motion for leave to appeal. This is now the leading case on seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from Divisional Court decisions.

In Jakupovic v. Intact Insurance Company, the Court allowed an insurer’s appeal and restored the Licence Appeal Tribunal’s decision denying accident benefits for late reporting. The Court held that the Divisional Court erred in its interpretation of s. 32(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule. The Court found that s. 32(1) unambiguously requires an insured person to notify their insurer of an intention to claim accident benefits and that merely reporting a motor vehicle accident without more does not satisfy that obligation.

In Tridelta Fixed Income Fund v. GTA Mixed-Use Developments GP Inc., the Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal from a motion judge’s order requiring him and the corporate defendants to pay costs as a sanction for being in contempt of court and disallowing set-off against the costs payable by the respondents. The Court found that the motion judge did not err in respect of any of the grounds claimed by the appellant, highlighting that the appellant in fact obtained a Charter remedy, namely the exclusion of evidence, which narrowed the scope of the conduct for which he could be punished at the sanction hearing.

Other topics covered this week included stay pending a proposed appeal to the Supreme Court from an order for security for costs of an appeal, as well as the refusal of an extension of time to appeal in a family law matter.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Civil Decisions

Knauff v. Ontario (Human Rights Tribunal), 2026 ONCA 653

Keywords: Human Rights, Constitutional Law, Freedom from Discrimination, Creed, Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Civil Procedure, Settlements, Mootness, Appeals, Leave to Appeal, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 6(1)(a), s. 19, Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 255, Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1, s. 6(1), Partition Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.4, s. 7, Construction Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. C.30, s. 71, Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sched G., s. 11, Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 49.38, Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 10, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35, Re Sault Dock Co. Ltd. and City of Sault Ste. Marie, [1973] 2 O.R. 479 (C.A.), West Whitby Landowners Group Inc. v. Elexicon Energy Inc., 2024 ONCA 910, Davis v. Aviva General Insurance Company, 2024 ONCA 944, Re United Glass & Ceramic Workers of North America, [1973] 2 O.R. 763 (C.A.), Iness v. Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp. (2002), 62 O.R. (3d) 255 (C.A.), Stoicevski v. Casement (1983), 43 O.R. (2d) 436 (C.A.), Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8, Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, Lawrence v. Peel Regional Police Force, 2011 CarswellOnt 13766, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Lamba v. Mitchell, 2022 ONCA 164, Kirpichova v. Galaxy Real Estate Core Ontario LP, 2024 ONCA 843, Schram v. Linwood Management Corporation, 2025 ONCA 337, Reid v. College of Chiropractors of Ontario, 2016 ONCA 779, Bajouco v. Green, 2017 ONCA 493, Lumaj v. St. Michael’s Hospital, 2022 ONCA 140, 828343 Ontario Inc. v. Demshe Forge Inc., 2022 ONCA 412, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, R. v. J.F., 2022 SCC 17, R. v. Salifu, 2023 ONCA 590, Kaiman v. Graham, 2009 ONCA 77, Ontario (Health Insurance Plan) v. K.S., 2025 ONCA 306, Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board), 2013 SCC 19, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Andrew Bernstein & Stefan Case, “Ontario Court of Appeal positions itself to hear more administrative law appeals” (16 December 2024), Cory Giordano, “Test for Leave: The End of Sault Dock?” (17 December 2024), Patricia Hughes, “Tension on the Ontario CA: Thwarting a Judicial Coup?” (7 January 2025), Lerners, “Judicial Joust: Court of Appeal Perspectives on Leave to Appeal” (19 February 2025)

Jakupovic v. Intact Insurance Company, 2026 ONCA 65

Keywords: Contracts, Insurance, Coverage, Motor Vehicle, Statutory Accident Benefits, Statutory Interpretation, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Standard of Review, Correctness, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, ss. 268(1), 258, 258.1(1), 258.3(1), Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, s. 11(1), 11(6), Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010, O. Reg. 34/10, ss. 32(1), 34, License Appeal Tribunal Rules, r. 18, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company v. Ridi, 2022 ONCA 564, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, R. v. Nguyen, 2026 SCC 10, Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2025 SCC 15, R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9, Tomec v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 882, Clouthier v. Co-Operators General Insurance, 2025 ONSC 6798, Zuchelkowski v. Zenith Insurance Co., 2024 ONSC 3512

Tridelta Fixed Income Fund v. GTA Mixed-Use Developments GP Inc., 2026 ONCA 645

Keywords: Partnerships, Limited Partnerships, Civil Procedure, Documentary Production, Orders, Enforcement, Contempt, Charter Rights, Right Against Self-Incrimination, , Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7 and 11(d), Rules of Civil Procedure, r 60.11(6), R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, R. v. Brunelle, 2024 SCC 3, Susin v. Susin, 2014 ONCA 733, Peoples Trust Company v. PSP Services Inc., 2025 ONCA 524

Yenovkian v. Shirtliff-Hinds Professional Corporation, 2026 ONCA 650

Keywords: Contracts, Solicitor and Client, Civil Procedure, Settlements, Enforcement, Appeals, Reviews, Security for Costs, Stay Pending Appeal, Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 65.1(2), Yenovkian v. Shirtliff-Hinds Professional Corporation, 2026 ONCA 366, Yenovkian v. Shirtliff-Hinds Professional Corporation, 2026 ONCA 588, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1 S.C.R. 311, BTR Global Opportunity Trading Limited v. RBC Dexia Investor Services Trust, 2011 ONCA 620, Livent Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche, 2016 ONCA 395, Wiseau Studio, LLC v. Harper, 2021 ONCA 504

Scharf v. Crowder, 2026 ONCA 647

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Extension of Time, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Petrisor v. Ramani, 2026 ONCA 520, Issai v. Rosenzweig, 2011 ONCA 112, Kideckel v. Kideckel, 2025 ONCA 787

Short Civil Decisions

Lower William Properties Ltd. v. Santaguida, 2026 ONCA 658

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Third Party Claims, Limitation Periods, Ultimate Limitation Period

McNeill v. Phillips, 2026 ONCA 652

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Duty of Care, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Procedural Fairness, Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sched. A, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 21.01(1)(b), 21.02(2)(b)

Wolf v. Wolf, 2026 ONCA 649

Keywords: Family Law, Child Support, Spousal Support, Arrears, Imputed Income, Property, Equalization of Net Family Property, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 5(6), Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, Halliwell v. Halliwell, 2017 ONCA 349, Berta v. Berta, 2017 ONCA 874, R.L. v. M.F., 2025 ONCA 595

CIVIL DECISIONS

Knauff v. Ontario (Human Rights Tribunal), 2026 ONCA 653

[Zarnett, Thorburn, Favreau, Monahan, and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

W. Poziomka, N. Papageorge and J. Zukowski, for the moving party

S.Z. Green, for the responding party His Majesty the King as represented by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry

S. Choudhry and M. Kakkar, for the interveners The Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario, Animal Justice, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Centre for Free Expression, Democracy Watch, and the Income Security Advocacy Centre

K. Mitchell and A. Pester, for the intervener Animal Justice

facts:

The moving party adheres to ethical veganism and alleges that his employer, the Ministry of Natural Resources (the “Ministry”), failed to provide vegan meals while he was on active duty as a forest firefighter. The moving party claims that in doing so, the Ministry discriminated against him in employment on the basis of creed, contrary to the Human Rights Code (the “Code”).

The moving party applied for a remedy before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (the “Tribunal”). Prior to the Tribunal deciding on the preliminary issue, the moving party and the Ministry entered into Minutes of Settlement (the “Minutes”) that resolved the moving parties claim. The Minutes provided that the settlement would take effect after, but regardless of the outcome of, the Tribunal’s decision on the preliminary issue. They acknowledged that the moving party continued to seek a decision as to whether ethical veganism constituted a creed under the Code and purported to reserve either party’s right to seek judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision on the preliminary issue when rendered.

The Tribunal adjudicator was not aware of the settlement until after she issued a decision on the preliminary issue. She decided that the moving party’s ethical veganism did not constitute a creed and therefore his application was dismissed as outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

The moving party then began an application in the Divisional Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decisions. The Divisional Court dismissed the judicial review application on the basis that the matter was moot because in the Minutes, the moving party withdrew his applications for substantive relief that he had filed with the tribunal. Even if the decision on the preliminary issue was found to be unreasonable, the matter could not be remitted to the Tribunal. The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to judicially review the determination of the preliminary issue despite it being moot. On this motion, the moving party sought leave to appeal the Divisional Court’s decision to the Court of Appeal.

issues:

1. Should the Sault Dock framework for granting leave to appeal from decisions of the Divisional Court be updated?

a. Should the updated framework apply uniformly to all applications for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court, regardless of whether the Divisional Court exercised original or appellate jurisdiction?

2. Does the moving party’s application for leave to appeal raise any arguable question of law or mixed law and fact of sufficient public importance to warrant consideration by the Court of Appeal?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

For over 50 years, the primary guidance on applications for leave to appeal from decisions of the Divisional Court has been Re Sault Dock Co. Ltd and City of Sault Ste. Marie. The Sault Dock decision provided the following three aspects:

First, it identified the overarching consideration on an application seeking leave to appeal from a Divisional Court decision as the importance of the question in issue viewed from the perspective of the development of Ontario law and the interest of the public, rather than from the perspective of the parties. “If the resolution of the question would largely have significance only to the parties and would not settle for the future a question of general interest to the public or a broad segment of the public, the requirement to obtain leave will not have been met” (Sault Dock para 480-481).

Second, Sault Dock indicated that the question on which leave is sought must be arguable, providing a short, non-exhaustive list of examples of cases that, if arguable, might merit leave. These examples include: (a) the interpretation of a statute or Regulation of Canada or Ontario including its constitutionality; (b) the interpretation, clarification or propounding of some general rule or principle of law; (c) the interpretation of a municipal by-law where the point in issue is a question of public importance; and (d) the interpretation of an agreement where the point in issue involves a question of public importance.

Third, Sault Dock briefly described a residual category of cases that might merit leave, even if they fell outside of the examples listed. These different types of cases are: (i) where “special circumstances” make the matter one of public importance; (ii) where “special circumstances” require that leave be granted in the “interest of justice … such as the introduction of new evidence, obvious misapprehension … of the relevant facts or a clear departure from the established principles of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice”; and (iii) to correct a clear error, even though the possibility of an error in the Divisional Court’s decision would not generally, on its own, justify granting leave.

The West Whitby case expressed concern about the Sault Dock test, and the court proposed a re-articulated lens. However, two weeks later, in Davis, a different panel expressed that West Whitby did not change the Sault Dock test.

1. Yes.

Sault Dock should be updated for four reasons. First, the changes to the legal landscape call into question the utility of the list of examples given in Sault Dock, especially, if parties ignore its non-exhaustive nature and view it as rigid. The first two examples provided ((a) and (b)) shed light on the meaning of public importance, while the other two ((c) and (d)) do not. The Court did not provide reasons for these other two examples, which has left parties without an evolving body of case law illuminating how the Court determines the public importance of a question that does not neatly fit into one of Sault Dock’s first two examples. Second, the Court did not elaborate on the consideration of a lack of an arguable question as a basis for denying applications for leave to appeal or how it interacted with public importance. Third, the residual category has never been fully developed. Fourth, the uncertainty over whether there is a single framework for applications for leave to appeal, or one that distinguishes between cases arising from exercises of the Divisional Court’s original jurisdiction and its appellate jurisdiction, should be settled.

The key consideration in the updated framework for an application for leave to appeal from any decision of the Divisional Court is whether the proposed appeal raises an arguable question of law or mixed law and fact that is of sufficient public importance to warrant consideration by the Court of Appeal. The components of the updated framework are accordingly arguability and public importance. These are separate but overlapping concepts.

Arguability focuses on whether there is a real, arguable question of law or mixed law and fact to be debated between the parties arising in the circumstances of the case. It does not require a determination that the appeal will necessarily succeed or will result in a different outcome than the one reached by the Divisional Court. But it does require that there be a real issue for appeal that then can be assessed for its public importance. This must be determined before proceeding to consider public importance because a question that is important in the abstract, or that would be important in different circumstances or on a different record, will not be one of public importance in the necessary sense if it does not arise as an arguable question in the case at hand.

There is no finite or closed category of question that can qualify as being of public importance. The underlying principle is that the public importance component of the framework strikes a balance between two considerations that pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, recourse beyond a determination by the Divisional Court is limited, not automatic, as the legislature imposed a leave requirement rather than creating a right of appeal and questions of fact alone are not appealable. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal has the responsibility to “monitor, clarify, and develop the jurisprudence of Ontario”, which necessarily involves considering some matters already decided by the Divisional Court.

Public importance is assessed from two perspectives. The first asks who would be affected by a disposition of the question, and how they would be affected. The second has to do with how the law of Ontario is affected by a disposition of the arguable question. This perspective focuses less on who beyond the parties might, in the near term, be impacted by a disposition of the issue, and more on the legal importance of the question. These two perspectives will overlap with each other and may also overlap with the consideration that the question must be arguable. Although Sault Dock suggested the severity and effect of the alleged error in the Divisional Court might in exceptional cases warrant granting leave, a special category for such cases is also unnecessary.

a. Yes.

The same framework for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal should apply to all decisions of the Divisional Court. There is no need to retain a notational distinction between the approach to leave to appeal in cases where the Divisional Court exercised original jurisdiction and those in which it exercised appellate jurisdiction. Whether leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is granted should be a function of the nature of the question arising from the Divisional Court’s decision, not how the case got to the Divisional Court in the first place. The principles that inform any difference in approach are dubious. Nor can it be said that the type of jurisdiction exercised by the Divisional Court is any indicator of when further appellate recourse from its decisions is more likely justified.

2. No.

The moving party’s request for leave to appeal must be dismissed. The proposed appeal involved the application of the well-established and undisputed test for mootness from Borowski v Canada (Attorney General). The Divisional Court correctly identified the legal test for mootness. It found that, as the underlying dispute between the moving party and his employer had been settled, the judicial review application was moot. The Divisional Court recognized that it had the discretion to nonetheless hear the challenge but refused to exercise its discretion to do so. The challenge to such a discretionary decision did not raise an arguable question of public importance.

Jakupovic v. Intact Insurance Company, 2026 ONCA 651

[Miller, Wilson, and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Lin and S. Mehta, for the appellant

A.M. Voudouris and V. Liang, for the respondent

R. El-Tawil and L. A. Cullen, for the intervener, Ontario Trial Lawyers Association

facts:

The respondent was involved in a motor vehicle accident on February 19, 2019. He reported the accident and property damage to his vehicle to the appellant insurer the following day and on multiple occasions since, but did not advise the insurer of his intention to claim accidents benefit until December 12, 2020, when he submitted an Application for Accident Benefits.

The appellant initially approved the respondent’s application for benefits but later notified the respondent that it was terminating his entitlement to benefits due to late reporting.

The respondent applied to the License Appeal Tribunal (“LAT”) for dispute resolution. The Adjudicator determined that the respondent failed to comply with s. 32(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (“SABS”) because he failed to notify the appellant within seven days of his intention to claim accident benefits. The respondent sought a reconsideration but that request was dismissed.

The respondent then appealed the decisions of the LAT to the Divisional Court. The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that by reporting the accident, the respondent complied with s. 32(1) of the SABS.

This appeal involves the appellant’s appeal from the Divisional Court’s decision to allow the appeal from the LAT’s decisions.

issues:

1. What was the standard of review?

2. Did the Divisional Court err in its interpretation of s. 32(1) of the SABS?

3. Did the Divisional Court err by exceeding the scope of proper appellate review and finding its own facts?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

1. The standard of review was correctness, as the appeal involved the interpretation of sections of the SABS.

2. Yes.

The Court rejected the respondent and intervener’s position that once an accident is reported, insurers have an obligation to make inquiries of the insured to determine whether they sustained injuries and intend to claim benefits.

The Court emphasized that courts are not to adopt meanings that are at odds with the actual language of the statute and that interpretation of statutes requires that words be read in their entire context and in their ordinary sense, in accordance with the scheme and object of the Act and the intention of parliament.

The Court found that s. 32(1) of the SABS is not ambiguous nor reasonably capable of supporting more than one meaning. There was no basis for the Divisional Court to conclude that s. 32(1) requires an insurer to assume that an insured will be making a claim for SABS once notified of a motor vehicle accident. Instead, the legislature has made a clear distinction between notice that an incident has occurred and notice of intention to claim benefits, as illustrated by s. 258 of the Insurance Act.

Although the Court agreed with the respondent and intervener that the SABS is consumer protection legislation, it held that the Divisional Court erred by focusing its analysis on this rather than following the established principles of statutory interpretation.

3. Yes.

The appeal to the Divisional Court was on a question of law only, but the Divisional Court made findings of fact that went far beyond its consideration of the provisions of s. 32(1) and which were contrary to the findings of fact made by the LAT.

Tridelta Fixed Income Fund v. GTA Mixed-Use Developments GP Inc., 2026 ONCA 645

[Roberts, Favreau, and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Enenajor, H. Gunter, C. Rempel, and K. Glowach, for the appellant M.M.T.

C.P. Naudie and L. Tomasich, for the respondents

facts:

The appellant, M.M.T., is the principal of three companies that were involved in a limited partnership (“LPs”) governance dispute with the respondents. The respondents started an action to take control of the LPs from the appellant’s companies (the defendants). The appellant was not named as a defendant in the proceedings.

At trial, the respondents succeeded and obtained declarations changing the governance of the LPs, production orders and an order requiring the defendants to provide an accounting (“Trial Order”). Almost a month after the Trial Order was made, the defendants’ documentary disclosure was insufficient. The parties attended a case conference with the motion judge in November 2023, who reiterated the need for the defendants to comply with their disclosure obligations and provided directions. The motion judge also directed Yale PGC LLP, the defendants’ and LPs’ accountant (“Yale”), to produce certain records to the respondents (“Yale productions”). The defendants did not comply with the motion judge’s directions at the case conference. Consequently, the respondents brought a contempt motion to enforce the Trial Order (“Contempt Motion”), relying on r. 60.11(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) to bring the appellant within the scope of the contempt proceedings as the defendants’ sole officer, director, shareholder, and directing mind.

The parties appeared before the motion judge on the Contempt Motion on January 5, 2024. The motion judge found that the defendants had not complied with the Trial Order because they had not turned over certain financial records. The motion judge ordered the parties to return on January 25, 2024, and gave the appellant and defendants an opportunity to purge their contempt by delivering the outstanding documents by January 22, 2024. The motion judge also ordered the respondents to deliver the Yale productions to the defendants by January 10, 2024. Both the defendants and respondents complied with these orders.

At the January 25, 2024 appearance before the motion judge, the defendants delivered a preliminary notice of motion to stay the Contempt Motion based on their allegations that the respondents had breached the appellant’s and defendants’ Charter rights in prosecuting the contempt proceedings, and as a result, the contempt hearing was adjourned (“Charter Motion”).

The court held a combined hearing on the Contempt Motion and Charter Motion on May 30, 2024. The motion judge did not grant a stay of proceedings, finding that the defendants had not met the high “clearest of cases” threshold required to warrant a stay in R v Brunelle. Instead, she excluded any evidence that the court determined was derived from the Yale productions. The motion judge found that the respondents’ non-disclosure of the Yale productions breached ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, specifically the rights against self-incrimination, to make full answer and defence, and to a fair hearing regarding the alleged contempt. The defendants were found liable for civil contempt and the appellant personally liable under r. 60.11(6) of the Rules. The motion judge held that the non-compliance she had found at the Contempt Motion involved an intentional narrow interpretation of, and failure to comply with, the Trial Order by withholding records. The motion judge dismissed two allegations of contempt relating to an alleged trust and withholding of various records, both of which relied on the excluded evidence.

The respondents requested their full-indemnity costs on the Contempt Motion as a sanction for contempt (“Sanction Motion”). The defendants argued that no costs should be awarded to either side, and in the alternative, asked that their success on the Charter Motion offset any costs award to the respondents on the Contempt Motion. The motion judge found that the appellant and defendants flagrantly disregarded the court’s process by adopting a disingenuously narrow interpretation of the Trial Order, and the contemnors were given many opportunities to remedy their non-compliance before the contempt hearing but chose not to comply.

The motion judge awarded the respondents full indemnity costs on the Contempt Motion and the Sanction Motion, payable by the defendants and the appellant. She reduced the full indemnity costs claimed by the respondents by 25% to reflect the amount of time the respondents spent to obtain, review, and make submissions about the excluded evidence. She also awarded full indemnity costs of the Charter motion in favour of the defendants but excluded the appellant from entitlement to these costs as he had not been named as a party on that motion. The motion judge refused to allow the appellant any set-off against the respondents’ cost awards. She found that there was no mutuality of debts because the appellant was not a party to the Charter Motion. Further, and more importantly, it was not just and equitable for the costs awarded as a sanction for contempt to be diluted by any other costs awards; rather, that sanction should stand on its own. The contemnors had already benefitted from the exclusion of evidence as a Charter remedy.

The appellant appealed against the motion judge’s order requiring him and the defendants to pay the respondents $456,708.58 in costs for the contempt of court sanction and disallowing set-off against the costs payable by the respondents.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err by failing to recognize that the s. 7 Charter breaches she found could only have been committed against the appellant personally and thus related to his rights and not those of the defendants?

2. Did the motion judge err by not considering the exclusion of evidence when determining the scope of contempt and the fitness of the sanction, thereby rendering the Charter remedy that the motion judge had earlier granted “illusory” and by rejecting the argument that the contempt findings represented mixed success and, in doing so, stripping the exclusion of evidence of any remedial value?

3. Did the motion judge err in refusing to include the appellant in the costs awarded to the defendants for the successful Charter motion and in disallowing set-off against the costs payable by the respondents?

4. Should the appellant’s request for an Order finding that, to the extent that the court below found that the respondents breached the defendants’ s. 7 Charter rights against self-incrimination, right to make full answer and defence and right to a fair hearing, those breaches related to the appellant’s individual s. 7 Charter rights and not the rights of the corporate defendants be granted?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No.

The motion judge did not fail to recognize that the appellant’s s. 7 Charter rights had been violated.

The motion judge based on her finding that the appellant’s and defendants’ ss. 7 and 11(d) Charter rights had been breached, granted the defendants’ requested alternative remedy of exclusion of evidence, which benefitted both the appellant and defendants by limiting the scope of conduct for which they were found guilty and could be punished for at the sanction hearing.

The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the motion judge fell into reversible error by misunderstanding that only his Charter rights were in issue. The appellant and defendants made no such distinction before the motion judge. Rather they argued that the contemnors collectively suffered breaches of their ss. 7 and 11(d) Charter rights, including a breach of the s. 7 Charter right against self-incrimination. Any misstatement as to whose right against self-incrimination was violated was of no moment because the appellant benefitted from the finding: the motion judge dismissed two of the contempt allegations on that basis. The Court found that it was within the motion judge’s discretion to not grant a sentence reduction.

2. No.

The Court held that the remedy was not illusory, nor was it stripped of its remedial value.

The Court found that the appellant and defendants did receive a benefit from the exclusion of evidence. The Court found that the motion judge explicitly considered the exclusion of evidence when determining the scope of the contempt when she reduced the respondents’ full indemnity costs by 25% “to ensure that costs are not awarded in respect of work done that was tainted by the court’s finding of Charter breaches on the Stay Motion.”

Far from rendering the remedy illusory or stripping it of remedial value, the motion judge quantified that remedy’s impact on the ultimate sanction.

3. No.

The motion judge did not err in refusing to include the appellant in the costs awarded to the defendants for the successful Charter motion and by disallowing any set off against the costs sanction. There was no basis to interfere with her discretionary decision to refuse to permit the appellant to lower the contempt sanction through set-off.

The motion judge did not award costs in favour of the appellant on the Charter Motion because he was not named as a moving party in the notice of motion.

The Court agreed with the motion judge’s decision that it would not be just and equitable for the costs awarded as a sanction for contempt to be diluted by other costs awards. The Court found that this was a sufficient basis to deny the appellant any costs of the successful Charter Motion.

A court imposing a penalty for contempt of court has a broad discretion to craft the appropriate sanction, and because this is a discretionary decision, the court will not interfere unless the sentence is clearly unfit or the reasons disclose an error in principle. The Court accordingly found that the appellant had not established any basis for appellate intervention and ultimately held that the sanction imposed was a just and appropriate sanction for the nature of the appellant’s contempt.

4. No.

The Court refused to grant the appellant’s requested order.

While the appellant was right to say that only he could have a s. 7 Charter right against self-incrimination, he was seeking to vary an order that he did not appeal and relief he did not request in his notice of appeal. Moreover, given that the appellant obtained a remedy for the breach of his s. 7 Charter rights, the requested relief would serve no practical purpose.

Yenovkian v. Shirtliff-Hinds Professional Corporation, 2026 ONCA 650

[Monahan J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

V.Y., acting in person

R.B.M., for the responding party

facts:

The moving party, V.Y., sought a stay of a decision of a panel of the Court upholding the order of Thorburn J.A. that he post security for costs, pending the determination of a leave to appeal application that he intends to file with the Supreme Court of Canada.

In July 2018, V.Y. retained Shirtliff-Hinds Professional Corporation (“SHPC”) in a family law proceeding in which he was seeking custody of his two children. V.Y.’s motion for custody was unsuccessful and shortly thereafter, SHPC terminated the retainer. V.Y. obtained an order for the assessment of SHPC’s fees under the Solicitors Act. Before the assessment hearing took place, the parties negotiated a settlement. V.Y. subsequently refused to sign a release which was a term of the settlement. A conference was conducted on November 13, 2025, where the case conference judge issued an order enforcing the settlement.

V.Y. appealed the conference judge’s order, following which SHPC brought a motion seeking security for costs. Thorburn J.A. ordered V.Y. to post security for costs on the basis that his appeal was frivolous and vexatious, and he had not demonstrated that he had assets in the province. She also stayed his appeal pending compliance with the security for costs order and granted SHPC leave to move without notice to dismiss the appeal if security for costs was not posted. V.Y. sought a panel review of the Security for Costs Order, but that motion was dismissed and he was given seven days to post security.

issues:

Should the Panel Review Order be stayed pending V.Y.’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

No.

V.Y. failed to satisfy the legal test required to stay an order pending a motion for leave to the Supreme Court of Canada. This test is the three-factor inquiry established in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) namely, (1) a preliminary assessment must be made of the merits of the case to ensure that there is a serious question to be tried; (2) it must be determined whether the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the application were refused; and (3) an assessment must be made as to which of the parties would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of the remedy pending a decision on the merits.

V.Y. did not meet the first factor. Even though the threshold for assessing if there is a serious issue to be tried is low, since V.Y. was seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the “serious issue to be tried” factor must be assessed considering the Supreme Court only grants leave where the proposed appeal raises an issue of public or national importance. The Court found no issue of public or national importance. Thorburn J.A. applied the correct legal principles in ordering security for costs, and her decision was a discretionary one predicated on the facts in this case.

V.Y. did not demonstrate he would suffer irreparable harm if he complied with the Security for Costs Order. V.Y. claimed the Order was “punitive” because he would be required to liquidate investments and therefore be deprived of earning returns while posting funds for security. V.Y. also claimed he would suffer irreparable harm because his appeal may be dismissed if he failed to post security. The Court made clear that irreparable harm constitutes harm that “either cannot be quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured:” RJR-Macdonald. V.Y.’s argument that he would suffer irreparable harm because his appeal may be dismissed if he failed to satisfy the security costs order was misconceived. Irreparable harm in this context is harm that would result if he complied with the order, not if he violated it. The Court found no merit to V.Y.’s arguments.

The Court concluded that the balance of convenience also favoured denial of the stay motion. Thorburn J.A. found that V.Y.’s appeal was frivolous and vexatious, which was upheld by the panel that dismissed his review motion.

Scharf v. Crowder, 2026 ONCA 647

[Paciocco, Sossin, and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

T.S.C, acting in person

S. Kirby, for the responding party

facts:

The moving party, TC, missed the deadline for filing an appeal from financial orders arising from the breakdown of his marriage to the responding party. The motion judge denied TC’s motion to extend the time for filing his proposed appeal.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge commit a legal error by ruling on the merits of the appeal?

2. Did the motion judge err by concluding that the moving party did not refer to any specific documents in support of his motion?

3. Did the motion judge err by failing to recognize arguable issues raised by the moving party relating to procedural failings which made his trial unfair?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No.

The motion judge did not rule on the merits of the proposed appeal. A judge rules on the merits of an appeal when they base their decision on how they themselves would resolve the appeal. In this case, she determined, in substance, that the appeal was so lacking in merit that there was no realistic prospect that any judge could allow the appeal. That decision was an appropriate determination by the motion judge relevant to whether it was in the interests of justice to grant the extension and entertain the appeal: Issai v. Rosenzweig; Kideckel v. Kideckel.

Accordingly, the Court held that there was no point in permitting the late filing of an appeal that had no realistic prospect of succeeding. The was particularly the case where family litigation has been protracted and acrimonious, as was the case in this instance.

2. No.

The motion judge did not proceed under the misapprehension that TC had not referred to any specific documents. On the record, it was clear the motion judge was aware that TC had referred to specific documents. She was not obliged to identify and address each of the specific documents that TC referred to before her. Further, there was no indication that she ignored or misapprehended his submissions. Rather, the motion judge stated that TC did not refer to any specific documents relating to the valuation of the pension.

3. No.

The motion judge was entitled to find that TC failed to show that there was merit to his ground of appeal that his mother had not been served personally. Documentation put before the motion judge showed that personal service occurred. Although this service was not accomplished within the timeline set out in the Gordon J. Order, there was no basis for apprehending that the late service had any impact on the outcome. TC’s mother attended on the first day of the trial and raised no objection to not having been served, nor did TC.

Relatedly, the Court noted that the fact that TC’s mother, a party, left when witnesses were excluded from the courtroom, does not provide a viable ground for appeal, absent evidence that she was specifically directed to leave. Indeed, even with such evidence, this would only provide grounds for appeal to TC’s mother, not TC.

Furthermore, the motion judge was entitled to suggest that the motion record was deficient. While the proceeding that was before the motion judge was a motion for an extension, not an appeal, TC bore the burden of showing that it was in the interests of justice to grant the extension. He failed to do because the foundation for his appeal remained vague and the errors he claimed were neither supported by the record nor shown to potentially matter.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Lower William Properties Ltd. v. Santaguida, 2026 ONCA 658

[van Rensburg, Dawe, and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P. Ghosh and J. Zeppieri, for the appellant

J.T. MacQuarrie, for the respondents

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Third Party Claims, Limitation Periods, Ultimate Limitation Period

McNeill v. Phillips, 2026 ONCA 652

[Miller, Trotter, and Copeland JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S.R. Sanyal, for the appellant

M. Zatovkanuk, for the respondent

Wolf v. Wolf, 2026 ONCA 649

[Thorburn, Coroza, and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N. Wilson, for the appellant

T.L. Simionati and B.M. Thompson, for the respondent

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email